[qubes-devel] [Contribution] Module for dracut to allow 2FA on LUKS

2018-08-09 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I wrote a module for dracut to allow 2FA on LUKS. Currently it's a beta version. AFAIK a native solution for dracut already exists, however it isn't compatible with systemd and the latter is enabled by default. Furthermore it uses GPG, but

Re: [qubes-devel] [Contribution] Module for dracut to allow 2FA on LUKS

2018-08-10 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 There is a discussion about its security model at https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2712 Best Regards, Raffaele. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEXw2ov1HEFPFo+AVy07vJZYtrAOMFAlttU7UACgkQ07vJZYtr AOMWpw/9Gf10egH/hkzruEFOe

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: [Contribution] Module for dracut to allow 2FA on LUKS

2018-08-11 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Thanks! I'll wait your opinion! Best Regards, Raffaele. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEXw2ov1HEFPFo+AVy07vJZYtrAOMFAltui9IACgkQ07vJZYtr AOMN5hAAsNUgqro1Pw98v3bgBhBjP7z1O2ECLM8xq5S9kK4464kO+HF0YMVvVCju jnmrbfNdzvUOzX8LL8/dnALUnvzghCPn

[qubes-devel] Open in Qube 3.0 beta released!

2018-09-14 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Dear Qubes community, I've released a new version of "Open in Qube" (aka qubes-url-redirector) [v3.0_beta]. The repository is at [repo]. This is a browser extension inspired by [gsoc idea] and it's written using standard WebExtension APIs. Each cus

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Open in Qube 3.0 beta released!

2018-09-17 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 > Impressive work, Raffaele! Qubes OS just became an order of magnitude more > attractive, and more Qubes-like :) Yeah and it's a pleasure for me!! :) Best Regards, Raffaele. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEXw2ov1HEFPFo+AVy07vJZYtr

[qubes-devel] Open in Qube 3.0.1 beta released!

2018-10-08 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Dear Qubes community, I've released a new version of "Open in Qube" (aka qubes-url-redirector) [v3.0.1_beta] because I fixed a bug in a function (makeUrl) that simplify the build process of a whitelisted entry. The announce about the previous relea

[qubes-devel] Re: [qubes-users] My farewell to Qubes OS!

2018-10-26 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Joanna, Thanks, thanks and thanks again for all your work! I wish you all the best. Cheers, Raffaele. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEXw2ov1HEFPFo+AVy07vJZYtrAOMFAlvTIVUACgkQ07vJZYtr AOOqAxAAovyvQQKp0n3uW70apch9QG0nQgGCD2gPS4aeqjXJKD

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Password encryption for individual vm's

2019-01-19 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
> - In the rare case I forget to lock my notebook at cusomer 1 I don't want > anyone to be able to extract other customers data. (While not perfect in > regards to dom0 security at least it makes sure no data can be stolen) > After you forgot the notebook, will you restore to a clean state (lik

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Password encryption for individual vm's

2019-01-19 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
> Idea proposal: > > === > > During writing I had an idea. An improved way to handle such use case could > be the concept of PC (OS or Qubes) state (I hadn't time to find a suitable > name, lol). I mean: when you are in a state only a subset of VMs are present, > the other ones are d

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Password encryption for individual vm's

2019-01-19 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
> Yes, of course you have to consider the notebook compromised at this point > and needs to be reset to a clean state afterwards. But that's another topic, > It's all about minimizing the damage done here. If the VM groups are > encrypted individually, at least you can have some peace of mind th

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Password encryption for individual vm's

2019-01-20 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
I'm asking apples, and you're giving me oranges. I'll explain again in what my idea is, and why I think that this naive approach is bad. As premises you should remember that you're proposing this feature in Qubes OS, a security oriented OS. Furthermore you aren't the only user of this OS, so wh

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Password encryption for individual vm's

2019-01-21 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
> Giving the user a way to additionaly encrypt some higher value VMs does not > change anything for any user that doesn't use this feature at all. You can > use it but you don't have to! > Sorry, what I meant isn't clear. Nonetheless the point is cleared subsequently in my previous post. I wasn'

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Password encryption for individual vm's

2019-01-22 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
> So at first you are against vm-encryption with the possiblity to use unique > passwords since it was too hard for you to remember multiple passwords. At > the same time you refused to use the same password for more than one VM. > Now you say, your "state" model also relies on ENCRYPTED VMS, whi

