Re: [Tails-dev] Support of "go get" command
Hi, Sorry for reviving a thread from some time ago, but I thought others might enjoy this one. As the only workaround for now consisted of manually git cloning repositories, no more! Ola found out a nice workaround that's documented here: https://github.com/agl/xmpp-client/issues/82#issuecomment-514616589 Best, Jurre On 9/16/15 8:30 PM, billingscience...@ruggedinbox.com wrote: > It seem that after the total removal of Polipo (Tails 1.3 and up [0]) Go's > "go get" command does not work anymore in Tails ; giving "unrecognized > import path" is supposedly a notice about refusing to connect [1]. > > Does the Tails team plan to support "go get" in the same way as "git > clone" [2]? > > If this is not the right place to ask, sorry! > > Daniel > > [0] I tested this with xmpp-client and "go get" works in 1.2.3 but not in > 1.5. > [1] https://github.com/agl/xmpp-client/issues/82 > [2] https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/8680 > > ___ > Tails-dev mailing list > Tails-dev@boum.org > https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev > To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to > tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://www.autistici.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Is Tails affected by the CVE-2015-7547 glibc getaddrinfo() vulnerability?
Hi, This is an on-going investigation. Indeed, applications using the Tor socks port for name resolution are not vulnerable for this attack. An automated test was ran trying to determine (using the public proof of concept) whether any application was vulnerable, so far, we're on the safe side but were investigating a couple of applications which returned an error. Even if there was an evil exit node, it should be fine since getaddrinfo() in torsocks resolves it through Tor on the SocksPort. In addition, applications which are configured to use socks don't use getaddrinfo() in this case since the resolving will go through Tor's DNSPort. We'll keep the mailinglist up-to-date on any progress regarding this matter. Best, Jurre On 02/18/2016 11:34 AM, intrigeri wrote: > Hi, > > my understanding is that clients that use Tor SOCKS port for name > resolution are fine. > > For clients who use the DNSPort, it's not clear to me if an > attacker-controlled payload can make it's way from the exit node being > used for the name resolution to the client. Has anyone looked > into this? > > Cheers, ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Fwd: Re: Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls
Forwarding e-mail. Forwarded Message Subject:Re: Fwd: Re: [Tails-dev] Reducing attack surface of kernel and tightening firewall/sysctls Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 12:28:35 +0100 From: Cornelius Diekmann <diekm...@net.in.tum.de> To: Jurre van Bergen <ju...@useotrproject.org> Hi Jurre, On 11.02.2016 01:24, Jurre van Bergen wrote: > Hey, > > About the firewall stuff and iptables/ferm we discussed at 32c3. There > is some movement in this. Could you give us any feedback on what we did? I looked at the resulting iptables config from the ferm.conf (most recent version 32e89ef2d7ca2b564990b6758479c47c3713d1e9 in the mentioned feature branch). This config will go completely without RELATED. This is really cool. Summary of the discussion: RELATED handles some ICMP error messages, which might me necessary. As discussed, if the kernel handles MTU errors (net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing=1), then everything should be fine. But note that this was rather intended as a work-around for buggy configurations which block ICMP. ICMP MTU discovery is also an integral part of IPv6. A conservative change to the tails config would be to keep an RELATED rule but limit it to known good ICMP messages. What I did not see in the discussion is the Destination Unreachable ICMP error. If a host is unreachable, tails will eventually find out by a timeout. But with an unreachable message, a user does not have to wait for a timeout. Best, Cornelius ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] vpwned + greeter
On 02/11/2016 12:06 AM, intrigeri wrote: > Anyone wants to try out Subgraph Application Firewall (fw-daemon) in > the context of Tails? Let's see if I can do something here. I'll document a long the way. Best, Jurre ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] #10972 Port tails to arm platforms
