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On 2017-01-18 18:00, haxy wrote:
> On 2017-01-16 13:22, haxy wrote:
On 2017-01-14 20:04, haxy wrote: Qubes onion repos have just
been implemented. Minimal documentation available here:
> On Sat, Jan 14, 2017 at 12:08:25AM -, haxy wrote:
>> Going back to the first post.
>>
>> "Qubes repository will allow changing the
>> "http" to "https" in the qubes entry /etc/apt/sources.list.d/."
>>
>> How would one implement that on a qubes-fedora template?
>>
>> Looking at Installing and
Going back to the first post.
"Qubes repository will allow changing the
"http" to "https" in the qubes entry /etc/apt/sources.list.d/."
How would one implement that on a qubes-fedora template?
Looking at Installing and updating software in VMs
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On 12/17/16 17:50, Unman wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 17, 2016 at 06:18:41PM -, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote:
>> While updates are signed, so even if they come over the wire in cleartext,
>> the fact that they often are sent in the clear (even from
On Sat, Dec 17, 2016 at 06:18:41PM -, johnyju...@sigaint.org wrote:
> While updates are signed, so even if they come over the wire in cleartext,
> the fact that they often are sent in the clear (even from debian.net)
> allows a snooper to know what packages your scanning for metadata or
>
johnyju...@sigaint.org:
> While updates are signed, so even if they come over the wire in cleartext,
> the fact that they often are sent in the clear (even from debian.net)
> allows a snooper to know what packages your scanning for metadata or
> installing. It reveals a lot about the state of
While updates are signed, so even if they come over the wire in cleartext,
the fact that they often are sent in the clear (even from debian.net)
allows a snooper to know what packages your scanning for metadata or
installing. It reveals a lot about the state of your system.
Updating over Tor or
