[tor-bugs] #7992 [Tor bundles/installation]: Tor in Iran ( stuck in 25% Loading Network Stats Consensus) All versions!
#7992: Tor in Iran ( stuck in 25% Loading Network Stats Consensus) All versions! --+- Reporter: urasilon | Owner: erinn Type: defect| Status: new Priority: blocker | Milestone: Component: Tor bundles/installation |Version: Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- TOR network in IRAN/Tehran. It used to be working just yesterday . But today seems it is stuck in this step according to the LOG Files: 25% Loading Network Stats Consensus according to TOR's Status: Loading Network Status is there any way to solve this problem ? Even bridges doesn't work. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7992 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7992 [Tor bundles/installation]: Tor in Iran ( stuck in 25% Loading Network Stats Consensus) All versions!
#7992: Tor in Iran ( stuck in 25% Loading Network Stats Consensus) All versions! --+- Reporter: urasilon | Owner: erinn Type: defect| Status: new Priority: blocker | Milestone: Component: Tor bundles/installation |Version: Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- Comment(by asn): Which ISP? Check out this page: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OONI/censorshipwiki/CensorshipByCountry/Iran Also try these bundles: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/combined-flash-proxy-pyobfsproxy-browser- bundles they should work. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7992#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #7993 [Ooni]: ooni frontpage points to wiki docs page, which very subtly points back to ooni docs page
#7993: ooni frontpage points to wiki docs page, which very subtly points back to ooni docs page +--- Reporter: arma| Owner: hellais Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni|Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- https://ooni.torproject.org/ click on Documentation and you get to https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OONI apparently you're supposed to follow the really small link back to https://ooni.torproject.org/docs/ Suggestion one would be to link from the ooni frontpage to the place you want people to go. Suggestion two would be to make the no, go to this page line on the wiki bigger. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7993 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #7994 [Ooni]: ooni instructions don't say required libdnet and pypcap versions
#7994: ooni instructions don't say required libdnet and pypcap versions +--- Reporter: arma| Owner: hellais Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni|Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- On https://github.com/hellais/ooni-probe#getting-started it says It's ideal to install these manually since the ones in debian or ubuntu are not up to date One day that statement will become false. Only you will know when that's the case. What is the version that you get from source right now? Is anything earlier than that acceptable? -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7994 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #7995 [Ooni]: ooni instructions say to use mkvirtualenv; wheezy doesn't easily have it
#7995: ooni instructions say to use mkvirtualenv; wheezy doesn't easily have it +--- Reporter: arma| Owner: hellais Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni|Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- https://github.com/hellais/ooni-probe#getting-started says to apt-get install python-virtualenv virtualenvwrapper, and then has you run mkvirtualenv. Apparently there is some extra implicit step I'm supposed to do. At the least, your instructions should acknowledge that they won't work for wheezy users. Better is to make them work. :) -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7995 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #7996 [Ooni]: scapy-based test example code has wrong example
#7996: scapy-based test example code has wrong example
+---
Reporter: arma| Owner: hellais
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Ooni|Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
+---
On (I think it was) https://ooni.torproject.org/docs/writing_tests.html
there is some sample code using twisted.defer.inlineCallbacks() which
calls
{{{
optParameters = [['target', 't', self.localOptions['target'], Specify the
target to ping]]
}}}
Arturo thought part of this line was wrong -- self.localOptions should
either be 127.0.0.1 or None.
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[tor-bugs] #7997 [Ooni]: Ooni documentation does not adequately explain Twisted
#7997: Ooni documentation does not adequately explain Twisted +--- Reporter: arma| Owner: hellais Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni|Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Aaron says The OONI documentation is confusing because it doesn't explain Twisted. Isis says defer inline callbacks need to be explained, and maybe deferred lists too. Dominic suggests just a link to the Twisted documentation. Bonus points if you can find a fantastic twisted tutorial on the internet and link to it. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7997 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7997 [Ooni]: Ooni documentation does not adequately explain Twisted
#7997: Ooni documentation does not adequately explain Twisted +--- Reporter: arma| Owner: hellais Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni|Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Comment(by gsathya): Replying to [ticket:7997 arma]: Bonus points if you can find a fantastic twisted tutorial on the internet and link to it. http://krondo.com/?page_id=1327 -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7997#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #7998 [Ooni]: document user-agent randomization is enabled by default
#7998: document user-agent randomization is enabled by default +--- Reporter: arma| Owner: hellais Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni|Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- user-agent randomization is enabled by default on the http test, and it's not mentioned anywhere in the documentation -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7998 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #7999 [Ooni]: Ooni: try inheriting from two templates at once
#7999: Ooni: try inheriting from two templates at once +--- Reporter: arma| Owner: hellais Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni|Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Dominic asks: Can I do a test that involves http and dns at once? If you bring in the http test template *and* the dns test template to do a test that involves both, will the keys in a given template clash in the resulting report? Does anything else fail in a surprising way? -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7999 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7989 [Website]: revise OS X relay instructions
#7989: revise OS X relay instructions -+-- Reporter: phobos | Owner: Type: defect | Status: needs_review Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Website |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- Changes (by mo): * status: new = needs_review Comment: I have committed a first version of the new instructions for Homebrew (rev 26005). I don't own a Mac, so there are some sections I am unsure about (verification, uninstall, configuration location, sample config), but they should definitely be an improvement over the old useless instructions. Can someone fill me in on how to configure Tor to run as daemon? The document also states that at least 20kb/s are a good contribution as a relay. I don't think that's good advice nowadays. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7989#comment:3 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8000 [TorBrowserButton]: Add interface to access HTTP(S) authenticated hidden services
#8000: Add interface to access HTTP(S) authenticated hidden services --+- Reporter: lunar | Owner: mikeperry Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: TorBrowserButton |Version: Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- Tor support authenticated hidden services. Unfortunately, the easiest way to currently reach them is by modifying torrc. It would be great if the TorBrowser would offer an easier interface to reach HTTP(S) authenticated hidden services. A quick brainstorm lead to think that their could be two sides of this interface: * an option in the onion menu, * custom Unable to connect page for .onion that would say maybe this hidden service requires an auth cookie and a field to enter one. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8000 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8001 [Tor]: obfsproxy makes tor warn when one bridge is down
#8001: obfsproxy makes tor warn when one bridge is down
+---
Reporter: arma| Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor |Version:
Keywords: tor-client | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
+---
When you run the fancy new flashproxy/obfsproxy bundle:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/combined-flash-proxy-pyobfsproxy-browser-
bundles
you get
{{{
Jan 19 15:09:17.120 [Warning] Proxy Client: unable to connect to
208.79.90.242:55564 (server rejected connection)
}}}
That's because that bridge is down currently.
