Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-27 Thread Eric Broch
I did understand the discussion. I was just making the point that when 
one does cram-md5 as opposed to plain or login that the password travels 
across an encrypted tunnel in all instances; however, the difference 
between 587 and 465 is that 587 does not start as an encrypted session, 
465 does.


On 1/27/2019 8:35 PM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

Eric,

I use port 465/TLS for submission, so I agree completely with you.

But I think the discussion was regarding using port 587/STARTTLS. In 
that setting, STARTTLS is vulnerable to a downgrade attack which 
tricks the conversation to authenticating without the STARTTLS 
encryption.  So if one uses STARTTLS, one must rely on the SMTPAUTH 
encryption (cram-md5).  However, that too is vulnerable (dictionary 
attack, I believe).  This is the reason the RFC now recommends port 
465/TLS.


At least, that's my understanding.

-Andy


On 1/27/2019 6:19 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password encryption is inside an encrypted tunnel. IMHO opinion 
it's really quite useless.


On 1/27/2019 8:16 PM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

Ahhh... that's right.

But then the next question is should one use cram-md5?  I believe it 
is currently considered insecure.


I just found this link which explains the qmail SMTPAUTH options:
https://www.fehcom.de/qmail/smtpauth.html##SETUP

Unless there is a newer patch, it looks like cram-md5 is the only 
password encryption option.


-Andy


On 1/27/2019 11:20 AM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello Andy

it is indeed a parameter you set in the env variable in the run 
file (in my case I set it up in the submission run file)


cat /var/qmail/supervise/submission/run
#!/bin/sh
QMAILDUID=`id -u vpopmail`
NOFILESGID=`id -g vpopmail`
MAXSMTPD=`cat /var/qmail/control/concurrencyincoming`
SMTPD="/var/qmail/bin/qmail-smtpd"
TCP_CDB="/etc/tcprules.d/tcp.smtp.cdb"
HOSTNAME=`hostname`
VCHKPW="/home/vpopmail/bin/vchkpw"
export SMTPAUTH="!+cram" <--

exec /usr/bin/softlimit -m 12800 \
 /usr/bin/tcpserver -v -R -H -l $HOSTNAME -x $TCP_CDB -c 
"$MAXSMTPD" \

 -u "$QMAILDUID" -g "$NOFILESGID" 0 587 \
 $SMTPD $VCHKPW /bin/true 2>&1

The current _qmail-authentication_ patch allows you to use the 
environment variable SMTPAUTH for *qmail-smtpd* in the following way:


SMTPAUTH settings for *qmail-smtpd



* *SMTPAUTH* *Meaning*
"" Left blank to allow Authentication types "PLAIN" and "LOGIN"
"+cram" Add "CRAM-MD5" support
"cram" Just (secure) "CRAM-MD5" support, no other types offered
"!" Enforcing SMTP Auth (of type "LOGIN" or "PLAIN")
"!cram" Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "CRAM-MD5"
"!+cram" Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "LOGIN", "PLAIN", or 
"CRAM-MD5"

"-" Disabling SMTP Auth (for a particular connection)

The complete patch info is listed here :
https://www.fehcom.de/qmail/smtpauth.html


Regards
-P


On 1/26/19 8:06 PM, Andrew Swartz wrote:
My guess is that there must be a difference in the patches applied 
to qmail-smtpd or a different compile time option.  I don't think 
this is a simple setting (like in qmail/control).


When the connection comes in, tcpserver forwards it to 
qmail-smtpd. If STARTTLS is invoked, qmail-smtpd hands that task 
off to openssl, which then returns the decrypted plaintext.  But 
the password processing, whether plain, login, or encrypted, is 
likely handled directly by qmail-smtpd.


Is anyone out there familiar enough with the source code to 
confirm or refute this?


If it is a compile option, it should be fixable with mild to 
moderate effort.  If it is a patch change, that seems more 
difficult (at least with my skill level).


If you figure this out, please let us know, as others will likely 
be making the migration in the future.



-Andy



On 1/25/2019 1:21 AM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:
I tested with Thunderbird (where the account was working fine 
with stable version and encrypted password on starttls)


and the message came up after the upgrade to change to normal 
password.


