RE: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
Frances to Edwina and Listers--- Thanks for your most recent reply, but please allow me to dig a little more into Peircean writings for some clarity on his ideas about idealism and representamen. Let me read further on specifically what the difference might be for Peirce between "idealist realism" and "objective idealism" and "objective relativism". On the issue of representamen it is my rough understanding in Peirce that there are phenomenal representamen which are not signs and phenomenal representamen which are signs, and both kinds of representamen be they of continuing or existing phenomena are aside from any phenomenal phanerism acting as a signer or thinker or interpreter. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
Frances to Edwina and listers--- My search goes on for a Peircean approach to at least metaphysical being. In response to your kind reply, consider some of my rambling tentative guesses, but without any specific Peircean references. (The new lettered paras directly below roughly refer to the earlier numbered paras further below.) A. Peircean philosophy overall is a brand of realism called idealist realism. His idealism posits a world of infinite continuity. His realism posits a world of continuing activity. Under his realism falls naturalist pragmatism, which posits respectively a cause to action and a purpose to action. The fated destiny of the world is disposed tendencies, so that the agent of such telic design is simply a trait determined by the habit of law. Further theories in support of these theories include objective relativism and fallibilism. B. Phenomena are needed by say enabled phanerisms to get at accessible or inaccessible being or stuff or things or objects or whatever, and then only by way of representamen as nonsigns or signs that stand for it. For the rest of the phenomenal universe that yet lacks emergent representamen, it would likely remain unrepresented and of course inaccessible. C. To speculate, the whole wide world of galactic universes might be held as sented mena that seemingly grows into presented nomena and represented phenomena and derepresented epiphenomena; but only phanerisms can feel they feel or sense or know such mena, and then only by way of phenomena that are representamen. This built menal scheme suggests that the world of phenomena is of menal secondness and is thus a dyadic or dual structure. D. The feeling and being and minding of say extra menal phenomena continues infinitely to act independent of phenomena and representamen, and also of phenomenal matter and life, but can be guessed by phanerisms to be in the distant evolving world by way of phenomenal representamen; which phenomenal stuff as matter or life can be of continuent things, or of existent objects that are also signs of other objects. E. The phenomenal terness or menal dyad of manythingness and somethingness initially emerges from the medadic chaos of nomenal nothingness or empty zeroness as a class holder ready to be filled with phenomenal thingness. The tendential evolution of what is felt by enabled phanerisms to be represented as phenomenal matter is of sporting monadic firstness alone, seeking to conform together with some dyadic secondness, and even finding to be controlled by the lawful habits of triadic thirdness to assure the phenomenal matter of natural normality. F. Overall menal mind or minding is the law of feeling and being and minding that emerges from the constant trait and habit of action. Phanerisms use representative phenomena to realize this menal bent as a natural fact of matter and life. There may be many original continua that are felt to continue in the menal world, but there will be at least one such continuum after all others are eliminated, be it eternal time or infinite space or perpetual mind or whatever. G. One pressing thorn here is how evolving phenomena generates nonsign representamen in the first place, and for this representation to then be felt as nonsign representamen by enabled phanerisms, even well before the emergence of representational signs. It may be that signs are felt by phanerisms like thinkers to offer a metaphysical account of being or of the whole wide world of universes, but it is not likely that only signs generate such a world or fully permeate it. The task of offering such an account and especially to empirical science probably falls to philosophy at its broadest, and the more realist the better. Frances and Edwina earlier wrote--- 1. Allow me to musingly guess, it perhaps may be the representamen of phenomena that fully fills the whole cosmic universe, allowing that there may also be some primal phenomena that are not representamen, and that objects as signs only fills a part of the cosmic universe. EDWINA: The Representamen, in my view, is only one part of the semiosic triad and could never stand on its own. You might be suggesting that Mind [which is functioning in the Representamen, might finally fill the whole universe. I don't see this, as I don't think Mind can exist except as instantiated within Matter. 2. The representamen of phenomena might thus be found as a dyad of ideal continuent things, and real existent objects of which just some objects are signs. Such a secondary or subsequent existentia would hold evolving synechastic objects that are not signs, and evolving semiosic objects that are signs; although all of continua and existentia would nonetheless be representamen and phenomena. EDWINA: Not sure what you mean by this. I think you are saying that some 'things' are ideas and some things are material objects'. I don't agree with this Platonic scena
Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
Edwina, list, I find your dialogue between DOs very interesting, like in your examples some days ago, with the wind, water, and waves. Then I thought, maybe when there is such an interaction, the sign grows spatially: The DOs merge to one DO. Like, first, when there is only the wind but no waves, there is a one way causation: The wind causes the waves. But later, when there are waves, they have a back-effect on the wind, giving it resistance. So later it is an interaction in which each component has an influence on each other. So maybe first the wind and the waves are two different DOs, and later they are one? With two masses attracting each other in space, it is different, there is no delay at the beginning, so the two masses are one DO from the start? Best, Helmut 13. April 2018 um 17:35 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" Helmut, list Interesting. I continue to differentiate between the internal and external - and also, between the local stimuli and non-local laws. I agree that the Sign is a functional composition - but I consider that it is also a spatial and temporal one. It exists and function in time and space. I don't exclude the DO, DI or FI from the Sign; I just differentiate them in space and time. After all - an interaction begins, so to speak, from a DO in dialogue with another DO. Two people interacting; or a bird and an insect. Both are, as interactive agents, operationally DOs. Edwina On Fri 13/04/18 11:29 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Mike, Edwina, list, I have worked out a different model. it is based on the three Peircean categories, and Stanley N. Salthe´s distinction between subsumption (which is the same or something closely related to classification), and composition. The result of it regarding the sign is, that the sign is a functional composition, not a spatial one, and in a functional composition there is no "external", so in my model the DO, DI, and FI are not excluded from the sign. See: www.signs-in-time.de . What I wrote there seems very convoluted first, but I believe it is very systematic. Maybe it is not totally Peircean in the end, but Peirce too changed his mind about many things he had written before, so I thought it was probably ok to adapt a little here and there, so it fits into my model? Not good? Best, Helmut 12. April 2018 um 06:40 Uhr "Mike Bergman" wrote: Hi Edwina, List, Thank you; I knew you would respond in a complete and thoughtful manner. (I also apologize to Frances for responding earlier in the thread and hijacking her more recent comment, since I first asked the question and had been formulating a response directly to Edwina.) So, Edwina, there is much I agree wholeheartedly with in your response, which should not be met with indifference or sneers because what we are really probing here is whether Peirce captured some fundamental essences of reality or not. General Agreement - I agree with all of these interpretations: "there is nothing in my [Edwina's] view that counters or cannot be sustained within a Peircean analysis" "don't confine semiosis to the conceptual or human realm"; "include the physical-chemical and biological realms" "the Sign is . . . a relational dynamic process" I like the use of 'instantiations' to discuss Secondness I concur with the "DO-[IO-R-II]-DI" expansion of the Sign, though once stated, continuing to drag along the DO and DI just seems to complicate things a bit. In real simple terms, DO and DI just affirm Peirce's standard mantra that truth is a limit function, so our signs can only incompletely represent the object and can only be incompletely understood I concur it is better practice to use "the term R or Representamen to differentiate it from the Sign" I concur the Sign is "the triad set of Three Relations [IO-R-II]" "semiosis is Relational; it is necessarily interactive and dynamic" Your CP 8.328, 8.330 quotes of Peirce go without saying. My Real Question My real question relates to your earlier assertion that all three universal categories need not be involved in a relationship with Thirdness, for which you used the term "quasi-necessarily" and also presented your two examples of '3-2' and '3-1'. For example, your '3-2' example of bird beaks evolving for new seed types can not occur without Firstness, the source of chance or variation. I really have no idea what you mean as an "example of 3-1, in the biological realm, would be where organisms reproduce according to the dominant model [iconicity]." Is not an organism a Secondness? By virtue of describing the Sign as 'dynamical' and a 'process' I think you already concede that the Sign, any Sign, is triadic. Thus, while I see certain aspects of the universal categories as being more dominant in a given circumstance, which Peirce also clearly acknowledges in his ten-classification scheme, I do not believe any sign can be monadic or dyadic. A Sign is not synonymous with a relation