When a bridge fails, we should probably only [warn] if no bridges have
succeeded.
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Re: [tor-bugs] #5662 [GetTor]: Add Obfsproxy TBB to GetTor
#5662: Add Obfsproxy TBB to GetTor ---+ Reporter: runa| Owner: Type: task| Status: closed Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: GetTor | Version: Resolution: fixed |Keywords: Parent: | Points: Actualpoints: | ---+ Changes (by kaner): * status: needs_review = closed * resolution: = fixed Comment: Ok, added asn's patch to GetTor. Added some help text about obfsproxy bundles to response mails, too. I'll open a ticket for the short user manual to add a section about obfsproxy. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5662#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8002 [Tor]: Mis-count of CPUs
#8002: Mis-count of CPUs -+-- Reporter: tmpname0901 | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.3.x-final Component: Tor |Version: Tor: 0.2.3.25 Keywords: SMP | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- On start-up Tor v0.2.3.25/Linux says: [notice] Wow! I detected that you have 64 CPUs. I will not autodetect any more than 16, though. If you want to configure more, set NumCPUs in your torrc This is in a CentOS6/OpenVZ VPS with only a single virtual CPU. Tor config param NumCPUs is not used. It turns out that OpenVZ, since version rhel6/042stab061.2, lists all the *host* CPUs in /sys/devices/system/cpu/. It is this number of processors that is returned by the sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_CONF) that Tor uses in ~/tor-0.2.3.25/src/common/compat.c to determine CPU count. From the command line: # getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN 1 Programmatically: $ /tmp/main sysconf() says: 64 Wow, too many CPUs: 64 I know that there's not much you can do about a sysconf() that lies. I want to get this on the record, though, for the sake of Tor's future auto- scaling. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8002 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8003 [Quality Assurance and Testing]: Short user manual should add some text about obfsproxy bundles
#8003: Short user manual should add some text about obfsproxy bundles ---+ Reporter: kaner | Owner: cypherpunks Type: enhancement| Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Quality Assurance and Testing |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: ---+ The short user manual we send out with GetTor should add some text about the Tor Obfsproxy Bundle that just got added to GetTor. Assinging this to component Quality Assurance and Testing for lack of a better component. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8003 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #5823 [Tor]: Remove dirreq-v2-* and dirreq-v?-share statistics
#5823: Remove dirreq-v2-* and dirreq-v?-share statistics
+---
Reporter: karsten | Owner: karsten
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review
Priority: minor | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor |Version:
Keywords: easy tor-relay | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
+---
Comment(by karsten):
Here's the `stats/dirreq-stats` file from my test relay written 24 hours
after the relay was started:
{{{
dirreq-stats-end 2013-01-19 07:28:27 (86400 s)
dirreq-v3-ips
it=16,us=16,br=8,ca=8,cz=8,de=8,eg=8,es=8,fr=8,gb=8,ie=8,il=8,ir=8,ng=8,nl=8,ru=8,sa=8,sd=8,sg=8,si=8,sy=8,tg=8,th=8,tr=8
dirreq-v3-reqs
it=16,us=16,br=8,ca=8,cz=8,de=8,eg=8,es=8,fr=8,gb=8,ie=8,il=8,ir=8,ng=8,nl=8,ru=8,sa=8,sd=8,sg=8,si=8,sy=8,tg=8,th=8,tr=8
dirreq-v3-resp ok=64,not-enough-sigs=0,unavailable=0,not-found=0,not-
modified=16,busy=0
dirreq-v3-direct-dl complete=0,timeout=0,running=0
dirreq-v3-tunneled-dl
complete=60,timeout=4,running=0,min=2176,d1=20257,d2=31323,q1=39711,d3=45486,d4=62359,md=71595,d6=73982,d7=76214,q3=77018,d8=78153,d9=78977,max=81316
}}}
Everything looks good there. That relay didn't publish a new extra-info
descriptor with these statistics, but I don't see how that should fail.
The relay was still running 30 hours after I started it, and now I shut it
down. Should be safe to merge my bug5823 branch. Thanks!
