The recent discussion raised some thoughts I’d not entertained in some time. We know that there are huge differences between what Husserl called phenomenology and Peirce’s project. Indeed Peirce explicitly criticized Husserl for psychologism. There’s nothing really like the reduction or bracketing in Peirce’s thought and intentionality is completely inverse from Brentano/Husserl. Intentionality is from object through signs rather than anything like an ego or directness. Consciousness just isn’t an issue the way it is for the more Cartesian inclined phenomenologists. Peirce’s sense of intentionality arises not from the conceptions developed in the modern era but from Scotus’ notion of first and second intentions.
I’ve long noted that while Peirce’s phenomenology bears little resemblance to Husserl’s, Heidegger’s seems quite different. Famously it is both on the nature of consciousness and intentionality that Heidegger breaks from Husserl. Heidegger too turned to Scotus and particularly Scotus’ notion of intentionality. Following Scotus Heidegger saw a distinction between ideal meaning and real Being that the intended meanings must be a priori in some sense. For Scotus the foundation of signs thus because the a priori structures of the soul. I’m here thinking of Scotus’ Grammatica Speculativa. Peirce too turns to this same aspect of Scotus’ thought. In the Comments dictionary there are quite a few entries for Speculative Grammar that are tied to Scotus’ thought. These are the conditions of signs as signs. (See CP 1.444 for example) http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/speculative-grammar <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/speculative-grammar> Like Peirce, Heidegger uses this as a stepping off point. Meaning becomes autonomous due to this a priori structure. That is fundamentally Heidegger breaks with Husserl over these same aspects of psychologism. The main place one might see a difference is over the meaning of an individual soul. Peirce sees individuals as symbols - arising out of these phenomenological structures in acts. Heidegger comes close, seeing historicity in the individual soul where these acts occur. Yet at the same time Heidegger’s notion of “living spirit” bears similarities to Peirce’s conception of universe in terms of sign. Unfortunately this is most pronounced in the early Heidegger rather than the more interesting Heidegger of the late 20’s and early 30’s. Yet the shift tends to maintain the a priori structure from his engagement with Scotus combined with a more historical sense. So I’m not saying they are doing the same thing, but I do think they are more commensurate than many think. (Unlike Husserl)
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