[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose:] I am playing at trying to reject it. ("poss.Bs
poss.~Bs") I have accepted it more often than not.
Now you tell me.
[Jim] I also understand the difference between discussing formal
properties that hold between propositions (modal or non-modal) and forming a
"1st order" proposition out of the discussion of contingent
propositionsand the formal properties. This could be made clearer by
noting the following:
[Jim] "P" is a contingent proposition
[Jim] "P" "-P"are feasible.
[Jim] "" and "feasible" are part of the metalanguage used to
discuss contingent propositions.
[Jim] "feas. P" "feas.-P" are ill-formed.
[Jim] Explanation: "Feasibility" is a 2nd order predicate used to
discuss
It does appear that you understand the difference, though the example could
be misleading. We often do not have distinct words for the object and the sign,
and, even in the case of the word "true" where we can distinguish"true"
(corresponding to the real, to the genuine, etc.) from"real," "genuine,"
etc., nevertheless the word "true" doesdouble duty and we douse the
word "true" about objects in orderto call them genuine, real, authentic,
rather than in order to call them signs corresponding to the real.In the
cases of "possible," "feasible," etc., we're not always going to have enough
words to make the distinction easily. Thus saying that some proposition "Hs" is
feasible could be taken to mean that"Hs" is something which
isfeasible asa proposition. Thusformal logic has functors and
ordinary English has adverbswhich grammatically modify the whole
clause.Some of the functors are too powerful for 1st-order logic, and
whether or not we formalize them as modifying (describing) the proposition or as
altering the attribution of a modification to a substance or re-routing the
denotative force (e.g., to "another than x" or to "inverted order of xyz"), the
basic difference is that, in attributing a modification to a substance, we do
not change which modification or which substance we're discussing. On the other
hand, in "modifying" a modification or its attribution, by negation or
modalizing, etc., we _are_ changing and even reversing what it is that we're
attributing to the substance. In rerouting the denotative force, we're changing
which objects we're characterizing as such--such. I mean, for instance,
"another thing than this stove" is not a kind of this stove, and that "red dog"
is a kind of dog, but "nonred dog" is not a kind of red dog and "non-canine" is
not a kind of canine, "possibly canine" is not a kind of canine, etc. One may
feel more comfortable by thinking in terms of a sign which can be described as
not corresponding to a given obect, or as possibly corresponding to given
object, so that one is dealing with various kinds of the same sign. In the
construction of deductive formalisms, it's often better to avoid the syntactical
complication of formalizing adverbs as functors. But the point in philosophy is
not rephrasability, but instead to understand the result and end of such
procedures, in which the description of signs is a _means_ to
_transformations_ of extension and intension, transformations which
themselves are a means to represent real relationships. The research interest of
smoothing and smoothly "encoding" cognitions into common convenient keys
ormodes guides deductive maths of propositions, predicates, etc.; but does
not guide philosophy, which is more interested in the corresponding "decoding."
Philosophy applies deductive formalisms but is no more merely applied deductive
theory of logic than statistical theory were merely applied probability theory.
_Contra_ many of the linguistic analysis school, philosophy is no more
merely _criticism_ of arguments, argumentswhereof deductive
theory of logic is the _theory_, than statistical theory is merely
_criticism_ of probabilitypropositions whereof probability theory
is the _theory_. There is such a thing as "applied probability theory"
but it is not statistical theory, and a statistical theorist who merely devised
possibly applicable probability formalisms but left the task of statistical
inference to others would be no statistical theorist.
[Jim] This looks strangely similar to where we started in terms of
rephrasing "she is possibly pregnant" as 'it is possible that "she is pregnant"'
or ':she is pregnant" is possible.' But then, 2nd order assertions obey
the theory of NLC cognition except we talk of feasibility, optimality,
possibility and even assertibility. "Assertibility" would be an even
higher-order predicate. Wasn't your initial concern with certain epistemic
predicates that qualify "1st order" predicates?
To the contrary, my initial concern was with the categories {substance,
accident, whetherhood, and object(s)-to-object(s) relations (e.g.
mappings)}.
As I've said, the point is that the mind must be able to treat things in
terms of alternatives to the
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Ben,
You say,
"Saying that the NLC 'theory' of cognition (which seems to me no more a cognition theory than Peircean truth theory is an inquiry theory even though it references inquiry) is sufficient except when we talk about possibility, feasibility, etc., is -- especially if that list includes negation (you don't say) --to deny that there is an issue of cognizing in terms of alternatives to the actual and apparent, etc., even though then logical conceptions of meaning and implication become unattainable. " (END)
It is not asufficient theory. I see it as asking"what are the most general elements ina process by which the mind forms propositions." The example is a simple case ofperceptual data. But, it is not a complete theory of knowledge. In fact, it is more of a chapter in the history of cognitive psychology. It is a logical description of a psychological process;some parts of which may be empirically established. (For instance, Peirce thinks it is questionable what the then current results of empirical psychology have established with respect to acts of comparison and contrast.) If the paper is coupled with some theses from the JSP series, itseems clear to me that a theory of cognition emerges that could be of interest to psycholinguists and cognitive scientists working in language formation and even speech-act theory. Does it handle all epistemic interests, propositional attitudes, modalities? No.
But it is not a special science since the results uncovered are precisely the most general elements used in any inquiry.It is more nearly what the 1901 Baldwin entry suggests, namely, erkenntnislehre, a doctrine of elements. Peirce struggled with where to assign this study. Is it a part of logic or pre-logical? There doesn't seem to bemuch of the normative concern that later demarcates logic proper. But there is a law-like element that is presupposed in so far as "one can only discover unity by introducing it." That transcendental point could easily mark a historical divide between naturalists such as Quine and "static" modelists such as Chomsky. In some sense, grammar is the issue, although generalized to the utmost. Both could take the spirit of the paper and do things, Chomsky in the specialized application to syntactic structures and transformational grammar, and Quine, in so far as the theory is empirically testable, as shedding some light on knowledge.(He is also obviously engaged in the "paraphrase" business.)
Modern epistemology cannot even get off the ground with this NLC paper unless the enterprise is so naturalized that the theory (historical curiosity or not) is used to guide research in the relevant special sciences. The specific perceptual cognition and cognitive assertion under discussion meet none of the criteria for knowledge in the "classical" picture. The assertion "this stove is black" need neither be justified, true, or even believed. The paper, at least in part, is merely explanatory, if only insufficiently, of what is required to even begin the classical assessment.
You say,
"But the point in philosophy is not rephrasability, but instead to understand the result and end of such procedures, in which the description of signs is a _means_ to _transformations_ of extension and intension, transformations which themselves are a means to represent real relationships. The research interest of smoothing and smoothly "encoding" cognitions into common convenient keys ormodes guides deductive maths of propositions, predicates, etc.; but does not guide philosophy, which is more interested in the corresponding "decoding." Philosophy applies deductive formalisms but is no more merely applied deductive theory of logic than statistical theory were merely applied probability theory." (END)
Well, I agree. It is not for nothing that normative science is structured the way it is in Peirce's architecture. The purpose of logical analysis, linguistic analysis, "theory criticism," can't be lost sight of.
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 10:39 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose:] I am playing at trying to reject it. ("poss.Bs poss.~Bs") I have accepted it more often than not.
Now you tell me.
