[SC-L] Origins of Security Problems

Before widespread use of the Internet, computers were isolated from malicious attacks. Many of them were not networked. CPUs were slow. Memory was small. It was common practice to "trust the user" to minimize the size of programs to speed up processing and to make programs fit in memory. Non-ty

[SC-L] Origins of Security Problems

I had no idea I was promulgating a syllogism. In fact, I did not intend to. My point was that the world changed and the software didn't nor did people change their behaviors to compensate. Remember, the Internet until 1992 was a community of well-behaved techies: netizens. Software design was n

Re: [SC-L] Education and security -- another perspective (was "ACM Queue - Content")

You are not nuts. Your course outline is a very substantial step in the right direction. - Original Message - From: "Dana Epp" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Fernando Schapachnik" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Tuesday, July 06, 2004 16:42 Subject: Re: [SC-L] Education and s

Re: [SC-L] Programming languages -- the "third rail" of secure coding

JOVIAL goes back to the 1960s as "Jules' Own Version of the International Algebraic Language." ALGOL and IAL are the same thing. JOVIAL was used almost exclusively by the United States Air Force. - Original Message - From: "Dave Aronson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMA

Re: [SC-L] Programming languages -- the "third rail" of secure coding

(e.g. nonconformant) input. Mark Rockman MDRSESCO LLC - Original Message - From: "Michael S Hines" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, July 22, 2004 10:32 Subject: RE: [SC-L] Programming languages -- the "third rail" of secure coding

[SC-L] Buffer Overrun

If I allocate a buffer of n bytes, open the channel and receive n+m bytes where m>0, then where does the fault lie? Some possibilities: 1) My choice for n is too small, 2) the software with which I open the channel does not permit me to specify that my buffer is only n bytes in length and it retu

Re: [SC-L] temporary directories

The old Sperry operating system from Unisys for successors to the 1108 computer has temporary files that are accessible only to the process that creates them. Such files can be treated as "directories," even though the file system on such machines is not tree-structured. Space allocated to tem

[SC-L] COBOL Exploits

The adolescent minds that engage in "exploits" wouldn't know COBOL if a printout fell out a window and onto their heads. I'm sure you can write COBOL programs that crash, but it must be hard to make them take control of the operating system. COBOL programs are heavy into unit record equipment

[SC-L] Disable Bounds Checking?

Back around 1980, when Ada was new, it was common for compiler manufacturers to claim it is best to disable bound checking for performance reasons. Getting your program to run slightly faster trumped knowing that any of your buffers was overflowing. Code that silently trashes memory can be expe

[SC-L] Software Assist to Find Least Privilege

course, everytime the program is changed in any way, the process would have to be repeated. MARK ROCKMAN MDRSESCO LLC___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l

[SC-L] How Can You Tell It Is Written Securely?

is there that'll do the job? Doesn't exist, does it? MARK ROCKMAN MDRSESCO LLC ___ Secure Coding mailing list (SC-L) SC-L@securecoding.org List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l List charter available