Jim,
[Jim Willgoose:] I am playing at trying to reject it. ("poss.Bs
poss.~Bs") I have accepted it more often than not.
Now you tell me.
[Jim] I also understand the difference between discussing formal
properties that hold between propositions (modal or non-modal) and forming a
"1st
Ben,
You say,
"Saying that the NLC 'theory' of cognition (which seems to me no more a cognition theory than Peircean truth theory is an inquiry theory even though it references inquiry) is sufficient except when we talk about possibility, feasibility, etc., is -- especially if that list
Ben,
(I responded to your later message first.) I agree with a lot here.The idea that there are objective possibilities that are true, regardless of our knowledge, has beenarguably the central issue in discussions of philosophical realism for 2500 years. The idea of objective indeterminacy is a
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which
involves no contradiction. Let us call that sort of logical possibility,
essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical
possibility; for in this sense, two
Thanks Ben,
Well,I guess the passage doesn't discuss modal propositions if you disallow rephrasing "this stove is possibly black" with 'It is possible that "this stove is black."'There is certainly a logic of possibility at work.Why aren' t these modal propositions?It is just that the
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] (I responded to your later message first.) I agree with
a lot here.The idea that there are objective possibilities that are true,
regardless of our knowledge, has beenarguably the central issue in
discussions of philosophical realism for 2500 years. The idea of
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Well, I guess the passage doesn't discuss modal
propositions if you disallow rephrasing "this stove is possibly black" with 'It
is possible that "this stove is black."' There is certainly a logic of
possibility at work.Why aren' t these modal propositions?It is just
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily
understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential
contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and
furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might
Jim,
I should add, upon re-reading your comments, that the idea of possibility
that I've been discussing has pretty much been in terms of ignorance, but it
seems to me that the terms don't need to be essentially in terms of ignorance.
If one is talking about a future event, then the reason
Thanks Ben,
There is a difference between treating possibility epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and "possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not allowing multiple
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] There is a difference between treating possibility
epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and
"possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state
of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not
Ben,
Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction Let us call that sort of logical possibility, essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical possibility; for in this sense, two propositions contradictory
Thanks Ben,
The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might
Ben,
You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove
is,
isn't,
may be,
might
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly,
probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or
proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can
apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may
Thanks Ben,
It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem area.
You say,
"The disparity of Peirce's approaches to (1) attribution
Jim, list,
[Jim Wilgoose] It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have
been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say
you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem
area.
[Jim] You say,
[Ben] The disparity of Peirce's
Dear Folks-- poking about I found that much of what
Peirce says about perceptionrelevant to our discussion of
verification. (I think what makes verification possible within
representation is that the capacity to respond to secondness is inherent in
representation -- Peirce didn't say that
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