[peirce-l] Christop Koch's science / religion paper
For those curious about the paper I mentioned previously - you can find it here : http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/religion-06.pdf With respect, Steven --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Dear Patrick, My thanks for your interesting response. At the start of the 20th Century it was, perhaps, still acceptable for Peirce and Whitehead to contend that "that holding religious beliefs and maintaining a responsible and coherent scientific attitude were fully compatible with one another." Although, Whitehead was more committed to this view and I suspect that Peirce would have been easily persuaded from it. At the start of the 21st Century I see no good cause for accepting it, if by it we mean adhering to the religious conventions of the past in any form. Hypotheses are one of two classes of merit. The first are the useful hypotheses. They are constructive and they make falsifiable predictions - they are those that Popper and Peirce would seek. The second class, all other hypotheses, are those that are not constructive and do not make falsifiable predictions. Science pursues the former and rapidly dismisses the latter. It is certainly foolish today to base research programs and public science expenditure on premises that clearly fall into the latter class - as is happening today in the USA and EU. The provisional nature of scientific hypothesis does not excuse or condone the acceptance of hypotheses clearly of the second kind - and the "market of ideas" is not served by including them. A belief in God by any inherited convention falls manifestly into the second class. Even if the proposed God turned up and said "I did it" this would still not be science since a priori predictions based on the premise are not falsifiable. Science simply cannot take God's word for it. If there is such a God then science is simply a pragmatic understanding God's will. This view would still not excuse the intellectual laziness that is the invention of emergence and identity theories - or change the irrational nature of an intuition that a God exists in the first place. It does not block inquiry to insist on sound premises and good reason. This is not to say that there is not something unknown and equally remarkable about the universe. But if there is, and I certainly believe that there is in the unexplained presence of experience in the world, then it is for science to discover. My reference to Christophe Koch is meant with the greatest respect - I admire what he has written and that he has written openly about his beliefs. And my observation remains a valid one. Scientists that adhere to any conventional notion of God, of there being something "extra" to the universe beyond science, are necessarily predisposed to accept the magic of today's emergence and identity theories. Mid 20th century logicians threw the baby out with the bath water by ignoring experience and not taking it seriously as a phenomenon (as Peirce did). Their dismissal of it has left a hole that has been filled by the very same irrational propositions they sought to counter. With respect, Steven Patrick Coppock wrote: Hi Steven, --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick, I'm don't know what in my post you're replying to. I don't keep my posts, so I can't be sure, but I don't recall mentioning an "expression continuum," "segments" or "meaning continuum." I may have; I sometimes think I only think I know what I say or mean. My post (I think) had to do with the confusion/conflation of independent processes. If that's what you're doing in your last paragraph, quit it! (I don't have any of those smiley gadget to put here.) Cheers, Bill - Original Message - From: "Patrick Coppock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Cc: "Bill Bailey" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 10:46 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! Hi Bill, you wrote: I think it is not very useful to speak of signs as existing in the same process as existential objects, but if we must, perhaps we can say, "Yes, signs exist, but much faster than objects do." Well yes I guess so. The sign function may be construed (rather simplistically) as an event where some "segment" of "expression continuum" is perceived as entering into, or being brought into, relation with some "segment" of "meaning continuum". If we are considering any kind of culturally contingent sign processes we normally will have to try and take into account the varying amounts of time and energy consumption and different forms of effort that are associated with our semiotic "use" of the many different possible forms and mediums of expression that may be brought into play during the course of sign production and interpretation processes. Thought is just one of these. Thoughts flash by, words take longer to speak, and even longer to write down - especially if we want others to understand what they are supposed to mean. The production of cinema, theatre and ballet performances, each will have their own specific time and energy consumption requirements. Diagrams, sketches and pictures written on paper have their own time and energy consumption requirements, "digital" variants of the same objects theirs. But it seems to me that if we adopt a process perspective on semiosis, what becomes central is that the "existence" of both signs and objects becomes conceivable of as a transient form of "reality" (of varying durability and speed), and it also seems feasible that the inherent transience of signs and objects, and the various types of transitivity that may be attributed to them in the course of the (intersubjective, or other) negotiation of their potential meanings in different situations and contexts must be closely interrelated aspects of this "reality" and/or "existence". Best regards Patrick -- Patrick J. Coppock Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences University of Modena and Reggio Emilia Reggio Emilia Italy phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] www: http://coppock-violi.com/work/ faculty: http://www.cei.unimore.it the voice: http://morattiddl.blogspot.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.8/380 - Release Date: 6/30/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Re Crick and Koch and their theories of consciousness: What Koch
actually says in his recent book is "that consciousness emerges from
neuronal features of the brain" (p. 10). For a detailed review, see
http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/Koch.htm .