On 01/31/2016 06:59 PM, Tails wrote: > Hi Jurre, > > thanks! > >> Should I assume you're subscribed to the mailinglist? If so, please tell >> me and I can remove you from the CC. > Yes, I'm on the mailinglist, please remove me from CC > >> Humm, seems python3 on armhf is indeed >> 3.4(https://packages.debian.org/jessie/armhf/python3/download), maybe >> we've run into a bug. What does which `python` says? > `which python` --version points to a version 2.7.9 (!!!), but python3 > and python3.4 packages are installed also in the build chroot. > But, it seems, that this is not a package problem, it seems that the > dbus_bindings might not haven been build during the package build. > Yes, booring job but I'll investigate ... package for package. Yes, not quite exciting.. tedious but important work however! :) > But isn't there a tails test repro, where I can upload arm packages to test? >> Not quite at the moment, however, you should be able to run the test >> suite yourself. See the following link and subpages: >> https://tails.boum.org/contribute/release_process/test/ > Ok, as far as I see ... no continuous development and integration :D Well! There are! - https://tails.boum.org/contribute/working_together/roles/sysadmins/#index12h2 - https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/automated_builds_and_tests/ > BUT isn't there anybody who has a more pwoerfull test environment? >> I could provide you with a Debian VM if you want! > Thanks & good to know, could be a way if I don't find a suitable "place" > ... anyhow if possible I would prefer an environment I can access > physically. It's not built/made up over night. Sure thing. > > Good idea, should be possible to set up a qemu arm VM running a Debain arm! Yay, let me know if we could help in any way possible. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] #10972 Port tails to arm platforms
Hi, Should I assume you're subscribed to the mailinglist? If so, please tell me and I can remove you from the CC. On 01/31/2016 01:57 PM, Tails wrote: > Hi Dr_Whax > >> Hey, if you have any issues with the development environment, feel >> free to send an e-mail to the tails-dev list :) >> THANKS! Off course, I have a lot of, just take look into attached >> statePackages.txt and search for "FAILED.deb" extended with comments. >> Some examples: >> - ./d/dbus-python/ seems to be a deprecated state (python3 seems to be >> no more available for jessie armhf; has to be changed to python 3.4) Humm, seems python3 on armhf is indeed 3.4(https://packages.debian.org/jessie/armhf/python3/download), maybe we've run into a bug. What does which `python` says? >> - ./g/grub2/ segment fault sig 11 in debconf-updatepo, no idea for the >> moment >> - ./h/haskell-cmdargs/ seems to fail due to a strange make rule >> - ./h/haskell-hledger/ found no jessie armhf shakespeare-text package. >> Seems that must be ported too or any replacement .. >> - ./h/haveged/ I'm not sure if I found a solution, needs more deeper >> investigation >> - ./i/i2p/ "Unsupported build environment. jcpuid is only used on x86 >> systems." and known "debconf-updatepo -> qemu Illegal instruction (4) >> und Segmentation fault (11)" >> - ... a lot of more issues. Good job so far! I think it would be good to see if some of these require any changes on Tails' side and we should fill individual bugs accordingly for it to track progress. Boring but important work! :) >> Is there a repo where we could follow the amazing progress you're doing on >> this? > For the moment only risup issue #10972 ... :( > For the moment I'm doing any tests on a rpi 2 ... :( > > But isn't there a tails test repro, where I can upload arm packages to test? Not quite at the moment, however, you should be able to run the test suite yourself. See the following link and subpages: https://tails.boum.org/contribute/release_process/test/ > BUT isn't there anybody who has a more pwoerfull test environment? I could provide you with a Debian VM if you want! Best, Jurre ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Tails Hardware
On 01/02/2016 11:41 PM, Spencer wrote: > Hi, > >> >> a3: >> Personally, with my Lenovo X200, I have removed the BIOS from the >> manufacturer... >> > > Will you make step-by-step instructions available for others? That exists already: http://libreboot.org/docs/install/x200_external.html For other hardware: http://libreboot.org/docs/install/index.html > > Wordlife, > Spencer > > > ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Getting Started
On 11/04/2015 10:01 PM, kili...@tuta.io wrote: > Hello, > I would like to contribute to tails. I poked around the website and found the > easy_tasks article which said that to begin I should email what I would like > to work on so that I can become more familiar with the process of submitting > work. I looked at the list of easy tasks and I think that I would be able to > port the tails-about from python2 to python3.4 > (https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/10082). How should I go about getting > started (I already downloaded the latest ISO as the insctructions in the > above link stated) once I am finished porting the code? > Thanks in advance! > -kilid Hi kilid! I'm happy to see a new face and thanks for your enthusiasm! Do you have a Redmine account by any chance? We could put you as responsible for the tickets and ping you in case you need any help. If you're done with porting the code, you could update the ticket with a git branch with your changes(preferred) or submit a git-format-patch. You can find the source code in the tails repository: https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails Then it's in: ./config/chroot_local-includes/usr/local/bin/tails-about A pointer from our blueprint can be found: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/python3/| - gtk|: deprecated, replaced by |python3-gi| and |gir1.2-gtk-3.0| These are packages you would have to install on Tails. If you need anymore info feel free to reply to this e-mail thread! :) Best, Jurre ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge] #9335 Add the coppersurfer.tk tracker to our Torrent