[Jim] I also understand the difference between discussing formal properties that hold between propositions (modal or non-modal) and forming a "1st order" proposition out of the discussion of contingent propositionsand the formal properties. This could be made clearer by noting the following:
[Jim] "P" is a contingent proposition
[Jim] "P" "-P"are feasible.
[Jim] "" and "feasible" are part of the metalanguage used to discuss contingent propositions.
[Jim] "feas. P" "feas.-P" are ill-formed.
[Jim] Explanation: "Feasibility" is a 2nd order predicate used to discuss
It does appear that you
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Ben, (I responded to your later message first.) I agree with a lot here.The idea that there are objective possibilities that are true, regardless of our knowledge, has beenarguably the central issue in discussions of philosophical realism for 2500 years. The idea of objective indeterminacy is a part of that. Consider that a proposition which reflects an objectively indeterminate state of affairs is not bivalent. (I assume that a God would know that it is not bivalent. S/he would be omniscient.) Just some terminological notes. "1st order" logic usually means the universe of discourse and the domain of the variablesareindividuals. "2nd order" logic usually meansthe discourse is about collections, properties, or relations. I am not sure what you mean by "standard." A lot hinges on that. You say, "The idea that a true proposition (zero-place predicate) about concrete things is true of all concrete things everywhere and everywhen seems -- somehow -- at odds with the idea that the relevant information is not everywhere and everywhen, if indeed chance is real (for my part, I think it's real)" (end) I am not sure I understand this. We can replace a variable with an individual. If an individual satisfies a predicate, it is called "zero-place." Some logics allow "substitution of identity." Any individualcan be substituted for another that satifies the predicate with certain restrictions.I think of formal logic as a set of rules that, in part, allow us to represent things. If we don't like the representation, we can change the rules. A large part of logic is not monolithic. The "flat in or out" universe is a problem of identity. We seem to need this to manage many affairs no matter how rough the identity is. I am not sure why the big bang universe is a problem for 1st order logic. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 12:53 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List Jim, I should add, upon re-reading your comments, that the idea of possibility that I've been discussing has pretty much been in terms of ignorance, but it seems to me that the terms don't need to be essentially in terms of ignorance. If one is talking about a future event, then the reason for one's ignorance of the outcome may be the uncertainty and vagueness of current things themselves as determinants of the future -- the uncertainty is not just "in one's head," nor even just "necessarily in one's head, by the nature of intelligence." I think that Peirce agrees that not all uncertainty is merely epistemic, since he holds that chance is real. For my own part, I consider standard 1st-order logic as a low-resolution, "low-pixelage"picture of the real for this reason among others. The idea that a true proposition (zero-place predicate) about concrete things is true of all concrete things everywhere and everywhen seems -- somehow -- at odds with the idea that the relevant information is not everywhere and everywhen, if indeed chance is real (for my part, I think it's real). That is to say that our concrete Big-Bang universe differs in some logically deep way from a 1st-order logical universe of discourse -- well, who could be shocked! shocked! by that, but what I mean is, that the idea of a flat-out in-or-out membership in a universe of discourse seemsa crudebeginning for understanding what sort of universe of "discourse" and information it is that we actually live in. It's not that I've forgotten that, in a 1st-order logical universe, there can be true contingent propositions which don't imply each other -- I get that, but chance and uncertainty seem (to me) deeper and more complicated in the concrete world, for some reason. Best, Ben Udell http://tetrast.blogspot.com - Original Message - Jim, [Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. But can "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only one individual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate. The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which
involves no contradiction. Let us call that sort of logical possibility,
essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical
possibility; for in this sense, two propositions contradictory of one another
may both be severally possible, although their combination is not possible."
(CP3:527)
Just as I thought, Peirce does not discuss modal propositions in the
passage which you had in mind.
[Jim] Two propositions, "Bs" and "-Bs" may both be possible.
(severally) But, the proposition "pos Bs poss.-Bs" is not possible.
The first two propositions arenot contradictory of one another.
In the context of oppositions, the contradictory of a proposition is the
_negation_ /of that proposition. "Bs" ("This stove is black") and "-Bs"
("This stove is notblack") are contradictory of one another. They can't
both be true and they can't both be false. Thus they fit the form defined in the
logic of oppositions for contradictories.
"Bs" and "-Bs" are both internally consistent but are inconsistent with
each other. That is all that Peirce is implying, nothing more.
You are confusing formal logical properties with logical _expression_ of
modality in just such a way that, ironically,you call impossible the same
modal statement which can be used in order to express the idea that two
propositions are severally possible.
Now, there is nothing that constrains modal expressions to be used in order
solely tocharacterize formal logical relationships such as contrarity,
subcontrarity, implication, etc.However, they _can_ be used in a
context which confines them to that purpose.Taking 'poss.' as the
1st-order _expression_ corresponding to 2nd-orderimputation
ofpossibility or logical internal consistency to a predicate or
proposition,
"poss. Bs poss.-Bs" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are severally possible." ==
"[Logically,] this stove can be black and this stove can be non-black."
"~ poss.(Bs ~Bs)" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are incompossible." ==
"[Logically,] it can't be both that this stove is black and that this stove is
not black."
(Note: "this stove", a.k.a. "s", is not, as you called it in an earlier
post, an individual variable, but is instead an individual constant. In
traditional logic, the subject of propositions in the form "Hs" (e.g. "Socrates
is human") is taken as constant across propositions. If "this stove" is not
constant across propositions in a given example, then it is really a variable
and we're no longer talking about an already singled-out stove as in Peirce's
example).
[Jim] The proposition resulting from their combination appears to be
[contradictory].
It does not appear to be contradictory. The components do not imply each
other's negations.
For instance, "poss.Bs" does not imply the negative of "poss.~Bs".
The negation of "poss.~Bs" is "~poss.~Bs".
"~poss.~Bs" is equivalent to "necess.Bs".
Yet "poss.Bs" does not imply "necess.Bs"
Ergo, "poss.Bs" does not imply "~poss.~Bs".
Ergo, "poss.Bs" is consistent with "poss.~Bs".
QED.
[Jim] They are not Aristotelian (sub) contraries dealing with
"some" objects.
I said nothing about some specifically Aristotelian kind of subcontraries
that deal only with "some" objects, "all" objects, etc.
The oppositional relationships of subcontrarity, contrarity, contradiction,
etc., are certainly not confined to pertaining to quantificational propositions
about some objects, all objects, etc. The Square of Opposition shows some
oppositional relationships arising between quantificational propositions;
however, one does not need quantificational forms at all in order to define such
oppositional relationships -- indeed, a complete system of such binary formal
logical relationships. The forms or schemata of propositional logic are all
that's needed.
[Jim] The so called "failure of contradiction" deals usually with
general object indefiniteness in the case of the existential quantifier. That is
not what is going on here. Vagueness is just as much the result of considering
the two propositions severally.
In the context of logical oppositions, contradiction is the validity of
exclusive alternation, and contradictories are defined as two propositions which
can't both be true and can't both be false. Subcontrarity is positive
alternation's validity conjoined with negative alternation's nonvalidity, and
subcontraries are defined as two propositions which can both be true and can't
both be false.
(Formal) equivalence.Validity of the biconditional.
Can't be the 1st one true
the 2nd one false.Can't be the 1st one false
the 2nd one true.
p. p.
T. T.
F. F.
--
(Formal) strict forward
implication*.Validity
of the forward conditional and nonvalidity of the reverse
conditional.
