RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
Jeff, Lists, I haven't read this book. Wilson is widely regarded as a genic selectionist (genes are the units of selection). This doesn't fit the species as individuals view very well, but it can be made to. That view is held by almost all systematists now, but there are still some evolutionary theorists who are holdouts to the classification methodology and data. Others, Like Richard Dawkins take this view. And others, like David Sloan Wilson, disagree. The history is a bit complex, with some bizarre generalizations and misinterpretations of both evolutionary processes. It is supposed that group selection, for example, was disproved by George C. Williams on theoretical grounds, but interestingly Williams and his father had earlier shown one of the paradigmatic cases of group selection. You can make the process of evolution fit the gene selection account -- there is no logical failing, but it focuses attention on the wrong causal processes to explain evolution. You end up having to invoke groups as filtering units for gene selection in any case. Joel Cracraft was asking at one point do species do anything?, the idea being that if they did not, then they were not causal units. They do indeed do something by constraining evolutionary possibilities through the constraints they put on what gene combination can be presented for selection. This is equally, if not more important, than the selection process itself. (Darwin had a passage to this effect in the 5th edition of The Origin of Species.) So the evidence allows going in a number of directions about the units of selection, but Wilson's way (if it is indeed his) is a bit more strained than others, and is not the way that species individuation experts, systematists, have gone. I should say that there are some holdout systematists, but there aren't very many. They take a cluster view of species rather than a constraint view, which would allow species to be epiphenomenal, but would not imply it. Wilson's view makes them epiphenomenal, if his view is like Dawkins' view, as I have been assuming here, but not from systematists. I would say that E.O. Wilson, all evidence I have considered, has always accepted multilevel selection, and his views have been misrepresented by himself or others. He is not always that careful about consistency, in my opinion. In any case, I would throw my lot in with the systematists, who are the experts on identifying species, rather than evolutionary theorists, who have an annoying habit of giving post facto explanations (abductions without the follow-up testing). Lewontin and Gould have complained that this methodological error is rank in the field. I once had an optimality theorist go in a two sentence circle without even recognizing it, which indicates how deep seated the idea is that if you can give an account that fits the genic selection view and optimizes some property you have attributed, then it is a good explanation; no further testing required. This was a major objection to Wilson's sociobiology (sometimes justified) and that may be where the idea he was a genic selectionist came from. John -Original Message- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: May 29, 2015 2:51 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Hi John, Lists, In the The Diversity of Life, E.O. Wilson devotes of few chapters to the conception of a species. As far as I can tell, he takes the account he is arguing for to be a mainstream position amongst evolutionary theorists and ecologists. Is your account consistent the position he articulates, or are the positions at odds with one another? --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: Wednesday, May 27, 2015 9:04 AM To: Benjamin Udell; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Ben, Lists, I mean a historical individual with an origin and probably an end, localized in space. A concrete individual. This is the Hull-Ghiselen view that Is almost universally accepted by systematists and evolutionary biologists these days. It follows from the phylogenetic view of species, developed by Cladists and for which the standard text for a long time was Phylogenetic Systematics by my friend Ed Wiley. John From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: May 27, 2015 2:43 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R John C., Just curious, by an _individual species_ do you mean something like an individual kind or do you mean (and I suspect that you don't) the species population as a large, somewhat scattered, collective concrete individual? Best, Ben On 5/26/2015 2:27 PM, John Collier
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
John C., Just curious, by an _/individual species/_ do you mean something like an individual kind or do you mean (and I suspect that you don't) the species population as a large, somewhat scattered, collective concrete individual? Best, Ben On 5/26/2015 2:27 PM, John Collier wrote: We mean something different by “individual”, Edwina. I am using it in the sense that species are individuals. It was David HulI who put the ecologists onto me because of my work on individuality. I don’t think that further discussion with you on this topic is likely to be fruitful for either of us. John From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: May 26, 2015 8:23 PM To: John Collier; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R I don't see an ecosystem as an individual but as a system, in its case, a CAS. It doesn't have the distinctive boundaries of an individual - either temporally or spatially. I see a human being as a system, in that its parts co-operate in a systemic manner; and it is also an individual - with distinctive temporal and spatial boundaries. But a human being is not a CAS, for it lacks the wide range of adaptive flexibility and even transformative capacities of a CAS. I have long argued that societies are a CAS; they are socioeconomic ecological systems, operating as logical adaptations to environmental realities - which include soil, climate, water, plant and animal typologies etc. All of these enable a particular size of population to live in the area and this in turn, leads to a particular method of both economic and political organization. Unfortunately, the major trends in the social sciences have been to almost completely ignore this area - except within the alienated emotionalism of AGW or Climate Change...Instead, the social sciences tend to view 'culture' or 'ideology' as the prime causal factors in societal development and organization. Whereas I view these areas as emotionalist psychological explanations, as verbal narratives for the deeper causal factors of ecology, demographics, economic modes. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Collier To: John Collier ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 1:59 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
