Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi One has to finance retirement somehow :) It’s also a pretty simple way to demonstrate the what and why of a spoof without getting into anything so obscure that it can’t be understood. A secondary point *might* be that indeed, the stuff we are talking about is mainly useful to “bad guys”.

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

On 8/15/17 9:58 AM, Ken Winterling wrote: Hmmm Bob, It seems you have given a considerable amount of thought to armored cars, gold bars, bank vaults, and stock trades... Is there anything you want to tell us LOL There's a lot of really neat time-nuts gear out there that's expensive.

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hmmm Bob, It seems you have given a considerable amount of thought to armored cars, gold bars, bank vaults, and stock trades... Is there anything you want to tell us LOL Ken WA2LBI On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 12:44 PM, Bob kb8tq wrote: > Hi > > In the case of a spoof,

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi In the case of a spoof, the target is likely one specific vehicle. You care about the armored car with the big pile of gold bars in it. The objective is not to get him to drive into a bridge abutment. It’s to get him to turn left on the wrong road. You tailor the spoof so everything

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

I think that even with a rudimentary and incomplete knowledge of the road network one could detect spoofing a car navigation system. The car would show up inside buildings and farm fields and lakes. You'd see this even on a very poor map. If the spoofer moved the signal even 200 yards the

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi all, On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 06:10:33PM -0400, Ron Bean wrote: > >In a car it is even easier. The car nav system KNOWS it must be on a > >roadway. The car's ground track (positional history) must be on a road. > > That's assuming the GPS company keeps their maps up to date (it doesn't >

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

This article from 2009: http://web.stanford.edu/group/scpnt/gpslab/website_files/anti-spoofing/insideGNSS_rasd-montgomery.pdf It talks about spoofing and preventing Spoofing. On 2017-08-15 09:06, REEVES Paul wrote: > This was referred to in my post (subject: 'Loran') on 8/8/17 and was a

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

This was referred to in my post (subject: 'Loran') on 8/8/17 and was a news item in 'Inside GNSS' and other journals before that. Didn't get many comments on my post :-( Must have used the wrong subject Paul G8GJA -Original Message- From: time-nuts

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

>In a car it is even easier. The car nav system KNOWS it must be on a >roadway. The car's ground track (positional history) must be on a road. That's assuming the GPS company keeps their maps up to date (it doesn't matter how often you update the maps in the device if the company's maps don't

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Detecting a spoof is not really so hard. What you need to redundancy. When the two navigation methods diverge then you know one of them is acting up. (that is broken or being spoofed or just buggy) On a ship you have magnetic compass and knot log and almost certainly gyros and all these are

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi Setting up the signals for any time / location on earth is simply matter of a few mouse clicks with any of a number of packages. No need to do anything more than that to get the data. Bob > On Aug 14, 2017, at 3:02 PM, Graham / KE9H wrote: > > Remember the

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Remember the military drone that the Iranians tricked into landing in Iran a few years ago? The best explanation I heard of how they did it was that they knew that if it lost its command channel, that it would return to the airport where it took off. So, what they did was spoof the GPS with a

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

albertson.ch...@gmail.com said: > I'm far from a professional but I've taken the six week class and I'm > reasonably certain I could find a place on the other side of the pacific > ocean with no GPS. The GPS is far easier to use and more accurate but no > one uses just GPS alone, they alway

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

On 8/14/17 10:24 AM, Magnus Danielson wrote: Hi Jim, On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote: And GPS users who care about spoofing tend to use antenna systems that will reject signals coming from the "wrong" direction. It's pretty easy to set up 3 antenna separated by 30 cm or so and tell what

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi, Sure, some have started to work on it, but far from it. Traditional navigation helps a lot. While you have signal you can trim continously. Cheers, Magnus On 08/14/2017 07:43 PM, paul swed wrote: Sextent, compass, and clock. Amazingly as posted on time nuts some time ago the Navy and

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi > On Aug 14, 2017, at 2:13 PM, Chris Albertson > wrote: > > The trouble with spoofing location is that in theory every ship is using > more than one method of navigation. They would notice their GPS is acting > up and turn it off. In most cases the “other

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi Consider what your automotive GPS receiver does coming out of a tunnel or out from under a bunch of trees. It still needs to work correctly in that situation. Same thing with a big rain cloud “over there”. I don’t think you would want a receiver that went nuts in those cases. I don’t

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

The trouble with spoofing location is that in theory every ship is using more than one method of navigation. They would notice their GPS is acting up and turn it off. I'm far from a professional but I've taken the six week class and I'm reasonably certain I could find a place on the other side

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

HI Since multi path is a real issue in a mobile environment, defining what an “abnormal” change is could be quite tricky. A reasonable “spoof” would start with feeding the correct data and then slowly capture the target (still with correct data). Once he is are “in charge” signal wise, start

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Civilian receivers generally do not measure absolute strength but instead report S/N. The spoofer could fake up a reasonable amount of noise to get a wimpy S/N with a much stronger signal. Tim. On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:40 PM, ken Schwieker wrote: > Wouldn't monitoring

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

In some sense the "jump everyone to the airport 32km away" is a too-simplistic case because it's too easy to detect. Let's just arbitrarily place 100nanoseconds as the threshold for detectable time jump indicating that you're being spoofed. Yes modern timing receivers do better than that all the