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
Helmut, list Interesting. I continue to differentiate between the internal and external - and also, between the local stimuli and non-local laws. I agree that the Sign is a functional composition - but I consider that it is also a spatial and temporal one. It exists and function in time and space. I don't exclude the DO, DI or FI from the Sign; I just differentiate them in space and time. After all - an interaction begins, so to speak, from a DO in dialogue with another DO. Two people interacting; or a bird and an insect. Both are, as interactive agents, operationally DOs. Edwina On Fri 13/04/18 11:29 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Mike, Edwina, list, I have worked out a different model. it is based on the three Peircean categories, and Stanley N. Salthe´s distinction between subsumption (which is the same or something closely related to classification), and composition. The result of it regarding the sign is, that the sign is a functional composition, not a spatial one, and in a functional composition there is no "external", so in my model the DO, DI, and FI are not excluded from the sign. See: www.signs-in-time.de . What I wrote there seems very convoluted first, but I believe it is very systematic. Maybe it is not totally Peircean in the end, but Peirce too changed his mind about many things he had written before, so I thought it was probably ok to adapt a little here and there, so it fits into my model? Not good? Best, Helmut 12. April 2018 um 06:40 Uhr "Mike Bergman" wrote: Hi Edwina, List, Thank you; I knew you would respond in a complete and thoughtful manner. (I also apologize to Frances for responding earlier in the thread and hijacking her more recent comment, since I first asked the question and had been formulating a response directly to Edwina.) So, Edwina, there is much I agree wholeheartedly with in your response, which should not be met with indifference or sneers because what we are really probing here is whether Peirce captured some fundamental essences of reality or not. General Agreement - I agree with all of these interpretations: *"there is nothing in my [Edwina's] view that counters or cannot be sustained within a Peircean analysis" *"don't confine semiosis to the conceptual or human realm"; "include the physical-chemical and biological realms" *"the Sign is . . . a relational dynamic process" *I like the use of 'instantiations' to discuss Secondness *I concur with the "DO-[IO-R-II]-DI" expansion of the Sign, though once stated, continuing to drag along the DO and DI just seems to complicate things a bit. In real simple terms, DO and DI just affirm Peirce's standard mantra that truth is a limit function, so our signs can only incompletely represent the object and can only be incompletely understood *I concur it is better practice to use "the term R or Representamen to differentiate it from the Sign" *I concur the Sign is "the triad set of Three Relations [IO-R-II]" *"semiosis is Relational; it is necessarily interactive and dynamic" *Your CP 8.328, 8.330 quotes of Peirce go without saying. My Real Question My real question relates to your earlier assertion that all three universal categories need not be involved in a relationship with Thirdness, for which you used the term "quasi-necessarily" and also presented your two examples of '3-2' and '3-1'. For example, your '3-2' example of bird beaks evolving for new seed types can not occur without Firstness, the source of chance or variation. I really have no idea what you mean as an "example of 3-1, in the biological realm, would be where organisms reproduce according to the dominant model [iconicity]." Is not an organism a Secondness? By virtue of describing the Sign as 'dynamical' and a 'process' I think you already concede that the Sign, any Sign, is triadic. Thus, while I see certain aspects of the universal categories as being more dominant in a given circumstance, which Peirce also clearly acknowledges in his ten-classification scheme, I do not believe any sign can be monadic or dyadic. A Sign is not synonymous with a relation, even though a "Sign is relational". Some Ancillary Items -- I'm not sure I agree with these characterizations, because they do not feel general enough, but are points I really don't want to dispute or get bogged down with: *"My view of semiosis is that it defines the basic process of Mind-as-Matter in our universe." Yeah, I can see that, and Peirce's use of mind and quasi-mind attempts to define a realm for thought or the symbolic, but I think this is not the metaphor I want to lead with, since there is such a broad range of interpretation about 'mind' and I personally think it is too easily anthropomorphized *"I understand the Representamen as an action of mediation." Hmmm, I really don't like
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