When lamba users will get that message they ll just panic and 
wont know what to do.



I still need to check how outlook will react ...


On 1/25/19 10:52 AM, Tommi Järvilehto wrote:
Was there a problem with Outlook and encrypted passwords? Or the 
password cache?


On 25.1.2019 11:43, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

Yes that's one of the reason I was wondering why encrypted 
password was no longer supported for STARTTLS in the lastest 
dev version


Regards

-P

On 1/25/19 8:56 AM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

I would add the caveat that STARTTLS is only "probably safe".

Unfortunately, it suffers from a critical error in the very 
concept of going from an plaintext session to a TLS session, 
resulting in an unfixable (as far as I know) vulnerability.  A 
man-in-the-middle can inject text into the server response to 
tell the client that STARTTLS is not available and that the 
conversation should therefore continue in plaintext.  I've 
read that several ISP's have been caught using this 
vulnerability to s

Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-27 Thread Andrew Swartz

Eric,

I use port 465/TLS for submission, so I agree completely with you.

But I think the discussion was regarding using port 587/STARTTLS.  In 
that setting, STARTTLS is vulnerable to a downgrade attack which tricks 
the conversation to authenticating without the STARTTLS encryption.  So 
if one uses STARTTLS, one must rely on the SMTPAUTH encryption 
(cram-md5).  However, that too is vulnerable (dictionary attack, I 
believe).  This is the reason the RFC now recommends port 465/TLS.


At least, that's my understanding.

-Andy


On 1/27/2019 6:19 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password encryption is inside an encrypted tunnel. IMHO opinion it's 
really quite useless.


On 1/27/2019 8:16 PM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

Ahhh... that's right.

But then the next question is should one use cram-md5?  I believe it 
is currently considered insecure.


I just found this link which explains the qmail SMTPAUTH options:
https://www.fehcom.de/qmail/smtpauth.html##SETUP

Unless there is a newer patch, it looks like cram-md5 is the only 
password encryption option.


-Andy


On 1/27/2019 11:20 AM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello Andy

it is indeed a parameter you set in the env variable in the run file 
(in my case I set it up in the submission run file)


cat /var/qmail/supervise/submission/run
#!/bin/sh
QMAILDUID=`id -u vpopmail`
NOFILESGID=`id -g vpopmail`
MAXSMTPD=`cat /var/qmail/control/concurrencyincoming`
SMTPD="/var/qmail/bin/qmail-smtpd"
TCP_CDB="/etc/tcprules.d/tcp.smtp.cdb"
HOSTNAME=`hostname`
VCHKPW="/home/vpopmail/bin/vchkpw"
export SMTPAUTH="!+cram" <--

exec /usr/bin/softlimit -m 12800 \
 /usr/bin/tcpserver -v -R -H -l $HOSTNAME -x $TCP_CDB -c 
"$MAXSMTPD" \

 -u "$QMAILDUID" -g "$NOFILESGID" 0 587 \
 $SMTPD $VCHKPW /bin/true 2>&1

The current _qmail-authentication_ patch allows you to use the 
environment variable SMTPAUTH for *qmail-smtpd* in the following way:


SMTPAUTH settings for *qmail-smtpd



* *SMTPAUTH* *Meaning*
"" Left blank to allow Authentication types "PLAIN" and "LOGIN"
"+cram" Add "CRAM-MD5" support
"cram" Just (secure) "CRAM-MD5" support, no other types offered
"!" Enforcing SMTP Auth (of type "LOGIN" or "PLAIN")
"!cram" Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "CRAM-MD5"
"!+cram" Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "LOGIN", "PLAIN", or "CRAM-MD5"
"-" Disabling SMTP Auth (for a particular connection)

The complete patch info is listed here :
https://www.fehcom.de/qmail/smtpauth.html


Regards
-P


On 1/26/19 8:06 PM, Andrew Swartz wrote:
My guess is that there must be a difference in the patches applied 
to qmail-smtpd or a different compile time option.  I don't think 
this is a simple setting (like in qmail/control).