Can't be the 1st one true
the 2nd one false.Can be the 1st
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Thanks Ben,
Well,I guess the passage doesn't discuss modal propositions if you disallow rephrasing "this stove is possibly black" with 'It is possible that "this stove is black."'There is certainly a logic of possibility at work.Why aren' t these modal propositions?It is just that the possibility operator is outside of the proposition. I took it that Peirce is saying that "this stove is black" and this "stove is not black" are formally possible. What would a "logical _expression_ of modality" be? The operator is a unary connective much like negation. ('it is not the case that "this stove is black."')
You say,
"~ poss.(Bs ~Bs)" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are incompossible." == "[Logically,] it can't be both that this stove is black and that this stove is not black." (END)
Ilike this alot and have read it this way too.(at times) My mistake with respect to mixing contrary and contradiction up. It is easy to get in the habit. What is the other sort of possibility Peirce refers to? I have always looked for the supposed vague possibility.Maybe this is not the right passage from Peirce.Yet, If weacceptthe proposition"poss. Bs poss.-Bs", then the point of the passage might be that besides formal possibility, there is vague possibility.In the othermode of possibility, contradiction is inapplicable. Thus, the proposition "poss. Bs poss.-Bs" is not a contradiction.But I reject this for the example "this stove is possibly black and this stove is possibly not black."
I thinkI know my problem. In thecontext where "this stove" is a definite, actual individual and I assert this stove is black, every state of affairs is restricted to this stove and blackness. Thus, necessarily this stove is black and what does not occur is impossible or vice versa. This is an extreme form of actualism.But, I can make some sense of the claim that -poss.( poss.Bs poss-Bs) The confusion and irony, however, doesn't lie with the possibility operator or where possibility appears in an ordinary proposition. It is all modal logic.
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 1:28 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction. Let us call that sort of logical possibility, essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical possibility; for in this sense, two propositions contradictory of one another may both be severally possible, although their combination is not possible." (CP3:527)
Just as I thought, Peirce does not discuss modal propositions in the passage which you had in mind.
[Jim] Two propositions, "Bs" and "-Bs" may both be possible. (severally) But, the proposition "pos Bs poss.-Bs" is not possible. The first two propositions arenot contradictory of one another.
In the context of oppositions, the contradictory of a proposition is the _negation_ /of that proposition. "Bs" ("This stove is black") and "-Bs" ("This stove is notblack") are contradictory of one another. They can't both be true and they can't both be false. Thus they fit the form defined in the logic of oppositions for contradictories.
"Bs" and "-Bs" are both internally consistent but are inconsistent with each other. That is all that Peirce is implying, nothing more.
You are confusing formal logical properties with logical _expression_ of modality in just such a way that, ironically,you call impossible the same modal statement which can be used in order to express the idea that two propositions are severally possible.
Now, there is nothing that constrains modal expressions to be used in order solely tocharacterize formal logical relationships such as contrarity, subcontrarity, implication, etc.However, they _can_ be used in a context which confines them to that purpose.Taking 'poss.' as the 1st-order _expression_ corresponding to 2nd-orderimputation ofpossibility or logical internal consistency to a predicate or proposition,
"poss. Bs poss.-Bs" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are severally possible." == "[Logically,] this stove can be black and this stove can be non-black."
"~ poss.(Bs ~Bs)" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are incompossible." == "[Logically,] it can't be both that this stove is black and that this stove is not black."
(Note: "this stove", a.k.a. "s", is not, as you called it in an earlier post, an individual variable, but is instead an individual constant. In traditional logic, the subject of propositions in the form "Hs" (e.g. "Socrates is human") is taken as constant across propositions. If "this stove" is not constant across propositions in a given example, then it is really a variable and we're no longer talking about an already singled-out stove as in Peirce's example).
[Jim] The proposition resulting from their combination appears to be
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim, [Jim Willgoose] (I responded to your later message first.) I agree with a lot here.The idea that there are objective possibilities that are true, regardless of our knowledge, has beenarguably the central issue in discussions of philosophical realism for 2500 years. The idea of objective indeterminacy is a part of that. Consider that a proposition which reflects an objectively indeterminate state of affairs is not bivalent. (I assume that a God would know that it is not bivalent. S/he would be omniscient.) In the concrete world, the most obvious case of objective indeterminacy is that of quantum mechanics. For point A there will be some point B regarding which the info doesn't exist at point A as regards the determination of point B. Yet that info will exist eventually. Or, if in accordance with the "superdeterminism" interpretation of quantum mechanics, there is superluminal determinism, then the relevant info can't be available to subluminal entities at point A. I can't say whether it is fair to deny that such info _actually_ exists at all until at least point B. This gets into a more general question about _actuality_, which Peirce defined as reactiveness. Putting aside superluminal determination, there is to note that it takes light 10,000 years to cross the visible Milky Way. Does the Milky Way _actually_ exist as an _actual_ coherent whole with respect to a duration briefer than 10,000 years? Should one double the duration in order to allow for two-way interaction? Well, expressed in light-units, the width of the Milky Way and the time which light takes to cross its width are the same. (The only other kinematics time-version of length of which I'm aware is L/v, the amount of time that an object takes to pass its length through a given point at rest, a quantity which is obviously highly variable like velocity and which approaches infinity as velocity approaches zero). This question, with which I've played (nothing more) occasionally for decades, is of particular interest in regard to whether the current claim, that our Big Bang universe is spatially infinite, amounts to a claim that it is _actually_ infinite in spatial extent. Maybe it doesn't amount to such a claim. Decades ago a physics student, a roommate of mine, told me "existence travels at the speed of light." Still more generally, the inevitable imprecision and errors of measurements guarantees some imprecision and errors in our knowledge. Since therefore even the final interpretant would involve leaving room for such error, and since the real depends on the final interpretant, therefore the real itself must be subject, in some sense, to imprecision and "errors" or nonconformity to laws -- at least laws that we can formulate. Peirce wrote in "The Architecture of Theories" (CP6.7-34), "...within another century our grandchildren will surely know whether the three angles of a triangle[in actual space] are greater or less than 180 degrees,-- that they are _exactly_ that amount is what nobodyever can be justified in concluding." Also B. Roy Frieden http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._Roy_Frieden is of interest in regard to inevitable error's and imprecision'sconsequences for "reality itself." John Collier has said at peirce-l that an information channel can't convey infinite information. Infinite information is what would be needed for infinite precision, I think, unless there were some sort of "perfect analog" measuring device and some mental "perfect analog" way to cognize the results, some sort of continuum which potentially could actualize any of its potential points. (I'm averse to actual infinities but, if I remember correctly, Peirce is not averse to actual infinities.) But the moment that info must be translated or encoded or decoded into an incommensurate form (e.g. continuous into discrete), then imprecision must become involved. Now, this is the part where I have special trouble developing a clear idea. Inthe foregoing sense, it _seems_ that we are not alone in necessary imprecision -- the world's parts seem subject to necessary imprecision, and chance is mathematically founded in the world. However, the world doesn't "know" that it is sometimes trying to "translate" between incommensurate forms, rather we are trying to use one form incommensurate with another in order to learn about the other. That sounds less vague than it should in order to reflect what I'm trying to think about. Anyway, still more generally, there is the question of insoluble mathematical problems, including many that have been proven insoluble. Peirce somewhere says that even these would prove amenable to inductive and abductive approaches. Well, there is a blur of issues here. Penrose talks hypothetically of "oracles" which can solve problems which require infinities of computation, a higher degree of oracle for each higher aleph, or something like that. How would we verify that something were
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Well, I guess the passage doesn't discuss modal
propositions if you disallow rephrasing "this stove is possibly black" with 'It
is possible that "this stove is black."' There is certainly a logic of
possibility at work.Why aren' t these modal propositions?It is just
that the possibility operator is outside of the proposition. I took it that
Peirce is saying that "this stove is black" and this "stove is not black" are
formally possible. What would a "logical _expression_ of modality" be? The
operator is a unary connective much like negation. ('it is not the case
that "this stove is black."')
