Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
From my standpoint the conversation concerning China gets loud because of the lack of concrete economic and political data. Then ideology parades as insight. Quite. If China's non agricultural workforce is between 350 and 400 million . . . with roughly 100 million in the NON STATE SECTOR . . . then the question becomes what is the economic meaning of state sector and non state sector in China? The self-described meaning of the state sector is here: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/eng/eng_qygg/eng_qygg_0001.htm This is its number 1 responsibility: 1) ... to guide and push the reform and restructuring of the state-owned enterprises. Supervise the maintenance and appreciation of state assets value for those state-invested enterprises, reinforce the management of the state-owned assets, promote the establishment of modern enterprise system of the SOEs and improve enterprises Corporate governance, drive the strategic adjustment of the state-owned economic structure and layout. Also, your employment numbers are fantastically off. Here's a report (2002) from China's State Council: The employees of state and collective enterprises and institutions accounted for 37.3 percent of the total urban employees in 2001, down from 99.8 percent in 1978. Meanwhile, the number of employees of private, individually owned and foreign-invested enterprises has increased drastically. In the countryside, the household is still the dominant unit of agricultural employment. However, with the implementation of the urbanization strategy and the development of non-agricultural industries, non-agricultural employment and the transfer of rural labor have increased rapidly. By the end of 2000, the number of employees of township enterprises had reached 128.195 million, of which 38.328 million were employed by township collective enterprises, 32.525 million by township private enterprises and 57.342 million by individually owned township enterprises. Since the 1990s, the labor force transferred from rural to urban areas has topped the 80-million mark. from: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20020429/1.I.htm Furthermore, since 2000, nearly *all* of the township and village enterprises have been formally privatized (usually sold to the managers), so the 38+ million listed above in the 'collective' economy can now be moved to the 'private' column. Add it all up: 65 million employed in the state sector, 800+ million outside of it. Also, the ratio of employees working in the state sector continues to decline, as does its share of GDP/assets, etc. And furthermore, many of the SOEs are now no longer fully 'owned' by the State. The state merely has a controlling stake of the enterprises' shares, while management has been contracted out to From the perspective of living labor, what is the difference between state and non-state management if their common goal is the ruthless expansion of value? Let's forget about the 800 million in agriculture . . . who under the best conditions of industrial socialism ... can only alienate their products on the basis of exchange . . . no matter what the form of property in land. There aren't 800 million in agriculture. There are somewhere around 800 million people registered in rural areas, but a little less than half of China's working age population is engaged in agriculture, around 450 million. Jonathan
Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
In a message dated 8/11/2004 12:06:10 PM Central Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Also, your employment numbers are fantastically off. Here's a report (2002) from China's State Council: Reply Thanks for the data. Actually . . . they are not my figures . . . and perhaps should not have been used. Here is the data and source of "my" figures from an article dated Nov. 1, 2003: Current Condition of China's Working Class by Liu Shi is a former vice-chairman of the Chairman of the ACFTU (All-China Federation of Trade Unions) "Workers now are responsible for the creation of 72.1% of China's GDP. In 1978, there were 120 million workers in China. By 2000, there were 270 million. Adding the 70 million peasants that have moved to the cities and found long-term wage work, China's working class now numbers approximately 350 million, accounting for half of China's working population. There are currently more than 100 million workers now employed in the non-state sectors. The 13th Party Congress established that workers laboring in private enterprises are wage laborers. What about the SOEs? SOEs have undergone two types of reforms: the small have been sold-off and the large have been transformed into joint-stock corporations. A portion of small and medium-sized SOEs have been sold to private owners, and transformed into private enterprises, while another portion have transferred ownership of a significant portion of enterprise shares to the management. http://www.chinastudygroup.org/index.php?type=articleid=62 Melvin P.
Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
In a message dated 8/11/2004 12:06:10 PM Central Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: From the perspective of living labor, what is the difference betweenstate and non-state management if their common goal is the ruthlessexpansion of value? Comment The property relations that determines the circuit of reproduction and give it a distinct shape. Under the best socialism . . . or rather under the socialism that has and exist . . . one sells their labor power . . . even if it is to a system that is the dictatorship of the proletariat. At best socialism is a transition in the form of property and does not equal the abolition of property. Socialism has never meant freedom to me. You are correct concerning my use of 800 million. They arerural as opposed to agricultural sector. Nevertheless my base question was what did Fidel say that qualified as being horrified by China. Melvin P.
Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Nevertheless my base question was what did Fidel say that qualified as being horrified by China. He probably has never criticized China's capitalist transformation publicly since China has been fairly generous with Cuba economically. The article I forwarded quotes diplomats who were in contact with Castro supposedly, but I doubt you'll find anything specific in print. The last time Castro visited China, he made a rather tactful observation about how much had changed. To really get a handle on how he might see developments in China, you have to look at what he has said about Cuba and extrapolate from that. Castro has been resistant to market reforms all along the line. If you want more information, check the Castro speech database at: http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html It is a very useful resource. -- The Marxism list: www.marxmail.org
Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
In a message dated 8/11/2004 3:20:06 PM Central Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Nevertheless my base question was what did Fidel say that qualified as being horrified by China. He probably has never criticized China's capitalist transformation publicly since China has been fairly generous with Cuba economically. The article I forwarded quotes diplomats who were in contact with Castro supposedly, but I doubt you'll find anything specific in print. The last time Castro visited China, he made a rather tactful observation about how much had changed. Reply Agreed . . . and I will most certainly examine the sources indicated. I of course do not deny the existence of the bourgeois property relations in China. Nor do I beleive that one can advance to communism on the basis of the industrial system. My resistance is to an ideological curve in our history that bounces from crying crocodile tears over the alleged famine killing perhaps as many as 40 million people and all kinds of vilification of the revolution in China and the on going revolutionary process. China . . . or rather the character and substance of her economy . . . is most certainly being more and more integrated into the world economy on the basis of bourgeois reproduction or a set of needs that generates profits and the reproduction of the bourgeois property relations. What some call expanded value without qualification. Value is more than one thing . . . and embraces a social relationship. To be frank . . . telling me about the law of value or expanded value in CHina means next to nothing . . . it don't mean shit to me. You did not state this . . . but is there a possibility of us reaching communism without an expanded value that is transformed on the basis of the form of property and the technological regime? We read and can read the same material more than less. I cannot predict the path of the people of China for the next 100 years. Fuck dumb shit. What has been our path for the past 100 years . . . in terms of the liberation of an oppressed class? The class that was liberated was the sharecropper . . . he was fucking abolished or his energy as a class was no longer need as productive activity. All of us speak of value as this mystical thing. My communism is common sense. Yea . . . common sense and not theoretical excursion about alienation. Fuck that abstract shit about expanded value . . . I did that for twenty years. What did Fidel say about China is a valid question and you answered in an honorable way. I know a little bit about Cuba and its curve of history and why Fidel is out of time. Hey . . . I love Fidel . . . but there are some outstanding demographics that cannot be ignored forever. There is some real history involved. Thanks . . . Lou. Melvin P. China . . . or rather her economy . . .
Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My resistance is to an ideological curve in our history that bounces from crying crocodile tears over the alleged famine killing perhaps as many as 40 million people and all kinds of vilification of the revolution in China and the on going revolutionary process. Which I haven't heard anyone do here, please correct me if I'm wrong. But speaking of revolution, here's the (very) rough draft of a piece by Li Changping, former county head in China, who came to fame in China by writing a letter to then Premier Zhu Rongji about corruption and the desperate conditions in Hubei Province. Prevent Rural Problems From Becoming Revolutionary The main manifestation of rural problems 1. In central and western China, most rural households find it difficult to even maintain simple reproduction after paying taxes and fees on their agricultural income. Furthermore, the majority of migrant workers find it difficult to reproduce their labor power on their wages. In 70% of the villages in central and western China, each family has about 8 mu of land. In average years, each mu of land produces about 1,500 jin of grain, and at .5 yuan/jin, this is about 750 yuan in gross revenue per mu. After subtracting about 200 yuan per mu in production and transaction costs, and 100 yuan in all sorts of visible and invisible taxes and fees, this leaves 450 yuan/mu in income, or about 3,600 yuan in income per family, and usually not more than 5,000 if you include income from sidelines. This figure is an approximation of farm income in currency, while only about 3,000 yuan of a family's income comes in the form of cash. Because education, medical, and the production costs of farmers are all high, it is thus difficult for farming households to break even. According to a survey undertaken by students from Nanjin University in their hometowns, 66% of central-western rural households find it difficult to maintain simple reproduction, and 64% of households are operating in debt. Migrant workers in cities currently earn about 6,000 yuan a year, but they have on average 900 yuan in medical expenses, 1,500 yuan in rent, 2,000 in food and incidental expenses, 200 yuan in clothing expenses, etc. This leaves them with about 600 yuan/year to take home. It is not possible for a young man to accumulate enough money to build a house, get married, and prepare for children and old age on 600 yuan a year. 2. Central-western China's infrastructure has been crumbling. Health, education and other public goods exist only in name. Rural markets are depressed, and financial resources have dried up. Production and life in general are difficult in rural areas, and the romantic image of farming in China is now nothing more than a historical memory. In recent years, the state has spent a great deal on managing large river systems, with impressive results. However, because the level of organization and mobilization in villages has fallen from the past, many of the infrastructure projects built under the communes are not being maintained, lowering villages' abilities to fight natural disasters. The number of school buildings has increased in the last few years, but the public education system that existed before the 80s no longer exists. Schooling is now farming households' biggest expense (36% of their income). A survey by the Ministry of Health revealed that rural households pay on average 500 yuan/year in medical expenses. Falling ill and going to the hospital have become a luxuries for farmers, and also one of their greatest fears. In the 80s, middle schools, roads, electricity, communication, pumps, etc., were all part of the state's responsibility, but now they are all the people's responsibility. How will farmers, who have a difficult time with simple reproduction, be able to shoulder what should be the state's burden to provide public goods? Farmers' disposable cash income is falling, as is their purchasing power. Rural markets are shrinking, and TVEs (town and village enterprises) are having a rough time as rural markets shrink. The four major state banks have retreated from rural areas, and the inability of farmers to secure loans has become one of the bottlenecks for rural development. The new generation of farmers no longer feel a connection with the land, signaling that the age of chaotic urban growth is set to begin. 