Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

It is exacting to read Peirce only literally.

But in numerous places, Peirce lets us know that he is aware of us.



For example, from the Commens Dictionary:



“… Should somebody here whip out his lead pencil in order to note on the
margin of the page that no such immiscibility attaches to the subjects of
the *fruitfulness* of observations and that [of] reasonings, *I hope he
will pause long enough to reflect* that I can hardly be supposed to have
selected the unusual word “uberty” instead of “fruitfulness” merely because
it is spelled with half as many letters. Observations may be as *fruitful* as
you will, but they cannot be said to be *gravid* with young truth in the
sense in which reasoning may be, not because of the nature of the subject
it considers, but because of the manner in which it is supported by the
ratiocinative instinct.”



and,



Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of
these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.]



Note that in these three lines one finds, “conceivably,” “conceive,”
“conception,” “conception,” “conception.” Now I find there are many people
who detect the authorship of my unsigned screeds; and I doubt not that one
of the marks of my style by which they do so is my inordinate reluctance to
repeat a word. This employment five times over of derivates of
*concipere* *must
then have had a purpose*."



Hence, it is to our advantage to know that he regarded us when
communicating his work.  So, what are some reasons to support his purpose,
which we may tie down to promote ultimate liberty?





Hookway recapitulates our current situation regarding the pragmatic maxim:



“Many recent pragmatists are doubtful that a defensible form of the maxim
can be found.  However the connections between the two are clear…” ~SEP,

*First published Sat Aug 16, 2008; substantive revision Mon Oct 7, 2013*



Are the connections clear?



Reasons for why pragmatic maxim are listed everywhere:

*viz*., tool of analysis, make meanings clear, give account of meaning,
guide habits of action toward purpose, virtually the philosophy of
Socrates, etc...).

Yet, they all appear vague when placed next to CP 5.402.



So, why not CP 5.189?  If not this, which?  What is your *strongest
argument*?



That is, if we simply swap expectations for CP 5.402 and redirect them
towards CP 5.189, would we conclude that CP 5.189 is a good maxim; the
*best* one even?



If “logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad.” ~Peirce



Then does it follow that we possess a good, defensible form of the maxim
where the connections have the best likeness to one another?

__



For instance, here is an anecdote that illustrates the vitality that comes
attached to CP 5.189:



I learned a new word, yesterday: adversative.

Adversative is a “favorite word”, in this case, those words that change the
direction of a thought or a poem, (c.f., 14:50- 16:23):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RHa4HqfWv0o



So, if adversative should matter, then CP 5.189 over CP 5.402 because *But*.




For if we were to start with a declaration of a state of affairs, ‘we
look’,

and if we do now value favorite words- find them sexy even,

then we have reason to suspect that this maxim allows us to play in this
jungle gym.



Is it possible that we have here a single thing to which we can attach many
different predicates?  Peirce asserted that we cannot escape predestinate
opinion; that the progress of investigation will carry us by a force
outside of ourselves to one and the same conclusion.  Such things, if true,
I would call divine.  With respect to divine things, perhaps it is time to
take providence more seriously.



That is, to the living man who inquires about the pragmatic maxim:



“: — *O wonderful being, and to what are you looking*?





With best wishes,
Jerry Rhee

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:01 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list:
>
>
>
> If pragmaticism appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates,
> then it should be helpful to see Peirce and Plato in the same place.  Here,
> I’d like to use them together to determine the Sign of pragmatic maxim.
> That is, give reasons for why the name/definition/essence should go from
> surprise to suspect.
>
>
>
> A primary theme of Platonic philosophy is the assertion that there is a 
> “threefold
> knowledge of things…I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the
> definition of the essence, and the name,- these are the three; and there
> are two questions which may be raised about anything…
>
> Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; or he may
> give the definition and ask the name.” ~*Laws*
>
>
>
> In *Cratylus*, Plato discusses a fitness of names in context of a theory
> of the truth of names.  The dialogue supplies considerations for what a
> good name consists in; it 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

In *Pragmatism and the Normativity of Assertion,* Helmut Pape begins his
essay with a quote by Peirce:



“*No general description of the mode of advance of human knowledge can be
just which leaves out of account the social aspect of knowledge…*

*What a thing society is!...”*



Then he observes:



“Pragmatism is many things to many people…



According to Richard Rorty we are pragmatists, if we admit that we know the
criteria for truth whenever we know what we want…

Nevertheless, *knowing* what we want with any precision and to determine by
that knowledge coherent criteria for truth may be a harder task than Rorty
imagines.”

___



To illustrate just how hard this task is of 1) knowing and stating what we
want with any precision and 2) determining coherent criteria for truth from
that knowledge; *here is what I want*.  Here is my normative assertion
stated explicitly.