Peirce makes some assertions themselves modal in character about some
non-modal propositions. This can be translated into modal propositions or
assertions but it is not the same thing as discussing modal propositions. To say
that "Bs" "~Bs" are incompossible is to say "~poss.(Bs ~Bs)" and
isn't to say "~(poss.Bs poss.~Bs)" or "~poss.(poss.Bs
poss.~Bs)". Peirce was not implying either "~(poss.Bs poss.~Bs)" or
"~poss.(poss.Bs poss.~Bs)" in any way, shape, or form.He was
implying that "Bs" "~Bs" are severally possible, "distributively"
possible, each in its turn possible -- "poss.Bs poss.~Bs" -- but not
compossible, not collectively possible -- "~poss.(Bs ~Bs).
[Jim] You say,
"~ poss.(Bs ~Bs)" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are incompossible." ==
"[Logically,] it can't be both that this stove is black and that this stove is
not black." (END)
[Jim]I like this alot and have read it this way too.(at
times) My mistake with respect to mixing contrary and contradiction up. It is
easy to get in the habit. What is the other sort of possibility Peirce
refers to? I have always looked for the supposed vague
possibility.Maybe this is not the right passage from
Peirce.Yet, If weacceptthe proposition"poss. Bs
poss.-Bs", then the point of the passage might be that besides formal
possibility, there is vague possibility.In the othermode of
possibility, contradiction is inapplicable. Thus, the proposition
"poss. Bs poss.-Bs" is not a contradiction.But I reject
this for the example "this stove is possibly black and this stove is possibly
not black."
[Jim] I thinkI know my problem. In thecontext where
"this stove" is a definite, actual individual and I assert this stove is
black, every state of affairs is restricted to this stove and blackness. Thus,
necessarily this stove is black and what does not occur is impossible or vice
versa. This is an extreme form of actualism.But, I can make some
sense of the claim that -poss.( poss.Bs poss-Bs) The confusion and irony,
however, doesn't lie with the possibility operator or where possibility appears
in an ordinary proposition. It is all modal logic.
What's happening is that you're simply refusing to accept definitions of
modal logic going back to Aristotle such that "necessary to do X" = "impossible
not to do X" and "possible to do X" = "unnecessary not to do X" and "necessary
to do X" implies but is unimplied by "possible to do X" and so forth. Instead,
for you"poss." = "necess." =straightforward affirmation,and
"~poss." = "~necess." = straightforward negation.The sense that you're
making of " -poss.( poss.Bs poss-Bs)" is your interpreting it as being
practically no different from "~(Bs ~Bs)." Yet 2nd-order logic itself
offers a model for ideas of possibility and necessity in the ideas of
consistency and validity, and furthermore allows for the distinction between
contingently true and necessarily true -- which is a distinction which you don't
accept.
Even when it is a premiss that the stove is black, it does not become
formally true, in furtherinference,that the stove is black.
*_That is the difference between a premiss and an
assumption._* It's been said that a true proposition implies all
true propositions and that a false proposition implies all propositions -- but
that "implies"refers to_material_ implication, nowadays
oftener called"theconditional" and not to _formal_
implication.It's true that I'm writing this post, but that doesn't
formally imply that I'm in my apartment, though that's true too.But it
_is_ true that either I'm not writing this post or I'm in my apartment
or both. "~p v q" == "p--q" -- material implication. Meanwhile, we do assume
the rules of formal implication. So, if the premiss is that the stove is black,
such that the schema is "Bs," then the schema is consistent and nonvalid --
possible and non-necessary. Hence, logically it is possible but non-necessary
that the stove is black, even when it is true that the stove is black. The
possibility and nonnecessity are "relative" to the choice of rules whereby we
attribute possibility and necessity.
If you don't have a problem with that, then why should you have a problem
with attributing necessity and possibility to things in virtue of more
complicated and empirically anchored "formalisms" and norms and patterns and
laws
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim, [Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. But can "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only one individual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate. The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are inconsistent with each other. In any case, do you think some of your examples can be handled by Peirce's theory of cognition? A possible pregnancy could be idenitified as being in respect of signs positive but inconclusive about pregnancy. In the given case, there would need to be an understood threshhold, even if only a vague one, for what the mind counts as representing a significant degree of possibility, as in practical affairs wherein one signifies that one is momentarily departing from just such a practical understood norm by saying something like, "well, it's _theoretically_ possible but...," etc. I don't know to what extent modal logics have dealt with these issues or instead leave them to the user along with the standard advice to be consistent across the given case. Note that any problem with the idea of a possible pregnancy is also part of a problem with a flat-out modal proposition such as "Possibly there is a pregnant woman" or any propostion of the form "Possibly[Ex(GxHx)]. In any non-empty universe, certain Ex, there is something. So it's a question of the possibility of HxGx. If one goes even simpler, "Possibly[ExHx], then in any non-empty universe the same question about a "possibly H" will be raised. Theories of probability and statistics are among the ways of dealing with possibility more variegatedly. There's alsofuzzy logic, or at least a fuzzified modal logic (I presume),in order to deal with ways to formalize the informality and vagueness involved with talking about things like "maybe pregnant," "oh just possibly pregnant," etc. I don't see why you consider "possibly black" and "possibly non-black" contrary. They seem forall the world to be _subcontrary_ -- it seems that of a given subject they can both be true butthey can't both be false."Necessarily black" and "necessarily non-black" -- those seem contrary, since it seems that of a given subject they can both be false but can't both be true. Boldface: *3 any-pair-wise contraries*, collectively exhausting the options (usually one would say "exhausting the possibilities" but the word "possible" itself appears in the table, so, in order to avoid confusion) Italics: _3 any-pair-wise subcontaries_, whose negatives collectively exhaust the options. ~ ~ ~ _necessary or impossible_ ~ ~ ~ *necessary* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ *impossible* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ | ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _possible_ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _unnecessary_ (=possible non-) ~ ~ *possible and unnecessary* ~ ~ _necessary or impossible_ *necessary* *impossible* X possible orimpossible _possible_ _unnecessary_ *possible unnecessary* Boldface:*4 any-pair-wise contraries*, collectively exhausting the options. Italics:_4 any-pair-wise subcontaries_, whose negatives collectively exhaust the options. Table pattern in familiar case (Boolean quantification). I iff A *IA* *OE* F _AvE_ A E *AE* _IvO_ I O *IO* T _IvA_ _OvE_ I iff O not contingent *necessarily true* *necessarily false* X _not contingently true_ necessarily true or contingently false false *contingently false* _not contingently false_ true necessarily false or contingently true *contingently true* true or false _possibly true_ _possibly false_ contingent Rearranged a little, but table has same overall oppositional properties: necessarily true or contingently false *necessarily true *contingently false* X _not contingently true_ not contingent false *necessarily false* _possibly true_ true contingent *contingently true* true or false _not contingently false_ _possibly false_ necessarily false or contingently true