When the connection comes in, tcpserver forwards it to qmail-smtpd. 
If STARTTLS is invoked, qmail-smtpd hands that task off to openssl, 
which then returns the decrypted plaintext.  But the password 
processing, whether plain, login, or encrypted, is likely handled 
directly by qmail-smtpd.


Is anyone out there familiar enough with the source code to confirm 
or refute this?


If it is a compile option, it should be fixable with mild to 
moderate effort.  If it is a patch change, that seems more difficult 
(at least with my skill level).


If you figure this out, please let us know, as others will likely be 
making the migration in the future.



-Andy



On 1/25/2019 1:21 AM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:
I tested with Thunderbird (where the account was working fine with 
stable version and encrypted password on starttls)


and the message came up after the upgrade to change to normal 
password.


When lamba users will get that message they ll just panic and wont 
know what to do.



I still need to check how outlook will react ...


On 1/25/19 10:52 AM, Tommi Järvilehto wrote:
Was there a problem with Outlook and encrypted passwords? Or the 
password cache?


On 25.1.2019 11:43, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

Yes that's one of the reason I was wondering why encrypted 
password was no longer supported for STARTTLS in the lastest dev 
version


Regards

-P

On 1/25/19 8:56 AM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

I would add the caveat that STARTTLS is only "probably safe".

Unfortunately, it suffers from a critical error in the very 
concept of going from an plaintext session to a TLS session, 
resulting in an unfixable (as far as I know) vulnerability.  A 
man-in-the-middle can inject text into the server response to 
tell the client that STARTTLS is not available and that the 
conversation should therefore continue in plaintext.  I've read 
that several ISP's have been caught using this vulnerability to 
scan people's outgoing email. That means PLAIN or LOGIN type 
submission passwords can be seen.


This is why the 2018 RFC (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8314) 
has strongly recommended abandoning STARTTLS on port 587 and 
using dedicated TLS on port 465 for mail submission.


-Andy





On 1/24/2019 9:30 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password is n

Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-27 Thread Eric Broch
The password encryption is inside an encrypted tunnel. IMHO opinion it's 
really quite useless.


On 1/27/2019 8:16 PM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

Ahhh... that's right.

But then the next question is should one use cram-md5?  I believe it 
is currently considered insecure.


I just found this link which explains the qmail SMTPAUTH options:
https://www.fehcom.de/qmail/smtpauth.html##SETUP

Unless there is a newer patch, it looks like cram-md5 is the only 
password encryption option.


-Andy


On 1/27/2019 11:20 AM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello Andy

it is indeed a parameter you set in the env variable in the run file 
(in my case I set it up in the submission run file)


cat /var/qmail/supervise/submission/run
#!/bin/sh
QMAILDUID=`id -u vpopmail`
NOFILESGID=`id -g vpopmail`
MAXSMTPD=`cat /var/qmail/control/concurrencyincoming`
SMTPD="/var/qmail/bin/qmail-smtpd"
TCP_CDB="/etc/tcprules.d/tcp.smtp.cdb"
HOSTNAME=`hostname`
VCHKPW="/home/vpopmail/bin/vchkpw"
export SMTPAUTH="!+cram" <--

exec /usr/bin/softlimit -m 12800 \
 /usr/bin/tcpserver -v -R -H -l $HOSTNAME -x $TCP_CDB -c 
"$MAXSMTPD" \

 -u "$QMAILDUID" -g "$NOFILESGID" 0 587 \
 $SMTPD $VCHKPW /bin/true 2>&1

The current _qmail-authentication_ patch allows you to use the 
environment variable SMTPAUTH for *qmail-smtpd* in the following way:


SMTPAUTH settings for *qmail-smtpd



* *SMTPAUTH* *Meaning*
"" Left blank to allow Authentication types "PLAIN" and "LOGIN"
"+cram" Add "CRAM-MD5" support
"cram" Just (secure) "CRAM-MD5" support, no other types offered
"!" Enforcing SMTP Auth (of type "LOGIN" or "PLAIN")
"!cram" Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "CRAM-MD5"
"!+cram" Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "LOGIN", "PLAIN", or "CRAM-MD5"
"-" Disabling SMTP Auth (for a particular connection)

The complete patch info is listed here :
https://www.fehcom.de/qmail/smtpauth.html


Regards
-P


On 1/26/19 8:06 PM, Andrew Swartz wrote:
My guess is that there must be a difference in the patches applied 
to qmail-smtpd or a different compile time option.  I don't think 
this is a simple setting (like in qmail/control).