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[tor-bugs] #8004 [arm]: Saving log file to ~/foo.txt doesn't work as 'expected'
#8004: Saving log file to ~/foo.txt doesn't work as 'expected' -+-- Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: arm |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- When you save a log file to ~/foo.txt it creates a new folder called '~' in pwd and saves a 'foo.txt' log file in that folder. A more intuitive approach would be to expand '~' to the users $HOME dir. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8004 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8004 [arm]: Saving log file to ~/foo.txt doesn't work as 'expected'
#8004: Saving log file to ~/foo.txt doesn't work as 'expected' -+-- Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: arm |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- Changes (by gsathya): * status: new = needs_review Comment: I have a patch for this on my bug8004 branch - https://github.com/gsathya/arm/compare/bug8004 -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8004#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #5823 [Tor]: Remove dirreq-v2-* and dirreq-v?-share statistics
#5823: Remove dirreq-v2-* and dirreq-v?-share statistics +--- Reporter: karsten | Owner: karsten Type: enhancement | Status: closed Priority: minor| Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final Component: Tor | Version: Resolution: implemented |Keywords: easy tor-relay Parent: | Points: Actualpoints: | +--- Changes (by nickm): * status: needs_review = closed * resolution: = implemented Comment: Excellent; merging. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5823#comment:11 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7907 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: disable ruleset for dafont.com
#7907: disable ruleset for dafont.com -+-- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: pde Type: task | Status: closed Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: EFF-HTTPS Everywhere | Version: Resolution: fixed |Keywords: httpse-ruleset-bug Parent:| Points: Actualpoints:| -+-- Changes (by cypherpunks): * status: new = closed * resolution: = fixed Comment: The certificate was renewed on 15th january for 1 year. So I am closing this bug report. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7907#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8005 [Stem]: stem parse_file errors when using descriptor_type='server-descriptor 1.0'
#8005: stem parse_file errors when using descriptor_type='server-descriptor 1.0' -+-- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: atagar Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Stem |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- On a call like stem.descriptor.parse_file(f,'server-descriptor 1.0') the new parse_file() fails with an error like ValueError: Line contains invalid characters: @downloaded-at 2012-09-17 17:44:50 or ValueError: Line contains invalid characters: @type server-descriptor 1.0 when it encounters annotations in a descriptor file, and it fails with an error like ValueError: The 'router' entry can only appear once in a descriptor when there are no annotations but multiple router entries. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8005 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8006 [Torsocks]: Unnecessary test in torsocks script
#8006: Unnecessary test in torsocks script --+- Reporter: dma | Owner: Type: defect| Status: new Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: Torsocks |Version: Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- Torsocks suggests running with no arguments to start a shell, however the launcher script errors when no arguments are passed. Attached patch fixes this. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8006 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8006 [Torsocks]: Unnecessary test in torsocks script
#8006: Unnecessary test in torsocks script --+- Reporter: dma | Owner: Type: defect| Status: needs_review Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: Torsocks |Version: Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- Changes (by dma): * status: new = needs_review -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8006#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8007 [Vidalia]: Wingwn10.dll missing + 0xc00009
#8007: Wingwn10.dll missing + 0xc9 +--- Reporter: tonyspa89 | Owner: chiiph Type: defect | Status: new Priority: major | Milestone: Component: Vidalia |Version: Tor: 0.2.3.25 Keywords: Vidalia, Tor, 0xc906, Wingwm10.dll | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Downloaded TBB v.2.3.25-2 ran it . Start TorBrowser and got error: file Wingwm10.dll (vidalia.exe)is missing. Reran the exe file. File was present then. Start TorBrowser and got error: Error 0xc906 (vidalia.exe). Tried re- installing several times but can't get it to work. Help? -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8007 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8006 [Torsocks]: Unnecessary test in torsocks script
#8006: Unnecessary test in torsocks script -+-- Reporter: dma | Owner: Type: defect| Status: closed Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: Torsocks | Version: Resolution: wontfix |Keywords: Parent:| Points: Actualpoints:| -+-- Changes (by dma): * status: needs_review = closed * resolution: = wontfix Comment: better fix is already a pending change -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8006#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8007 [Vidalia]: Wingwn10.dll missing + 0xc00009
#8007: Wingwn10.dll missing + 0xc9 +--- Reporter: tonyspa89 | Owner: chiiph Type: defect | Status: new Priority: major | Milestone: Component: Vidalia |Version: Tor: 0.2.3.25 Keywords: Vidalia, Tor, 0xc906, Wingwm10.dll | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Comment(by tonyspa89): Add: It was working fine the first time I installed it but then I turned off the computer and the next day I tried Start TorBrowser again and it showed these errors. I have Windows 7 64 bits -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8007#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8003 [Quality Assurance and Testing]: Short user manual should add some text about obfsproxy bundles
#8003: Short user manual should add some text about obfsproxy bundles ---+ Reporter: kaner | Owner: Runa Type: enhancement| Status: assigned Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Quality Assurance and Testing |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: ---+ Changes (by kaner): * owner: cypherpunks = Runa * status: new = assigned -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8003#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8008 [Ooni]: exclude logs from git
#8008: exclude logs from git -+-- Reporter: dma | Owner: hellais Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- logs and yamloo outputs are being included in the local git view. They really shouldn't be. We do still want before_i_commit.log to be included though. Patch to .gitignore attached. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8008 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8009 [Ooni]: exclude logs from git
#8009: exclude logs from git -+-- Reporter: dma | Owner: hellais Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- logs and yamloo outputs are being included in the local git view. They really shouldn't be. We do still want before_i_commit.log to be included though. Patch to .gitignore attached. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8009 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8009 [Ooni]: exclude logs from git