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim, I should add, upon re-reading your comments, that the idea of possibility that I've been discussing has pretty much been in terms of ignorance, but it seems to me that the terms don't need to be essentially in terms of ignorance. If one is talking about a future event, then the reason for one's ignorance of the outcome may be the uncertainty and vagueness of current things themselves as determinants of the future -- the uncertainty is not just "in one's head," nor even just "necessarily in one's head, by the nature of intelligence." I think that Peirce agrees that not all uncertainty is merely epistemic, since he holds that chance is real. For my own part, I consider standard 1st-order logic as a low-resolution, "low-pixelage"picture of the real for this reason among others. The idea that a true proposition (zero-place predicate) about concrete things is true of all concrete things everywhere and everywhen seems -- somehow -- at odds with the idea that the relevant information is not everywhere and everywhen, if indeed chance is real (for my part, I think it's real). That is to say that our concrete Big-Bang universe differs in some logically deep way from a 1st-order logical universe of discourse -- well, who could be shocked! shocked! by that, but what I mean is, that the idea of a flat-out in-or-out membership in a universe of discourse seemsa crudebeginning for understanding what sort of universe of "discourse" and information it is that we actually live in. It's not that I've forgotten that, in a 1st-order logical universe, there can be true contingent propositions which don't imply each other -- I get that, but chance and uncertainty seem (to me) deeper and more complicated in the concrete world, for some reason. Best, Ben Udell http://tetrast.blogspot.com - Original Message - Jim, [Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. But can "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only one individual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate. The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are inconsistent with each other. In any case, do you think some of your examples can be handled by Peirce's theory of cognition? A possible pregnancy could be idenitified as being in respect of signs positive but inconclusive about pregnancy. In the given case, there would need to be an understood threshhold, even if only a vague one, for what the mind counts as representing a significant degree of possibility, as in practical affairs wherein one signifies that one is momentarily departing from just such a practical understood norm by saying something like, "well, it's _theoretically_ possible but...," etc. I don't know to what extent modal logics have dealt with these issues or instead leave them to the user along with the standard advice to be consistent across the given case. Note that any problem with the idea of a possible pregnancy is also part of a problem with a flat-out modal proposition such as "Possibly there is a pregnant woman" or any propostion of the form "Possibly[Ex(GxHx)]. In any non-empty universe, certain Ex, there is something. So it's a question of the possibility of HxGx. If one goes even simpler, "Possibly[ExHx], then in any non-empty universe the same question about a "possibly H" will be raised. Theories of probability and statistics are among the ways of dealing with possibility more variegatedly. There's alsofuzzy logic, or at least a fuzzified modal logic (I presume),in order to deal with ways to formalize the informality and vagueness involved with talking about things like "maybe pregnant," "oh just possibly pregnant," etc. I don't see why you consider "possibly black" and "possibly non-black" contrary. They seem forall the world to be _subcontrary_ -- it seems that of a given subject they can both be true butthey can't both be false."Necessarily black" and "necessarily non-black" -- those seem contrary, since it seems that of a given subject they can both be false but can't both be true. Boldface: *3 any-pair-wise
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Thanks Ben,
There is a difference between treating possibility epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and "possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not allowing multiple reference for "this," we know that both statements cannot be true for a definite individual. Particular propositions, for Peirce,obey both the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. ( 1st order Form: (poss. Bs poss -Bs )Notice thatI do not use the quantifier "E" since "this stove" denotesa definite individual. ("s" is an individual variable and "B" is a predicate letter.) These two propositions are not "compossible, although they are severally possible." (Peirce's language) However, 2nd order Formcreates a problem. EF(Fs -Fs) Which property? Here "F" is an indefinite predicate variable.Should not all substitutions for "F" be identical regardless of whether we can identify the property?Maybe not. Peirce said in the gamma graphs that for ordinary purposes, "qualities may be treated as individuals." Ifthere is no definite property, then the proposition is vague rather than false. Identity is critical even for possible states of information.
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 10:18 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. But can "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only one individual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate. The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are inconsistent with each other. In any case, do you think some of your examples can be handled by Peirce's theory of cognition?
A possible pregnancy could be idenitified as being in respect of signs positive but inconclusive about pregnancy. In the given case, there would need to be an understood threshhold, even if only a vague one, for what the mind counts as representing a significant degree of possibility, as in practical affairs wherein one signifies that one is momentarily departing from just such a practical understood norm by saying something like, "well, it's _theoretically_ possible but...," etc. I don't know to what extent modal logics have dealt with these issues or instead leave them to the user along with the standard advice to be consistent across the given case.
Note that any problem with the idea of a possible pregnancy is also part of a problem with a flat-out modal proposition such as "Possibly there is a pregnant woman" or any propostion of the form "Possibly[Ex(GxHx)]. In any non-empty universe, certain Ex, there is something. So it's a question of the possibility of HxGx. If one goes even simpler, "Possibly[ExHx], then in any non-empty universe the same question about a "possibly H" will be raised.
Theories of probability and statistics are among the ways of dealing with possibility more variegatedly. There's alsofuzzy logic, or at least a fuzzified modal logic (I presume),in order to deal with ways to formalize the informality and vagueness involved with talking about things like "maybe pregnant," "oh just possibly pregnant," etc.
I don't see why you consider "possibly black" and "possibly non-black" contrary. They seem forall the world to be _subcontrary_ -- it seems that of a given subject they can both be true butthey can't both be false."Necessarily black" and "necessarily non-black" -- those seem contrary, since it seems that of a given subject they can both be false but can't both be true.
Boldface: *3 any-pair-wise contraries*, collectively exhausting the options (usually one would say "exhausting the possibilities" but the word "possible" itself appears in the table, so, in order to avoid confusion)
Italics: _3 any-pair-wise subcontaries_, whose negatives collectively exhaust the options.
~ ~ ~ _necessary or impossible_ ~ ~ ~
*necessary* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ *impossible*
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ | ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] There is a difference between treating possibility
epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and
"possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state
of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not allowing
multiple reference for "this," we know that both statements cannot be true for a
definite individual. Particular propositions, for Peirce,obey both the
laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. ( 1st order
Form: (poss. Bs poss -Bs )Notice thatI do not
use the quantifier "E" since "this stove" denotesa definite
individual. ("s" is an individual variable and "B" is a predicate letter.)
These two propositions are not "compossible, although they are severally
possible." (Peirce's language) However, 2nd order
Formcreates a problem. EF(Fs -Fs) Which property? Here "F"
is an indefinite predicate variable.Should not all substitutions for "F"
be identical regardless of whether we can identify the property?Maybe not.
Peirce said in the gamma graphs that for ordinary purposes, "qualities may be
treated as individuals." Ifthere is no definite property, then the
proposition is vague rather than false. Identity is critical even for possible
states of information.
Maybe there's a necessary difference at a simple logical level between
epistemic and ontological treatments of possibility, but such difference isn't
evident to me.
You don't provide a reference or a quote, but presumably Peirce is
referring to the components of "(Bs ~Bs)" as non-compossible and as
severally (separately) possible, but is _not_ referring to a form like
"(poss. Bs poss. -Bs)"at all. It would be strange, I think, if
he did. Yet Peirce's technical conception of propositions and predicates and
their treatment differs enough from the contemporary, that, well, who knows? So
I ask for a quote from him. Somehow you seem to be thinking that "poss.Bs" is
the negative of "poss.~Bs".