When the connection comes in, tcpserver forwards it to qmail-smtpd.  
If STARTTLS is invoked, qmail-smtpd hands that task off to openssl, 
which then returns the decrypted plaintext.  But the password 
processing, whether plain, login, or encrypted, is likely handled 
directly by qmail-smtpd.


Is anyone out there familiar enough with the source code to confirm 
or refute this?


If it is a compile option, it should be fixable with mild to 
moderate effort.  If it is a patch change, that seems more difficult 
(at least with my skill level).


If you figure this out, please let us know, as others will likely be 
making the migration in the future.



-Andy



On 1/25/2019 1:21 AM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:
I tested with Thunderbird (where the account was working fine with 
stable version and encrypted password on starttls)


and the message came up after the upgrade to change to normal 
password.


When lamba users will get that message they ll just panic and wont 
know what to do.



I still need to check how outlook will react ...


On 1/25/19 10:52 AM, Tommi Järvilehto wrote:
Was there a problem with Outlook and encrypted passwords? Or the 
password cache?


On 25.1.2019 11:43, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

Yes that's one of the reason I was wondering why encrypted 
password was no longer supported for STARTTLS in the lastest dev 
version


Regards

-P

On 1/25/19 8:56 AM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

I would add the caveat that STARTTLS is only "probably safe".

Unfortunately, it suffers from a critical error in the very 
concept of going from an plaintext session to a TLS session, 
resulting in an unfixable (as far as I know) vulnerability.  A 
man-in-the-middle can inject text into the server response to 
tell the client that STARTTLS is not available and that the 
conversation should therefore continue in plaintext.  I've read 
that several ISP's have been caught using this vulnerability to 
scan people's outgoing email. That means PLAIN or LOGIN type 
submission passwords can be seen.


This is why the 2018 RFC (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8314) 
has strongly recommended abandoning STARTTLS on port 587 and 
using dedicated TLS on port 465 for mail submission.


-Andy





On 1/24/2019 9:30 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password is not encrypted (Normal) but is sent over an 
encrypted connection, it's safe.


On 1/24/2019 5:39 PM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

I was testing the dev version (an upgrade over the stable 
version) and came through that annoying problem


if I have to advise all users to change their config :


Sending of the message failed.
The Outgoing server (SMTP) xx does not seem to support 
encrypted passwords. If you just set up the account, try 
changing the 'Authentication method' in 'Account settings | 
Outgoing server (SMTP)' to 'Normal password'.


All the users having a

Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-27 Thread Andrew Swartz

Ahhh... that's right.

But then the next question is should one use cram-md5?  I believe it is 
currently considered insecure.


I just found this link which explains the qmail SMTPAUTH options:
https://www.fehcom.de/qmail/smtpauth.html##SETUP

Unless there is a newer patch, it looks like cram-md5 is the only 
password encryption option.


-Andy


On 1/27/2019 11:20 AM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello Andy

it is indeed a parameter you set in the env variable in the run file (in 
my case I set it up in the submission run file)


cat /var/qmail/supervise/submission/run
#!/bin/sh
QMAILDUID=`id -u vpopmail`
NOFILESGID=`id -g vpopmail`
MAXSMTPD=`cat /var/qmail/control/concurrencyincoming`
SMTPD="/var/qmail/bin/qmail-smtpd"
TCP_CDB="/etc/tcprules.d/tcp.smtp.cdb"
HOSTNAME=`hostname`
VCHKPW="/home/vpopmail/bin/vchkpw"
export SMTPAUTH="!+cram" <--

exec /usr/bin/softlimit -m 12800 \
     /usr/bin/tcpserver -v -R -H -l $HOSTNAME -x $TCP_CDB -c "$MAXSMTPD" \
     -u "$QMAILDUID" -g "$NOFILESGID" 0 587 \
     $SMTPD $VCHKPW /bin/true 2>&1

