Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

Okay that was a fail on my part I meant to put all 6 in. Updated the PR. spt > On Mar 1, 2018, at 20:05, Martin Thomson wrote: > > I think that I was suggesting this: > > The following values SHALL be marked as > "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

I think that I was suggesting this: The following values SHALL be marked as "Recommended": ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, rsa_pss_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_pss_sha384,rsa_pss_pss_sha512, and ed25519. On Fri, Mar

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

> On Mar 1, 2018, at 16:31, Martin Thomson wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 7:32 AM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote: >> To expound a bit more on my thinking, pss_pss is what we actually want >> people to be using, thus it should be Recommended, but pss_rsae

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 7:32 AM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > To expound a bit more on my thinking, pss_pss is what we actually want > people to be using, thus it should be Recommended, but pss_rsae is what > people are actually going to be using (to large extent), and that is >

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

To expound a bit more on my thinking, pss_pss is what we actually want people to be using, thus it should be Recommended, but pss_rsae is what people are actually going to be using (to large extent), and that is still a deployment that we consider good and useful, for now.  Maybe in 5 years the

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

I should note that Ben pointed out in the PR that we might need to specify all 6 as recommended. I can kind of get behind that because before we were doing PSS regardless of the identifier. Thoughts? spt > On Mar 1, 2018, at 09:58, Sean Turner wrote: > > I’ve submitted the

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

I’ve submitted the following PR to make sure we answer IANA questions*: https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1159 One thing I’d like to get input on is which of the RSA-PSS signature schemes should be recommended. The IANA considerations currently recommends rsa_pss_sha256, rsa_pss_sha384,

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

t the choice to leave in 0-RTT, but I have >>> to support it as a WG decision. Whatever the version number in the >>> ServerHello decision is from the WG, I will support that decision. >>> The ServerHello decision doesn't really fall into the, "arms race" as >

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

, Feb 15, 2018 at 9:04 PM, Yuhong Bao <yuhongbao_...@hotmail.com> >> wrote: >>> I wonder what is IESG's opinion on the TLS arms race with middleboxes. >>> Yes, I am talking about moving the version number in the ServerHello. >>> >>>

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

2018 at 9:04 PM, Yuhong Bao <yuhongbao_...@hotmail.com> >> > wrote: >> > > I wonder what is IESG's opinion on the TLS arms race with middleboxes. >> > > Yes, I am talking about moving the version number in the ServerHello. >> > > >> >

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

<tls-boun...@ietf.org> on behalf of The IESG < > > iesg-secret...@ietf.org> > > > Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2018 1:13:48 PM > > > To: IETF-Announce > > > Cc: draft-ietf-tls-tl...@ietf.org; tls-cha...@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org > > > Sub

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

15, 2018 1:13:48 PM > > To: IETF-Announce > > Cc: draft-ietf-tls-tl...@ietf.org; tls-cha...@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org > > Subject: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport > Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard > > > > > > The IESG has received

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

t; > Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2018 1:13:48 PM > To: IETF-Announce > Cc: draft-ietf-tls-tl...@ietf.org; tls-cha...@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org > Subject: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer > Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard > > > The IESG has recei

Re: [TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

For those not steeped in IETF process, the IETF LC is two weeks. IETF LC also kicks off the directorate review process; we are likely to receive General Area and Transport Areas as well as our own Security Directorate review; you can see the reviews on this page

[TLS] Last Call: (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard

The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG (tls) to consider the following document: - 'The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3' as Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action.