Monday, September 10, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote:
MM --- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I intentionally don't want to exactly define what S is as it describes
vaguely-defined 'subjective experience generator'. I instead leave it
at description level.
MM If you can't define what
On 10/09/07, Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
As a final paradoxical example, if implementation Z is nothing, that
is it comprises no matter and information ar all, there still is a
correspondence function F(Z)=S which supposedly asserts that Z is X's
upload. There can even be a
Sunday, September 9, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote:
MM Also, Chalmers argues that a machine copy of your brain must be conscious.
MM But he has the same instinct to believe in consciousness as everyone else.
My
MM claim is broader: that either a machine can be conscious or that
consciousness
MM
Monday, September 10, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote:
MM Perhaps I misunderstand, but to make your argument more precise:
MM X is an implementation of a mind, a Turing machine.
No. The whole argument is about why turing machine-like implementation
of uploaded brain doesn't seem to do the trick. X is
--- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I intentionally don't want to exactly define what S is as it describes
vaguely-defined 'subjective experience generator'. I instead leave it
at description level.
If you can't define what subjective experience is, then how do you know it
exists? If
On 10/09/07, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
--- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I intentionally don't want to exactly define what S is as it describes
vaguely-defined 'subjective experience generator'. I instead leave it
at description level.
If you can't define what