The current _qmail-authentication_ patch allows you to use the 
environment variable SMTPAUTH for *qmail-smtpd* in the following way:


SMTPAUTH settings for *qmail-smtpd



* *SMTPAUTH**Meaning*
""Left blank to allow Authentication types "PLAIN" and "LOGIN"
"+cram"   Add "CRAM-MD5" support
"cram"Just (secure) "CRAM-MD5" support, no other types offered
"!"   Enforcing SMTP Auth (of type "LOGIN" or "PLAIN")
"!cram"   Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "CRAM-MD5"
"!+cram"  Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "LOGIN", "PLAIN", or "CRAM-MD5"
"-"   Disabling SMTP Auth (for a particular connection)

The complete patch info is listed here :
https://www.fehcom.de/qmail/smtpauth.html


Regards
-P


On 1/26/19 8:06 PM, Andrew Swartz wrote:
My guess is that there must be a difference in the patches applied to 
qmail-smtpd or a different compile time option.  I don't think this is 
a simple setting (like in qmail/control).


When the connection comes in, tcpserver forwards it to qmail-smtpd.  
If STARTTLS is invoked, qmail-smtpd hands that task off to openssl, 
which then returns the decrypted plaintext.  But the password 
processing, whether plain, login, or encrypted, is likely handled 
directly by qmail-smtpd.


Is anyone out there familiar enough with the source code to confirm or 
refute this?


If it is a compile option, it should be fixable with mild to moderate 
effort.  If it is a patch change, that seems more difficult (at least 
with my skill level).


If you figure this out, please let us know, as others will likely be 
making the migration in the future.



-Andy



On 1/25/2019 1:21 AM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:
I tested with Thunderbird (where the account was working fine with 
stable version and encrypted password on starttls)


and the message came up after the upgrade to change to normal password.

When lamba users will get that message they ll just panic and wont 
know what to do.



I still need to check how outlook will react ...


On 1/25/19 10:52 AM, Tommi Järvilehto wrote:
Was there a problem with Outlook and encrypted passwords? Or the 
password cache?


On 25.1.2019 11:43, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

Yes that's one of the reason I was wondering why encrypted password 
was no longer supported for STARTTLS in the lastest dev version


Regards

-P

On 1/25/19 8:56 AM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

I would add the caveat that STARTTLS is only "probably safe".

Unfortunately, it suffers from a critical error in the very 
concept of going from an plaintext session to a TLS session, 
resulting in an unfixable (as far as I know) vulnerability.  A 
man-in-the-middle can inject text into the server response to tell 
the client that STARTTLS is not available and that the 
conversation should therefore continue in plaintext.  I've read 
that several ISP's have been caught using this vulnerability to 
scan people's outgoing email. That means PLAIN or LOGIN type 
submission passwords can be seen.


This is why the 2018 RFC (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8314) has 
strongly recommended abandoning STARTTLS on port 587 and using 
dedicated TLS on port 465 for mail submission.


-Andy





On 1/24/2019 9:30 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password is not encrypted (Normal) but is sent over an 
encrypted connection, it's safe.


On 1/24/2019 5:39 PM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

I was testing the dev version (an upgrade over the stable 
version) and came through that annoying problem


if I have to advise all users to change their config :


Sending of the message failed.
The Outgoing server (SMTP) xx does not seem to support 
encrypted passwords. If you just set up the account, try 
changing the 'Authentication method' in 'Account settings | 
Outgoing server (SMTP)' to 'Normal password'.


