The 6th UNILOG - WORLD CONGRESS AND SCHOOL ON UNIVERSAL LOGIC
will take place in Vichy, France, June 16-26, 2018
after previous editions in Montreux 2005, Xi'an 2007, Lisbon 2010, Rio
2013 and Istanbul 2015:
http://www.uni-log.org/vichy2018
Along these years UNILOG has been a leading
Clark, you wrote that for Peirce, “Intentionality is from object through signs
rather than anything like an ego or directness.” I don’t see that this applies
to Peirce’s use of the terms “intention” or “intentional,” and that makes it
difficult for me to see what your sentence means. Can you
On 7/28/2017 12:39 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
I’ve long noted that while Peirce’s phenomenology bears little
resemblance to Husserl’s, Heidegger’s seems quite different. Famously it
is both on the nature of consciousness and intentionality that Heidegger
breaks from Husserl. Heidegger too turned
Dear Clark, list,
I'm not sure what you're suggesting here. You wrote:
CG: For Scotus the foundation of signs thus because the *a priori* structures
of the soul. I’m here thinking of Scotus’ *Grammatica Speculativa.*
Peirce too turns to this same aspect of Scotus’ thought. In the Comments
The recent discussion raised some thoughts I’d not entertained in some time. We
know that there are huge differences between what Husserl called phenomenology
and Peirce’s project. Indeed Peirce explicitly criticized Husserl for
psychologism. There’s nothing really like the reduction or
