& Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: RFRA, the Establishment Clause, and saving constructions
Eugene writes: "Even in the face of this caselaw, and the argument that such
preference for religion makes the statute unconstitutional, the Court can't
read RFRA the same way [as co
Two additional thoughts:
1. While the Court certainly could take the approach Eugene suggests, does
anyone think the Court will do so? In light of the fact that the Court
recently and unanimously embraced the position in Hosanna-Tabor that
religion gets special treatment under the Constitution, an
t;
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marci Hamilton
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 03, 2013 8:14 AM
>
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> *Cc:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
>
aring of the belief by a larger group.
> Yet RFRA has not been terribly burdensome for the government, as best I can
> tell. Why would allowing similarly crackpot (or noncrackpot) secular
> philosophical objections to be covered suddenly cause much bigger problems?
>
>
is instead compelled to read it in a way that makes it
unconstitutional?
Eugene
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marci Hamilton
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2013 8:14 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Cc: Law & Reli
t;>
>>
>> Eugene
>>
>>
>>
>> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
>> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu
>> Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2013 7:45 AM
>>
>>
>> To: Law & Re
*Ira Lupu
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 03, 2013 7:45 AM
>
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> *Subject:* Re: RFRA, the Establishment Clause, and saving constructions
>
>
>
> The reason not to construe RFRA to apply to all secular philosophical
> obje
n issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: RFRA, the Establishment Clause, and saving constructions
The reason not to construe RFRA to apply to all secular philosophical objectors
is that it's just plain crazy as a matter of policy. RFRA (which we would have
to rename FRA after such a const
The reason not to construe RFRA to apply to all secular philosophical
objectors is that it's just plain crazy as a matter of policy. RFRA (which
we would have to rename FRA after such a construction) applies to all of
federal law. So this construction would give the holder of every crackpot
philo
I appreciate Jim's argument, and also the arguments that the
problem with the exemption isn't discrimination in favor of religion, but
rather the burden on third parties, regardless of whether the exemption is only
for the religious. (I hope to respond to those arguments soon.)
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