All the users having a starttls config in their mail client had 
to change from encrypted to normal


which of course brought the question "oh it is not safe anymore 

Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-27 Thread Philip Nix Guru

Hello Andy

it is indeed a parameter you set in the env variable in the run file (in 
my case I set it up in the submission run file)


cat /var/qmail/supervise/submission/run
#!/bin/sh
QMAILDUID=`id -u vpopmail`
NOFILESGID=`id -g vpopmail`
MAXSMTPD=`cat /var/qmail/control/concurrencyincoming`
SMTPD="/var/qmail/bin/qmail-smtpd"
TCP_CDB="/etc/tcprules.d/tcp.smtp.cdb"
HOSTNAME=`hostname`
VCHKPW="/home/vpopmail/bin/vchkpw"
export SMTPAUTH="!+cram" <--

exec /usr/bin/softlimit -m 12800 \
    /usr/bin/tcpserver -v -R -H -l $HOSTNAME -x $TCP_CDB -c "$MAXSMTPD" \
    -u "$QMAILDUID" -g "$NOFILESGID" 0 587 \
    $SMTPD $VCHKPW /bin/true 2>&1

The current _qmail-authentication_ patch allows you to use the 
environment variable SMTPAUTH for *qmail-smtpd* in the following way:


SMTPAUTH settings for *qmail-smtpd



* *SMTPAUTH**Meaning*
""Left blank to allow Authentication types "PLAIN" and "LOGIN"
"+cram"   Add "CRAM-MD5" support
"cram"Just (secure) "CRAM-MD5" support, no other types offered
"!"   Enforcing SMTP Auth (of type "LOGIN" or "PLAIN")
"!cram"   Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "CRAM-MD5"
"!+cram"  Enforcing SMTP Auth of type "LOGIN", "PLAIN", or "CRAM-MD5"
"-"   Disabling SMTP Auth (for a particular connection)

The complete patch info is listed here :
https://www.fehcom.de/qmail/smtpauth.html


Regards
-P


On 1/26/19 8:06 PM, Andrew Swartz wrote:
My guess is that there must be a difference in the patches applied to 
qmail-smtpd or a different compile time option.  I don't think this is 
a simple setting (like in qmail/control).


When the connection comes in, tcpserver forwards it to qmail-smtpd.  
If STARTTLS is invoked, qmail-smtpd hands that task off to openssl, 
which then returns the decrypted plaintext.  But the password 
processing, whether plain, login, or encrypted, is likely handled 
directly by qmail-smtpd.


Is anyone out there familiar enough with the source code to confirm or 
refute this?


If it is a compile option, it should be fixable with mild to moderate 
effort.  If it is a patch change, that seems more difficult (at least 
with my skill level).


If you figure this out, please let us know, as others will likely be 
making the migration in the future.



-Andy



On 1/25/2019 1:21 AM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:
I tested with Thunderbird (where the account was working fine with 
stable version and encrypted password on starttls)


and the message came up after the upgrade to change to normal password.

When lamba users will get that message they ll just panic and wont 
know what to do.



I still need to check how outlook will react ...


On 1/25/19 10:52 AM, Tommi Järvilehto wrote:
Was there a problem with Outlook and encrypted passwords? Or the 
password cache?


On 25.1.2019 11:43, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

Yes that's one of the reason I was wondering why encrypted password 
was no longer supported for STARTTLS in the lastest dev version


Regards

-P

On 1/25/19 8:56 AM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

I would add the caveat that STARTTLS is only "probably safe".

Unfortunately, it suffers from a critical error in the very 
concept of going from an plaintext session to a TLS session, 
resulting in an unfixable (as far as I know) vulnerability.  A 
man-in-the-middle can inject text into the server response to tell 
the client that STARTTLS is not available and that the 
conversation should therefore continue in plaintext.  I've read 
that several ISP's have been caught using this vulnerability to 
scan people's outgoing email. That means PLAIN or LOGIN type 
submission passwords can be seen.


This is why the 2018 RFC (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8314) has 
strongly recommended abandoning STARTTLS on port 587 and using 
dedicated TLS on port 465 for mail submission.


-Andy





On 1/24/2019 9:30 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password is not encrypted (Normal) but is sent over an 
encrypted connection, it's safe.


On 1/24/2019 5:39 PM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

I was testing the dev version (an upgrade over the stable 
version) and came through that annoying problem


if I have to advise all users to change their config :


Sending of the message failed.
The Outgoing server (SMTP) xx does not seem to support 
encrypted passwords. If you just set up the account, try 
changing the 'Authentication method' in 'Account settings | 
Outgoing server (SMTP)' to 'Normal password'.


All the users having a starttls config in their mail client had 
to change from encrypted to normal


which of course brought the question "oh it is not safe anymore 
..."



