Re: Meltdown, aka "Dear Intel, you suck"

2018-01-06 Thread Mark Kettenis
> From: Philip Guenther 
> Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 20:52:20 -0800
> 
> Unless something unexpected happens, we'll be applying the workaround to
> amd64 first and then working out what to do for i386 and arm* (if still
> though to be necessary for arm) after that.

FWIW, Meltdown is a non-issue for OpenBSD/armv7 and OpenBSD/arm64 at
the moment.  The only vulnerable ARM core is the Cortex-A75 which
isn't actually on the market yet.  And we don't currently support
non-ARM implementations.  That said, we are considering separating the
page tables on arm64 since it seems to be relatively easy and unlikely
to have a severe impact on performance.

Some ARM cores are vulnerable to various Spectre attacks.  However
since OpenBSD/armv7 flushes the BTB on each context switch already, it
is unliekly that other processes can be attached.  We're still
investigating whether more BTB flushes are necessary.  Everything with
a Cortex-A7 core should be safe, which is a large fraction of the
hardware supported by OpenBSD/armv7.

For OpenBSD/arm64 the situation is not so great.  Flusihing the BTB
there is almost impossible without a firmware update.  However,
everything with a Cortex-A53 core should be safe, which covers the
majority of the hardware supported by OpenBSD/amd64.



Re: Meltdown, aka "Dear Intel, you suck"

2018-01-05 Thread Theo de Raadt
> We have received *no* non-public information.  I've seen posts elsewhere by
> other *BSD people implying that they receive little or no prior warning, so
> I have no reason to believe this was specific to OpenBSD and/or our
> philosophy.  Personally, I do find itamusing? that public announcements
> were moved up after the issue was deduced from development discussions and
> commits to a different open source OS project.  Aren't we all glad that
> this was under embargo and strongly believe in the future value of
> embargoes?

if only the millionares and billionares benefit from receiving
information to make improvements to the so-called open and free
software stack, then the ecosystem has truly grown up to become
captured and will soon gain all the market benefits of other supply
chains -- such as ensuring you have inexpensive salmonella spinach on
your table from purchased from a smallselection of vendors.  But not
safety, security, diversity, and choice.

Some people should be ashamed of themselves, but they probably
purchased options.



Meltdown, aka "Dear Intel, you suck"

2018-01-05 Thread Philip Guenther
So, yes, we the OpenBSD developers are not totally asleep and a handful of
us are working out how to deal with Intel's fuck-up aka the Meltdown
attack.  While we have the advantage of less complexity in this area (e.g.,
no 32bit-on-64bit compat), there's still a pile of details to work through
about what has to be *always* in the page tables vs what can/should/must be
hidden.

Do KARL or other features of OpenBSD mitigate this?  Not particularly.  If
you're running code from multiple trust domains then yeah, you're largely
at risk.

We have received *no* non-public information.  I've seen posts elsewhere by
other *BSD people implying that they receive little or no prior warning, so
I have no reason to believe this was specific to OpenBSD and/or our
philosophy.  Personally, I do find itamusing? that public announcements
were moved up after the issue was deduced from development discussions and
commits to a different open source OS project.  Aren't we all glad that
this was under embargo and strongly believe in the future value of
embargoes?

Unless something unexpected happens, we'll be applying the workaround to
amd64 first and then working out what to do for i386 and arm* (if still
though to be necessary for arm) after that.  No promises on only applying
it to Intel CPUs or knobs to disable it, yet: we'll see how complex that
would make things.  As always, our own developer laptops are the first
targets, so we're invested in it working and being usable.


Philip Guenther
guent...@openbsd.org