Mike, Edwina, list, I have worked out a different model. it is based on the three Peircean categories, and Stanley N. Salthe´s distinction between subsumption (which is the same or something closely related to classification), and composition. The result of it regarding the sign is, that the sign is a functional composition, not a spatial one, and in a functional composition there is no "external", so in my model the DO, DI, and FI are not excluded from the sign. See: www.signs-in-time.de . What I wrote there seems very convoluted first, but I believe it is very systematic. Maybe it is not totally Peircean in the end, but Peirce too changed his mind about many things he had written before, so I thought it was probably ok to adapt a little here and there, so it fits into my model? Not good? Best, Helmut 12. April 2018 um 06:40 Uhr "Mike Bergman" wrote: Hi Edwina, List, Thank you; I knew you would respond in a complete and thoughtful manner. (I also apologize to Frances for responding earlier in the thread and hijacking her more recent comment, since I first asked the question and had been formulating a response directly to Edwina.) So, Edwina, there is much I agree wholeheartedly with in your response, which should not be met with indifference or sneers because what we are really probing here is whether Peirce captured some fundamental essences of reality or not. General Agreement - I agree with all of these interpretations: "there is nothing in my [Edwina's] view that counters or cannot be sustained within a Peircean analysis" "don't confine semiosis to the conceptual or human realm"; "include the physical-chemical and biological realms" "the Sign is . . . a relational dynamic process" I like the use of 'instantiations' to discuss Secondness I concur with the "DO-[IO-R-II]-DI" expansion of the Sign, though once stated, continuing to drag along the DO and DI just seems to complicate things a bit. In real simple terms, DO and DI just affirm Peirce's standard mantra that truth is a limit function, so our signs can only incompletely represent the object and can only be incompletely understood I concur it is better practice to use "the term R or Representamen to differentiate it from the Sign" I concur the Sign is "the triad set of Three Relations [IO-R-II]" "semiosis is Relational; it is necessarily interactive and dynamic" Your CP 8.328, 8.330 quotes of Peirce go without saying. My Real Question My real question relates to your earlier assertion that all three universal categories need not be involved in a relationship with Thirdness, for which you used the term "quasi-necessarily" and also presented your two examples of '3-2' and '3-1'. For example, your '3-2' example of bird beaks evolving for new seed types can not occur without Firstness, the source of chance or variation. I really have no idea what you mean as an "example of 3-1, in the biological realm, would be where organisms reproduce according to the dominant model [iconicity]." Is not an organism a Secondness? By virtue of describing the Sign as 'dynamical' and a 'process' I think you already concede that the Sign, any Sign, is triadic. Thus, while I see certain aspects of the universal categories as being more dominant in a given circumstance, which Peirce also clearly acknowledges in his ten-classification scheme, I do not believe any sign can be monadic or dyadic. A Sign is not synonymous with a relation, even though a "Sign is relational". Some Ancillary Items -- I'm not sure I agree with these characterizations, because they do not feel general enough, but are points I really don't want to dispute or get bogged down with: "My view of semiosis is that it defines the basic process of Mind-as-Matter in our universe." Yeah, I can see that, and Peirce's use of mind and quasi-mind attempts to define a realm for thought or the symbolic, but I think this is not the metaphor I want to lead with, since there is such a broad range of interpretation about 'mind' and I personally think it is too easily anthropomorphized "I understand the Representamen as an action of mediation." Hmmm, I really don't like this statement. To use your notation, here is how I see it. O is a 2ns, I is a 3ns, and R is a 1ns. We know that Thirdness is often characterized as mediation. Are you really trying to say that the Representamen is in Thirdness?? I don't really have a problem calling the 'universal categories', the phrase most used I think by Peirce, 'modal categories', but I'm not sure Peirce ever used this phrasing. Further, in your own emphasis on the total of six modes, note that O has two options, I has three options, and R stands alone. So, in summary, I question whether 'dynamic processes' can ever be characterized as anything less than triadic. I guess I remain unconvinced that there are classes of interactions involving Thirdness that can be expressed solely as dyadic re
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