[qubes-devel] First contribution - dwm patch

2017-08-07 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
Hi all, My name is Raffaele Florio and before Qubes OS I used a lot of open source OS (Arch Linux most of all). Unfortunately I never was really satisfied. Now, definitively, I am a happy Qubes OS user, and I want to contribute. :D Actually this is my first contribution ever. It's a patch for dw

[qubes-devel] Re: First contribution - dwm patch

2017-08-08 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I've an update :D I patched dmenu for Qubes OS. You can get the patch here: https://github.com/raffaeleflorio/qubes-dmenu As you can see there are two files executed by dwm or other: one for Dom0 (dmenu_dom0), one for vms (dmenu_vms). For th

[qubes-devel] Re: First contribution - dwm patch

2017-08-09 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I've just uploaded a better patch. With an obviously improvement, one shell file instead of two for each type of dmenu (dom0 or vms). Best, Raffaele. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJZitFtAAoJEI08Rvun9XHuENIQA

[qubes-devel] Re: First contribution - dwm patch

2017-08-09 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 I'd like to know if dwm has to handle /etc/xdg/autostart to gain complete support for Qubes OS. Or is it acceptable to handle /etc/xdg/autostart not directly? For example with a shell script that execute predefined required stuff such as qubes-gui

[qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-02 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I'm writing an extension to resolve this issue: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/845. I uploaded on GitHub an alpha version. Currently I implemented redirection with a context menu. You can choose to open the link in: dvm, de

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-03 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 I explain better what I'm doing. I just re-read and I think that this explanation is not complete. Currently I'm writing extension for Firefox/Chrome to resolve the issues pointed in gsoc ideas list about browsers and email client, not only #845 is

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-04 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I've just uploaded a working version on GitHub. I tried it on Firefox, soon I'll try on Chrome. Actually it can work on every browser that supports the WebExtension standard. Here what I've done: 1) You can customize default url redirectio

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-05 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 > One question about encoding here [1]. Encoding issue resolved. Then I also modified background's interface. > In a specific VM is... non-trivial. See comments below. Actually I implemented specific VM redirection because qvm-open-in-vm supports

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-05 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 I've just uploaded a new working version (1.1) on GitHub. I implemented javascript regexp support. In this way there is a lot of flexibility to define whitelisted URL. IMHO, this feature is vital. So I implemented the last planned feature! :D Soo

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-07 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 I've just finished tests on Chrome. Extension works with some fixes (to Chrome settings too, it has a bad default behavior about suggestions). Soon I'll create a new branch where I add Chrome's functions. There will be also a new branch for Firefox

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-08 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I updated to v1.2. I improved Promise's code and setting's interface. I picked colors from: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/style-guide/ and I improved interface following: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/usability-ux/. I uploaded images on GitH

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-12 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, Good news. I've just finished to write a polyfill for Chrome. So I finished tests on Chrome. It works! I wrote a polyfill because with Mozilla's polyfill doesn't work properly. Tomorrow I'll upload everything on GitHub. Best, Raffaele. -

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-14 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, Finally the compatible version with Chrome/Chromium is on GitHub. I reorganized directories and files. Differences between the two versions are only two files: manifest.json and json file about nativeMessaging. Best, Raffaele. -BEGIN P

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-20 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I've just build xpi file (Firefox package extension). However in order to be installed user has to disable pacakge verification globally through about:config or I have to send xpi to Mozilla and they signs the package. Obviously I prefer th

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-23 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I've a question about Thunderbird's extension. Are main objectives these ones? 1) Whitelist senders based on email address and signing key. 2) Open/Save behavior about attachment. 3) Context menus to decide where to open links. I don't under

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-23 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 > I'm not sure what the original intention was either. But the first step > could be about attachments. The current extension allow you to open all > attachments in DispVM by default. It would be nice to configure this > behaviour based on sender (id

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-09-28 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I've a question about HTTP redirection behavior. During this period of testing I'm noting that redirection, sometimes useless (i.e. domain.xyz -> www.domain.xyz), is very common. Currently, before redirection, extension treats the request

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector

2017-10-07 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, Today I uploaded the version with redirection's modification. Furthermore I fixed some issues and I added some features. Maybe a feature to implement is domain name verification according RFC spec. However I don't consider it a vital featu

