Ben, Gary, list,
For an example of hypotheses that remain uncertain I want to mention hypotheses whose conclusions are not yet existing facts, but viabilities in the future. Like: "So this will work: .", like keynesianism in economics, or political decisions meant to solve certain problems.
I assume Peirce is distinguishing from Cartesian doubt. Genuine doubt has a
reason (or at least prima facie reason) for the doubt. Doubt based on mere
possibilities of something being false is not genuine doubt.
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy,
I left one point murky; what I had failed to see clearly, until Jon S.'s
remarks, was that 5.189 can't be regarded as a version, the best as
Jerry R. has been urging, or otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim. - Best, Ben
On 10/1/2016 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jon S., Gary R., list,
Jon,
Ben wrote: "5.189 can't be regarded as a version, the best as Jerry R. has
been urging, or otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim."
Exactly. As Jon made clear, 5.189 has its value in critical logic and ought
not be conflated with the PM. I have found Jerry's near obsession with
5.189 off putting so
Gary R., list,
"Good" is traditionally taken as meaning "valid" or "justified" when
applied to an inference. Valid deductions can conclude in falsehoods by
vice of falsehood among the premisses, and we can see both critical and
methodeutical kinds of justification of an abductive inference
Jon S., Gary R., list,
Jon, you wrote,
CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts,"
yet are /not/ "capable of experimental verification," and thus are
/not/ admissible for subsequent deductive explication and inductive
evaluation. In other words, an abduction
Ben, Jon, List,
Ben, you commented:
"An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the
economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, if
it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively fruitful
(think of all the hypotheses that positively
Jon S., Gary R., Jerry R., list, I left one point murky; what I had
failed to see clearly, until Jon S.'s remarks, was that 5.189 can't be
regarded as a version, the best as Jerry R. has been urging, or
otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim. - Best, Ben
On 10/1/2016 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell
Mike, List:
Alas, as I anticipated, there was no further discussion of principles of
classification in R 1343. There were some fragments of alternative drafts
of the portion that I already excerpted, but they did not seem different
enough to warrant typing up and posting.
I was also quite
Ben U., Gary R., List:
You have both made some great points today. Peirce clearly considered
economy of research to be an important purpose of methodeutic or
speculative (i.e., theoretical) rhetoric. He even advocated, under certain
circumstances, admitting a hypothesis that we *expect *to fail
Ben, List,
Thanks for this clarification. You wrote: Researchers need to be able to
state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words to keep
communication clear because the scientific method is the inquiry method
that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. They don't
Jon S., list,
Thanks, but I need to correct myself. I wrote,
the scientific method is the inquiry method that, by its own
account, can go wrong as well as right
[End quote]
I should say instead that the scientific method is the inquiry method in
which inquiry, by its own account, can
Gary R., list,
I agree, a hypothesis may be uncertain yet still be helpful, although
it's important for a contrite fallibilism in any science that the
uncertainty, possible errors, etc., be examined and expressed.
- Best, Ben
On 10/1/2016 12:53 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben, List,
Thanks
Hi Gary, list:
I suppose you could think of that potential population as *movement of the
community* where:
*“Negative to negative is not change…*
*change from the negative into the positive… is generation…*
*change from positive to negative is destruction…*
*only the change from positive
14 matches
Mail list logo