Hi, This time the patch should apply just fine! Thanks, Jurre On 05/14/2015 04:18 PM, Jurre van Bergen wrote: Hi, Ready for review 'n merge: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/9335 Best, Jurre ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Tails contributors meeting: Sunday May 03
On 04/30/2015 04:35 PM, anonym wrote: On 15/04/15 09:00, sajolida wrote: Feel free to propose and prepare discussion topics. Either: - Raise them in this thread so that others can ask details and prepare the discussion too. I'd like to discuss #9277 - https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/9277 Best, Jurre ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Blueprint: delete obsolete Git branches (review)
On 02/22/2015 05:47 PM, intrigeri wrote: Looks good. Pushed a few minor rephrasing and formatting improvements. Cheers! There's one confusing point, though: somewhere it is said that merged branches can be deleted After a new Tails release has been shipped, while elsewhere I see it can be done post-merge. This should be clarified. I have done so. I personally prefer if it's done after each release, and not after each merge: we're in no hurry, and IMO it is not worth adding more steps to the review'n'merge process. Ack! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Git history rewrite
Hi folks, I want to make you all aware that we will be rewriting the git history of tails.git, our main git repository. To make it easy for everybody and have less pain for us or for yourself in the future. I would like to ask you to push any local branches you might have laying around, even if the work isn't finished, to the git repo. Please do not postpone! :-) All the best, Jurre ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Blueprint: delete obsolete Git branches (review)
Hoi, I have worked on a blueprint (delete obsolete Git branches)[1] and would like to ask you to review it. Does the proposed workflow makes sense? Did I miss anything? Would you like to see anything changed and if so, why? [1] https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/delete_obsolete_Git_branches Thanks! All the best, Jurre ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Automated builds specification
Hi, As some of you might know, we'll spend quite some time this year seting up automated builds and test using our Jenkins platform and make it easier to extract information and data from it. For the first iteration, which is automatically build of interesting branches, we need to specify: * Which branches we want to build? We already build the base branches (stables, testing, devel and experimental + feature/jessie). So the questions raised is mostly concern the feature/* and bugfix/* branches (so topic branches) The criterias to automatically select the branches to be build could be: branches which are not merged to devel but has new commits since N weeks time, 15 days or the previous release. * Which regularity if needed? (assuming it will be build when a push is made on it) - Is a branch built everyday enough? Should it be built more often or less often? * How should you be notified? - Direct e-mail? - IRC channel? We're already drafted some scenario's on: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/automated_builds_and_tests/autobuild_specs/ Some of you might want to see other one's implemented , so please update the blueprint accordingly. Scenarios can range from release managers, developers, reviewers, testers. Some of these suggestions might not make it this year but will be looked at in the following year. Need to keep in mind that the same question will be raised when we'll design the automated tests. All the best, CI team ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Selling
Please see: https://www.mail-archive.com/tails-dev@boum.org/msg04117.html On 11/25/2014 01:54 PM, Stewart Mcleod wrote: Hello, I understand that the software is free but are there any restrictions on selling a usb stick with tails? I would like to do this and spread adoption and then donate a share back to tails? Cheers Stewart ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] vpwned + greeter
