Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, list,

 

I am impressed, I never have seen the categories so accurately assigned, as you did:

 

"experience--quality, reaction, and mediation in Phaneroscopy; feeling, action, and thought in Normative Science; possibility, actuality, and conditional necessity in Metaphysics."

 

Now: Is  "Phaneroscopy, Normative Science, Metaphysics " itself a triad, in the very sequence like you wrote them: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns??

 

Best, Helmut

 

 

 

15. Dezember 2018 um 00:05 Uhr

 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:




Edwina, List:
 

Who said anything about "an ordinal outline"?  1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are Peirce's generalized terms for the three irreducible elements of experience--quality, reaction, and mediation in Phaneroscopy; feeling, action, and thought in Normative Science; possibility, actuality, and conditional necessity in Metaphysics.

 

As for EP 2:303-304, I mainly had in mind what Peirce wrote earlier in that passage.

 






CSP:  Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects. All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet's madness, are parts of one and the same Universe of being, the "Truth." But so far as the "Truth" is merely the object of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so. In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or qualities ... All these characters are elements of the "Truth." Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies ... The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it.






 

According to Peirce, objects (2ns) comprise the Aristotelian Matter of the universe (logical subject), characters (1ns) comprise the Aristotelian Form of the universe (logical predicate), and bringing them together (3ns) is the Entelechy of the universe (logical copula)--which Aristotle never quite managed to grasp.  This is even more clearly spelled out at NEM 4:292-300, which I have attached since it may not be as accessible to everyone.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 4:34 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Gary R, list

Again - we'll just have to disagree.

1] In my view, something that is occurring with the actions of 'chance, spontaneity and freedom' is not amenable to measurement. As such, the experience of them is subjective, i.e., emerging within the organism rather than from an external agent. I consider 'quality' to be the same value - As noted - 'it has no individuality' and as such - cannot be measured.

Just because chance/spontaneity etc are vital for actions of adaptation and evolution does not mean that they are not subjective! I think that you and I are using the term 'subjective' in different ways. I do not mean within the human mind, conscious or unconscious.  I mean within the organism and not caused by an external agent. I don't consider 'quality' to be amenable to external measurement. It is 'what it is', in itself, i.e., 1ns, and not measurable.

2] I don't consider the nature and function of scientific measurement to be an 'obsession' but a rational and objective action. I certainly don't want to ride a plane or train that has not been built according to measurements.  All I have done is to point out that some actions within our complex infrastructure are not amenable to such external objective measurements.

3] I disagree with both your and Jon's outline of the terms of Form, Matter and Entelechy, which you both put into an ordinal outline. To say that Form is 1ns, suggests that its identity is pre-established as a potentiality,  whereas, I believe that the Form that matter/mass takes only appears within the Interpretant phase, after having been 'moulded' so to speak, by the  rules of the Representamen. These rules can alter the nature of the incoming matter/mass...

4] The reference Jon gave to NP 2.303-4 is an outline of the semiosic process -  

"Of the two great tasks of humanity, Theory and Practice, the former sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted, passing from this as its matter, to successive interpretants embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a direct perception of the entelechy;"

NOTE: in the above 

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, list,

Just now I am guessing, that there are two different approaches: Individuation and evolution:

If we talk about individuation, matter (as you and Old Stotle said) has no individuality, so matter is that what is worked upon by individuation (which is formal, with form as a first), so matter is a second. Though this would be ordinal thinking, which is wrong, as you and Edwina said (lest we agree with the similarity of onto- and phyllogenesis).

If we talk about evolution, we assume forms emerging out of amorphous matter (in the Aristotelian sense, and also in modern physics´ concepts of symmetry-break).

I propose to allow both views (individuation and evolution), because the attempt to decide between the two would raise a futile theological discussion.

My conclusion would be, that one cannot assign the nesses to the things without telling which sign s*he is talking about. In this case, the question whether matter or form is first, the answer is due to whether the sign is "individuation" or "evolution".

It is always good to mess things up a little, make simple-seeming things complicated, to find the seem.

Best, Helmut

 14. Dezember 2018 um 17:19 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut, list,

When we talk about “matter” in the English of our time, we tend to think of it as tangible stuff, or in physics, as stuff that has mass. Aristotle’s “matter” (ὕλη) is a very different concept, pertaining more to logic than to physics, and Peirce says in the excerpt Jon quoted, “it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of” — not physical matter in the modern sense. Aristotelian matter is simply that which has no individuality. I think this might be clarified by reading Peirce’s Baldwin’s Dictionary article,  http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Matter%20and%20Form.

And of course Peirce was not talking about sexuality in the physical sense either …

I also agree with Edwina that if we are going to talk about Peircean Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, we should not take them in an ordinal sense, as if we were talking about the temporal order of events.

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 14-Dec-18 10:26
To: h.raul...@gmx.de
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic



 



  


  



Supplement: Meaning, that we see, hear, etc. very much about sex (e.g. in literature, music, advertisement, the conventional and new media), but dont receive enough of it. I imho agree.



Form and matter: After having read JAS´ post with the CSP-quotation, I am not so sure anymore. I guess, Platon would have said, that form (ideas) are first, Einstein and Mach, that both are conditions for each other (like hen and egg)...





  


Yes, sorry, I was a bit too happy to have had learnt a new English term. There is a theory that assumes, that people in the western civilization are "oversexed and (term)". Best, Helmut 



 13. Dezember 2018 um 20:20 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 





Helmut, that’s an interesting new term you’ve introduced into metaphysical discourse, but I wonder whether it will stick … it might help if you explain what it means. (But maybe that would make the discussion overfucked?)

 

Anyway … your reason for asserting that “matter is first, and form second” does seem consistent (or paraconsistent?) with Aristotle’s matter/form distinction as given in De Anima. You imply that Peirce held the opposite view; but do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that “form” was first and “matter” second?

 

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Sent: 13-Dec-18 13:19
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] the sexuality of methodeutic





  


  



Supplement: Or was he just underfucked?






List,



I think the question, whether matter is 1ns, and form 2ns, or the other way round, does not have to do with sex. This discussion is underfucked. Form requires matter, because a form must consist of something. Matter does not require form, matter may be amorphous. So matter is first, and form second. If Peirce said it differently, maybe he was wrong. Is that possible, that Peirce was wrong, or was he God?



Best, Helmut



  










- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .







- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More