#8009: exclude logs from git -+-- Reporter: dma | Owner: hellais Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- Changes (by dma): * status: new = needs_review -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8009#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8010 [Ooni]: remove unnecessary imports
#8010: remove unnecessary imports +--- Reporter: dma | Owner: hellais Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni|Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8010 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8010 [Ooni]: remove unnecessary imports
#8010: remove unnecessary imports +--- Reporter: dma | Owner: hellais Type: defect | Status: needs_review Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni|Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Changes (by dma): * status: new = needs_review -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8010#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8011 [Ooni]: add lua test
#8011: add lua test -+-- Reporter: dma | Owner: hellais Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- Adding a new test case to spawn lua scripts and add their output to the result dict. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8011 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8011 [Ooni]: add lua test
#8011: add lua test -+-- Reporter: dma | Owner: hellais Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- Changes (by dma): * status: new = needs_review -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8011#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8003 [Quality Assurance and Testing]: Short user manual should add some text about obfsproxy bundles
#8003: Short user manual should add some text about obfsproxy bundles ---+ Reporter: kaner | Owner: runa Type: enhancement| Status: assigned Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Quality Assurance and Testing |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: ---+ Changes (by runa): * owner: Runa = runa -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8003#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7990 [arm]: NameError: global name 'enumeration' is not defined
#7990: NameError: global name 'enumeration' is not defined +--- Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar Type: defect | Status: closed Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: arm | Version: Resolution: fixed|Keywords: Parent: | Points: Actualpoints: | +--- Changes (by atagar): * status: reopened = closed * resolution: = fixed Comment: Ok, stopped being lazy and reproed it this time. It should now be fixed for realz. :P https://gitweb.torproject.org/arm.git/commitdiff/0d396cc60c710d8a7ecc726b7f7ea82900a0afa0 -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7990#comment:3 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7991 [arm]: IOError: 'module' object has no attribute 'controller'
#7991: IOError: 'module' object has no attribute 'controller' +--- Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar Type: defect | Status: closed Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: arm | Version: Resolution: fixed|Keywords: Parent: | Points: Actualpoints: | +--- Changes (by atagar): * status: new = closed * resolution: = fixed Comment: Doh, that was stupid of me. Fixed. https://gitweb.torproject.org/arm.git/commitdiff/8400b655e160c8b17b03a93047e00834b222f95b -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7991#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8004 [arm]: Saving log file to ~/foo.txt doesn't work as 'expected'
#8004: Saving log file to ~/foo.txt doesn't work as 'expected' +--- Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar Type: enhancement | Status: closed Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: arm | Version: Resolution: fixed|Keywords: Parent: | Points: Actualpoints: | +--- Changes (by atagar): * status: needs_review = closed * resolution: = fixed Comment: Pushed. Thanks for the patch! -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8004#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8012 [Tor]: tor current compile breakage compat_libevent.c
#8012: tor current compile breakage compat_libevent.c +--- Reporter: yancm | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: unspecified Component: Tor |Version: unspeficied Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- With NetBSD 5_Stable (i386), libevent-2.0.21, tracking current tor. Even after 'make clean' and autogen/configure... I get: CC src/common/compat_libevent.o src/common/compat_libevent.c: In function 'tor_check_libevent_version': src/common/compat_libevent.c:424: error: 'version' undeclared (first use in this function) src/common/compat_libevent.c:424: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once src/common/compat_libevent.c:424: error: for each function it appears in.) *** Error code 1 Stop. Unable to continue... -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8012 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8012 [Tor]: tor current compile breakage compat_libevent.c
#8012: tor current compile breakage compat_libevent.c +--- Reporter: yancm | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final Component: Tor |Version: unspeficied Keywords: tor-client | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Changes (by nickm_mobile): * keywords: = tor-client * priority: normal = major * milestone: Tor: unspecified = Tor: 0.2.4.x-final Comment: I could swear I fixed that. What exact version of the master branch do you have? -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8012#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8012 [Tor]: tor current compile breakage compat_libevent.c
#8012: tor current compile breakage compat_libevent.c +--- Reporter: yancm | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final Component: Tor |Version: unspeficied Keywords: tor-client | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Comment(by yancm): How do I check? I just type git pull and believe I am getting the latest dev version... -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8012#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8012 [Tor]: tor current compile breakage compat_libevent.c
#8012: tor current compile breakage compat_libevent.c +--- Reporter: yancm | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final Component: Tor |Version: unspeficied Keywords: tor-client | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Comment(by yancm): Sorry, I think it is: 0.2.4.9-alpha-dev -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8012#comment:3 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8011 [Ooni]: add test that can run scripts through an interpreter (was: add lua test)
#8011: add test that can run scripts through an interpreter -+-- Reporter: dma | Owner: hellais Type: enhancement | Status: needs_review Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Ooni |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- Comment(by dma): Added replacement 'script.patch' patch that extends this to allow other interpreters than lua. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8011#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7539 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Amazon Web Services rule prevents product images from loading