Koch and Crick are near the reductionist end of the consciousness-theory
spectrum, whereas the kind of "magic" usually associated with Catholic
belief would be found at the opposite end, along with outright mind/body
dualism. So when i first saw Steven's remarks on Koch, i assumed it was
some kind of joke -- and didn't reply because i didn't really get the
joke. ("Emergence and identity theory" is a rather odd colligation,
certainly not due to Koch, and i didn't have enough context to guess
what Steven meant by it, or whether his reference to "magic" was
tongue-in-cheek.)
Anyway, i think Peirce's views on consciousness are often closer to
traditional religious views than they are to Koch's. However, i find
Peirce's views on consciousness difficult to characterize, especially
since i read this passage in "Man's Glassy Essence":
[[[ I long ago showed that real existence, or thing-ness, consists in
regularities. So, that primeval chaos in which there was no regularity
was mere nothing, from a physical aspect. Yet it was not a blank zero;
for there was an intensity of consciousness there, in comparison with
which all that we ever feel is but as the struggling of a molecule or
two to throw off a little of the force of law to an endless and
innumerable diversity of chance utterly unlimited. ]]]
Among religious views, the closest thing i know to this is the Tibetan
Buddhist idea that consciousness is a kind of background awareness, so
to speak, which we all sink back into when we no longer have the
incessant chatter of the waking brain to distract us from it.
gary
- Original Message -
From: "Patrick Coppock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 5:44 PM
...
Both Peirce and Whitehead certainly believed that holding religious
beliefs and maintaining a responsible and coherent scientific
attitude were fully compatible with one another.
...
At 12:03 -0700 28-06-2006, Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote:
>Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis" (the name of Crick's book on the
>subject) is emergence and identity theory - and the continuing focus
>of Crick's younger partner (Crick himself died recently) Christophe
>Koch at CalTech is neuronal according to Koch's recent book (as I
>recall).
>All theories dependent on emergence and identity are essentially
>appeals to magic - despite the wide popularity of the argument
>(including the popular appeals by Wolfram, Kurzweil et al.).
>
>Koch is fairly religious (Catholic) - and has recently written about
>his religion on his web site - and without making aspersions upon
>his integrity I do find that a number of scientists in the field
>that are prepared to accept such magic are also religious. As a
>result they may, in fact, be predisposed to the argument that "God
>did it."
>
>My own view is that these appeals to magic as the product of
>intellectual laziness. :-)
>
>With respect,
>Steven
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Hi Steven,
You wrote:
Koch is fairly religious (Catholic) - and has recently written about
his religion on his web site - and without making aspersions upon
his integrity I do find that a number of scientists in the field
that are prepared to accept such magic are also religious. As a
result they may, in fact, be predisposed to the argument that "God
did it."
My own view is that these appeals to magic as the product of
intellectual laziness. :-)
You are of course entitled to your own views, but I feel you are
being a bit harsh on scientists/ philosophers who might happen to
hold personal religious beliefs in your comments, especially when you
mention people by name, as you do above.
Seems lkike a bit of a "blow beneath the belt" to me.
Both Peirce and Whitehead certainly believed that holding religious
beliefs and maintaining a responsible and coherent scientific
attitude were fully compatible with one another.
Now, it may not be absolutely necessary to believe in God in order to
do good science or philosophy, but on the other hand, it is not
absolutely necessary either to believe passionately in science in
order to live our lives and do our daily work well, and treat other
people with tolerance and respect.
Belief in science and religious beliefs have each their different
potentials and each fulfill their own specific human/social functions
- for good and for bad (remember Giordano Bruno and eugenics)
I think where serious problems often arise is when the sentiments or
passions that might move people to believe in God (or not) become
confused with the sentiments that might move people to believe (or
not) that a consciencious pursuit of scientific practice in the
course of time will provide us with the objective or "true" knowledge
about the world that we desire/ need in order, not only just to
survive, but also to live our lives together well...
As Peirce put it (all good) "logic is based on a social principle",
since for him, any workable logic presupposes ethics, which in its
own turn presupposes aesthetics.
I would consider either agnosticism or athieism to be valid
metaphysical positions based on specific sentiments that may be as
strongly held as those metaphysical positions based on specific
sentiments that may valorise religious beliefs.
You wrote too:
Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis" (the name of Crick's book on the
subject) is emergence and identity theory - and the continuing focus
of Crick's younger partner (Crick himself died recently) Christophe
Koch at CalTech is neuronal according to Koch's recent book (as I
recall).