*I want to condense, simplify and spread the complete meaning of
pragmaticism in a single maxim, one and only one*.



That is, I want to maintain the relevant complexity but present it in
simplicity.

The one stated in CP 5.402 (“Consider what effects…”, the “*received view”*)
is unsatisfactory, fragmentary and *incomplete*.



Alternatively, I present *this* pragmatic maxim, the one and only one that
faithfully and *completely* condenses pragmaticism, for “if you carefully
consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else
than the question of the logic of abduction”:



The surprising fact, C, is observed.

But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.

Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.  (CP 5.189)



To say then, that CP 5.189 is that complete pragmatic maxim is to say that
it serves as the foundation for what it means to be a pragmaticist.

It is to say that exercising the will to adopt and use this maxim to solve
complex problems is to expect convergence of diverse minds to a single
truth in spite of *dark* conditions.

It is to say that this is the “right rule of logical analysis”.

Adoption of this preamble “makes things *a priori”*.

It is to accept this maxim as a “formal, and necessary presupposition of
all meaningful claims about reality”.

This “logical principles state conditions that make the objective
representation of states of affairs possible”.



CP 5.189 is an argument because *On a New List of Categories*.

If “to determine an interpretant is the function of arguments”, then
adopting this argument is to determine an interpretant.  It is to make
meanings clear.



If you examine this argument closely, you will find that *this* argument
(unlike CP 5.402) gives you a sequence; it “claims that the process of
sign-transformation involves *some* real sequential cognitive process:

*…all my own writings upon formal logic have been based on the belief that
the concept of Sequence, alike in reasonings and in judgments…could in no
wise be replaced by any composition of ideas.  For in reasoning, at least,
we affirm, or, affirmatively judge, the conjugate of the premises, the
judgment of the conclusion has not yet been performed.  There then follows
a real movement in thought.*



That is, CP 5.189 better than CP 5.402 because sequence.


When you examine it, this “*logical principle* considered as a proposition
will be found to be quite empty”.   That is, the argument must be
transformed into an argumentation for it to be not empty.


As you fill out terms C and A explicitly, *utter them out loud in public*,
you will realize “that no term has a connotation incapable of logical
analysis- there are no truly “simple” terms.”



In summary, it is precise to this extent.  Filling out terms explicitly
with a correct habit of mind (dialectic and not eristic) will lead to
making ideas clear because that is the function of arguments, to determine
interpretants.

This immerses you in the social aspect of knowledge construction and will
help you discover on your own what the criteria are for truth-making.

___



Now the difficulty:



Who gets to speak for all who investigate, especially about complex
situations?

Where is this proof for such a thing?



That is, if “knowledge, like the verb ‘to know’, means two things, of which
one is potential and one actual”, then where is this “teridentity of its
object that is developed in a sequence of interpretations, which is
complete and perfect because it contains the ultimate interpretant of every
sign”?



That is,

*if* “The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except
through the medium of examples”,

*then* “What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with
the political occupation?”


Where is this thing to "take these in the case of one instance, and so
understand them in the case of all"?



“: — O wonderful being, and to what are you looking?



Are we to find this “truth of the pragmatic maxim by relying on findings in
biology and psychology”?

For “every man seems to know all 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:



Wonderful!  Thank you for stating your position clearly.



So now, all we need decide is whether CP 5.189 is or is not a pragmatic
maxim.

But before that, we need to decide whether it is or is not a maxim.

For a pragmatic maxim belongs to the set of maxims.



Here are some standards for “maxim”:



‘*Every man who has seen the world knows that nothing is so useless as a
general maxim’*, wrote Lord Macaulay in 1827.



In Macaulay’s view, outlined here, maxims are essentially for the purpose
of regulating conduct by preventing foolish action, but do not often work.



General maxims’ are for the improvement and education of the masses and
might occasionally prevent folly..



But in pre-theoretical thought, maxims are a way of preserving truth, a way
of ‘thinking memorable thoughts’, the very stuff of knowledge, replete with
communal values.



They are used by, and of, the socially-elevated as much as the common
people; by and of women; in a casual, ordinary ‘*ofost is selost’* (haste
is best) way, as well as for narrative, rhetorical and emphatic purpose. “

*~* Paul Cavill, Maxims in Old English Poetry





“A *form*, consisting in universality; and in this view the formula of the
moral imperative is expressed thus, that the

maxims must be so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of
nature.”

~Kant



As to reasons for why pragmatic maxim, I would refer to Jon and John’s
arguments.



But what I would also like to point out are their reasons for why CP 5.189
is *NOT* a maxim, much less a pragmatic one, for there must also be reasons
to suspect A is *not* true.