#7539: Amazon Web Services rule prevents product images from loading -+-- Reporter: subsection1t | Owner: pde Type: defect| Status: closed Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: EFF-HTTPS Everywhere | Version: Resolution: fixed |Keywords: httpse-ruleset-bug Parent:| Points: Actualpoints:| -+-- Changes (by pde): * status: accepted = closed * resolution: = fixed -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7539#comment:5 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7777 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: openoffice.org invalid security certificate
#: openoffice.org invalid security certificate -+-- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: pde Type: defect| Status: closed Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: EFF-HTTPS Everywhere | Version: HTTPS-E 3.1 Resolution: fixed |Keywords: httpse-ruleset-bug Parent:| Points: Actualpoints:| -+-- Changes (by pde): * status: new = closed * resolution: = fixed Comment: Fixed in 3.1.3 -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/#comment:3 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7336 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: [CHROME] Coursera.org assessment details page issues
#7336: [CHROME] Coursera.org assessment details page issues -+-- Reporter: sofianeh | Owner: pde Type: defect| Status: reopened Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: EFF-HTTPS Everywhere | Version: Resolution:|Keywords: chrome, coursera, httpse-ruleset-bug Parent:| Points: Actualpoints:| -+-- Changes (by pde): * keywords: chrome, coursera = chrome, coursera, httpse-ruleset-bug Comment: Can you see if this problem is persisting with the 2013.1.18 release? -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7336#comment:7 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7855 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: wouldMatch is not defined - cookies set in JS not secured
#7855: wouldMatch is not defined - cookies set in JS not secured -+-- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: pde Type: defect| Status: closed Priority: major | Milestone: Component: EFF-HTTPS Everywhere | Version: HTTPS-E 3.1.2 Resolution: fixed |Keywords: Parent:| Points: Actualpoints:| -+-- Changes (by pde): * status: accepted = closed * resolution: = fixed Comment: This should be fixed in 4.0development.5. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7855#comment:9 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7794 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: [CHROME] HTTPS Everywhere breaks Sourceforge downloads
#7794: [CHROME] HTTPS Everywhere breaks Sourceforge downloads --+- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: pde Type: defect| Status: new Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: EFF-HTTPS Everywhere |Version: Keywords: httpse-ruleset-bug| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- Changes (by pde): * keywords: = httpse-ruleset-bug Comment: Damn, missed this for the recent bugfix releases :/ -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7794#comment:3 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7794 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: [CHROME] HTTPS Everywhere breaks Sourceforge downloads
#7794: [CHROME] HTTPS Everywhere breaks Sourceforge downloads -+-- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: pde Type: defect| Status: closed Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: EFF-HTTPS Everywhere | Version: Resolution: fixed |Keywords: httpse-ruleset-bug Parent:| Points: Actualpoints:| -+-- Changes (by pde): * status: new = closed * resolution: = fixed Comment: Well, actually, that download seems to work for me in both Chrome and Firefox. If anyone can sitll reproduce this, please reopen and we'll investigate further. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7794#comment:4 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7745 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS-Everywhere 4.0dev3 breaks www.spotify.com/nl/
#7745: HTTPS-Everywhere 4.0dev3 breaks www.spotify.com/nl/ -+-- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: pde Type: defect| Status: closed Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: EFF-HTTPS Everywhere | Version: HTTPS-E 4.0dev3 Resolution: fixed |Keywords: httpse-ruleset-bug Parent:| Points: Actualpoints:| -+-- Changes (by pde): * status: new = closed * resolution: = fixed Comment: I believe this should probably be fixed in 4.0dev5. Please reopen if it isn't. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7745#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8005 [Stem]: stem parse_file errors when using descriptor_type='server-descriptor 1.0'
#8005: stem parse_file errors when using descriptor_type='server-descriptor 1.0' -+-- Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: atagar Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Stem |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- Comment(by atagar): ValueError: Line contains invalid characters: @type server-descriptor 1.0 Oops! Sorry about that. Added a test to repro the issue and fixed... https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commitdiff/3d3e69417975499fbe5d2a3eb591d808c6800874 ValueError: Line contains invalid characters: @downloaded-at 2012-09-17 17:44:50 Hmmm, I'm not entirely sure about that one. Please attach a file that's causing this and the call you're using. ValueError: The 'router' entry can only appear once in a descriptor When I get the descriptor_type argument I'm treating it like a metrics archive. Maybe I should just drop the 'there's only one descriptor' check entirely. Please attach a small descriptor file that exemplifies this issue for me to use in the tests. Cheers! -Damian -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8005#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8013 [HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome]: Video in dailymail.co.uk broken
#8013: Video in dailymail.co.uk broken --+- Reporter: NewEraCracker | Owner: pde Type: defect| Status: new Priority: normal| Milestone: Component: HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome |Version: Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- The video in the end of the following article is broken (loading forever) when HTTPS Everywhere is enabled in Chrome. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2263847/Cristiano- Ronaldo-appears-new-Nike-video.html -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8013 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7085 [Tor bundles/installation]: Integrate Cryptocat Browser Extension into Tor Browser Bundle
#7085: Integrate Cryptocat Browser Extension into Tor Browser Bundle --+- Reporter: kaepora | Owner: erinn Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: normal| Milestone: TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stable Component: Tor bundles/installation |Version: Tor: unspecified Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- Comment(by mikeperry): Unfortunately, putting Cryptocat into the default TBB is not zero cost/zero risk. Here's a list of things that would make me feel better about the decision. First and foremost, I'd want to be absolutely sure that it didn't potentially expose even users who didn't use it to XUL XSS bugs or other vulnerabilities. Related. I'd want to be sure the UI didn't confuse or distract users who didn't know what it was for. Second, I am very concerned that there were XUL XSS bugs in the chat windows. To me, that's a bad sign. Ideally, I'd like to see something on your side (ie a tag in your bugtracker or some other document you wrote) that enumerates the patches that resulted from your first audit. Third, while it does look like the audit was extremely thorough, I think I'd prefer a second one for this reason. XUL XSS is quite serious, and since you're writing a network-facing app with lots of user and network provided content, its critical that your code receives lots of this type of review. I also want to feel sure you understand the issues and vulnerability vectors here, so I can be confident they won't reappear in future versions as you add features. Fourth, I guess I am mildly concerned about the crypto security. I don't believe it's impossible to do crypto with JS, but I would prefer it if the underlying primitive implementations also had a chance for review, especially since our inclusion of this addon would probably be seen as endorsement of its crypto and security by many. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7085#comment:26 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
