Re: [qubes-users] Remnder: Ubuntu-template anyone?

2016-10-25 Thread Achim Patzner 
Am 26.10.2016 um 00:17 schrieb Unman:

> On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 11:17:44AM +0200, Robert Mittendorf wrote:
>> What would be the advantage of a Ubuntu-template compared to the Debian
>> template?
>> (No offense, I'm just curious)
>>
> No offense taken.
>
> Comparing Stable with LTS, probably not that great a difference. Perhaps
> Ubuntu is slightly easier out of the box and the core software is well
> integrated.
> Comparing stable with Ubuntu releases, Ubuntu will generally have newer
> versions and better driver support.

Even Arch was already a major improvement for me... I've baesd most of
my machines on a (rather easy to produce) arch template...


Achim


>

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Re: [qubes-users] Net does not work

2016-10-25 Thread Unman 
On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 08:19:45PM -0700, nezna...@xy9ce.tk wrote:
> I installed qubes. Then i changed mac address in the "clone mac" string, but 
> network does not work. On another one pc with that mac i have no problems. In 
> the qubes i have. What is wrong?
> 

You'll have to provide more information if you want help.
Among the information you might want to provide -
Is this a wired or wireless connection?
What are symptoms of network not working?
Does the network "work" if you dont change the mac address?
Are you changing the string in the Network Manager applet?

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Re: [qubes-users] Remnder: Ubuntu-template anyone?

2016-10-25 Thread Unman 
On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 11:17:44AM +0200, Robert Mittendorf wrote:
> What would be the advantage of a Ubuntu-template compared to the Debian
> template?
> (No offense, I'm just curious)
>
No offense taken.

Comparing Stable with LTS, probably not that great a difference. Perhaps
Ubuntu is slightly easier out of the box and the core software is well
integrated.
Comparing stable with Ubuntu releases, Ubuntu will generally have newer
versions and better driver support.

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Re: [qubes-users] Remnder: Ubuntu-template anyone?

2016-10-25 Thread Unman 
On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 10:24:12AM -0700, richard.g...@gmail.com wrote:
> > > > > Last night I built Xenial - I'll put in a PR today, 
> > 
> > Has this happened? I'd like to build a 16.04 template, but the Qubes 
> > Builder in the offical QubesOS repository does not offer Xenial - neither 
> > does the one in Mareks repository...
> 
> I'd also be very interested in this. I have created a Vivid template and 
> upgraded that to Wily successfully (Wily is already out of support, however), 
> but had no luck with upgrading from Wily to Xenial. The upgrades does work 
> and the VM boots successfully, but the Xorg install is broken so the Qubes 
> GUI integration does not work - it complains about the ABI major version not 
> matching.
> 
> Any advice would be greatly appreciated.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Richard
> 

Ah, ok. I submitted a PR and then we got bogged down with handling of
the Trolltech.conf. I havent returned to it since.

I'll have another look and we'll get the xenial build in there

unman

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Re: [qubes-users] Update to xen-4.6.3 doesn't appear in /boot

2016-10-25 Thread Chris Laprise 

On 10/25/2016 03:07 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 02:27:23PM -0400, Chris Laprise wrote:

I'm trying to install the xen-4.6.3 package from current-testing, but there
is no xen*.gz added to /boot.

This file is part of xen-hypervisor package. I recommend to keep all the
xen* packages at the same version (upgrade them at the same time).

- -- 


Thanks! Unfortunately, neither a xen upgrade nor Linux downgrade to 
4.4.12 fixed the problem I'm having with tboot 1.9.4 not resuming from 
S3 suspend...


Chris

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Re: [qubes-users] detecting malicious usb devices

2016-10-25 Thread Ilpo Järvinen 
On Tue, 25 Oct 2016, Vít Šesták wrote:

> I am not sure if the devices can sniff both directions. I've believed 
> that a device can sniff only inbound data and cannot communicate with 
> other devices. I've tried to look for some document that would allow me 
> to be sure about this, but I've found nothing. Well, the official 
> documentation would likely contain enough information, but it seems to 
> be quite large.