All theories dependent on emergence and identity are essentially
appeals to magic - despite the wide popularity of the argument
(including the popular appeals by Wolfram, Kurzweil et al.).
However, in the generally accepted scientific paradigm (when it
works), any hypothesis ("astonishing" or not) will always come to be
"read" as a very provisional assertion regarding some (presumably
reasoned and argued) opinion, or set of opinions, about "the way
things may well be...".
The current norms of the community of science hold that the practical
consequences of any such assertions must be shown to hold
consistently over time on the basis of some future systematic
empirical inquiry in order to be taken seriously.
If not, the hypothesis in question is not likely to become widely
accepted as potentially valid/useful by the wider community of
inquiry.
Whether any given theory is "an appeal to magic" -- a term which I
would provisionally take to mean "potentially appealing to the
eye/sentiments/mind but also potentially deluding -- or not, it is
often only time -- coupled with the degree of individual and
collective interest and energy the scientific community actually
turns out to devote to systematic inquiry into the problem in hand --
will show.
I always tend to hold with Peirce that we should never try to "block
the way of inquiry", however wild other people's speculations may
seem to be. But of course we need some kind of filters that help us
sort out the chaff from the wheat.
So, in a sense, we will always have to put our trust in the wider
"market of ideas" (assuming that all ideas can flow and be discussed
as freely as possible), and in the informed common sense of our
"peers"
Best regards
Patrick
At 12:03 -0700 28-06-2006, Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote:
Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis" (the name of Crick's book on the
subject) is emergence and identity theory - and the continuing focus
of Crick's younger partner (Crick himself died recently) Christophe
Koch at CalTech is neuronal according to Koch's recent book (as I
recall).
All theories dependent on emergence and identity are essentially
appeals to magic - despite the wide popularity of the argument
(including the popular appeals by Wolfram, Kurzweil et al.).
Koch is fairly religious (Catholic) - and has recently written about
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Dear Patrick:A few quick notes from Salzburg as I found your comments of interest and perhaps I can clarify some issues.My goals are more concerned with a coherent philosophy of science, especially a coherent relation between chemical philosophy and biological philosophy and medical philosophy. Peirce, as a 19 th Century chemist should be relevant to my interests. Whitehead asserts a philosophy of organism, which also should be relevant.While the course of development of an individual's thought and patterns of digestion and indigestion are always relevant to understanding the individual, they are not always relevant to my restricted interests. In particular, at the turn of the 21 Century, we see highly specialized logics in Quantum mechanics, chemistry (valence) and molecular biology (genetic code). The challenge I face is to place the modern logics in context of earlier logics. The QM advocates have a highly developed narrative. Chemistry and biology do not. Thus, I seek connections that allow development of coherent narratives for these sciences. It is in this context that I appreciate the narratives you construct.Now for a few comments:On Jul 2, 2006, at 1:08 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: In any case, I can see I'll have my work cut out=20 to be brief in replying to your notes, since=20 brief though they may be, they are also fairly=20 "dense" in "content". terms, at least if I try to=20 read between the lines.. I would prefer the terms "concise" and "crisp", but, if you insist on the term "dense" I accept your judgment. :-) You wrote: My take on the distinctions between Peirce and Whitehead is rather differen= t. In early Peirce (1868), the analogy with=20 distance functions and branching was the given=20 basis for distinguishing paths of logic,=20 relation to chemical valence and the more=20 general concept of extension. The later=20 writings of Peirce describing "division" of a=20 sign in natural language is not a crisp way of=20 looking at the concept of extension. (One might=20 substitute for the term "division" such terms as=20 partition, trichotomy, lattice, subtraction,=20 incomplete parts, lack of additivity, and so=20 forth; but I do not see how that would create a=20 coherent concept of relational extension.) Well, first off, I personally think it is very=20 important that "early" and "late" Peirce's are=20 seen as part and parcel of one and the same=20 philosophical project, that developed (emerged)=20 over a considerable time period, but always with=20 the key notion of synechism ("the tendency to=20 regard everything as continuous") at its base.=20 Kelley Parker's work on Peirce's continuity is a=20 useful point of reference here.This comment identifies a critical issue. It is not clear to me how relate Peirce's later views to continuity. I do not know the writings of Parker. Clearly, the concept of continuity as well as chemistry was in the early writings. However, in later works, the "flow of semiosis" displaces the relevance to chemical logic; it remains consistent with various aspects of "signal processing" and "Memory Evolutive Systems." When you write that "The later writings of Peirce=20 describing "division" of a sign in natural=20 language is not a crisp way of looking at the=20 concept of extension", I think I'll have to ask=20 you for a bit more detailed explanation of what=20 you mean by that... Very simple. Extension as growth; as increase; as sequence of relations, the later extending the former.My conjecture is that extension is easy in number/arithmetic, difficult in chemistry, and very difficult in natural language.In the example, sign is extended to qualisign, sinsign and legisign. This extension appears to me to include a fair amount of arbitrariness. Fine for a philosophy of belief, not adequate for chemical or biological purposes. It would be helpful if someone could suggest a path that associates these terms with chemical, biological or medical practice. In late Whitehead, Process and Reality, he gets=20 into bed with set theory and never re-emerges=20 from this highly restrictive view of extension.