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: qubes-url-redirector

2017-10-14 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi, I've just uploaded the repo with installation istructions. Yeah I read that method. However I don't consider it suitable for browsers, as you can read from aforesaid motivations. Before update [0], if an user opens a whitelisted URL and the se

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: qubes-url-redirector

2017-10-15 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 The polyfill is at [0]. However I added it as a git submodule to qubes-url-redirector. If you used git to clone my repo you can get proper file following instructions at [1]. Essentially git clones the submodule in the main repo. In this way there

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: qubes-url-redirector

2017-10-15 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 However I added to the Makefile the procedure to clone the submodule. Best, Raffaele. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJZ4xLBAAoJEI08Rvun9XHu1MQQAJ2Ai8zSGPE+LqL5Ph/ltULt efyaAeXmW4PQXI5Yzysg18M8HC6M+heqWsx3+jyu7VbcWGHL8

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: qubes-url-redirector

2017-10-16 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Yeah, with the next commit I'll resolve tab issue. I know ad-tracker issue, in fact I implemented an object to escape Google Search rwt manipulation. However I think that it's a privacy issue not related to this extension. Maybe I'll write an exten

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: qubes-url-redirector

2017-10-18 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, I've just released 2.0 version. There are a lot of changes in the code and related files organization. I implemented tab closing prevention but actually there is a Chrome issue, [0]. [0] = https://github.com/raffaeleflorio/qubes-url-redire

Re: [qubes-devel] Invitation to submit ideas for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018

2018-02-01 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all :), During past months I worked on idea [0]. Currently it's supported only by Firefox and Chrome. The repo is at [1] and the qubes-issue regarding contribution message is at [2]. It was assigned to the 4.1 milestone. I've a question about i

Re: [qubes-devel] Invitation to submit ideas for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018

2018-02-02 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi, I can also work on the Thunderbird extension. However I've just submitted the Firefox extension to Mozilla for their signing. Best Regards, Raffaele. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEE9bU8N8AgwMcjiC1xjTxG+6f1ce4FAlp0ercACgkQjTxG+6f1

[qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector v2.1 released!

2018-02-02 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi all :), I've just released the qubes-url-redirector extension. The GitHub repo is at [0] and the issue on QubesOS's repo is at [2]. The extension is based on the gsoc idea [1]. Soon I'll work on the Thunderbird one :). Here a brief description:

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector v2.1 released!

2018-02-03 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi Andrew, Thanks for the comments! 1) I partially agree. Can you explain better please? 2) I don't consider this case an issue. This extension is designed to block and redirect non whitelisted URLs, that is opened through the browser (e.g. with th

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector v2.1 released!

2018-02-04 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 > The "make firefox" rule uses wget to get a few files. Is this because you > don't want to distribute signatures on Github? Ideally, it would use local > files only. I was referring to the HTTPS statement. I'd like to deepen this statement. Ther

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector v2.1 released!

2018-02-05 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi Andrew, > It introduces an extra point of failure. I could owned by a corrupted "git > clone" operation. I could also get cloned by a corrupted wget operation. > It's one extra thing to audit (if I want to be careful). Yeah, as I wrote the clo

Re: [qubes-devel] Invitation to submit ideas for Google Summer of Code (GSoC) 2018

2018-02-15 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 > See discussion in https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2518 Great, thanks! Best Regards, Raffaele. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEE9bU8N8AgwMcjiC1xjTxG+6f1ce4FAlqFxWUACgkQjTxG+6f1 ce7VchAAiIaJTSR00JrO9oxaI0CDDSjDH0e+z8FuY

Re: [qubes-devel] qubes-url-redirector v2.1 released!

2018-02-22 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi Andrew, I'm implementing these features. I'll release the v2.1.1 soon. The extension itself could be automatically updated. However I'll not enable this feature because: 1. There isn't any way to verify updated extension in Chrome/Chromium. Inst

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: qubes-url-redirector v2.1 released!

2018-02-26 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 > Version 2.1 is not working on my Chrome 66.0.3350.0 (Official Build) dev > (64-bit) > > It blocks URLs properly. It allows those matching the whitelist properly. > > But nothing is run on the Default VM specified. Did you follow installation in

Re: [qubes-devel] GPG-split like application

2018-03-09 Thread 'Raffaele Florio' via qubes-devel
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 > So I'm curious about the different options that exist for implementing this, > and if anyone can point me towards what resources I should read up on to > understand what I need to do to accomplish this. Do I need to build a > modified Qubes in o