USB2 downstream traffic (towards device) seems to be broadcasted and
USB3 is routed only to the particular device due to power considerations. 
Some exceptions to that USB2 rule based on different USB speeds. The 
speed restrictions seem quite safe electrically too - assuming firmware 
level only compromizes - because of different signalling voltage levels
(a dual speed capable sniffing transreceiver does not seem too convincing 
threat as possibility deploying them to a victim probably should allow 
much easier to accomplish attacks too).

The USB2 upstream is different and is seen only by the hubs on the path
towards the host and the host itself.

Whether upstream isolation and USB3 downstream routing is really safe 
w.r.t. firmware attacks, I don't know (do hubs use firmware or not?).

Based on information here:
  http://www.totalphase.com/support/articles/200349256-USB-Background


In general, USB is a full "bus" only logically, not electrically due
to tiered-star topology.


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Re: [qubes-users] Update to xen-4.6.3 doesn't appear in /boot

2016-10-25 Thread Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 
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On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 02:27:23PM -0400, Chris Laprise wrote:
> I'm trying to install the xen-4.6.3 package from current-testing, but there
> is no xen*.gz added to /boot.

This file is part of xen-hypervisor package. I recommend to keep all the
xen* packages at the same version (upgrade them at the same time).

- -- 
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
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[qubes-users] Update to xen-4.6.3 doesn't appear in /boot

2016-10-25 Thread Chris Laprise 
I'm trying to install the xen-4.6.3 package from current-testing, but 
there is no xen*.gz added to /boot.


How can I get this installed properly to test on my system?

Chris

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Re: [qubes-users] detecting malicious usb devices

2016-10-25 Thread Vít Šesták 
USB does not have DMA capabilities. If you have access to DMA, you have already 
got access to the controller or the usbvm.

You probably can get into USBVM easily from an USB device by logging as root on 
the login screen. This, however, assumes that keystrokes are not captured by 
other means, which I am not sure if it is true on the latest Qubes version, 
since some input proxies have been implemented. On 3.0, I was able to shutdown 
Debian USBVM by ctrl+alt+delete, which suggests that some more complex attacks 
(using the default empty root password) might be possible on this version. On 
newer version, I haven't tested it.

Nevertheless, I have disabled all USB keyboards on my USBVM for the reason 
above. They are enabled only in dom0, which uses a separate USB controller.

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Re: [qubes-users] detecting malicious usb devices

2016-10-25 Thread pixel fairy 
On Tuesday, October 25, 2016 at 11:43:51 AM UTC-4, Vít Šesták wrote:
> I am not sure if the devices can sniff both directions. I've believed that a 
> device can sniff only inbound data and cannot communicate with other devices. 
> I've tried to look for some document that would allow me to be sure about 
> this, but I've found nothing. Well, the official documentation would likely 
> contain enough information, but it seems to be quite large.

a dma attack could do this, and much more. the mitigation / detection i was 
referring to are things like honeyusb, https://github.com/daveti/GoodUSB

the idea was to use the usbvm to screen for malicious devices. 

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Re: [qubes-users] detecting malicious usb devices

2016-10-25 Thread Vít Šesták 
I am not sure if the devices can sniff both directions. I've believed that a 
device can sniff only inbound data and cannot communicate with other devices. 
I've tried to look for some document that would allow me to be sure about this, 
but I've found nothing. Well, the official documentation would likely contain 
enough information, but it seems to be quite large.

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Re: [qubes-users] detecting malicious usb devices

2016-10-25 Thread Robert Mittendorf 

Am 10/25/2016 um 04:15 PM schrieb Vít Šesták:

I don't think that a USB drive can directly record keystrokes. The 
communication goes in the opposite direction that the USB drive would need.

A malicious USB drive can also listen the data going to other USB devices on 
the same controller. You cannot detect this.
Well, your second point is exactly that. As USB is a Bus, all devices 
should be able to record the other devices messages - and thereby the 
keystrokes.