Frances - thanks for your comments. I'll try to respond below On Wed 11/04/18 10:13 PM , frances.ke...@sympatico.ca sent: Frances in the wings to Edwina and listers--- 1. Allow me to musingly guess, it perhaps may be the representamen of phenomena that fully fills the whole cosmic universe, allowing that there may also be some primal phenomena that are not representamen, and that objects as signs only fills a part of the cosmic universe. EDWINA: The Representamen, in my view, is only one part of the semiosic triad and could never stand on its own. You might be suggesting that Mind [which is functioning in the Representamen, might finally fill the whole universe. I don't see this, as I don't think Mind can exist except as instantiated within Matter. 2. The representamen of phenomena might thus be found as a dyad of ideal continuent things, and real existent objects of which just some objects are signs. Such a secondary or subsequent existentia would hold evolving synechastic objects that are not signs, and evolving semiosic objects that are signs; although all of continua and existentia would nonetheless be representamen and phenomena. EDWINA: Not sure what you mean by this. I think you are saying that some 'things' are ideas and some things are material objects'. I don't agree with this Platonic scenario. 3. The phenomenal universe could of course synechastically evolve to become phantasmal or mystical, and physical or material, and psychical or mental, or a variable combinatory mix of them all. It is likely however that a universe of existent semiosic signs would be the most viable representamen to continue and advance, and for signers as matter and life to use in dealing with it all. EDWINA: I see your point. 4. A universe of phenomena without representamen would bear or have at least feeling throughout its vastness, and then as the pseudo prematter of representamen it would emerge or grow by exploratory sporting into selected forms of being followed by minding them. All phenomenal matter and life would hence feel itself to be effete or weak mind to some representational extent. EDWINA: Are you saying a universe with mediation, i.e., without the triadic format of O-R-I?? You are describing Peirce's origin of the Universe...which he outlines, as you writeSee 1.412 - and his outline of the emergence of particulars and of habits. 5. Just exactly how representamen would originally emerge from primordial phenomena seems a mystery, but perhaps a synechastic theory of automatic generative representation by phenomena alone would hold a clue. The fact that synechastics as a study of evolution comes before categorics as a study of phenomena should not pose a problem here, because it seems likely that qualitative firstness could feel by itself solely alone, until it conformed with some brute factual secondness, and then came under the control of a lawful thirdness or mind that might assure representative normality to say phenomenal phanerisms. EDWINA: Yes, I agree - the emergence of Mind is indeed a mystery. I can only conclude that Matter without Mind couldn't exist; matter would be chaotic and would reduce to pure low energy. 6. Also note that information is seemingly held to be what a sign comes to bear in acts of semiosis, so that the information does not seemingly exist prior to or apart from the sign that bears it. Information is therefore likely not a part of representamen or objects that are not signs. It is representation however that phenomena might bear throughout the universe. EDWINA: Agree. 7. Furthermore, semiosis and semiotics is seemingly not intended to be a metaphysical account of being or of the whole wide universe. It is seemingly representamen that are not signs along with synechastics and categorics that endures such a task. EDWINA: THis is interesting - but I'm not sure what you mean. ---Frances You partly wrote in effect--- 1. Semiosis defines the basic process of mind as matter in the universe. 2. The sign is a relational dynamic process of interactive existent instantiations. 3. The representamen as a sign is an action of mediation. 4. The relations of signs function within the modal categories or modes of being and organizations of mind as matter. 5. Pure or genuine thirdness is an action of the mind only, and such mind is alienated from physical reality and feelings. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
Mike, list - Thanks for your supportive comments. I'll try to clear up some points. 1] When I say that a degenerate mode of Thirdness is operating, I don't mean that it excludes - within the whole triad - the other modes. For example, with the bird beak - Let's say that the bird's habits, which are stored in the Representamen node, are interacting with the real environment. These interactions will be via the relational interaction between the R and the DO. This interactional mode will be in that 3-2 mode, which simply means that Mind is not purely analytic but is absorbing, connecting with and 'thinking' about the real physical data that is being inputted into the organism. This new input will then trigger a rhematic response - within the II - of novelty [Firstness] such that the DI can develop as a new beak form in Secondness. 