Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

2018-03-03 Thread Helmut Raulien
 

Edwina,

yes, Peirce wrote about the interpreter. On the other hand there is his phaneron quote (I dont find it), where he writes that if one asks to whose mind a sign is present, he would not entertain a doubt, that it is present to all minds (to the phaneron).

 

But maybe this seeming contradiction can be solved by saying that the interpreter is a sign too, and as such part of the phaneron. He/she just is a very slow sign, and this slow scale identifies him/her as something that may be called "interpreter". Like (analogy:) matter is effete mind, and this effeteness makes this piece of mind something that may be called "matter", though it still is mind.

 

In the "network" metaphor I have missed the triadic aspect. A string between two nodes seemed like a dyadic picture to me. But maybe the string is not depicting the relation, but a node with three strings going away from it, like in the logic of relations.

My bias against the term is based on my fear, that digitalism replaces concepts like "friendship" with it.

 

Best, Helmut


 02. März 2018 um 22:28 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 



Helmut - with regard to the word 'Interpreter' - that's a direct quote from Peirce.

 And after all, in his reference to a Quasi-mind, Peirce refers to an 'utterer' and an interpreter..."there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although the two are at one [i.e., are one mind] in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic" 4.551.

That is - semiosis is a Relational process; it is interactional [there can be no isolated sign] ...I read the above that, in a dialogue of at least two agents, an utterer and an interpreter...even if they agree on the interpretation [and are of 'one mind']...the requirement for relation, for interaction...is vital.

As for 'networking' - heh - I can't help you out with your bias against the term - but - think of it as interaction, as interconnections, as free links, and necessary links - and optional links - and so on.

Edwina


 

On Fri 02/03/18 4:09 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



 

Edwina, List,

you have introduced two things: The interpreter, and a network. Interpreter: I had thought, that Peirce´s theory does not require identifying an interpreter. Network: I aways had taken this term for a mechanistic metaphor Silicon Valley nerds use to replace with algorhithms things they do not understand. But sorry! I admit allergy against certain terms: My problem only, don´t take offence! Best, Helmut


Freitag, 02. März 2018 um 21:49 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 





Jon, list,

1] My problem with your terms is that you use 'sign' to refer only to the mediate node in the semiosic triad; the Representamen. Where and how does the triad enter into your understanding of semiosis?

2. I understand the term of 'symbol' to refer to the Relation between the Representamen and the Dynamic Object, such that this Relation sets up a triadic semiosic process of conceptualization:  i.e., "In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. .

..."I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic objects only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant  8.335...

and thus - the Relation between the Representamen and the DO is in a mode of Thirdness and the Representamen in such an interaction functions within Thirdness - as a Legisign. That is - I see the Symbol as a Relational function of the triad, not as an integral component of the 'Sign/representamen'.

3. I don't read the Interpretant section the same way as you do. There are three Interpretants: Immediate, Dynamic and Final. IF, in the terms you use, the  Sign is that mediate node in the O-R-I semiosic triad, then - none of the three Interpretants can be that mediate process.

Peirce says" that I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant" (CP 4.536; 1906).

I read the above that the Quasi-mind is the INTERPRETER. Not the Interpretant. And the semiosic process that is ongoing via the interaction between the Dynamic Object-Immediate Object-Representamen...is producing in 'the Quasi-mind/Interpretera feeling. Or an action/exertion. Or - Thirdness/a concept...all of which can be expressed as 'the Interpretant'.

4. And I read this differently from you: " For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one inter

Aw: : [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

2018-03-02 Thread Helmut Raulien
 

Edwina, List,

you have introduced two things: The interpreter, and a network. Interpreter: I had thought, that Peirce´s theory does not require identifying an interpreter. Network: I aways had taken this term for a mechanistic metaphor Silicon Valley nerds use to replace with algorhithms things they do not understand. But sorry! I admit allergy against certain terms: My problem only, don´t take offence! Best, Helmut


Freitag, 02. März 2018 um 21:49 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 





Jon, list,

1] My problem with your terms is that you use 'sign' to refer only to the mediate node in the semiosic triad; the Representamen. Where and how does the triad enter into your understanding of semiosis?

2. I understand the term of 'symbol' to refer to the Relation between the Representamen and the Dynamic Object, such that this Relation sets up a triadic semiosic process of conceptualization:  i.e., "In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into Icons, Indices and Symbols" 8.335. .

..."I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic objects only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant  8.335...

and thus - the Relation between the Representamen and the DO is in a mode of Thirdness and the Representamen in such an interaction functions within Thirdness - as a Legisign. That is - I see the Symbol as a Relational function of the triad, not as an integral component of the 'Sign/representamen'.

3. I don't read the Interpretant section the same way as you do. There are three Interpretants: Immediate, Dynamic and Final. IF, in the terms you use, the  Sign is that mediate node in the O-R-I semiosic triad, then - none of the three Interpretants can be that mediate process.

Peirce says" that I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant" (CP 4.536; 1906).

I read the above that the Quasi-mind is the INTERPRETER. Not the Interpretant. And the semiosic process that is ongoing via the interaction between the Dynamic Object-Immediate Object-Representamen...is producing in 'the Quasi-mind/Interpretera feeling. Or an action/exertion. Or - Thirdness/a concept...all of which can be expressed as 'the Interpretant'.

4. And I read this differently from you: " For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind" (CP 4.550; 1906).

I read it as a network of triads - where at least two of them have one Interpretant - i.e., their 'actual effects are in effective interconnection' 4.550ff - 

The result of the semiosic process among a number of Agents/Interpreters , the Dynamic Interpretant - are connected.  This relates to [a] a shared mediate Representamen such that the Interpretants are all 'determinations of a common Representamen -  and a shared Mind, i.e., a Quasi-mind among all networked agents/Interpreters in this semiosic interconnection.

Edwina


 

On Fri 02/03/18 3:04 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:


Edwina, List:
 

1.  Please read more carefully--I stated that all concepts are Symbols, not that all Signs are Symbols.  Obviously Icons and Indices are also Signs.

 

2.  Peirce explicitly distinguished three kinds of Interpretants, only one of which is a Sign.  "I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant" (CP 4.536; 1906).

 

3.  Peirce explicitly defined a Quasi-mind as a Sign that is a complex of Signs.  "For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which is a Quasi-mind" (CP 4.550; 1906).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


JAS, Gary R, List - and here is, as I view it, a problem.

1] Notice that JAS seems to be confining the definition [and function?] of a 'Sign' to a 'symbol', in other words, to Thirdness. But is this accurate? Or is this term of symbol applied only to 'concepts'; i.e.,to the  intellectual results of semiosis? [NOTE: I would agree with this last sentence since I view the symbol as confined to human semiosis] ]

 [and I am assuming that JAS refers only to the mediate aspect of the triad of O-R-I, where he uses 'Sign' to refer to that