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Re: [qubes-users] detecting malicious usb devices

2016-10-25 Thread Vít Šesták 
I don't think that a USB drive can directly record keystrokes. The 
communication goes in the opposite direction that the USB drive would need.

But USB drive can act as a keyboard (i.e. send keystrokes). You can disable all 
devices acting as a keyboard using udev rules.

A malicious USB drive can also listen the data going to other USB devices on 
the same controller. You cannot detect this.

A malicious USB device can also send data (including keystrokes) on behalf of 
other devices. If you have a keyboard attached to the same controller, you are 
currently out of luck.

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Re: [qubes-users] detecting malicious usb devices

2016-10-25 Thread 7v5w7go9ub0o 



On 10/25/2016 09:09 AM, Robert Mittendorf wrote:

Am 10/25/2016 um 09:05 AM schrieb Andrew David Wong:



On 2016-10-24 23:48, pixel fairy wrote:
can the a usbvm be used to detect malicious usb devices? has anyone 
tried this?


Sure, you can run whatever kind of detection software you like in a 
USB VM.
However, not all malicious USB devices are detectable (whether you're 
in a USB VM

or somewhere else). I haven't tried it.

-END PGP SIGNATURE-

Example: A thumb drive that claims to be a keyboard to record your key 
strokes. How would you detect that?




ISTM ITL has considered this issue, and here's a writeup: 



I'd guess you'd try lsusb and dmesg before and after insertion 
(insertion after the OS is up and running).



As to the OP, he may be referring to Windows autorun files which can be 
simply listed.


Naturally, use an offline DispVM for these tests.


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[qubes-users] HCL - Dell XPS 14Z (L412Z)

2016-10-25 Thread a . mcwheel 
Thank you guys!



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Qubes-HCL-Dell_Inc_-XPS_L412Z-20161025-195808.yml
Description: Binary data

[qubes-users] HCL - Lenovo T430s (23561Y3)

2016-10-25 Thread 4r1eyh+30fj0sg5cb6l8 via qubes-users 
TPM - Works fine! Turn TPM support off and on again in BIOS if you have issues 
the first time.

AEM - Works fine!

PERIPHERALS - Works fine! Keyboard, Touch-pad, Red ball thing in middle of 
keyboard etc all work.  

SOUND - Works fine!

SLEEP - Works fine!

BRIGHTNESS - Works fine!

WEBCAM/MIC - Doesn't work. Minimal effort taken here though.
Should work fine in Qubes 3.2. Different USB pass through mechanism.

Search for "USB passthrough" here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/09/29/qubes-32

All in all, smooth installation and never found any real roadblocks except 
mic/webcam with should be fixed in the new release.






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Qubes-HCL-LENOVO-23561Y3-20161025-151121.yml
Description: application/yaml

Re: [qubes-users] Remnder: Ubuntu-template anyone?

2016-10-25 Thread Robert Mittendorf 
What would be the advantage of a Ubuntu-template compared to the Debian 
template?

(No offense, I'm just curious)

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Re: [qubes-users] detecting malicious usb devices

2016-10-25 Thread Robert Mittendorf 

Am 10/25/2016 um 09:05 AM schrieb Andrew David Wong:

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 2016-10-24 23:48, pixel fairy wrote:

can the a usbvm be used to detect malicious usb devices? has anyone tried this?


Sure, you can run whatever kind of detection software you like in a USB VM.
However, not all malicious USB devices are detectable (whether you're in a USB 
VM
or somewhere else). I haven't tried it.

- -- 
Andrew David Wong (Axon)

Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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Example: A thumb drive that claims to be a keyboard to record your key 
strokes. How would you detect that?


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Re: [qubes-users] detecting malicious usb devices

2016-10-25 Thread Andrew David Wong 
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 2016-10-24 23:48, pixel fairy wrote:
> can the a usbvm be used to detect malicious usb devices? has anyone tried 
> this?
> 

Sure, you can run whatever kind of detection software you like in a USB VM.
However, not all malicious USB devices are detectable (whether you're in a USB 
VM
or somewhere else). I haven't tried it.

- -- 
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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