On 11/02/2014 12:48 AM, intrigeri wrote: Hi, Jacob Appelbaum wrote (24 Jul 2014 01:16:26 GMT) : I've waited a while for folks to read it and I think at this point, we're at year two or so of waiting. It seems like the easy thing is to simply give up and advocate for a fix with a simple patch. I have to admit I'm still affected by my vague memories of what I felt while reasoning about it two years ago, that is not being convinced that the attacks described in the paper were part of what Tails is seriously trying to protect against (as in: if an attacker can do that, then they possibly have other, and maybe easier ways to do it even if we kill access to RFC1918 addresses). Unfortunately, I've let it in the shape of very incomplete and not publishable notes back then, never came back to it, and have been feeling bad about it ever since. Yay. I've sent these notes to Jurre, who's recently volunteered to think this through. I'd love to see this happen anyway, but after two years of waiting for it, maybe we should stop blocking on it and move on. (Yes, it can take me a looong time to change my mind. You've not seen it all yet.) I've thought it true, but i've been lazy and not sending out my thoughts. Luckily, it seems that we had similar thoughts, yay. I'm not an UX person but I see the following solution(s) living next to each other if needed. Coming from a security point of view, I believe it's better to enable things than to disable things. Most of our users might not understand the risks associated to attacks described in vpwned and dma capable devices. We therefor, shouldn't make them vulnerable by default but rather by choice and document in a clear way what the risks associated to it are. I'd also rather not advocate for a way to enable through out a session, it's like having intercourse and deciding, gosh, we're ready to go but we're out of condoms, but whatever, just this one time. The implications might be for a lifetime. 1) When I boot Tails, i'm presented with an option to allow local traffic or not. 2) When I boot Tails, i'm presented with an option to allow certain local traffic like SSH and printing and the rest not. 3) When I boot Tails, i'm presented with an option to be able to login to a captive portal, only this IP is whitelisted on the firewall rules and the rest is blocked. I think my aim with providing these options is that, when you boot a computer, you often know what you're going to do with it or what you want access to or not. The same would go for allowing devices which are DMA capable like firewire, thunderbolt, pcmcia and others. I guess that, the longer you use Tails, say a couple of hours, the more likely it *could* become you might be targeted by an adversary. If you would then half way allow access to a local network, who knows what might happen to the user or how more likely it could become that vpnwed My 0,02 for now, I would be more than happy to hear critique! Jurre ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Bash bug
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Dear Tails users, As you might have heard there is a Bash vulnerability, I have created a temporary countermeasure write-up below. Temporary countermeasure Debian has provided an updated version, we recommend you to upgrade to the latest version of Bash and this is how you do it: This is a less safe way to do it, make sure you use a trusted network and please note this change isn't persistent. 1: Set up an administrative password[1] when you boot Tails 2: Connect to the Internet (I recommend using a trusted network) 3: Run the following in a root terminal: apt-get update apt-get install bash The more experienced user way: 1: Set up an administrative password[1] when you boot Tails 2 Download the wheezy package through a separate computer and place it on the persistent volume to install before you connect to the Internet and verify checksums :) 3 If you have the `deb` run in a root terminal: dpkg -i /path/bash.deb 4: Connect to the internet [1] https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/startup_options/administration_password/index.en.html -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJUI017AAoJELc5KWfqgB0Cn1IIALCob3ymEn7sWibryZ4NWF5B pDhBEp8rlGYGdIFtiOl50ywdgS1AUPlpo7+cSj/rUpEi53K1AiIt7Aw+ZBcQohW0 jI1Oluwnckc6ZVLZblLYaes6WfINC5sp6qvFknWgla8zd5kKU5VMWVHb/9JS0KL7 yMibOVDx1ib4rxSck+z7KfbTE/CF2+JCCABI7p7pmXw134BDQesPJa76ZpNwK8z5 YV0KJ+35od7pgjTe+2ihjuqdPWlu/tHl01GJmwAA9yChwUDwiE6JMMkSSVJNwaBk j1yyA91nBF1KUk9KJReAarVp3aWFgusWGjMSPj1ILfX45IqSWk4gR+HxmZOfGpE= =/JT9 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Bash bug
Seems the Debian patch wasn't good enough, Tavis Ormandy wrote a bypass. (https://twitter.com/taviso/status/514887394294652929) Act with caution! Jurre On 09/25/2014 01:02 AM, Jurre van Bergen wrote: Dear Tails users, As you might have heard there is a Bash vulnerability, I have created a temporary countermeasure write-up below. Temporary countermeasure Debian has provided an updated version, we recommend you to upgrade to the latest version of Bash and this is how you do it: This is a less safe way to do it, make sure you use a trusted network and please note this change isn't persistent. 1: Set up an administrative password[1] when you boot Tails 2: Connect to the Internet (I recommend using a trusted network) 3: Run the following in a root terminal: apt-get update apt-get install bash The more experienced user way: 1: Set up an administrative password[1] when you boot Tails 2 Download the wheezy package through a separate computer and place it on the persistent volume to install before you connect to the Internet and verify checksums :) 3 If you have the `deb` run in a root terminal: dpkg -i /path/bash.deb 4: Connect to the internet [1] https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/startup_options/administration_password/index.en.html ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] How the traffic confirmation attack on Tor affects Tails
On Wednesday, July 30th, the Tor project released a security advisory[1] with details about a so called deanonymization attack. Tails has Tor at it's heart, your traffic goes over Tor when you but not limited to, browse a website or trying to e-mail a peer. Because of this I wanted to give an overview of how Tails might be affected by this attack. Scope and severity === The attack is targeted at people who visit Tor hidden services and expose the ip-adress of the user. An attacker could run a number of Tor relays to modify traffic and learn the identity that way. It's not clear at this point in time how much attackers have learned and what they have learned. The attackers likely couldn't see full-application traffic like which websites were visited. There is a possibility that attackers have learned the ip-address of Tails users who visited Tor hidden services between January 30 and July 4, when the bad relays have been taken out of the Tor network, should assume affected. We recommend you read the full advisory[2] by Tor for the technical story behind the attack. Temporary countermeasure Tor has provided an updated version, we recommend you to upgrade to the latest version of Tor and this is how you do it: 1: Set up an administrative password[3] 2: Connect to the internet 3: Run the following in a root terminal: apt-get update apt-get install tor You know run the latest version of Tor which mitigates this vulnerability. [1] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack [2] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack [3] https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/startup_options/administration_password/index.en.html ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Removing or blacklist kernel modules
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi, By default Debian ships a beautiful kernel with a ton of features to work outside of the box. With features I mean modules, whether that's support for some really obscure network protocol or bluetooth(random example) drivers. While that comes in handy for a lot of things, I feel that it's important to reconsider what we would like to ship in Tails as the more kernel modules we load and/or ship we also increase the attack vector. So I would like to discuss whether it's a good idea to either remove and/or blacklist certain modules for the kernel. What the reasoning might be to remove those specific modules from the kernel and whether we can come to a consensus of some sorts so we can research on how to achieve this. I feel that actually _removing_ modules is a better way to achieve a slightly safer kernel as the code could not be reached anymore. Less attack vector! Blacklisting kernel modules allows you to compile them in, but not use them, however, *perhaps* code could still be reached which might be exploitable with some crazy exploit. I wonder if SubgraphOS has removed modules as well and what their reasoning is for removing them, if any. Thoughts? All the best, Jurre -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTwAC1AAoJELc5KWfqgB0Ch6AH/AjD6Blv9LyI+tHVnmvMMtiX mRKe7K/fug3+5WyEaGfcrXdI8IohRMRYK65eMI66B6qDkoZCZStxNylek9JxTgo4 rIPS/KKYQ2E6SMKx1HrZoVp0JzKHejI0hOCaTT0YPpCrdxjQYiVAhKGEUNAoc5kb fyQId5Z/UESYQzIUeOoncQPH0aQ4XcGBSd5bX+tpTJgIQDkQJjbEFTpr3SFlZGCN ofqrLcCS03bxp+dq4Bbenx6tB7uw2zX3lPIxFO6B7JwfZtwhzZDQsrQv8I4GYyGK 71neEkKaeh7cYoyzBJnNoIRvNEBA97fh2twggkgAj6swv0d5cDonNJ+vvuR/6yA= =0etp -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Post-backbone collaboration
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hoi, E-mail is hard, my apologies for the resend, but now everyone is cc'd and it's easier to stay in the loop. Please use reply-all to keep everyone in the loop.! - - Dear Privacy Distributions, It was good to see all of you recently at backbone409, I would like to keep this momentum fresh and e-mail you about how we can improve some software upstream we all benefit from, below, some tickets we would like to see happening, from Tails' side. What are the things freepto and subgraph would like to see happening? Or what are you working on? Perhaps a good start would be to make an inventory of bugs we would like to see resolved? :) Thoughts? For the folks who weren't at backbone409, we had a long discussion about our privacy distributions and finding out we are all based on Debian, this makes for leveraging work! Hurray! - - Feature #6337: Add support for TrueCrypt volumes in udisks https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70164 https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6337 - - Feature #5868: hkps support in Seahorse