2] What I mean by 3-1 is that the Mind, when operating to form a new instantiation [DI] is simply replicating its habits. This is Natural Selection, where the dominant pattern is replicated in the population. The Mind does not absorb or bother with any peripheral or deviant information from the envt. A single organism is in a mode of Secondness - with internal modes operating in Firstness and Thirdness. But the HABITS that mould, that form that organism are in Thirdness - general rules of organization. These interactions are not dyadic. The WHOLE triadic format is involved [IO-R-II] but, the Relation between the R and the O and the R and the I, would be in a mode of either 3-2 or 3-1. Thirdness operating within an indexical action; Thirdness operating within an iconic action. The Sign is always triadic: O-R-I [Note - these are both explained in the paper I sent you]. 3] You wrote: *"I understand the Representamen as an actionof mediation." Hmmm, I really don't like this statement. To use your notation, here is how I see it. O is a 2ns, I is a 3ns, and R is a 1ns. We know that Thirdness is often characterized as mediation. Are you really trying to say that the Representamen is in Thirdness?? The Representamen is the site of mediation between the input data from the DO and the output interpretation of the II and DI. No - I disagree that the external DO is in 2ns. It INCLUDES in its format, matter moulded within, operating within - 1ns and 3ns. After all, that external object exists as such within its own laws of organization ]3ns]. No, the R is rarely in a mode of 1ns. That's only within the most basic triad of a rhematic iconic qualisign. Take a look at the ten classes of triadic models. 2.254 I think. You'll see that 6 of the ten have the Representamen in Thirdness; 3 are in 2ns and only one is in 1ns. 4] The nodal sites, i.e., the O, R and I are NOT the same as the three categories. [I use the term 'mode' because Peirce used the term 'mode' in mode of being'. So- to say 'modal categories' isn't a deviation from their meaning. ]. The three categories, as modes of being, describe the Relations that, for example, the R has with the O, or with the I. See 8.330. 5] I never deviate from the triad - that is, the dynamic semiosic process is always triadic. Again, 3-2 and 3-1 are NOT dyadic relations! It's not Thirdness interacting with something in Firstness or with something in Secondness! It's degenerate Thirdness, which simply means, for 3-2 that it's Thirdness that isn't pure and just pure analytic Mind...but is Mind operating not just theoretically, but, mixed with hard physical reality [Secondness]. And 3-1 isn't pure thirdness which would be 3-3, but Thirdness operating with a sense of shared iconic qualities. These genuine and degenerate forms of Thirdness describe the nature of a Relation...the actual type or mode of that interaction. So- you could have a R interacting with some external O...but ..in a pure Thirdness relationship, which is 3-3 [Thirdness as Thirdness]...the interaction would be purely analytical, purely rhetorical, symbolic. [That is a seed]. But...if that interaction is more grounded in hard physical reality, then, the Mind analysis focuses on the hard physical reality of that Object.[That seed and my beak do not constructively physically interact and I'd better do something about it]. I hope this helps a bit. Edwina On Thu 12/04/18 12:40 AM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent: Hi Edwina, List, Thank you; I knew you would respond in a complete and thoughtful manner. (I also apologize to Frances for responding earlier in the thread and hijacking her more recent comment, since I first asked the question and had been formulating a response directly to Edwina.) So, Edwina, there is much I agree wholeheartedly with in your response, which should not be met with indifference or sneers because what we are
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
Hi Edwina, List,
Thank you; I knew you would respond in a complete and
thoughtful manner. (I also apologize to Frances for responding
earlier in the thread and hijacking her more recent comment,
since I first asked the question and had been formulating a
response directly to Edwina.) So, Edwina, there is much I agree
wholeheartedly with in your response, which should not be met
with indifference or sneers because what we are really probing
here is whether Peirce captured some fundamental essences of
reality or not.
General Agreement
-
I agree with all of these interpretations:
"there is nothing in my [Edwina's] view that counters or
cannot be sustained within a Peircean analysis"
"don't confine semiosis to the conceptual or human realm";
"include the physical-chemical and biological realms"
"the Sign is . . . a relational dynamic process"
I like the use of 'instantiations' to discuss Secondness
I concur with the "DO-[IO-R-II]-DI" expansion of the Sign,
though once stated, continuing to drag along the DO and DI
just seems to complicate things a bit. In real simple terms,
DO and DI just affirm Peirce's standard mantra that truth is a
limit function, so our signs can only incompletely represent
the object and can only be incompletely understood
I concur it is better practice to use "the term R or
Representamen to differentiate it from the Sign"
I concur the Sign is "the triad set of Three Relations
[IO-R-II]"
"semiosis is Relational; it is necessarily interactive and
dynamic"
Your CP 8.328, 8.330 quotes of Peirce go without
saying.