John, Just butting in. Quite accidentally happened to open this mail of yours. Quite interesting. The topic I am working on. Left me wondering how this may be connected with the concept on continuity in CSP's later work. - Pointing out any point in a continuous line, means breaking up the continuity, he writes. It is only allowed temporarily, and then it should be done consciously, with the determination of coming back to continuity. With species, there is not and cannot be, any point you can point out as the starting point, or the ending point. - It is possible to define the middle (whatever it is), but the start as well as the end,can never be pinpointed. Do you (and the phylogenetists you are refering to) agree with this? Kirsti John Collier kirjoitti 27.5.2015 19:04: Ben, Lists, I mean a historical individual with an origin and probably an end, localized in space. A concrete individual. This is the Hull-Ghiselen view that Is almost universally accepted by systematists and evolutionary biologists these days. It follows from the phylogenetic view of species, developed by Cladists and for which the standard text for a long time was Phylogenetic Systematics by my friend Ed Wiley. John FROM: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] SENT: May 27, 2015 2:43 PM TO: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R John C., Just curious, by an __individual species__ do you mean something like an individual kind or do you mean (and I suspect that you don't) the species population as a large, somewhat scattered, collective concrete individual? Best, Ben - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
I don't see an ecosystem as an individual but as a system, in its case, a CAS. It doesn't have the distinctive boundaries of an individual - either temporally or spatially. I see a human being as a system, in that its parts co-operate in a systemic manner; and it is also an individual - with distinctive temporal and spatial boundaries. But a human being is not a CAS, for it lacks the wide range of adaptive flexibility and even transformative capacities of a CAS. I have long argued that societies are a CAS; they are socioeconomic ecological systems, operating as logical adaptations to environmental realities - which include soil, climate, water, plant and animal typologies etc. All of these enable a particular size of population to live in the area and this in turn, leads to a particular method of both economic and political organization. Unfortunately, the major trends in the social sciences have been to almost completely ignore this area - except within the alienated emotionalism of AGW or Climate Change...Instead, the social sciences tend to view 'culture' or 'ideology' as the prime causal factors in societal development and organization. Whereas I view these areas as emotionalist psychological explanations, as verbal narratives for the deeper causal factors of ecology, demographics, economic modes. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Collier To: John Collier ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 1:59 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R I should have further remarked that socio-ecological systems (SESs) are a fairly recent area of study, and I would suppose that society is part of the ecology in general and separating cause involved will not be easy, if it is possible at all, so more holistic methods are needed. This seems to be a growing consensus of people who work in the field, mostly ecologists, not social scientists. John From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:52 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience is. They don’t do it very well. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Collier To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
We mean something different by “individual”, Edwina. I am using it in the sense that species are individuals. It was David HulI who put the ecologists onto me because of my work on individuality. I don’t think that further discussion with you on this topic is likely to be fruitful for either of us. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 8:23 PM To: John Collier; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R I don't see an ecosystem as an individual but as a system, in its case, a CAS. It doesn't have the distinctive boundaries of an individual - either temporally or spatially. I see a human being as a system, in that its parts co-operate in a systemic manner; and it is also an individual - with distinctive temporal and spatial boundaries. But a human being is not a CAS, for it lacks the wide range of adaptive flexibility and even transformative capacities of a CAS. I have long argued that societies are a CAS; they are socioeconomic ecological systems, operating as logical adaptations to environmental realities - which include soil, climate, water, plant and animal typologies etc. All of these enable a particular size of population to live in the area and this in turn, leads to a particular method of both economic and political organization. Unfortunately, the major trends in the social sciences have been to almost completely ignore this area - except within the alienated emotionalism of AGW or Climate Change...Instead, the social sciences tend to view 'culture' or 'ideology' as the prime causal factors in societal development and organization. Whereas I view these areas as emotionalist psychological explanations, as verbal narratives for the deeper causal factors of ecology, demographics, economic modes. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 1:59 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R I should have further remarked that socio-ecological systems (SESs) are a fairly recent area of study, and I would suppose that society is part of the ecology in general and separating cause involved will not be easy, if it is possible at all, so more holistic methods are needed. This seems to be a growing consensus of people who work in the field, mostly ecologists, not social scientists. John From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:52 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience is. They don’t do it very well. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience is. They don’t do it very well. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case. The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above. John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent property, but I don’t think it need be (memory in current computers, for example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
I should have further remarked that socio-ecological systems (SESs) are a fairly recent area of study, and I would suppose that society is part of the ecology in general and separating cause involved will not be easy, if it is possible at all, so more holistic methods are needed. This seems to be a growing consensus of people who work in the field, mostly ecologists, not social scientists. John From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:52 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience is. They don’t do it very well. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case. The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above. John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities
