http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article13737.htm

In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran's Offer of Dialogue

Some Officials Lament Lost Opportunity

By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer

06/23/06 "Washington Post" --Sunday, June 18, 2006 -- Just after the 
lightning takeover of Baghdad by U.S. forces three years ago, an 
unusual two-page document spewed out of a fax machine at the Near 
East bureau of the State Department. It was a proposal from Iran for 
a broad dialogue with the United States, and the fax suggested 
everything was on the table -- including full cooperation on nuclear 
programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support 
for Palestinian militant groups.

But top Bush administration officials, convinced the Iranian 
government was on the verge of collapse, belittled the initiative. 
Instead, they formally complained to the Swiss ambassador who had 
sent the fax with a cover letter certifying it as a genuine proposal 
supported by key power centers in Iran, former administration 
officials said.

Last month, the Bush administration abruptly shifted policy and 
agreed to join talks previously led by European countries over Iran's 
nuclear program. But several former administration officials say the 
United States missed an opportunity in 2003 at a time when American 
strength seemed at its height -- and Iran did not have a functioning 
nuclear program or a gusher of oil revenue from soaring energy demand.

"At the time, the Iranians were not spinning centrifuges, they were 
not enriching uranium," said Flynt Leverett, who was a senior 
director on the National Security Council staff then and saw the 
Iranian proposal. He described it as "a serious effort, a respectable 
effort to lay out a comprehensive agenda for U.S.-Iranian 
rapprochement."

While the Iranian approach has been previously reported, the actual 
document making the offer has surfaced only in recent weeks. Trita 
Parsi, a Middle East expert at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, said he obtained it from Iranian sources. The 
Washington Post confirmed its authenticity with Iranian and former 
U.S. officials.

Parsi said the U.S. victory in Iraq frightened the Iranians because 
U.S. forces had routed in three weeks an army that Iran had failed to 
defeat during a bloody eight-year war.

The document lists a series of Iranian aims for the talks, such as 
ending sanctions, full access to peaceful nuclear technology and a 
recognition of its "legitimate security interests." Iran agreed to 
put a series of U.S. aims on the agenda, including full cooperation 
on nuclear safeguards, "decisive action" against terrorists, 
coordination in Iraq, ending "material support" for Palestinian 
militias and accepting the Saudi initiative for a two-state solution 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document also laid out an 
agenda for negotiations, with possible steps to be achieved at a 
first meeting and the development of negotiating road maps on 
disarmament, terrorism and economic cooperation.

Newsday has previously reported that the document was primarily the 
work of Sadegh Kharazi, Iran's ambassador to France and nephew of 
Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi and passed on by the Swiss 
ambassador to Tehran, Tim Guldimann. The Swiss government is a 
diplomatic channel for communications between Tehran and Washington 
because the two countries broke off relations after the 1979 seizure 
of U.S. embassy personnel.

Leverett said Guldimann included a cover letter that it was an 
authoritative initiative that had the support of then-President 
Mohammad Khatami and supreme religious leader Ali Khamenei.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stressed that the U.S. 
decision to join the nuclear talks was not an effort to strike a 
"grand bargain" with Iran. Earlier this month, she made the first 
official confirmation of the Iranian proposal in an interview with 
National Public Radio.

"What the Iranians wanted earlier was to be one-on-one with the 
United States so that this could be about the United States and 
Iran," said Rice, who was Bush's national security adviser when the 
fax was received. "Now it is Iran and the international community, 
and Iran has to answer to the international community. I think that's 
the strongest possible position to be in."

Current White House and State Department officials declined to 
comment further on the Iranian offer.

Paul R. Pillar, former national intelligence officer for the Near 
East and South Asia, said that it is true "there is less daylight 
between the United States and Europe, thanks in part to Rice's 
energetic diplomacy." But he said that only partially offsets the 
fact that the U.S. position is "inherently weaker now" because of 
Iraq. He described the Iranian approach as part of a series of 
efforts by Iran to engage with the Bush administration. "I think 
there have been a lot of lost opportunities," he said, citing as one 
example a failure to build on the useful cooperation Iran provided in 
Afghanistan.

Richard N. Haass, head of policy planning at the State Department at 
the time and now president of the Council on Foreign Relations, said 
the Iranian approach was swiftly rejected because in the 
administration "the bias was toward a policy of regime change." He 
said it is difficult to know whether the proposal was fully supported 
by the "multiple governments" that run Iran, but he felt it was worth 
exploring.

"To use an oil analogy, we could have drilled a dry hole," he said. 
"But I didn't see what we had to lose. I did not share the assessment 
of many in the administration that the Iranian regime was on the 
brink."

Parsi said that based on his conversations with the Iranian 
officials, he believes the failure of the United States to even 
respond to the offer had an impact on the government. Parsi, who is 
writing a book on Iran-Israeli relations, said he believes the 
Iranians were ready to dramatically soften their stance on Israel, 
essentially taking the position of other Islamic countries such as 
Malaysia. Instead, Iranian officials decided that the United States 
cared not about Iranian policies but about Iranian power.

The incident "strengthened the hands of those in Iran who believe the 
only way to compel the United States to talk or deal with Iran is not 
by sending peace offers but by being a nuisance," Parsi said.

© 2006 The Washington Post Company


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