On 11/21/2017 02:23 PM, taii...@gmx.com wrote:
> On 11/20/2017 06:08 PM, Jean-Philippe Ouellet wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Nov 20, 2017 at 5:59 PM, taii...@gmx.com wrote:
>>> On 11/19/2017 07:17 PM, riggedegg...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> Does this hold any water? Does the switch from paravirtualization to
On 11/20/2017 06:10 PM, Jean-Philippe Ouellet wrote:
On Mon, Nov 20, 2017 at 6:04 PM,taii...@gmx.comwrote:
On 11/20/2017 04:36 AM, Jean-Philippe Ouellet wrote:
That statement is demonstrably false. For example, we don't filter
CPUID vendor IDs in either mode.
How come?
See discussion at
On 11/20/2017 06:08 PM, Jean-Philippe Ouellet wrote:
On Mon, Nov 20, 2017 at 5:59 PM,taii...@gmx.comwrote:
On 11/19/2017 07:17 PM,riggedegg...@gmail.com wrote:
Does this hold any water? Does the switch from paravirtualization to
HVM/SLAT degrade privacy by allowing easier hardware fingerp
On Mon, Nov 20, 2017 at 6:04 PM, taii...@gmx.com wrote:
> On 11/20/2017 04:36 AM, Jean-Philippe Ouellet wrote:
>
>> That statement is demonstrably false. For example, we don't filter
>> CPUID vendor IDs in either mode.
>
> How come?
See discussion at https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
On Mon, Nov 20, 2017 at 5:59 PM, taii...@gmx.com wrote:
> On 11/19/2017 07:17 PM, riggedegg...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> Does this hold any water? Does the switch from paravirtualization to
> HVM/SLAT degrade privacy by allowing easier hardware fingerprinting?
>
> It holds no water.
>
> There is no suc
On 11/20/2017 04:36 AM, Jean-Philippe Ouellet wrote:
That statement is demonstrably false. For example, we don't filter
CPUID vendor IDs in either mode.
How come?
I didn't know you were a dev :0
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On 11/19/2017 07:17 PM, riggedegg...@gmail.com wrote:
Does this hold any water? Does the switch from paravirtualization to HVM/SLAT
degrade privacy by allowing easier hardware fingerprinting?
It holds no water.
There is no such thing as "hardware fingerprinting" - what is usually
done for DR
On 11/20/2017 02:22 PM, riggedegg...@gmail.com wrote:
Cheers, Jean-Philippe! Thanks for the reply.
Would you be able to point me in the direction of any unique privacy-specific
functions Qubes OS allows me to take advantage of (other than obvious stuff
like Whonix)? Is there anything of that s
Cheers, Jean-Philippe! Thanks for the reply.
Would you be able to point me in the direction of any unique privacy-specific
functions Qubes OS allows me to take advantage of (other than obvious stuff
like Whonix)? Is there anything of that sort?
Thanks again!
Qubes OS's main focus is securit
Cheers, Jean-Philippe! Thanks for the reply.
Would you be able to point me in the direction of any unique privacy-specific
functions Qubes OS allows me to take advantage of (other than obvious stuff
like Whonix)? Is there anything of that sort?
Thanks again!
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You received this message bec
On Sun, Nov 19, 2017 at 7:17 PM, wrote:
> Here's one such comment, taken from an r/privacy Reddit thread.
>
> "[...]paravirtualization makes hardware profiling impossible unless an
> exploit is found to defeat it."
That statement is demonstrably false. For example, we don't filter
CPUID vendor
I've been reading about Qubes OS for the past few days, and I came across the
blog post below, detailing the switch from paravirtualization to
hardware-enforced memory virtualization in Qubes 4. As I understand, the switch
is intended to improve security (and avoids the overhead added by convent
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