The same issues are involved withthe "(Fs ~Fs)"in "EF(Fs
~Fs)."
I don't know what your assumptions are about the 1st-order syntactical
status of "poss.", but it's as if you're treating "poss." in "poss. Bs" as a
predicate, whereas one needs to treat it asa functor (like the negative
sign) and to treat the resultant "poss. Bs" as function of "Bs" rather than as
"Bs" itself with some added predicated description "possible."This is the
same as one treats "~Bs"as a function of "Bs" rather than as "Bs" with
some added predicated description "negative."The appropriate 2nd-order
counterpart is not "EF(Fs ~Fs)" but "EF(poss.Fs poss.~Fs). But I'm
just guessing at your assumption. However it does seem that, however you're
treating "poss.", it's not as a functor like "not".
Best,
Ben Udell,
http://tetrast.blogspot.com/
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Ben,
Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction Let us call that sort of logical possibility, essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical possibility; for in this sense, two propositions contradictory of one another may both be severally possible, although their combination is not possible." (CP3:527)
Two propositions, "Bs" and "-Bs" may both be possible. (severally) But, the proposition "pos Bs poss.-Bs" is not possible. The first two propositions arenot contradictory of one another. The proposition resulting from their combination appears to be. They are not Aristotelian (sub) contraries dealing with "some" objects. The so called "failure of contradiction" deals usually with general object indefiniteness in the case of the existential quantifier. That is not what is going on here. Vagueness is just as much the result of considering the two propositions severally.
We started this discussion with a number of examples of "whetherhood" designed to expand and qualify the predicate assertion. I chose possibility becasue of its generality and largely epistemic flavor. I read Peirce as developing the meaning of possibility with "states of information," knowledge and probability in mind. I also favored in the beginning attaching the modal operator to propositions and treating the proposition as a subject. I did this in order to preserve the copula "is" in the subject assertion without qualification. The various ordinary ways of expressing the proposition can be rephrased. I also pointed out the way that identity becomes problematic.
You say,
"Maybe there's a necessary difference at a simple logical level between epistemic and ontological treatments of possibility, but such difference isn't evident to me."
Consider the difference between saying each proposition "Bs' and "-Bs" is indeterminate with respect to truth and saying that it is impossible that both propositions are jointly true. Ontologically,I do not think that the same stove or same women can have contrary qualities. Is this a principle of Being or just an idealization of excluded middle?Further, would you be prepared to say that the truth value of the compound proposition is indeterminate in the sense of "not known to be false?"
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 6:50 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] There is a difference between treating possibility epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and "possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not allowing multiple reference for "this," we know that both statements cannot be true for a definite individual. Particular propositions, for Peirce,obey both the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. ( 1st order Form: (poss. Bs poss -Bs )Notice thatI do not use the quantifier "E" since "this stove" denotesa definite individual. ("s" is an individual variable and "B" is a predicate letter.) These two propositions are not "compossible, although they are severally possible." (Peirce's language) However, 2nd order Formcreates a problem. EF(Fs -Fs) Which property? Here "F" is an indefinite predicate variable.Should not all substitutions for "F" be identical regardless of whether we can identify the property?Maybe not. Peirce said in the gamma graphs that for ordinary purposes, "qualities may be treated as individuals." Ifthere is no definite property, then the proposition is vague rather than false. Identity is critical even for possible states of information.
Maybe there's a necessary difference at a simple logical level between epistemic and ontological treatments of possibility, but such difference isn't evident to me.
You don't provide a reference or a quote, but presumably Peirce is referring to the components of "(Bs ~Bs)" as non-compossible and as severally (separately) possible, but is _not_ referring to a form like "(poss. Bs poss. -Bs)"at all. It would be strange, I think, if he did. Yet Peirce's technical conception of propositions and predicates and their treatment differs enough from the contemporary, that, well, who knows? So I ask for a quote from him. Somehow you seem to be thinking that "poss.Bs" is the negative of "poss.~Bs".
The same issues are involved withthe "(Fs ~Fs)"in "EF(Fs ~Fs)."
I don't know what your assumptions are about the 1st-order syntactical status of "poss.", but it's as if you're treating "poss." in "poss. Bs" as a predicate, whereas one needs to treat it asa functor (like the negative sign) and to treat the resultant "poss. Bs" as function of "Bs" rather than as "Bs" itself with some added predicated description "possible."This is the same as one
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Thanks Ben,
The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. Butcan "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only oneindividual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate.The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are inconsistent with each other. In any case, do you think some of your examples can be handled by Peirce's theory of cognition?
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 6:00 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove
is,
isn't,
may be,
might be,
is 57%-probably,
is if--only-if-it's-Thursday,
would feasibly be,
would most simply be,
is, oddly enough,
etc., etc., etc.,
black. " (end)
[Jim] I would say as I previously did that most of these can be handled by treating the subject as a proposition. Otherwise, youpredicate "possible blackness" of this stove rather than the proposition "this stove is black." This might not be so bad if only identification didn't break down. "this stove" is definite but "this is a possible black thing" suffers.
I don't see what's wrong with it. In real life we do in fact talk about possibilities involving actual things. You can break it into two interlocked propositions if you wish, oneaffirming the actual existence of the stove and the other affirming a possibility about it. Just make sure that their subjects are somehow equated. And I don't see what's wrong with making the possibility sentence into a one-place predicate "Ex(x={this stove} x[possibly(Eyy{y is black} y=x)])" which can be rephrased to "This stove is possibly black." Of course, one is more likely to say something like, "This stove is possibly malfunctioning a bit."
"This stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not-black" are not inconsistent in any logic whose treatment of the word "possibly" is within shouting distance of ordinary English usage. In fact their conjunction makes for at least one sense of the word "contingent," as in _it is a *contingent* question whether the stove is black or non-black._ Usually "possibly..." and "possibly not..." are taken in a sense parallel to that of "consistent" and "non-valid." Any truth-functional sentence is either (a) valid or (b) inconsistent or (c) both consistent and non-valid.
[Jim] I might even go so far as to say that "this stove is possibly black" fails to assert anything and thus fails the test of cognition.
Tell that to the man who's just been told, in regard to his wife, "She is possibly pregnant," and, in regard to his finances, "You are possibly bankrupt," and so on -- all definitely existent things around which possibilities range.
[Jim] It also runs up potentially against contradiction since "this"refers to a definite, individualobject and the two propositions "this stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not black" are inconsistent.
It potentially runs up against contradictions? I think you'll need to spell them out.They may be the fault of an inadequate logical formalism since obviously we deal with such things every day. And, again, "possibly black" and "possibly not black" are consistent, not inconsistent, unless one's formalism constrains one to signify something quite deviative from normal English usage of words like "possibly."
[Jim] But 'It is possible that "this stove is black"' seems to work better. What is the deal about supposing the identity of the predicate and then assessing the modality of the proposition? Peirce gives the example of "it rains" in the gamma graphs. He doesn't consider possible rain but whether the proposition "it rains" is possibly true (false)
If your possibilitative propositions are incapable of transformation into one-or-more-place predicates, then they seem strangely limited.
