Frances to Edwina and listers--- My search goes on for a Peircean approach to at least metaphysical being. In response to your kind reply, consider some of my rambling tentative guesses, but without any specific Peircean references. (The new lettered paras directly below roughly refer to the earlier numbered paras further below.)
A. Peircean philosophy overall is a brand of realism called idealist realism. His idealism posits a world of infinite continuity. His realism posits a world of continuing activity. Under his realism falls naturalist pragmatism, which posits respectively a cause to action and a purpose to action. The fated destiny of the world is disposed tendencies, so that the agent of such telic design is simply a trait determined by the habit of law. Further theories in support of these theories include objective relativism and fallibilism. B. Phenomena are needed by say enabled phanerisms to get at accessible or inaccessible being or stuff or things or objects or whatever, and then only by way of representamen as nonsigns or signs that stand for it. For the rest of the phenomenal universe that yet lacks emergent representamen, it would likely remain unrepresented and of course inaccessible. C. To speculate, the whole wide world of galactic universes might be held as sented mena that seemingly grows into presented nomena and represented phenomena and derepresented epiphenomena; but only phanerisms can feel they feel or sense or know such mena, and then only by way of phenomena that are representamen. This built menal scheme suggests that the world of phenomena is of menal secondness and is thus a dyadic or dual structure. D. The feeling and being and minding of say extra menal phenomena continues infinitely to act independent of phenomena and representamen, and also of phenomenal matter and life, but can be guessed by phanerisms to be in the distant evolving world by way of phenomenal representamen; which phenomenal stuff as matter or life can be of continuent things, or of existent objects that are also signs of other objects. E. The phenomenal terness or menal dyad of manythingness and somethingness initially emerges from the medadic chaos of nomenal nothingness or empty zeroness as a class holder ready to be filled with phenomenal thingness. The tendential evolution of what is felt by enabled phanerisms to be represented as phenomenal matter is of sporting monadic firstness alone, seeking to conform together with some dyadic secondness, and even finding to be controlled by the lawful habits of triadic thirdness to assure the phenomenal matter of natural normality. F. Overall menal mind or minding is the law of feeling and being and minding that emerges from the constant trait and habit of action. Phanerisms use representative phenomena to realize this menal bent as a natural fact of matter and life. There may be many original continua that are felt to continue in the menal world, but there will be at least one such continuum after all others are eliminated, be it eternal time or infinite space or perpetual mind or whatever. G. One pressing thorn here is how evolving phenomena generates nonsign representamen in the first place, and for this representation to then be felt as nonsign representamen by enabled phanerisms, even well before the emergence of representational signs. It may be that signs are felt by phanerisms like thinkers to offer a metaphysical account of being or of the whole wide world of universes, but it is not likely that only signs generate such a world or fully permeate it. The task of offering such an account and especially to empirical science probably falls to philosophy at its broadest, and the more realist the better. Frances and Edwina earlier wrote--- 1. Allow me to musingly guess, it perhaps may be the representamen of phenomena that fully fills the whole cosmic universe, allowing that there may also be some primal phenomena that are not representamen, and that objects as signs only fills a part of the cosmic universe. EDWINA: The Representamen, in my view, is only one part of the semiosic triad and could never stand on its own. You might be suggesting that Mind [which is functioning in the Representamen, might finally fill the whole universe. I don't see this, as I don't think Mind can exist except as instantiated within Matter. 2. The representamen of phenomena might thus be found as a dyad of ideal continuent things, and real existent objects of which just some objects are signs. Such a secondary or subsequent existentia would hold evolving synechastic objects that are not signs, and evolving semiosic objects that are signs; although all of continua and existentia would nonetheless be representamen and phenomena. EDWINA: Not sure what you mean by this. I think you are saying that some 'things' are ideas and some things are material objects'. I don't agree with this Platonic scenario. 3. The phenomenal universe could of course synechastically evolve to become phantasmal or mystical, and physical or material, and psychical or mental, or a variable combinatory mix of them all. It is likely however that a universe of existent semiosic signs would be the most viable representamen to continue and advance, and for signers as matter and life to use in dealing with it all. EDWINA: I see your point. 4. A universe of phenomena without representamen would bear or have at least feeling throughout its vastness, and then as the pseudo prematter of representamen it would emerge or grow by exploratory sporting into selected forms of being followed by minding them. All phenomenal matter and life would hence feel itself to be effete or weak mind to some representational extent. EDWINA: Are you saying a universe with mediation, i.e., without the triadic format of O-R-I?? You are describing Peirce's origin of the Universe...which he outlines, as you write....See 1.412 - and his outline of the emergence of particulars and of habits. 5. Just exactly how representamen would originally emerge from primordial phenomena seems a mystery, but perhaps a synechastic theory of automatic generative representation by phenomena alone would hold a clue. The fact that synechastics as a study of evolution comes before categorics as a study of phenomena should not pose a problem here, because it seems likely that qualitative firstness could feel by itself solely alone, until it conformed with some brute factual secondness, and then came under the control of a lawful thirdness or mind that might assure representative normality to say phenomenal phanerisms. EDWINA: Yes, I agree - the emergence of Mind is indeed a mystery. I can only conclude that Matter without Mind couldn't exist; matter would be chaotic and would reduce to pure low energy. 6. Also note that information is seemingly held to be what a sign comes to bear in acts of semiosis, so that the information does not seemingly exist prior to or apart from the sign that bears it. Information is therefore likely not a part of representamen or objects that are not signs. It is representation however that phenomena might bear throughout the universe. EDWINA: Agree. 7. Furthermore, semiosis and semiotics is seemingly not intended to be a metaphysical account of being or of the whole wide universe. It is seemingly representamen that are not signs along with synechastics and categorics that endures such a task. EDWINA: THis is interesting - but I'm not sure what you mean. Edwina originally but partly wrote in effect--- 1. Semiosis defines the basic process of mind as matter in the universe. 2. The sign is a relational dynamic process of interactive existent instantiations. 3. The representamen as a sign is an action of mediation. 4. The relations of signs function within the modal categories or modes of being and organizations of mind as matter. 5. Pure or genuine thirdness is an action of the mind only, and such mind is alienated from physical reality and feelings.
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