My Real Question
My real question relates to your earlier assertion that all three
universal categories need not be involved in a
relationship with Thirdness, for which you used the term
"quasi-necessarily" and also presented your two examples of '3-2'
and '3-1'.
For example, your '3-2' example of bird beaks evolving for new
seed types can not occur without Firstness, the
source of chance or variation. I really have no idea what you mean
as an "example of 3-1, in the biological realm, would
be where organisms reproduce according to the dominant model
[iconicity]." Is not an organism a Secondness?
By virtue of describing the Sign as 'dynamical' and a 'process'
I think you already concede that the Sign, any Sign, is triadic.
Thus, while I see certain aspects of the universal categories as
being more dominant in a given circumstance, which Peirce also
clearly acknowledges in his ten-classification scheme, I do not
believe any sign can be monadic or dyadic. A Sign is not
synonymous with a relation, even though a "Sign is relational".
Some Ancillary Items
--
I'm not sure I agree with these characterizations, because they do
not feel general enough, but are points I really don't want to
dispute or get bogged down with:
"My view of semiosis is that it defines the basic
process of Mind-as-Matter in our universe." Yeah, I can
see that, and Peirce's use of mind and quasi-mind attempts to
define a realm for thought or the symbolic, but I think this
is not the metaphor I want to lead with, since there is such a
broad range of interpretation about 'mind' and I personally
think it is too easily anthropomorphized
"I understand the Representamen as an action
of mediation." Hmmm, I really don't like this statement. To
use your notation, here is how I see it. O is a 2ns, I is a
3ns, and R is a 1ns. We know that Thirdness is often
characterized as mediation. Are you really trying to say
that the Representamen is in Thirdness??
I don't really have a problem calling the 'universal
categories', the phrase most used I think by Peirce, 'modal
categories', but I'm not sure Peirce ever used this
phrasing. Further, in your own emphasis on the total of six
modes, note that O has two options, I has three options, and
R stands alone.
So, in summary, I question whether 'dynamic processes' can
ever be characterized as anything less than triadic. I guess I
remain unconvinced that there are classes of interactions
involving Thirdness that can be expressed solely as dyadic
relations ('3-1', '3-2'). I can see the argument for a dominant
mode (1ns or 2ns), but ones that still require participation by
all three of the universal cate
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
Frances in the wings to Edwina and listers--- 1. Allow me to musingly guess, it perhaps may be the representamen of phenomena that fully fills the whole cosmic universe, allowing that there may also be some primal phenomena that are not representamen, and that objects as signs only fills a part of the cosmic universe. 2. The representamen of phenomena might thus be found as a dyad of ideal continuent things, and real existent objects of which just some objects are signs. Such a secondary or subsequent existentia would hold evolving synechastic objects that are not signs, and evolving semiosic objects that are signs; although all of continua and existentia would nonetheless be representamen and phenomena. 3. The phenomenal universe could of course synechastically evolve to become phantasmal or mystical, and physical or material, and psychical or mental, or a variable combinatory mix of them all. It is likely however that a universe of existent semiosic signs would be the most viable representamen to continue and advance, and for signers as matter and life to use in dealing with it all. 4. A universe of phenomena without representamen would bear or have at least feeling throughout its vastness, and then as the pseudo prematter of representamen it would emerge or grow by exploratory sporting into selected forms of being followed by minding them. All phenomenal matter and life would hence feel itself to be effete or weak mind to some representational extent. 5. Just exactly how representamen would originally emerge from primordial phenomena seems a mystery, but perhaps a synechastic theory of automatic generative representation by phenomena alone would hold a clue. The fact that synechastics as a study of evolution comes before categorics as a study of phenomena should not pose a problem here, because it seems likely that qualitative firstness could feel by itself solely alone, until it conformed with some brute factual secondness, and then came under the control of a lawful thirdness or mind that might assure representative normality to say phenomenal phanerisms. 6. Also note that information is seemingly held to be what a sign comes to bear in acts of semiosis, so that the information does not seemingly exist prior to or apart from the sign that bears it. Information is therefore likely not a part of representamen or objects that are not signs. It is representation however that phenomena might bear throughout the universe. 7. Furthermore, semiosis and semiotics is seemingly not intended to be a metaphysical account of being or of the whole wide universe. It is seemingly representamen that are not signs along with synechastics and categorics that endures such a task. ---Frances You partly wrote in effect--- 1. Semiosis defines the basic process of mind as matter in the universe. 2. The sign is a relational dynamic process of interactive existent instantiations. 3. The representamen as a sign is an action of mediation. 4. The relations of signs function within the modal categories or modes of being and organizations of mind as matter. 5. Pure or genuine thirdness is an action of the mind only, and such mind is alienated from physical reality and feelings. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Asking for Specifics
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Mike - I sent a long response but it seems to have disappeared. I'll
try again.