Regards

-Philip





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Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-25 Thread Philip Nix Guru
I tested with Thunderbird (where the account was working fine with 
stable version and encrypted password on starttls)


and the message came up after the upgrade to change to normal password.

When lamba users will get that message they ll just panic and wont know 
what to do.



I still need to check how outlook will react ...


On 1/25/19 10:52 AM, Tommi Järvilehto wrote:
Was there a problem with Outlook and encrypted passwords? Or the 
password cache?


On 25.1.2019 11:43, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

Yes that's one of the reason I was wondering why encrypted password 
was no longer supported for STARTTLS in the lastest dev version


Regards

-P

On 1/25/19 8:56 AM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

I would add the caveat that STARTTLS is only "probably safe".

Unfortunately, it suffers from a critical error in the very concept 
of going from an plaintext session to a TLS session, resulting in an 
unfixable (as far as I know) vulnerability.  A man-in-the-middle can 
inject text into the server response to tell the client that 
STARTTLS is not available and that the conversation should therefore 
continue in plaintext.  I've read that several ISP's have been 
caught using this vulnerability to scan people's outgoing email.  
That means PLAIN or LOGIN type submission passwords can be seen.


This is why the 2018 RFC (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8314) has 
strongly recommended abandoning STARTTLS on port 587 and using 
dedicated TLS on port 465 for mail submission.


-Andy





On 1/24/2019 9:30 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password is not encrypted (Normal) but is sent over an 
encrypted connection, it's safe.


On 1/24/2019 5:39 PM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

I was testing the dev version (an upgrade over the stable version) 
and came through that annoying problem


if I have to advise all users to change their config :


Sending of the message failed.
The Outgoing server (SMTP) xx does not seem to support 
encrypted passwords. If you just set up the account, try changing 
the 'Authentication method' in 'Account settings | Outgoing server 
(SMTP)' to 'Normal password'.


All the users having a starttls config in their mail client had to 
change from encrypted to normal


which of course brought the question "oh it is not safe anymore ..."


Regards

-Philip





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Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-25 Thread Tommi Järvilehto
Was there a problem with Outlook and encrypted passwords? Or the 
password cache?


On 25.1.2019 11:43, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

Yes that's one of the reason I was wondering why encrypted password 
was no longer supported for STARTTLS in the lastest dev version


Regards

-P

On 1/25/19 8:56 AM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

I would add the caveat that STARTTLS is only "probably safe".

Unfortunately, it suffers from a critical error in the very concept 
of going from an plaintext session to a TLS session, resulting in an 
unfixable (as far as I know) vulnerability.  A man-in-the-middle can 
inject text into the server response to tell the client that STARTTLS 
is not available and that the conversation should therefore continue 
in plaintext.  I've read that several ISP's have been caught using 
this vulnerability to scan people's outgoing email.  That means PLAIN 
or LOGIN type submission passwords can be seen.


This is why the 2018 RFC (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8314) has 
strongly recommended abandoning STARTTLS on port 587 and using 
dedicated TLS on port 465 for mail submission.


-Andy





On 1/24/2019 9:30 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password is not encrypted (Normal) but is sent over an encrypted 
connection, it's safe.


On 1/24/2019 5:39 PM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

I was testing the dev version (an upgrade over the stable version) 
and came through that annoying problem


if I have to advise all users to change their config :


Sending of the message failed.
The Outgoing server (SMTP) xx does not seem to support 
encrypted passwords. If you just set up the account, try changing 
the 'Authentication method' in 'Account settings | Outgoing server 
(SMTP)' to 'Normal password'.


All the users having a starttls config in their mail client had to 
change from encrypted to normal


which of course brought the question "oh it is not safe anymore ..."


Regards

-Philip





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--
Tommi Järvilehto
DataVahti Oy
040 732 8032


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Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-25 Thread Philip Nix Guru

Hello

Yes that's one of the reason I was wondering why encrypted password was 
no longer supported for STARTTLS in the lastest dev version


Regards

-P

On 1/25/19 8:56 AM, Andrew Swartz wrote:

I would add the caveat that STARTTLS is only "probably safe".