[tor-bugs] #8014 [Tor]: nacl library not recognised during tor build
#8014: nacl library not recognised during tor build +--- Reporter: mr-4| Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Tor |Version: Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: +--- during ./configure I get the following result: [...] checking whether we can use curve25519-donna-c64... no checking whether we can use curve25519 from nacl... no I do have nacl(-devel) installed on my machine. Closer inspection of config.log tells me that conftest.c has #include crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h. That file is in /usr/include/nacl, so I had to add -I/usr/include/nacl for this particular error to pass. That didn't work though as I am now getting conftest.c:58:4: error: #error Hey, this is the reference implementation!. The conftest.c file itself has this: #include crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h #ifdef crypto_scalarmult_curve25519_ref_BYTES #error Hey, this is the reference implementation! #endif crypto_scalarmult_curve25519_ref_BYTES is indeed defined in /usr/include/nacl/crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h, so how am I supposed to satisfy this test then? -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8014 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #4379 [Vidalia]: workaround for setting socks port to 9050 on OS X does NOT work
#4379: workaround for setting socks port to 9050 on OS X does NOT work +--- Reporter: lkasdfa | Owner: chiiph Type: defect | Status: reopened Priority: major| Milestone: Component: Vidalia | Version: Tor: 0.2.2.34 Resolution: |Keywords: Parent: | Points: Actualpoints: | +--- Changes (by cypherpunks): * status: closed = reopened * resolution: fixed = Comment: Hi, I'm a rather drunk mac user and I just spent (!) about ±30 minutes hacking this silly work around into your software. It sure was annoying and I almost feel like you don't use it very often. Please ship this fix already, how else are mac users to use say, Adium and Tor together on Mac OS X? Happy hacking! -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4379#comment:6 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7085 [Tor bundles/installation]: Integrate Cryptocat Browser Extension into Tor Browser Bundle
#7085: Integrate Cryptocat Browser Extension into Tor Browser Bundle --+- Reporter: kaepora | Owner: erinn Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: normal| Milestone: TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stable Component: Tor bundles/installation |Version: Tor: unspecified Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- Comment(by kaepora): Replying to [comment:26 mikeperry]: Unfortunately, putting Cryptocat into the default TBB is not zero cost/zero risk. Here's a list of things that would make me feel better about the decision. First and foremost, I'd want to be absolutely sure that it didn't potentially expose even users who didn't use it to XUL XSS bugs or other vulnerabilities. Related. I'd want to be sure the UI didn't confuse or distract users who didn't know what it was for. Second, I am very concerned that there were XUL XSS bugs in the chat windows. To me, that's a bad sign. Ideally, I'd like to see something on your side (ie a tag in your bugtracker or some other document you wrote) that enumerates the patches that resulted from your first audit. The patches in which we fixed the audit bugs are enumerated (perhaps incompletely) in this [https://blog.crypto.cat/2012/11/security-update- our-first-full-audit/ blog post]. Third, while it does look like the audit was extremely thorough, I think I'd prefer a second one for this reason. XUL XSS is quite serious, and since you're writing a network-facing app with lots of user and network provided content, its critical that your code receives lots of this type of review. Very well. Who would you recommend to perform the second audit? If you can give me a preferred auditor or a list of auditors that the Tor Project would feel comfortable with, I have no problem getting in touch with them. I also want to feel sure you understand the issues and vulnerability vectors here, so I can be confident they won't reappear in future versions as you add features. I can safely say that I strongly understand. Fourth, I guess I am mildly concerned about the crypto security. I don't believe it's impossible to do crypto with JS, but I would prefer it if the underlying primitive implementations also had a chance for review, especially since our inclusion of this addon would probably be seen as endorsement of its crypto and security by many. Our OTR implementation has been reviewed. If there is a specific type of further review you would wish to ask for, we can see it done. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7085#comment:27 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7797 [Tor]: tor DNS resolver unable to handle/return SRV type DNS records
#7797: tor DNS resolver unable to handle/return SRV type DNS records ---+ Reporter: mr-4 | Owner: Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: unspecified Component: Tor|Version: Tor: 0.2.4.7-alpha Keywords: tor-client dns needs-proposal | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: ---+ Comment(by mr-4): I am going to attach 2 .spec files, new Makefile and ttdnsd.init files. They allow torsocks and ttdnsd to be nicely packaged in a rpm file (Fedora-based). The latter 2 files are for ttdnsd - the Makefile is a cut- down version of the original with a few modifications/improvements I've made to fit the standard directory hierarchy. The ttdnsd.init file is an improved and simplified version of the init.d script originally supplied in the ttdnsd.tar.gz archive. Hopefully this could be useful to the ttdnsd/torsocks devs. I am going to deploy torsocks/ttdnsd in the next few days to hopefully take advantage of its extended functionality and the ability to deal with SRV/NAPTR and other such record types. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7797#comment:4 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8014 [Tor]: nacl library not recognised during tor build