=20 In modern chemistry, a multitude of=20 possibilities for extension exist . (The flow=20 of passions in a bed are great, but they should=20 not be conflated with the light of reason. :-) Regarding "early" and "late" with regard to=20 Whitehead, the same considerations as above=20 regarding the recursive, stepwise development of=20 Peirce's architectonic, I think also holds for=""> Whitehead. From the beginning he was a=20 mathematician (and education theorist) more than=20 a philosopher (and in fact, like Peirce, he never=20 "formally" studied philosophy apart from his own=20 personal readings of other philosophers' work),=20 but process and reality is built round ideas=20 developed in his many other philosophical=20 writings, such as "Adventures of Ideas", "Science=20 and the Modern World" -- in my opinion a good=20 starting poi
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Hi Bill, you wrote: I think it is not very useful to speak of signs as existing in the same process as existential objects, but if we must, perhaps we can say, "Yes, signs exist, but much faster than objects do." Well yes I guess so. The sign function may be construed (rather simplistically) as an event where some "segment" of "expression continuum" is perceived as entering into, or being brought into, relation with some "segment" of "meaning continuum". If we are considering any kind of culturally contingent sign processes we normally will have to try and take into account the varying amounts of time and energy consumption and different forms of effort that are associated with our semiotic "use" of the many different possible forms and mediums of expression that may be brought into play during the course of sign production and interpretation processes. Thought is just one of these. Thoughts flash by, words take longer to speak, and even longer to write down - especially if we want others to understand what they are supposed to mean. The production of cinema, theatre and ballet performances, each will have their own specific time and energy consumption requirements. Diagrams, sketches and pictures written on paper have their own time and energy consumption requirements, "digital" variants of the same objects theirs. But it seems to me that if we adopt a process perspective on semiosis, what becomes central is that the "existence" of both signs and objects becomes conceivable of as a transient form of "reality" (of varying durability and speed), and it also seems feasible that the inherent transience of signs and objects, and the various types of transitivity that may be attributed to them in the course of the (intersubjective, or other) negotiation of their potential meanings in different situations and contexts must be closely interrelated aspects of this "reality" and/or "existence". Best regards Patrick -- Patrick J. Coppock Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences University of Modena and Reggio Emilia Reggio Emilia Italy phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/ faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it the voice: http://morattiddl.blogspot.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear Joe, WOW! :) Thank you for the comments. Within Peirce's Systematic Philosophy, the scope of a visualization of Peirce's classes of signs, as I develop in my thesis, is grounded on mathematics (discrete or finite), assumes phenomenology (the cenopythagorean categories), and only touches upon Esthetics (only as a support for perception) and Speculative Grammar (only as a requisite for representation), without exploring them. This delimitation, although narrow, I belive is necessary, but it is clearly not suficient to study the historical implications and unfoldings of Peirce's Semiotics, which are outside it. However, due to the myriad of models and diagrams in the literature, each one stressing some dimensions of Peirce's work and assuming some premisses, sometimes in contradiction with others, the diagramatic sccafolds I propose are not only syntactical manipulations, but aim to establish some common ground within the community exactly to support the kind of work you are interested on. > I am much impressed by all that has been done graphically in representing > the sign classification system, and especially by Luis Merkle/s masterful > handling of it all in that part of his dissertation, as well as further > work > by others in Brazil and elsewhere as well, but my own interest in the > classification system is not with what can be learned from it by > manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding what use it > might > have when it comes to understanding how to apply it in the analysis and > understanding of distinctively philosophical problems such as have formed > the staple of philosophical concern from the time of the Greeks on. > I > wonder if anyone knows of any attempts to do that. In the early days of peirce-l list, back on 1993 or 1994, you developed some wonderful visualization of Peirce's concept of Icon, throughout his carreer.I was much impressed with that work too, which attempt to do exactly what you are interested. ;) Is that available? Thanks, Luiz --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