https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=617383 https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5868 - - Feature #6272: Wait for GNOME GnuPG agent to support OpenPGP smartcards https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=530439 https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6272 - - Feature #5655: Share username and hostname amongst all anonymity distributions https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5655 I included the last one, since I brought it up at backbone409 and might be interesting to have as an discussion. All the best, Jurre -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTr+zRAAoJELc5KWfqgB0Cih4IAIv2E9SiZEy6RMup9cJDCzQ0 2KEsBib5diZlOenEFnV2uguyB/Qk61ZuQxlV5rv8PxyqtCYjkR3imAkSZDMRiw9Y c2jDIcrc+i8KSrudQSIZ05sEG5XGubXGlHftYbdg0/7gA5M7g3MYfKGronGa4fa4 r7U8Sx7YL7F34Qny+HTueoGXdc8mQkGJsRw55d/laMRGayituoJnOJTLYzGQXFrA w2mrYP10EQfDPi1E2cMj6JQTsNIBy266uVZ1EGgd1UquwqyqhSCJIO4GgBkmVPyl e0rJL6wGB45F/weJ1Bz6hhuTu+0qPu+SNpegQ+HsuhBwNDXLPR2YpL2CMEXw+X8= =v9rl -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Macbook Wifi firmware
On 05/31/2014 07:47 PM, intrigeri wrote: A resolution to this problem, for the specific case of Debian Live systems, is being worked on: https://bugs.debian.org/748679 I think that's the way to go. That indeed seems as the way to go, i'll try to gather some PCI-id's and e-mail it to bug report. Thanks. Jurre ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Macbook Wifi firmware
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi, I'm trying to see how to get WiFi to work on several macbook's, like the pro and air. These mostly work with Broadcom non-free drivers, which is unfortunate, but c'est la vie. So I went to look in the Tails code and configuration file, which drivers were already supported, I see that the b43 driver is included which is an open-source wrapper around the binary drivers for Broadcom as far as I can see (the binaries gets fetched using b43-fwcutter from the broadcom website). So, this is an option, although not great, giving that we probably miss a package to make Thunderbolt ethernet controllers to work. So my suggestion is to add the following drivers: - - broadcom-sta-common - broadcom-sta-source - module-assistant - - broadcom-sta-dkms However, there could be conflicting modules loaded, which should be unloaded, so, this means that, we would need to check what kind of hardware it runs and only modprobe module A and not module X, Y and Z. [1] Thoughts? [1] https://wiki.debian.org/wl All the best, Jurre - -- Developer at https://www.useotrproject.org/ -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTigHvAAoJELc5KWfqgB0CVlwH/jbK4JbQwXp0Z73udg44UXaS aotrT7z/pXGUr+Muicv/7HrQCCyFLw392U5ewaUYuA10inJ6HnVeUPW78m+m3bLJ zvETc0NNxCIQe5CslCO6vQCD7BW/psf0lOTDNNcuhAi4RN1UXp7X136SQSCWJYLI J15RnmPIIBVIBRyCUbL42v8OlgW19tC/QpT9rWTsaruaf68M9xUWWH1mv403/Gqb +udGffXAtERVi3ggXX+4d66xQdLs4AWPELh35jyrAWqcVDQXFs4vNk+8ubS3A0hw Xw7jGeI2wVtDYSm1vUE4Wkbo7Ol8gwGsGwhtS7qkvfbejYuNrnjCXEc0nVSHFlU= =Lq7D -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] national mention
On 04/15/2014 11:52 AM, sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: Drumm, Dan L.: If you haven't heard, Glenn Greenwald/Laura Poitras mentioned tails on democracy now today 4/14/14 from somewhere from :30-:35 minutes is. This should yield a huge spike for you. Cool, I've added it to our press page: https://tails.boum.org/press Thanks for the info! Question and answer at 33:09 -- Developer at https://www.useotrproject.org/ ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] OpenITP Launches the Peer Review Board
On 04/03/2014 05:11 PM, sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: Anything new on this front? Unfortunately not, nobody has contacted me from OpenITP as of today. I will update the ticket if it happens. All the best, Jurre -- Developer at https://www.useotrproject.org/ ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] OpenITP Launches the Peer Review Board
On 03/07/2014 11:15 AM, sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: Great, it would be awesome if you subscribed to their mailing list then, and tell them Tails would be interested. https://lists.openitp.org/mailman/listinfo/prb Then don't hesitate to ask us for more help in case they ask you think you are not sure about regarding the process. I'm not sure any of us will be following this very closely, at least until we really have to bring in more knowledge than what you already have. Update: I have subscribed to the mailinglist and I have filled in their form at the OpenITP website (as that is the correct process as far as I can see on prb.openitp.org). I will keep the list up-to-date about what's happening. I created the following ticket to track this: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6889 All the best, Jurre -- Developer at https://www.useotrproject.org/ ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] OpenITP Launches the Peer Review Board
On 03/04/2014 01:00 AM, intrigeri wrote: Hi, source: https://openitp.org/news-events/openitp-launches-the-peer-review-board.html Anyone here interested in: * subscribing to their mailing-list and/or * looking if and how Tails (users) could benefit from this project ? Cheers, I could help out with that! Jurre -- Developer at https://www.useotrproject.org/ ___ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Patch: #6679 - Do not auto-connect to the #tor IRC channel
On 03/04/2014 10:13 AM, sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: intrigeri: Jurre van Bergen wrote (02 Mar 2014 22:43:47 GMT) : However, I don't think we should remove #tor from the listing. Some people I trust seemed to agree that the current situation sucks for #tor, so the status quo does not seem to be an option, unfortunately. A potential problem is that if we remove #tor, then we'll get more Tor-related (and not Tails-specific) questions on #tails, that we'll have to redirect. But at least *we* would be handling our users, and redirecting them to the right place, as we already do for other upstreams of ours, such as Debian. I've no very clear position on this whole thing, just my 0.02 commits. In other words: we are happy with the intention of your patch, but we just need it to be fixed in Git terms, so that it applies on the current devel branch. At least, let's try that and see how it affects the #tails channel... Alright, that's clear, i'll refactor my patch and send it in again! All the best, Jurre -- Developer at https://www.useotrproject.org/ ___ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Patch: #6679 - Do not auto-connect to the #tor IRC channel
On 03/02/2014 01:09 PM, sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: intrigeri: Jurre van Bergen wrote (01 Mar 2014 21:02:38 GMT) : I have a patch for #6679[1] attached. [1] https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6679 Sadly, this patch does not apply on current devel branch. (Yeah, I could trivially fix it, but hey, I could also have trivially written the patch myself, but I prioritized other things :) Actually, the name of the ticket is misleading because we don't currently auto-connect to the #tor channel (to the #tails channel) either. We only have it listed and preconfigured. But if that's enough of a problem, then the solution is to remove it all the way. So I'm renaming the ticket, to match this which is also the intention of Jurre's patch. Woops! This was my first time using git format patch, I might've messed up somewhere. However, I don't think we should remove #tor from the listing. All the best, Jurre -- Developer at https://www.useotrproject.org/ ___ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Patch: #6632 - Add a bookmark to Tor Stack Exchange
Heya, I prepared a patch to add Tor Stack Exchange to Iceweasel bookmarks. From fdbfe06e754cb1683dc48c09b71484c41d9b187d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tails developers amne...@boum.org Date: Sat, 1 Mar 2014 22:31:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Added Tor Stack Exchange to Iceweasel bookmarks.html --- .../etc/iceweasel/profile/bookmarks.html |1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/config/chroot_local-includes/etc/iceweasel/profile/bookmarks.html b/config/chroot_local-includes/etc/iceweasel/profile/bookmarks.html index 7779b5e..90f72a2 100644 --- a/config/chroot_local-includes/etc/iceweasel/profile/bookmarks.html +++ b/config/chroot_local-includes/etc/iceweasel/profile/bookmarks.html @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ DLp DTA HREF=https://check.torproject.org/;Tor Check/A DTA HREF=https://www.torproject.org/;Tor Project/A +DTA HREF=https://tor.stackexchange.com/;Tor Stack Exchange/A /DLp DTh3I2P/h3 DLp -- 1.7.9.5 Cheers. -- Developer at https://www.useotrproject.org/ ___ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Patch: #6679 - Do not auto-connect to the #tor IRC channel [wiki-patch]
From dc63b427cc5885bb994d4520d2e885d721da183b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tails developers amne...@boum.org Date: Sat, 1 Mar 2014 22:24:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Updated anonymous internet/pidgin page about removing #tor --- wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/pidgin.mdwn |2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/pidgin.mdwn b/wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/pidgin.mdwn index 2de885a8..233bf16 100644 --- a/wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/pidgin.mdwn +++ b/wiki/src/doc/anonymous_internet/pidgin.mdwn @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Predefined accounts Two accounts are configured in span class=applicationPidgin/span by default: -- `irc.oftc.net` to connect to the OFTC IRC server, and join the #tails and #tor chats. +- `irc.oftc.net` to connect to the OFTC IRC server, and join the #tails chat. - `127.0.0.1` to connect to the I2P IRC server. Those accounts are deactivated when Tails is started. To activate them, -- 1.7.9.5 -- Developer at https://www.useotrproject.org/ ___ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
