I admit that I don't see why the desire to reduce, mitigate, or spread the
costs of religious accommodation must be grounded on some judgment about the
impropriety of the accommodation.
If the justification and scope of the ministerial exemption (as mandated by the
constitution) is determined
In reply to Eric, I don't mean "jurisdictional" in the sense of subject
matter jurisdiction - and I think courts are usually wrong to dispose of
ministerial employment cases on a motion to dismiss -- facts are always
needed, if nothing other than to determine whether the position is
ministerial. B
I think the point is simply that the defense is nonwaivable, because in order
to determine the other issues in the case the court would need to determine
whether the employee was performing satisfactorily as a minister, which the
First Amendment precludes the court from doing. In effect, the cou
The jurisdictional point has always puzzled me as well. A large number of
the court decisions, roughly half I would say, call the ministerial
exception jurisdictional. But can that be right? It is "jurisdictional" in
a conceptual sense-there are things that properly belong to the authority of
the
Actually the Children of God did but that does not make Elvig wrongly decided.
Serious enough social harms can and should limit protection under the First
Amendment.
Licentiousness was never intended to be protected under the First Amendment.
Why craft a doctrine to do so today? Women are n
I'm not sure why, absent some judgment about the impropriety of the ministerial
exemption, one would think that employees and potential employees are somehow
entitled to disclosure about the way in which constitutional doctrine might
frustrate what they (perhaps erroneously) to be their statuto
Professor Tuttle's explanation for why the ministerial exception is
treated as jurisdictional also suggests why it should be limited to
claims that implicate questions of qualifications to perform a
ministerial job. Given that hostile work sexual harassment claims
arise from the failure of
By way of reply to both Marci and Chris - I think (and Chip Lupu and I have
written at some length) that the ministerial exception is jurisdictional
because, at least at some level, it's not subject to waiver by the parties,
any more than (post Blue Hull Memorial) a congregation/denomination could
Employees whose employers employ less than 15 people also have no protection
under federal law
Marc
- Original Message -
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Sent: Mon Jul 19 10:45:09 2010
Subject: Re: 10th Circuit Finds Church Immune From Workplace Di
One point of clarification, which goes to Bob Tuttle’s point more than Marci’s:
Are we sure that the ministerial exception is jurisdictional? I would have
thought it wasn’t. I agree it’s constitutional. So like Bob, I would think
that Congress can’t diminish its scope—Congress can’t say to a
Dear Marci -- Like you, I am happy to embrace efforts to educate the public
about constitutional rights generally, and about religious-freedom rights
(including churches’ right to select their own ministers) specifically. Like
Bob, though, I do not believe that these rights (and the constraints
Rick is casting a larger net than my post suggested. The relevant
universe here is the universe of employees. As in the speech cases (and in
particular the defamation cases since we're dealing with employment), there
should be some weighing of interests here. Right now, in my view, the
Friends -- with respect to Marci's suggestion that religious entities be
required to inform people in ministerial positions about the fact that such
entities have a constitutional right to hire-and-fire that is not subject to
many employment-law constraints . . . it seems to me that people oft
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