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Ben, You say, "The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may be, might be, is 57%-probably, is if--only-if-it's-Thursday, would feasibly be, would most simply be, is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc., black. " (end) I would say as I previously did that most of these can be handled by treating the subject as a proposition. Otherwise, youpredicate "possible blackness" of this stove rather than the proposition "this stove is black." This might not be so bad if only identification didn't break down. "this stove" is definite but "this is a possible black thing" suffers. I might even go so far as to say that "this stove is possibly black" fails to assert anything and thus fails the test of cognition. It also runs up potentially against contradiction since "this"refers to a definite, individualobject and the two propositions "this stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not black" are inconsistent. But 'It is possible that "this stove is black"' seems to work better. What is the deal about supposing the identity of the predicate and then assessing the modality of the proposition? Peirce gives the example of "it rains" in the gamma graphs. He doesn't consider possible rain but whether the proposition "it rains" is possibly true (false) Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thu, 7 Sep 2006 8:42 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List Jim, list, [Jim Wilgoose] It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem area. [Jim] You say, [Ben] The disparity of Peirce's approaches to (1) attribution and accident and (2) identity/distinction and substances (substantial things), is a serious flaw, and his approach to attribution and accident is better than his other approach. [Jim] In what way is there a flaw? In the NLC, a "pure species of abstraction" plays anecessary role in cognition. Peirce's theory (in many ways a continuation of Aristotelian and Medieval psychology) commits to this abstraction, without which assertions are inexplicable. Peirce says it is discriminated and treated independently. In other words, the question is not whether blackness is in the stove essentially or accidentally but only what is required for assertion or the "applicability of the predicate to the subject." Are you using the term "accident"in the classical metaphysical sense or are you reflecting on the passage where Peirce says that "intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents" or neither? I'm using "accident" in pretty much the sense in which I find it in Peirce. Peirce seldom mentions the conception of accident; basically, Peirce says the three categories 1stness, 2ndness, and 3rdness, can be termed "accidents" and thereafter we don't hear much about "substance-accident" issues.I'm not strong enough on Aristotlean or Scholastic philosophy to be able to say whether Peirce was departing from any tradition in flatly calling qualities "accidents." Of course, his definition of "quality" is not quite Aristotle's. Anyway, the question is not about the essentialness or accidentalness of the blackness's being in the stove. Thequestion is about _whether_ the blackness is or isn't in the stove. It's not even about the ground per se or about that word "in." The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may be, might be, is 57%-probably, is if--only-if-it's-Thursday, would feasibly be, would most simply be, is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc., black. A mind which cannot conceive, or can only weakly conceive,of alternatives to the actuality with which it is presented, is no longer a mind, oris a weak or weakened mind. In people, it bespeaks brain damage. _Meaning and implicationare in terms of such alternatives._ For instance, consider "'(p--q)'=='((~p)vq)'=='~(p~q)'" and, indeed, consider it both in its propositional-logic aspect and in its 2nd-order aspect. In Scholastic terms, I'm using "whetherhood" and "attribution-relation" in a sense similar to that ascribed to Avicenna's conception of _anitas_ which is a Latin translation of an Arabic term.The Latin word_anitas_ was coined by the translator from the common Latin _an_ which means "whether" and is used in the formation of indirect questions like "You know whether she is here." (It's quite English-like; neither "whether" nor_an_ is an
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly,
probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or
proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can
apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may be, might be,
is 57%-probably, is if--only-if-it's-Thursday,would feasibly
be, would most simply be,is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc.,
black. " (end)
[Jim] I would say as I previously did that most of these can be handled
by treating the subject as a proposition. Otherwise, youpredicate
"possible blackness" of this stove rather than the proposition "this stove
is black." This might not be so bad if only identification didn't break down.
"this stove" is definite but "this is a possible black thing" suffers.
I don't see what's wrong with it. In real life we do in fact talk about
possibilities involving actual things. You can break it into two interlocked
propositions if you wish, oneaffirming the actual existence of the stove
and the other affirming a possibility about it. Just make sure that their
subjects are somehow equated. And I don't see what's wrong with making the
possibility sentence into a one-place predicate "Ex(x={this
stove} x[possibly(Eyy{y is black}
y=x)])" which can be rephrased to "This stove is possibly black." Of
course, one is more likely to say something like, "This stove is possibly
malfunctioning a bit."
"This stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not-black" are
not inconsistent in any logic whose treatment of the word "possibly" is within
shouting distance of ordinary English usage. In fact their conjunction makes for
at least one sense of the word "contingent," as in _it is a
*contingent* question whether the stove is black or
non-black._ Usually "possibly..." and "possibly not..." are taken in a
sense parallel to that of "consistent" and "non-valid." Any truth-functional
sentence is either (a) valid or (b) inconsistent or (c) both consistent and
non-valid.
[Jim] I might even go so far as to say that "this stove is possibly
black" fails to assert anything and thus fails the test of
cognition.
Tell that to the man who's just been told, in regard to his wife, "She is
possibly pregnant," and, in regard to his finances, "You are possibly bankrupt,"
and so on -- all definitely existent things around which possibilities
range.
[Jim] It also runs up potentially against contradiction since
"this"refers to a definite, individualobject and the two
propositions "this stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not
black" are inconsistent.
It potentially runs up against contradictions? I think you'll need to spell
them out.They may be the fault of an inadequate logical formalism since
obviously we deal with such things every day. And, again, "possibly black" and
"possibly not black" are consistent, not inconsistent, unless one's formalism
constrains one to signify something quite deviative from normal English usage of
words like "possibly."
[Jim] But 'It is possible that "this stove is black"' seems to work
better. What is the deal about supposing the identity of the predicate and then
assessing the modality of the proposition? Peirce gives the example of "it
rains" in the gamma graphs. He doesn't consider possible rain but whether the
proposition "it rains" is possibly true (false)
If your possibilitative propositions are incapable of transformation into
one-or-more-place predicates, then they seem strangely limited. Anyway, I've
gone on at some length about deductive formalisms, philosophical inquiry, and
the difference betweenfinding a convenientand smooth way to "encode"
or represent something for a given general kind of guiding research interest,
and a specifically philosophical exploration of the conceptions involved in
those things represented. I certainly haven't exhausted the subject, but I leave
it to you to respond by argument to the arguments which I've already started in
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1377(my
second September 6, 2006 post to peirce-l).