#8014: nacl library not recognised during tor build +--- Reporter: mr-4 | Owner: Type: defect | Status: closed Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha Resolution: invalid |Keywords: Parent: | Points: Actualpoints: | +--- Changes (by rransom): * status: new = closed * resolution: = invalid Comment: The Curve25519 implementations included with Tor are considerably faster than the reference implementation in NaCl. Do not try to force Tor to link to a copy of NaCl whose build process chose the reference implementation of Curve25519. Also: * No one should be distributing binary packages of NaCl. NaCl's build process chooses the fastest implementation of a cryptographic primitive which works on the processor and OS on which it was built; it can quite easily choose one that won't work or has poor performance on a different box. * No one should be distributing packages which claim to be NaCl but have some of the pieces removed -- that's a recipe for confusion. Many of the cryptographic primitive implementations in NaCl (as of the last time I looked at it) do not come with source code; if your OS distribution has a policy against distributing such packages, they shouldn't ship a fake/mutilated NaCl package. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8014#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7085 [Tor bundles/installation]: Integrate Cryptocat Browser Extension into Tor Browser Bundle
#7085: Integrate Cryptocat Browser Extension into Tor Browser Bundle --+- Reporter: kaepora | Owner: erinn Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: normal| Milestone: TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stable Component: Tor bundles/installation |Version: Tor: unspecified Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- Comment(by kaepora): Replying to [comment:26 mikeperry]: I should also say something about your opening paragraphs: Unfortunately, putting Cryptocat into the default TBB is not zero cost/zero risk. Here's a list of things that would make me feel better about the decision. This is totally understood and agreed upon. I would really like to see Cryptocat included in TBB because of the benefits and the opportunity to deal with interesting problems, but I also quite aware of the risk and I plan to be very serious about addressing any issues or questions that may crop up. I don't think this kind of technology moves forward unless we push hard, but pushing hard comes with risk assessment and keeping both eyes opened and I fully acknowledge that. First and foremost, I'd want to be absolutely sure that it didn't potentially expose even users who didn't use it to XUL XSS bugs or other vulnerabilities. Related. I'd want to be sure the UI didn't confuse or distract users who didn't know what it was for. From an engineering perspective, I strongly do not believe that the plugin can expose even users who don't use it to XSS bugs. This is because unless activated, the only code that the plugin loads is the toolbar button, the addonbar button and the menu item. Clicking on any of these buttons launches a new tab which loads an HTML page inside. Everything happens inside that tab with no further interaction with Firefox internals except for a one-time seeding of the CSPRNG (using nsslib hooks.) From this perspective, the plugin is very simple and it seems to me that it is very difficult for it to cause problems to those that do not use it. Concerning the issue of UI confusion, we've tried to make the purpose of our plugin as clear and concise as possible ([http://i.imgur.com/1wmepA2.png screenshot]). I should also mention that it's available in 32 languages. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7085#comment:28 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7929 [Stem]: ArchLinux Packaging
#7929: ArchLinux Packaging +--- Reporter: atagar | Owner: atagar Type: task| Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Stem|Version: Keywords: | Parent: #7905 Points: | Actualpoints: +--- Comment(by atagar): Sjon has made an initial package... https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/stem-git/ -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7929#comment:1 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8014 [Tor]: nacl library not recognised during tor build
#8014: nacl library not recognised during tor build +--- Reporter: mr-4 | Owner: Type: defect | Status: closed Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha Resolution: invalid |Keywords: Parent: | Points: Actualpoints: | +--- Comment(by mr-4): Replying to [comment:1 rransom]: The Curve25519 implementations included with Tor are considerably faster than the reference implementation in NaCl. Do not try to force Tor to link to a copy of NaCl whose build process chose the reference implementation of Curve25519. I am not trying to force anything - I simply wanted to take advantage of nacl and wasn't aware that such implementation is included with tor. Perhaps the next time you guys type in your changelogs you should point this out and make it clear that nacl implementation *is* included with tor so that I (and others) won't try to make wild guesses. Also: * No one should be distributing binary packages of NaCl. NaCl's build process chooses the fastest implementation of a cryptographic primitive which works on the processor and OS on which it was built; it can quite easily choose one that won't work or has poor performance on a different box. So, cross-compilation is out of the question then, even if it is done in chrooted environment (which 99% of all automated cross-compilation builds are)? Very wise indeed (not!). Whoever bright spark decided upon that deserves to be shot! * No one should be distributing packages which claim to be NaCl but have some of the pieces removed -- that's a recipe for confusion. Many of the cryptographic primitive implementations in NaCl (as of the last time I looked at it) do not come with source code; if your OS distribution has a policy against distributing such packages, they shouldn't ship a fake/mutilated NaCl package. I have no idea whether the nacl package provided with my distro (Fedora) is mutilated or not - as far as I could tell, the source rpm consists of ... sources, there aren't any binaries. So I don't know where you've got that idea that my nacl distribution is mutilated. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8014#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7424 [Stem]: Piwik for stem's site
#7424: Piwik for stem's site +--- Reporter: atagar | Owner: atagar Type: enhancement | Status: closed Priority: minor| Milestone: Component: Stem | Version: Resolution: wontfix |Keywords: website Parent: | Points: Actualpoints: | +--- Changes (by atagar): * status: new = closed * resolution: = wontfix Comment: Closing. Piwik was ruled out pretty quickly and after a prolonged internal discussion I've been convinced to hold off on aggregate url referrals too (at least for now). -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7424#comment:2 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #7085 [Tor bundles/installation]: Integrate Cryptocat Browser Extension into Tor Browser Bundle
