[Tails-dev] Adding an HP to known issues
Hi, I added an HP laptop that doesn't boot Tails to the list of known 'not-booting' computers here to review/merge: mercedes508 HP-pavilion 2164fbd Thanks. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.4.1] bugfix/7249-truncated-notifications
Hi, I don't know why, back when we were getting Tails/Wheezy ready I did everything so that this bug would be fixed (well, not really, but improved a bit) in Jessie, and then I forgot to bring the improvements back to Tails. Thanks to goupille (who reported this problem again recently), I finally did it = please review'n'merge into stable and devel. See comments on the ticket wrt. how it's better but not perfect, and why I see it as good enough. Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] modify FAQ language to mention compromised firmware
Hi folks, The current Tails FAQ states that only compromised hardware could render a system unsafe to use Tails: https://tails.boum.org/support/faq/index.en.html#index30h2 This is not true because malicious firmware can render a system unsafe to use Tails. Relevant paper that explicitly mentions this re: Tails: http://legbacore.com/News_files/HowManyMillionBIOSesWouldYouLikeToInfect_Whitepaper_v1.pdf I would suggest modifying the FAQ language to clarify. One example: Is it safe to use Tails on a compromised system? Tails runs independently from the operating system installed on the computer. So, if your regular operating system has been compromised by malware (virus, trojan, etc.), it may be safe to use Tails on that computer. However, if the firmware of the computer has been compromised, or untrusted hardware has been added by someone with physical access to the computer, it may not be safe to use Tails. Thanks, Michael signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.4.1] bugfix/9126-deny-tor-browser-access-to-recently-used
On 06/06/2015 05:02 PM, intrigeri wrote: Hi, this branch denies Tor Browser access to the list of recently used documents. Please review'n'merge into stable. Thanks! Merged! Cheers! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.4.1] bugfix/9364-do-not-modify-hardware-clock
On 06/05/2015 07:22 PM, intrigeri wrote: Hi, this branch should fix #9364, that is we may be currently modifying the hardware clock on shutdown. I've tried (not very hard) for a week to test this on bare metal but failed to find appropriate hardware. It should be easy for the reviewer, thanks to the details on the ticket, to test if the bug is indeed a real one, and if the fix does correct it... and they would have to do it anyway, right? :) As can be seen on the ticket, this fix shouldn't be needed. Still, it's good for completeness, and the doc update is nice. Merged! Cheers! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.4.1] bugfix/7249-truncated-notifications
On 06/11/2015 01:39 PM, intrigeri wrote: Hi, I don't know why, back when we were getting Tails/Wheezy ready I did everything so that this bug would be fixed (well, not really, but improved a bit) in Jessie, and then I forgot to bring the improvements back to Tails. Thanks to goupille (who reported this problem again recently), I finally did it = please review'n'merge into stable and devel. See comments on the ticket wrt. how it's better but not perfect, and why I see it as good enough. Since most people seem to agree it's an improvement, I've merged this. Cheers! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Hide internal drives when no admin password has been entered
Please see this feature request in the Tails repository Local storage devices displayed- Tails DVD no admin (https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/9554) where intrigeri suggested raising this issue on the mailing list. The basic premise being that hiding the internal drives in working in what I call safe mode (booting with no admin privileges) to be more consistent with Tails goals and objectives of consistensy than it is to show them. Since without root login, access to them is denied it is pointless to show them in the file manager and in the Disk Utility. In response to my suggestion intrigeri rephrases it in his own words as: I can see your consistency point, that I would rephrase in my own words as one should not even see what they won't be able to access anyway; when I zoom in on it, it totally makes sense to me -- thanks for clarifying. Not having any experience in coding myself, I am calling any interested parties who feel this to be a worthwile and valuable endeavour to please take it on and to implement and maintain this feature. Thanks in advance. Cheers. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] modify FAQ language to mention compromised firmware
Michael: Hi folks, The current Tails FAQ states that only compromised hardware could render a system unsafe to use Tails: https://tails.boum.org/support/faq/index.en.html#index30h2 This is not true because malicious firmware can render a system unsafe to use Tails. Relevant paper that explicitly mentions this re: Tails: http://legbacore.com/News_files/HowManyMillionBIOSesWouldYouLikeToInfect_Whitepaper_v1.pdf I would suggest modifying the FAQ language to clarify. One example: Is it safe to use Tails on a compromised system? Tails runs independently from the operating system installed on the computer. So, if your regular operating system has been compromised by malware (virus, trojan, etc.), it may be safe to use Tails on that computer. However, if the firmware of the computer has been compromised, or untrusted hardware has been added by someone with physical access to the computer, it may not be safe to use Tails. Thanks, Michael Hi! Thanks for your interest in Tails documentation. This time, however, we already have work in progress on that :) https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/9116 Cheers, BitingBird ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_stable #434
See https://jenkins.tails.boum.org/job/build_Tails_ISO_stable/434/ ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_devel #1078
See https://jenkins.tails.boum.org/job/build_Tails_ISO_devel/1078/ ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.4.1] bugfix/9523-eatmydata-v82-everywhere
Hi, anonym wrote (10 Jun 2015 21:21:43 GMT) : On 06/10/2015 02:28 PM, intrigeri wrote: Assigned to anonym since our other usual reviewers seem to be mostly unavailable these days. Please merge into stable, devel and experimental, and then ping me so that I can: * upgrade eatmydata on our Jenkins ISO builders (without the backport there too, all builds will start failing); Done. Next time, perhaps coordination on IRC during office hours would help :) * send a heads up to code contributors so that they update their build system. Will do. This branch has been merged! Thanks! Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Heads up for code contributors: upgrade eatmydata in your build system
Hi, if you're building Tails ISO images, please set up APT pinning in your build system so that eatmydata from wheezy-backports is preferred, and then dist-upgrade it. Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Démarrage Tails
Hi, [French] tails-dev@ est une liste de discussions dédiée au *développement* de Tails. Pour le support utilisateur, cf. https://tails.boum.org/support/ [English] tails-dev@ is a mailing-list for Tails *development*. For user support, see https://tails.boum.org/support/ Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_feature-jessie #524
See https://jenkins.tails.boum.org/job/build_Tails_ISO_feature-jessie/524/ ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Jenkins build is back to normal : build_Tails_ISO_experimental #2320
See https://jenkins.tails.boum.org/job/build_Tails_ISO_experimental/2320/ ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