Unfortunately, it suffers from a critical error in the very concept of 
going from an plaintext session to a TLS session, resulting in an 
unfixable (as far as I know) vulnerability.  A man-in-the-middle can 
inject text into the server response to tell the client that STARTTLS 
is not available and that the conversation should therefore continue 
in plaintext.  I've read that several ISP's have been caught using 
this vulnerability to scan people's outgoing email.  That means PLAIN 
or LOGIN type submission passwords can be seen.


This is why the 2018 RFC (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8314) has 
strongly recommended abandoning STARTTLS on port 587 and using 
dedicated TLS on port 465 for mail submission.


-Andy





On 1/24/2019 9:30 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password is not encrypted (Normal) but is sent over an encrypted 
connection, it's safe.


On 1/24/2019 5:39 PM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

I was testing the dev version (an upgrade over the stable version) 
and came through that annoying problem


if I have to advise all users to change their config :


Sending of the message failed.
The Outgoing server (SMTP) xx does not seem to support encrypted 
passwords. If you just set up the account, try changing the 
'Authentication method' in 'Account settings | Outgoing server 
(SMTP)' to 'Normal password'.


All the users having a starttls config in their mail client had to 
change from encrypted to normal


which of course brought the question "oh it is not safe anymore ..."


Regards

-Philip





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Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-24 Thread Andrew Swartz

I would add the caveat that STARTTLS is only "probably safe".

Unfortunately, it suffers from a critical error in the very concept of 
going from an plaintext session to a TLS session, resulting in an 
unfixable (as far as I know) vulnerability.  A man-in-the-middle can 
inject text into the server response to tell the client that STARTTLS is 
not available and that the conversation should therefore continue in 
plaintext.  I've read that several ISP's have been caught using this 
vulnerability to scan people's outgoing email.  That means PLAIN or 
LOGIN type submission passwords can be seen.


This is why the 2018 RFC (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8314) has 
strongly recommended abandoning STARTTLS on port 587 and using dedicated 
TLS on port 465 for mail submission.


-Andy





On 1/24/2019 9:30 PM, Eric Broch wrote:
The password is not encrypted (Normal) but is sent over an encrypted 
connection, it's safe.


On 1/24/2019 5:39 PM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

I was testing the dev version (an upgrade over the stable version) and 
came through that annoying problem


if I have to advise all users to change their config :


Sending of the message failed.
The Outgoing server (SMTP) xx does not seem to support encrypted 
passwords. If you just set up the account, try changing the 
'Authentication method' in 'Account settings | Outgoing server (SMTP)' 
to 'Normal password'.


All the users having a starttls config in their mail client had to 
change from encrypted to normal


which of course brought the question "oh it is not safe anymore ..."


Regards

-Philip





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Re: [qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-24 Thread Eric Broch
The password is not encrypted (Normal) but is sent over an encrypted 
connection, it's safe.


On 1/24/2019 5:39 PM, Philip Nix Guru wrote:

Hello

I was testing the dev version (an upgrade over the stable version) and 
came through that annoying problem


if I have to advise all users to change their config :


Sending of the message failed.
The Outgoing server (SMTP) xx does not seem to support encrypted 
passwords. If you just set up the account, try changing the 
'Authentication method' in 'Account settings | Outgoing server (SMTP)' 
to 'Normal password'.


All the users having a starttls config in their mail client had to 
change from encrypted to normal


which of course brought the question "oh it is not safe anymore ..."


Regards

-Philip





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--
Eric Broch
White Horse Technical Consulting (WHTC)


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[qmailtoaster] Development version

2019-01-24 Thread Philip Nix Guru

Hello

I was testing the dev version (an upgrade over the stable version) and 
came through that annoying problem


if I have to advise all users to change their config :


Sending of the message failed.
The Outgoing server (SMTP) xx does not seem to support encrypted 
passwords. If you just set up the account, try changing the 
'Authentication method' in 'Account settings | Outgoing server (SMTP)' 
to 'Normal password'.


All the users having a starttls config in their mail client had to 
change from encrypted to normal


which of course brought the question "oh it is not safe anymore ..."


Regards

-Philip





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