#7085: Integrate Cryptocat Browser Extension into Tor Browser Bundle --+- Reporter: kaepora | Owner: erinn Type: enhancement | Status: new Priority: normal| Milestone: TorBrowserBundle 2.2.x-stable Component: Tor bundles/installation |Version: Tor: unspecified Keywords:| Parent: Points:| Actualpoints: --+- Comment(by mikeperry): Replying to [comment:27 kaepora]: Replying to [comment:26 mikeperry]: Second, I am very concerned that there were XUL XSS bugs in the chat windows. To me, that's a bad sign. Ideally, I'd like to see something on your side (ie a tag in your bugtracker or some other document you wrote) that enumerates the patches that resulted from your first audit. The patches in which we fixed the audit bugs are enumerated (perhaps incompletely) in this [https://blog.crypto.cat/2012/11/security-update- our-first-full-audit/ blog post]. This is great. You should show this to whoever you contact about further audit. Bugs tend to come in groups of similar nature, and seeing the types of mistakes you made will help the second auditor find more of them. Third, while it does look like the audit was extremely thorough, I think I'd prefer a second one for this reason. XUL XSS is quite serious, and since you're writing a network-facing app with lots of user and network provided content, its critical that your code receives lots of this type of review. Very well. Who would you recommend to perform the second audit? If you can give me a preferred auditor or a list of auditors that the Tor Project would feel comfortable with, I have no problem getting in touch with them. A quick search for Firefox extension XSS and related queries turns up Roee Hay and Roberto Liverani as previous folks who have done similar audits. I don't know these people, but I suppose an email couldn't hurt. You should also send Dan Veditz an email (dveditz at mozilla). He is a very Tor-friendly Mozilla security engineer. He might be too busy to give you a full review, but I bet if you also mention that integration with Mozilla's Social API is something you're considering, he might be able to justify devoting his time for such a review. Or at least point you in the right direction for getting a better understanding of the security issues the Social API team has had to deal with. I bet they are similar in nature. I can also do a review later, but for the next month or two I will be extremely busy trying to get TBB working with Firefox 17ESR. I also think the people I mentioned might actually be better at it than me (except perhaps for spotting potential proxy bypass issues). My approach with Torbutton has mostly been Zomg, don't ever interact with or display content window material in XUL. Sadly, even that failed me when implementing the content window JS hook injection. Luckily, Dan Veditz came to the rescue in that case :). Fourth, I guess I am mildly concerned about the crypto security. I don't believe it's impossible to do crypto with JS, but I would prefer it if the underlying primitive implementations also had a chance for review, especially since our inclusion of this addon would probably be seen as endorsement of its crypto and security by many. Our OTR implementation has been reviewed. If there is a specific type of further review you would wish to ask for, we can see it done. I think Nick is the person to best answer this. Or Ian himself. I also thought Moxie's observations on the website version were spot-on. Has he looked into the browser version? Things that come to my mind include: Is your implementation fully compatible with other OTR and MPOTR implementations? Verifying this to be the case can be one way to probe for implementation errors. One question academic researchers in need of racking up publication count will drool over is Can content window JS extract side channel info about your crypto operations? If the JS scheduling mechanism is predictable/discoverable and/or runs in the same thread, the answer here might actually be Yes. Very Yes.. Unfortunately, the publication bias in academia may very well cause them to structure their experiments such that the answer is Yes anyway regardless of threading model or content window JS timer resolution... :/ -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7085#comment:29 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list
[tor-bugs] #8015 [arm]: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly
#8015: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly
-+--
Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: arm |Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
-+--
I have this in my log -
{{{
08:55:41 [ARM_WARN] The torrc differs from what tor's using. You can
issue a sighup to reload the torrc values by pressing x.
- torrc value differs on line: 117
}}}
and in my torrc -
{{
│ 115 ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
│ 116 AccountingMax 1000 GB (1073741824000)
│ 117 ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
}}}
--
Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8015
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Re: [tor-bugs] #8015 [arm]: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly
#8015: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly
-+--
Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: arm |Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
-+--
Description changed by gsathya:
Old description:
I have this in my log -
{{{
08:55:41 [ARM_WARN] The torrc differs from what tor's using. You can
issue a sighup to reload the torrc values by pressing x.
- torrc value differs on line: 117
}}}
and in my torrc -
{{
│ 115 ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
│ 116 AccountingMax 1000 GB (1073741824000)
│ 117 ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
}}}
New description:
I have this in my log -
{{{
08:55:41 [ARM_WARN] The torrc differs from what tor's using. You can
issue a sighup to reload the torrc values by pressing x.
- torrc value differs on line: 117
}}}
and in my torrc -
{{{
│ 115 ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
│ 116 AccountingMax 1000 GB (1073741824000)
│ 117 ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
}}}
--
--
Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8015#comment:1
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Re: [tor-bugs] #8015 [arm]: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly
#8015: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly
-+--
Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: arm |Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
-+--
Description changed by gsathya:
Old description:
I have this in my log -
{{{
08:55:41 [ARM_WARN] The torrc differs from what tor's using. You can
issue a sighup to reload the torrc values by pressing x.
- torrc value differs on line: 117
}}}
and in my torrc -
{{{
│ 115 ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
│ 116 AccountingMax 1000 GB (1073741824000)
│ 117 ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
}}}
New description:
I have this in my log -
{{{
08:55:41 [ARM_WARN] The torrc differs from what tor's using. You can
issue a sighup to reload the torrc values by pressing x.
- torrc value differs on line: 117
}}}
and in my torrc -
{{{
│ 115 ## Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
│ 116 AccountingMax 1000 GB (1073741824000)
│ 117 ## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
│ 118 #AccountingStart day 00:00
}}}
--
--
Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8015#comment:2
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Re: [tor-bugs] #8015 [arm]: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly
#8015: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly -+-- Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: arm |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- Comment(by atagar): Please attach your full torrc. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8015#comment:3 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
Re: [tor-bugs] #8015 [arm]: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly
#8015: arm torrc parsing comments wrongly -+-- Reporter: gsathya | Owner: atagar Type: defect | Status: new Priority: normal | Milestone: Component: arm |Version: Keywords: | Parent: Points: | Actualpoints: -+-- Comment(by gsathya): Replying to [comment:3 atagar]: Please attach your full torrc. Attached. -- Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8015#comment:4 Tor Bug Tracker Wiki https://trac.torproject.org/ The Tor Project: anonymity online ___ tor-bugs mailing list tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