First - I expect this response will be met with indifference or
sneers from the list but I maintain that there is nothing in my view
that counters or cannot be sustained within a Peircean analysis.
My view of semiosis is that it defines the basic process of
Mind-as-Matter in our universe. That is, I don't confine semiosis to
the conceptual or human realm. I include the physical-chemical and
biological realms.
Therefore, my view of the Sign is that it is a relational dynamic
process, where Mind becomes Matter, as 'instantiations' [which can
last anywhere from a nanosecond to centuries] within an ongoing
interactiional triadic process. So, the Sign is a crystal, a rock, a
bacterium, an insect...and a word, a sentence etc. AND - all of these
'instantiations' are interactive with other 'instants' or
Mind-as-Matter.
The basic Sign is a Set of Relations: DO-[IO-R-II]-DI... I add the
DO Relation to the basic triad because no Sign can exist as isolate.
I use the term R or Representamen to differentiate it from the Sign,
which I see as the triad set of Three Relations [IO-R-II]. As we
know, there need not be a DI, but, most existent instances do produce
a new form of matter/mind. [See 4,536, 8.314-]. I understand the
Representamen as an action of mediation.
I understand, therefore, that this semiosis is Relational; it is
necessarily interactive and dynamic. How do the Relations function?
Within the modal categories. These categories are modes of being, or
organizations of Mind-as-Matter.
So, as Peirce outlines, "Firstness is the mode of being of that
which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything
else.
Secondness is the mode of being..with respect to a second but
regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being ...bringing a second and third in
relation to each other'. 8.328.
But Peirce doesn't just use these three modes. He mixes them up to
create a total of six - and this mixture enables pragmatic or
'factual' adaptation.
So- genuine Secondness functions by setting up Relations that are
brute interactions; 'one thing acting upon another' 8.330. 1.380] But
there is a 'degenerate Secondness' where the Relational interaction
involves a shared quality between the two [8.330, 2.91].
And pure or genuine Thirdness is an action of the Mind only -
aspatial and atemporal and alienated from physical reality and
feelings. But, if you add in Secondness to it, such that the relation
is 3-2, then, the mental interaction includes a physical contact with
existential reality. [2.92, 8.330] And if you insert Firstness into
the mental interaction, then, the relationship is one of similarity,
iconicity.
Examples include, in the biological realm, of 3-2, where an
organism, operating within its habits of organization [3rdness] will
interact, informationally, via Secondness with the external world -
to inform itself about these physical realities, such that a bird,
for example, will adapt its beak to better deal with novel seed
forms. A bacterium will adapt to antibiotics.
An example of 3-1, in the biological realm, would be where organisms
reproduce according to the dominant model [iconicity].
You referred to word examples. I'm not sure if you refer to the
conceptual realm. I'd give as an example, in this realm, of 3-2 where
a belief system will relate to external existential reality -and so,
will adapt. An example of 3-1 is an iconic mindset [see Peirce's a
priori fixation of belief] where beliefs are held due to the dominant
population.
Now - I hope that this attempt gets through!
Edwina
On Wed 11/04/18 3:13 AM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
Hi Edwina,
You stated in the 'General Agreement' thread:
But Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2,
3-1] and this enables information exchange with the environment
[via 3-2] rather than simple repetition of type [3-1]. So,
Firstness is involved to enable adaptation, and Secondness is
involved to enable direct contact with the local environmental
realities. The result - is an adapted insect.
I like the adaptive insect portion, but, honestly, I'd like you
to present word examples of what you mean by these complexes of
types. For example, please explain '3-1' or via '3-2'. Are these
predicates? That seems to be central to your argument. And, are
predicates in Thirdness?
Best, Mike
Edwina
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