I would challenge you to defend that position.

That is, the *reasons* for why CP 5.189 as a pragmatic maxim is surprising
and/or suspicious to you.



Thank you for the conversation.



Best,

Jerry Rhee

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 1:43 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> I agree with Jon, of course. He is right about the confusion, and the
> issue I tried to address in my previous post was to find some common
> unifying factor, not necessarily the best statement of the pragmatic maxim.
> Nonetheless, I believe there are better and worse versions, and that these
> are far outweighed by partial versions (not to mention outright
> misunderstandings).
>
>
>
> The non-existence of a single or best pragmatic maxim in Peirce makes
> Jerry’s request of me impossible to satisfy., as I tried in a rather around
> about way to explain.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Saturday, 15 October 2016 8:24 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
>
>
> List:
>
>
>
> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion to a new thread
> topic.  I would appreciate it if others would do likewise when extending
> any of the other ongoing conversations about pragmatic maxims or other
> subjects besides Peirce's cosmology.
>
>
>
> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the *pragmatic maxim," which
> is a very specific principle of *methodeutic *with multiple formulations
> in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim," which is not
> something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.  In particular,
> CP 5.189 is not *the *pragmatic maxim, nor even *a* pragmatic maxim in
> the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best* pragmatic maxim.  For
> one thing, as we established recently in another thread, it is the form of
> inference for abduction *only*, and thus falls under logical *critic*.
> *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently serves as a tool for admitting
> hypotheses that are amenable to deductive explication and inductive
> evaluation, and rejecting those that are not.
>
>
>
> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which *pragmatic
> maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>
>
>
> That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
> needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
> hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
> suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
> really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
> not understood as a proposition in psychology. (CP 5.196; 1903)
>
>
>
> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>
>
>
> For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical
> effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far
> as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might
> conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second
> conception.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[John Collier]

I agree with Jon, of course. He is right about the confusion, and the issue I 
tried to address in my previous post was to find some common unifying factor, 
not necessarily the best statement of the pragmatic maxim. Nonetheless, I 
believe there are better and worse versions, and that these are far outweighed 
by partial versions (not to mention outright misunderstandings).

The non-existence of a single or best pragmatic maxim in Peirce makes Jerry’s 
request of me impossible to satisfy., as I tried in a rather around about way 
to explain.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 8:24 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

List:

Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion to a new thread topic.  I 
would appreciate it if others would do likewise when extending any of the other 
ongoing conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects besides Peirce's 
cosmology.

There seems to be a confusion here between "the pragmatic maxim," which is a 
very specific principle of methodeutic with multiple formulations in Peirce's 
writings, and "the best pragmatic maxim," which is not something that Peirce 
ever discussed as far as I can tell.  In particular, CP 5.189 is not the 
pragmatic maxim, nor even a pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is 
certainly not the best pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established 
recently in another thread, it is the form of inference for abduction only, and 
thus falls under logical critic.  The pragmatic maxim subsequently serves as a 
tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to deductive explication and 
inductive evaluation, and rejecting those that are not.

In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate which pragmatic maxim 
Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...

That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render 
needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as 
hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful 
suggestions; and, furthermore, this is all that the maxim of pragmatism really 
pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is not 
understood as a proposition in psychology. (CP 5.196; 1903)

... because he told us in the very next sentence.

For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect or 
import differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken in 
connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify 
our practical conduct differently from that second conception.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:14 PM, Jerry Rhee 
> wrote:
John Collier, John Sowa, Kirsti Maatanen, Edwina Taborsky, list:

John Collier:
But that is my point.  Isn't a pragmatic maxim to be taken strictly since it is 
carefully crafted, with logographic necessity, then it shouldn't be handled 
loosely.  To say that such things are in the pragmatic maxim (the pragmatic 
maxim and not a pragmatic maxim) also implies that it is in ONE pragmatic 
maxim, the best one.  So, which one?  I think this is the matter that does not 
get criticized enough.
__

John Sowa, Edwina:

"logos means something rather like calculation than religion..." ~Strauss

“The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, number 
and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness 
that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and 
geometrician?”
~Plato

“By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower 
meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy is.”~Strauss

“When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which 
experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent 
arguments in its favor, each independent argument pro or con produces a certain 
impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for its quantity upon the 
frequency with which arguments of those kinds lead to the truth, and the 
algebraical sum of these impressions is the resultant impression that measures 
the wise man’s state of opinion on the whole.” ~Peirce

The way begets one;
One begets two;
Two begets three;
Three begets the myriad creatures.
~Lau 42


Kirsti,

You said:
I just wished to point out that it indeed is very important to study in detail 
the exact wording CSP worked