3. Agricultural investment continues to drop, the natural environment in rural areas is getting worse, farmers produce more and earn less, and many villages are being pressured to return to self-sufficiency. The central government increased its agricultural investment, but provincial, city, county and township governments, heavily in debt (rural townships alone owe 230 billion yuan in debt) and under pressure to issue wages to their millions of bloated staff, prevented this money from reaching the countryside. Since the 1990s, hundreds of millions of hours of labor were mobilized each year to undertake infrastructure
Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
My guess is that this is a reference to prostitution in Cuba. Charles Brown wrote: by Louis Proyect -clip- He is the sort of man who does not want to see his legacy diluted in his lifetime, the diplomat said, adding that Castro was probably unaware of the extent of social decay in Cuba. ^^ CB: Social decay in Cuba or China ? . -- The Marxism list: www.marxmail.org
Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
HORRIFIED BY CHINA Western observers said Castro was shocked by the rapid move to capitalism and growing social differences he witnessed in China last year. "There is no coincidence that a lot of this has happened since he visited China. Many people say he was horrified with what he saw," said a European ambassador. Comment Someone said that Castro said something . . . and with my dumb ass I thought this thread might be about something that FidelCastro (the paramount leader) had stated . . . instead of someone saying that Castro said something . . . about China. From my standpoint the conversation concerning China gets loud because of the lack of concrete economic and political data. Then ideology parades as insight. Last December insurance giant China Life completed the largest initial public offering in the world, raising US$3.46 billion, after raising allotments and pricing shares at the high end of estimates. In terms of the "capitalism or socialism" debate around China . . . and I am of the opinion that China has the largest socialist economy on earth in real time . . . and yes . . . the bourgeois property relations also exists in China . . . hard economic data and economic logic and insight is hard to come by. Dig China Life . . . an insurance company . . . that drew billions of dollars to it in an environment where interest payments from banks can be as small as 1/100 of 1 percent . . . annually. If China's non agricultural workforce is between 350 and 400 million . . . with roughly 100 million in the NON STATE SECTOR . . . then the question becomes what is the economic meaning of state sector and non state sector in China? Let's forget about the 800 million in agriculture . . . who under the best conditions of industrial socialism ... can only alienate their products on the basis of exchange . . . no matter what the form of property in land. What is the non state sector in respects to say China Life? Check out the following excerpt about China Life . . . and then ponder the question is China socialism or capitalism? Excerpt . . . begins here. China Life, like most companies China opens to overseas investors, is state-owned. It's been sliced and diced to create a Frankenstein offering of selected viable parts in order to pass muster with regulators and tempt investors. Bolted on to the top of this monster as its brain is the State Council of the People's Republic of China. The State Council has many constituencies to satisfy, and foreign investors will never climb very high on its list. That's because no foreign investor can threaten the Communist Party's monopoly on power the way domestic rivals or mass unrest might. Foreigners also get limited respect since investors keep falling over themselves to get a piece of the Chinese dream, as they have for the past century and a half. If the Chinese leadership had a good deal to offer, ask yourself, why would they offer it to you and the rest of the overseas investing public? That view may seem outdated, looking at the China that Deng invented and Zhu Rongji revved into the world's fastest-growing nation for a decade. But two other incidents last week, providing background music for flipping your China Life shares, indicate that the political leadership remains intimately involved with the economy in pursuit of its own interests. China's leading car maker, Shanghai Automobile Industrial Corp (SAIC), wants to buy South Korea's Ssangyong Motor, that nation's fourth-largest surviving car company with a dominant position in sport-utility vehicles. But China National Blue Star Group, a chemical company that provides some supplies to the auto industry, likes what it's seen of China's booming car market enough to make its own bid for Ssangyong. This high-stakes acquisition contest didn't play out in the offices of Ssangyong's bankers or lawyers, but in a Beijing meeting of China's National Development and Reform Commission, a body that reports directly to the State Council. As with any good political decision, both companies apparently left the meeting thinking they'd won the nod to bid for Ssangyong. In a wise saying that anyone tempted to think of China as just another economy ought to frame and hang on the wall, a Blue Star spokesman declared: "The Chinese government treats all companies equally - SAIC is state-owned and we are state-owned. This is a market economy, not a planned system." One with distinctly Chinese characteristics, though. This dispute between Chinese suitors will more likely result in heartaches for Ssangyong's sellers rather than a higher price. Whoever winds up with Ssangyong, the new Chinese State owners probably will continue to play by rules that suit themselves. (State-controlled companies, such as Singapore Telecom, buying assets overseas raise a host of competitive and even security questions to be examined in a future column. That Europe has the most experience with such situations is reason enough