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Wouldn't monitoring the received signal strength and noting any non-normal increase (or decrease) level change indicate possible spoofing? The spoofing station would have no way to know what the target's received signal strength would be. Ken S --- This email has been checked for viruses by

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Sextent, compass, and clock. Amazingly as posted on time nuts some time ago the Navy and Coast Guard have re-introduced that training. On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Magnus Danielson < mag...@rubidium.dyndns.org> wrote: > Hi Jim, > > On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote: > >> And GPS users who

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi > On Aug 14, 2017, at 11:38 AM, Clint Jay wrote: > > All very true and yes, for a capable programmer and hardware tech it's not > going to be an impossible task. > > I would still expect a turnkey solution to exist though as I can see many > applications for not just

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi Jim, On 08/14/2017 06:03 PM, jimlux wrote: And GPS users who care about spoofing tend to use antenna systems that will reject signals coming from the "wrong" direction. It's pretty easy to set up 3 antenna separated by 30 cm or so and tell what direction the signal from each S/V is coming

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

All very true and yes, for a capable programmer and hardware tech it's not going to be an impossible task. I would still expect a turnkey solution to exist though as I can see many applications for not just state actors. On 14 Aug 2017 4:32 pm, "Attila Kinali" wrote: > On

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

I guess it would depend on the level of infrastructure available to the attacker, clock distribution is a reasonably well solved problem isn't it? There would, I suppose also be the issue of receiver swamping, you could monitor received signal levels as it's my understanding that the signals from

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 12:09:43 -0400 Tim Shoppa wrote: > I think if you are only trying to spoof a single receiver it would be > possible to walk a spoofed time/space code in a way that time moved without > so obvious of a discontinuity. I'm sure there would be effects a

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi Time is one more thing the spoofer needs to consider. It does not eliminate the ability to spoof, it just adds one more factor to his setup. If he’s got a “clear” GPS signal to base his spoof on, that gives him a timebase to use. Bob > On Aug 14, 2017, at 12:09 PM, Tim Shoppa

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi The big(er) deal with some systems is that they offer encrypted services. If you happen to have access to the crypto version, that’s going to help you. As long as you are using “public” (and thus fully documented) modes … not a lot of difference. The same info that lets anybody design a

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Bringing this back around to time-nuts - wouldn't the timescale discontinuity at the receiver, be a powerful clue that spoofing was going on? But these being navigation receivers they aren't looking so critically at the time. Presumably this was a single-transmitter jammer that pretended it was a

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

On 8/14/17 8:24 AM, Attila Kinali wrote: On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 10:26:13 +0100 Clint Jay wrote: That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill to implement) is worrying and

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

So, what I wonder: to what extent (if any) are GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo sufficiently different that it is challenging to spoof all three in the same way? Is there any reason why it is more than 3 times the work to spoof all 3? Is there something clever receivers can do, with awareness of all

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 10:26:13 +0100 Clint Jay wrote: > That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and > would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill > to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Hi Björn, bg wrote: > Hi Martin, > No there was also a SDR hack to spoof. > http://www.rtl-sdr.com/cheating-at-pokemon-go-with-a-hackrf-and-gps-spoofing/ This sounds indeed like a nice way to test if a real spoofing approach is working properly, so it could also be used to do really evil things.

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Oh definitely and if I was going to cheat at Pokémon then that'd be the most cost effective method (yes, I play, my 9 year old son insists) but I'd rather have the "fun" of actually catching them the proper way On 14 Aug 2017 12:08 pm, "Martin Burnicki" wrote: >

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Clint Jay wrote: > No, this was not the software hack, it was done with some rather nice > Rohde test equipment. Ah, OK, of course that's also possible. However, what I found was much simpler: https://devs-lab.com/how-to-play-pokemon-go-without-moving-no-root-required.html

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

No, this was not the software hack, it was done with some rather nice Rohde test equipment. On 14 Aug 2017 10:42 am, "Martin Burnicki" wrote: > Clint Jay wrote: > > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > > using that example was

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

+01:00) To: Discussion of precise time and frequency measurement <time-nuts@febo.com> Subject: Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian   cyberweapon Clint Jay wrote: > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > using that examp

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Clint Jay wrote: > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is > if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy > (obviously you'd need deep pockets). I just

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Clint Jay wrote: > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is > if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy > (obviously you'd need deep pockets). > > That it

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy (obviously you'd need deep pockets). That it can "so easily" be spoofed

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Clint Jay wrote: > It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of > students who used it to fool Pokémon go... Yes, I read about that, too. However, related to Pokémon go it's just fun, but related to serious application it can cause quite some damage.

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of students who used it to fool Pokémon go... On 14 Aug 2017 8:27 am, "Martin Burnicki" wrote: > Clint Jay wrote: > > Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the >

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Clint Jay wrote: > Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the > shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago? https://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/29/ut-austin-researchers-successfully-spoof-an-80-million-yacht-at-sea

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

This has been an area of interest to the US Air Force for many years: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2006-10-18/usaf-facility-tests-gps-jamming-vulnerability -- Bill Byrom N5BB On Mon, Aug 14, 2017, at 12:46 AM, Clint Jay wrote: > Didn't someone demonstrate

Re: [time-nuts] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago? On 12 August 2017 at 22:23, John Allen wrote: > FYI, John K1AE > > -Original Message- > From: YCCC