Ben Udell
http://tetrast.blogspot.com/
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Thanks Ben, It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem area. You say, "The disparity of Peirce's approaches to (1) attribution and accident and (2) identity/distinction and substances (substantial things), is a serious flaw, and his approach to attribution and accident is better than his other approach." (end) In what way is there a flaw? In the NLC, a "pure species of abstraction" plays anecessary role in cognition. Peirce's theory (in many ways a continuation of Aristotelian and Medieval psychology) commits to this abstraction, without which assertions are inexplicable. Peirce says it is discriminated and treated independently. In other words, the question is not whether blackness is in the stove essentially or accidentally but only what is required for assertion or the "applicability of the predicate to the subject." Are you using the term "accident"in the classical metaphysical sense or are you reflecting on the passage where Peirce says that "intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents" or neither? Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wed, 6 Sep 2006 2:43 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List Jim, list, [Jim Wilgoose] You say, [Ben] "We don't just assert reality, we acknowledge it. Inquiry's coming to reasonable rest is marked not by assertions but by acknowledgements." (end) [Jim] But, every acknowledgement has an assertion to endorse. Thus, at the foundation of inquiry are cognitive assertions. The theory of cognition (JSP series) suggests a potentially infinite number of cognitions leading to a conclusion. But the NLC paper does not care whether the "reference to interpretant" is final or not. The paper is not concerned with listing epistemic interpretants. In fact, I will suggest that acknowledgement has a different subject and predicate than the cognition under consideration. The proposition ' "this stove is black" is true' has the predicate "--is true" and a proposition for a subject. But it still has the basic structure of the categories. I'm not concerned simply with criticism of the NLC paper and I'm not even concerned primarily with criticizing Peirce. I'm concerned with philosophical issues of the categories, and of determination, conveyance, meaning, and establishment. That the NLC paper does not care whether the "reference to interpretant" is final or not, is relevant to a fair criticism of Peirce at the time of the NLC paper, but that is not a criticism which I'm trying to do fairly or unfairly. In the present context it is, for instance, potentially relevant in outlining where and why Peirce developed the conception of the final interpretant -- which was in order to account for truth, reality, and inquiry, as themselves and as deeply and radically related to one another such that, for instance, inquiry is not just a whistling in the dark. [Jim] Thus, at the foundation of inquiry are cognitive assertions. The use of the word "foundation" can be quite ambiguous. Physics is "foundational" to the special sciences in the order of the entities and laws to which we appeal in explaining things. It is not "foundational" to the special sciences in the order of the principles to which minds appeal in establishing or verifying things. A special-scientific study of such establishmental and verificational principles and their use would belong in the human/social studies; this study would be especially concerned with surmise and abductive inference. (The cenoscopic (i.e., general but still positive-phenomenal) study of establishmental and verificational principles and their use is not in inverse optimization or in statistics, but in philosophy, and ampliatively inductive inference is the kind which most lends itself to being studied in the general but still positive-phenomenal context. The forward-implicationally deductive study is not in deductive mathematical theories of optimization or probability but in deductive logic. The equivalential-inferential and mathematically inductive study is not in maths of equations, manifolds, graphs, extremization, or integration, measure, etc., but in the maths of order structures.) A note: In my last post I tried to equate propositions with assumptions, and I'm having second thoughts there; the propositions studied in logic are not merely "toy assumptions," even if in some intellectual-historical sense the conception of propositions might have evolved in that way. It's probably better to think of propositions as a form abstractible indifferently from acknowledgements, renditions, assertions, and assumptions (or, really, expressions of assumptions; I'm not aware of a distinct word for such expressions). Anyway, by your reasoning, we could take
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim, list, [Jim Wilgoose] It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem area. [Jim] You say, [Ben] The disparity of Peirce's approaches to (1) attribution and accident and (2) identity/distinction and substances (substantial things), is a serious flaw, and his approach to attribution and accident is better than his other approach. [Jim] In what way is there a flaw? In the NLC, a "pure species of abstraction" plays anecessary role in cognition. Peirce's theory (in many ways a continuation of Aristotelian and Medieval psychology) commits to this abstraction, without which assertions are inexplicable. Peirce says it is discriminated and treated independently. In other words, the question is not whether blackness is in the stove essentially or accidentally but only what is required for assertion or the "applicability of the predicate to the subject." Are you using the term "accident"in the classical metaphysical sense or are you reflecting on the passage where Peirce says that "intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents" or neither? I'm using "accident" in pretty much the sense in which I find it in Peirce. Peirce seldom mentions the conception of accident; basically, Peirce says the three categories 1stness, 2ndness, and 3rdness, can be termed "accidents" and thereafter we don't hear much about "substance-accident" issues.I'm not strong enough on Aristotlean or Scholastic philosophy to be able to say whether Peirce was departing from any tradition in flatly calling qualities "accidents." Of course, his definition of "quality" is not quite Aristotle's. Anyway, the question is not about the essentialness or accidentalness of the blackness's being in the stove. Thequestion is about _whether_ the blackness is or isn't in the stove. It's not even about the ground per se or about that word "in." The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may be, might be, is 57%-probably, is if--only-if-it's-Thursday,would feasibly be, would most simply be,is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc., black. A mind which cannot conceive, or can only weakly conceive,of alternatives to the actuality with which it is presented, is no longer a mind, oris a weak or weakened mind. In people, it bespeaks brain damage. _Meaning and implicationare in terms of such alternatives._ For instance, consider "'(p--q)'=='((~p)vq)'=='~(p~q)'" and, indeed, consider it both in its propositional-logic aspect and in its 2nd-order aspect. In Scholastic terms, I'm using "whetherhood" and "attribution-relation" in a sense similar to that ascribed to Avicenna's conception of _anitas_ which is a Latin translation of an Arabic term.The Latin word_anitas_ was coined by the translator from the common Latin _an_ which means "whether" and is used in the formation of indirect questions like "You know whether she is here." (It's quite English-like; neither "whether" nor_an_ is an adaptation of a conditional-formative "if"-word; _an_ also has a prefixive sense of "either" as in "ancipital" = either-headed in the sense of a two-edged sword (having two opposite edges or angles), and is also related to "ambi-") However I see a lot more in "whetherhood" than the Scholastics seem to have seen. They were basically thinking of that which is represented by that whichin logic is traditionally called "logical quality" (positive, negative). I don't see any of this as pertaining directly to whether the sentence is assertoric, acknowledgemental, deliberative, imperative, inquisitive, declarative, etc. What Peirce says about attribution is, so far as I know, in terms of the predication of predicates of subjects, which is the interpretant's task. I'm not aware that Peirce in some passage actually says that this refers to the copula uniting substance with accident. So I've been left with the impression that, for Peirce, attribution is a representational relationand, in particular, aninterpretive relation. So what we actually get is this: 1. quality | 3. representation (includes attribution; imputation is a kind of attribution) 2. reaction/resistance (includes identifications/distinctions and the identicals/distincts) You might ask, aren't the "identical/distincts" substances or hypostatic abstractions? But Peirce goes so quiet in such regards about substance that it was only recently through Joe's finding and transcribing Peirce's partial rewriting of the NLC in MS 403 (1893), "The Categories", (see http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms403/ms403.pdf or both http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/msg01183.html(Ransdell
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Dear Folks-- poking about I found that much of what Peirce says about perceptionrelevant to our discussion of verification. (I think what makes verification possible within representation is that the capacity to respond to secondness is inherent in representation -- Peirce didn't say that but I think it's so). But Peirce did say this: "Whatever Comte himself meant by verifiable, which is not very clear, it certainly ought not to be understood to mean veifiable by direct observation, since that would cut off all history as an inadmissile hypothesis. But what must and should be meant is that the hypothesis must be capable of comparing perceptual predictions deduced from a theory with the facts of perception predicted, and in taking the measure of agreement observed as the provisional and approximative, or probametric, measure of the general agreement of the theory with fact. It thus appears that a conception can only be admitted into a hypothesis in so far as its possible consequences would be of a perceptual nature; which agrees with my original maxim of pragmatiism as far as it goes." (Source EP II page 225 -The Nature of Meaning) Well, whether the observation is direct orotherwise it does seem that Peirce views verification as comparing an prediction with an "observed" outcome. And elsewhere in discussions of perception/observation he seems to make it clear that secondness is involved in perception and perception is involved in cognition. And also from EP II pages 24 and 26 respectively: "It thus appears that all knowledge comes to us from observation. A part is forced upon us from without and seems to result from Nature's mind; a part comes from the depths of the mind as seen from within, whcih by an egotistical anacoluthon we call 'our' mind".. . . "The remark that reasoning consists in the observation of an icon will be found equally important in th theory and the practice of reasoning". None of the above intended as proof of anything -- just an interesting line of inquiry. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
