Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 19/02/2008, John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes, you've shown either that, or that even some occasionally intelligent and competent philosophers sometimes take seriously ideas that really can be dismissed as obviously ridiculous -- ideas which really are unworthy of careful thought were it not for the fact that pinpointing exactly why such ridiculous ideas are wrong is so often fruitful (as in the Chalmers article). It doesn't sound so strange when you examine the distinction between the computation and the implementation of the computation. An analogy is the distinction between a circle and the implementation of a circle. It might be objected that it is ridiculous to argue that any irregular shape looked at with the right transformation matrix is an implementation of a circle. The objection is valid under a non-trivial definition of implementation. A randomly drawn perimeter around a vicious dog on a tether does not help you avoid getting bitten unless you have the relevant transformation matrix and can do the calculations in your head, which would be no better than having no implementation at all but just instructions on how to draw the circle de novo. Thus, implementation is linked to utility. Circles exist in the abstract as platonic objects, but platonic objects don't interact with the real world until they are implemented, and implemented in a particular useful or non-trivial way. Similarly, computations exist as platonic objects, such as Turing machines, but don't play any part in the real world unless they are implemented. There is an abstract machine adding two numbers together, but this no use to you when you are doing your shopping unless it is implemented in a useful and non-trivial way, such as in an electronic calculator or in your brain. Now, consider the special case of a conscious computation. If this computation is to interact with the real world it must fulfil the criteria for non-trivial implementation as discussed. A human being would be an example of this. But what if the computation creates an inputless virtual world with conscious inhabitants? Unless you are prepared to argue that the consciousness of the inhabitants is contingent on interaction with the real world there seems no reason to insist that the implementation be non-trivial or useful in the above sense. Consciousness would then be a quality of the abstract platonic object, as circularity is a quality of the abstract circle. I might add that there is nothing in this which contradicts functionalism, or for that matter geometry. -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] Definitions
John K Clark wrote: Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] It seems to me the problem is defining consciousness, not testing for it. And it seems to me that beliefs of this sort are exactly the reason philosophy is in such a muddle. A definition of consciousness is not needed, in fact unless you're a mathematician where they can be of some use, one can lead a full rich rewarding intellectually life without having a good definition of anything. Compared with examples definitions are of trivial importance. John K Clark But consciousness is easy to define, if not to implement: Consciousness is the entity evaluating a portion of itself which represents it's position in it's model of it's environment. If there's any aspect of consciousness which isn't included within this definition, I would like to know about it. (Proving the definition correct would, however, be between difficult and impossible. As normally used consciousness is a term without an external referent, so there's no way of determining that any two people are using the same definition. It *may* be possible to determine that they are using different definitions.) --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] Definitions
John K Clark wrote: And I will define consciousness just as soon as you define define. Ah, but that is exactly my approach. Thus, the subtitle I gave to my 2006 conference paper was Explaining Consciousness by Explaining That You Cannot Explain it, Because Your Explanation Mechanism is Getting Zapped. Richard Loosemore --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 19/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Sorry, but I do not think your conclusion even remotely follows from the premises. But beyond that, the basic reason that this line of argument is nonsensical is that Lanier's thought experiment was rigged in such a way that a coincidence was engineered into existence. Nothing whatever can be deduced from an argument in which you set things up so that a coincidence must happen! It is just a meaningless coincidence that a computer can in theory be set up to be (a) conscious and (b) have a lower level of its architecture be isomorphic to a rainstorm. I don't see how the fact something happens by coincidence is by itself a problem. Evolution, for example, works by means of random genetic mutations some of which just happen to result in a phenotype better suited to its environment. By the way, Lanier's idea is not original. Hilary Putnam, John Searle, Tim Maudlin, Greg Egan, Hans Moravec, David Chalmers (see the paper cited by Kaj Sotola in the original thread - http://consc.net/papers/rock.html) have all considered variations on the theme. At the very least, this should indicate that the idea cannot be dismissed as just obviously ridiculous and unworthy of careful thought. I am aware of some of those other sources for the idea: nevertheless, they are all nonsense for the same reason. I especially single out Searle: his writings on this subject are virtually worthless. I have argued with Searle to his face, and I have talked with others (Hofstadter, for example) who have also done so, and the consensus among these people is that his arguments are built on confusion. (And besides, I don't stop thinking just because others have expressed their view of an idea: I use my own mind, and if I can come up with an argument against the idea, I prefer to use that rather than defer to authority. ;-) ) But going back to the question at issue: this coincidence is a coincidence that happens in a thought experiment. If someone constructs a thought experiment in which they allow such things as computers of quasi-infinite size, they can make anything happen, including ridiculous coincidences! If you set the thought experiment up so that there is enough room for a meaningless coincidence to occur within the thought experiment, then what you have is *still* just a meaningless coincidence. I don't think I can put it any plainer than that. Richard Loosemore --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
During the late 70's when I was at McGill, I attended a public talk given by Feynman on quantum physics. After the talk, and in answer to a question posed from a member of the audience, Feynman said something along the lines of : I have here in my pocket a prescription from my doctor that forbids me to answer questions from or get into discussions with philosophers or something like that. After spending the last couple of days reading all the links on the outrageous proposition that rocks, rainstorms or plates of spaghetti implement the mind, I now understand Feynman's sentiment. What a waste of mental energy. A line of discussion as equally fruitless as solipsism. I am in full agreement with Richard Loosemore on this one. Eric B. Ramsay Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 20/02/2008, Richard Loosemore wrote: I am aware of some of those other sources for the idea: nevertheless, they are all nonsense for the same reason. I especially single out Searle: his writings on this subject are virtually worthless. I have argued with Searle to his face, and I have talked with others (Hofstadter, for example) who have also done so, and the consensus among these people is that his arguments are built on confusion. Just to be clear, this is *not* the same as Searle's Chinese Room argument, which only he seems to find convincing. -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] Definitions
--- Charles D Hixson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John K Clark wrote: Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] It seems to me the problem is defining consciousness, not testing for it. And it seems to me that beliefs of this sort are exactly the reason philosophy is in such a muddle. A definition of consciousness is not needed, in fact unless you're a mathematician where they can be of some use, one can lead a full rich rewarding intellectually life without having a good definition of anything. Compared with examples definitions are of trivial importance. John K Clark But consciousness is easy to define, if not to implement: Consciousness is the entity evaluating a portion of itself which represents it's position in it's model of it's environment. If there's any aspect of consciousness which isn't included within this definition, I would like to know about it. (Proving the definition correct would, however, be between difficult and impossible. As normally used consciousness is a term without an external referent, so there's no way of determining that any two people are using the same definition. It *may* be possible to determine that they are using different definitions.) Or consciousness just means awareness... in which case, it seems to be located in the hippocampus. http://www.world-science.net/othernews/080219_conscious -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] Definitions
Richard Loosemore wrote: John K Clark wrote: And I will define consciousness just as soon as you define define. Ah, but that is exactly my approach. Thus, the subtitle I gave to my 2006 conference paper was Explaining Consciousness by Explaining That You Cannot Explain it, Because Your Explanation Mechanism is Getting Zapped. Great title. Couldn't google it though. Is it perchance available online or in a conference proceedings I perhaps subscribe to? - samantha --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
