Re: [tor-bugs] #25885 [Core Tor/Tor]: count_acceptable_nodes() would be more accurate using node_has_preferred_descriptor()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25885: count_acceptable_nodes() would be more accurate using
node_has_preferred_descriptor()
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by neel):

 My PR is here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/271

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27053 [Core Tor/Stem]: Check controller's event error handling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27053: Check controller's event error handling
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  controller |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Hi Mike, fix pushed. Feel free to reopen if you run into any further
 issues...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=ed6460d

 > One of these tests is failing intermittently.

 Thanks Dave, I saw this a bit too. Bumping the sleep looks to have done
 the trick.

 > Threads lingering after test run

 Pity, thought we had all those sorted out. We've sorted those when they
 cropped up in the past but presently I'm not seeing it. If you get a
 reliable repro then a patch would be great. That said, shouldn't be
 related to this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27053 [Core Tor/Stem]: Check controller's event error handling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27053: Check controller's event error handling
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  controller |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dmr):

 Somehow I missed this before, but currently I'm getting this output as
 well, when running all tests without any options beyond `-a`:
 {{{
 Threads lingering after test run:
   <_MainThread(MainThread, started 140422286939904)>
   
 68 TESTS WERE SKIPPED
 TESTING PASSED (100 seconds)
 }}}
 Specifically I've seen this for py27 //and// py35, but the above is only
 for py27 (it's probably slightly different for py35).

 It only seems to happen when the aforementioned test doesn't fail.

 It doesn't happen from the preceding commit.

 It also doesn't happen if only unit tests are run (`-u`), so there might
 be some weird interplay going on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22637 [Webpages/Website]: Find a more maintainable approach for the signing-keys page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22637: Find a more maintainable approach for the signing-keys page
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website
  |  redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content, website-bug  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by traumschule):

 This question came up in #tor today, I tried to answer (happy about
 feedback):

 > Hello all! I've been naively assuming to-date that @nickm signs all the
 Tor source bundles, but it turns out that the latest one that I'm fetching
 (3.3.9) is signed by Roger under C218525819F78451 - I'm wondering if
 there's a resource I can read to understand who is/is-not a trusted
 signer, please?

 > You can install the deb.torproject.org-keyring package:
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en
 > The signing keys are on this page: https://www.torproject.org/docs
 /signing-keys.html.en

 > that's a really interesting idea ... though I am a little worried,
 because this is on Raspbian / Raspberry Pi, and so that might not work.

 > On Raspbian you could retrieve the source as explained at the link above
 and run 'apt source deb.torproject.org-keyring'. Then the keyring is in
 deb.torproject.org-keyring-2018.08.06/keyrings/deb.torproject.org-
 keyring.gpg
 > Torproject could improve the authenticity of the signing keys page by
 actually signing it.

 My proposal is to have a script referenced in the Makefile of webwml which
 creates text file containing a signed statement of
 [https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en responsibilities]
 with all valid fingerprints and subkeys. Including this in the website
 would raise the credibility of the site a lite. Riseup uses a similar
 process for their [https://riseup.net/en/security/network-
 security/certificates TLS certificates].

 {{{
 # option 1: list all keyids
 keys="0x4E2C6E8793298290 0x0E3A92E4 0x4B7C3223 0xD0220E4B 0x23291265
 0xD752F538C0D38C3A 0x28988BF5 0x19F78451 0xFE43009C4607B1FB
 0x6AFEE6D49E92B601 0x165733EA 0x8D29319A 0x886DDD89 0x9ABBEEC6 0x58ACD84F
 0x42E86A2A11F48D36 0xB01C8B006DA77FAA 0xC82E0039 0xE1DEC577"
 gpg --recv $keys

 # option 2: import keys from a keyring
 apt source deb.torproject.org-keyring
 gpg --import deb.torproject.org-keyring-*/keyrings/deb.torproject.org-
 keyring.gpg

 # the exact options may differ
 gpg --fingerprint $keys >> docs/en/signing-keys.txt
 gpg --clearsign docs/en/signing-keys.txt
 }}}

 related: #21808, #23586

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22487 [Webpages/Website]: Add https version of `deb.torproject.org` repository install instructions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22487: Add https version of `deb.torproject.org` repository install 
instructions
--+--
 Reporter:  anadahz   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-content   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26474| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>
 * parent:   => #26474


Comment:

 This is not yet fixed, but is being looked at in combination with the
 other ticket. Setting parent ticket to force this ticket to be looked at
 again before parent can be closed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I figured out how to get fix the bug, however, with a catch: instead of
 using `fascist_firewall_choose_address_base()` to choose the address in
 `fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls()`, I do it manually with:

 {{{
   if (have_v6 && (pref_ipv6 || !have_v4)) {
 tor_addr_copy(>addr, _v6);
 ap->port = port_v6;
   } else if (have_v4 && (!pref_ipv6 || !have_v6)) {
 tor_addr_copy(>addr, _v4);
 ap->port = port_v4;
   }
 }}}

 Would this be okay?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use NSS for RSA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26818: Use NSS for RSA
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-  |  Actual Points:
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26631   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay, rebased again. The tests now pass for me now with openssl and nss.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19683 [Webpages/Website]: Add flag to allow building website without tor docs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19683: Add flag to allow building website without tor docs
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  website-bug   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 As webwml will be obsoleted in some months the easiest is to remove 'doc'
 from the SUBDIRS= line in Makefile. Does this work for you?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23586 [Webpages/Website]: fingerprint in documentation is wrong

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23586: fingerprint in documentation is wrong
--+--
 Reporter:  kkuehl@…  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  gpg fingerprint   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  hiro  |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  hiro => traumschule
 * reviewer:   => hiro


Comment:

 With gpg 2.2.9 on debian it looks like this:

 {{{
 $ gpg --fingerprint 0x4E2C6E8793298290
 pub   rsa4096/0x4E2C6E8793298290 2014-12-15 [C] [expires: 2020-08-24]
   Key fingerprint = EF6E 286D DA85 EA2A 4BA7  DE68 4E2C 6E87 9329 8290
 uid   [ unknown] Tor Browser Developers (signing key)
 
 sub   rsa4096/0xD1483FA6C3C07136 2016-08-24 [S] [expires: 2018-08-24]
   Key fingerprint = A430 0A6B C93C 0877 A445  1486 D148 3FA6 C3C0 7136
 sub   rsa4096/0xEB774491D9FF06E2 2018-05-26 [S] [expires: 2020-09-12]
   Key fingerprint = 1107 75B5 D101 FB36 BC6C  911B EB77 4491 D9FF 06E2
 }}}

 I have no way to test it on windows but propose to update the website to
 resemble the output of a modern gpg assuming it looks similar with
 gpg4win. What do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26972 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create CI task to ensure that all Rust files have been formatted with rustfmt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26972: Create CI task to ensure that all Rust files have been formatted with
rustfmt
+
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, 036-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24629  | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
+

Comment (by cypherpunks3):

 Replying to [comment:14 teor]:

 I created a new branch 'rustfmt-notravis' at
 https://gitgud.io/onionk/tor.git with the only new changes being the
 removal of the Travis commit, and fixing a typo in CodingStandardsRust.md.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20874 [Core Tor/Tor]: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20874: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, torrc, saveconf, |  Actual Points:
  configuration, annoyance, 035-triaged- |
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I have written tests and pushed them. Same PR as last one. Everything
 passes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22487 [Webpages/Website]: Add https version of `deb.torproject.org` repository install instructions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22487: Add https version of `deb.torproject.org` repository install 
instructions
--+
 Reporter:  anadahz   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  website-content   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 see #26474

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27094 [Webpages/Website]: doc/en/debian: don't recommend specific keyserver

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27094: doc/en/debian: don't recommend specific keyserver
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 see #26474

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25218 [Webpages/Website]: Update screenshots to use obfs4 bridges (instead of obfs3) (was: the website recommends using obfs3 bridges (instead of obfs4))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25218: Update screenshots to use obfs4 bridges (instead of obfs3)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  jaruga
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  t0mmy |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  (none) => jaruga
 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * reviewer:   => t0mmy


Comment:

 (see no field to CC ggus)

 do you know if the updated screenshots are online somewhere?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use NSS for RSA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26818: Use NSS for RSA
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-  |  Actual Points:
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26631   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22947 [Webpages/Blog]: Possible Security Issue (Information Disclosure) with Drupal on blog.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22947: Possible Security Issue (Information Disclosure) with Drupal on
blog.torproject.org
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by traumschule):

 I propose to [https://www.drupal.org/node/1172266 disable on-screen
 warnings] completely. Users cant act on errors, only admins reviewing a
 log can. Waiting for the next occurrence is the wrong approach in my eyes
 :)
 [https://www.drupal.org/project/errorlevelpermission module error level
 permission]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19926 [Core Tor/Tor]: BUG warning in connection_ap_attach_pending: waiting for rendezvous desc :*

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19926: BUG warning in connection_ap_attach_pending: waiting for rendezvous 
desc :*
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug, regression, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  refactoring, easy  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asan):

 The symptoms are exactly the same with the current 0.3.3.9:

 {{{Aug 10 11:34:59.000 [notice] Tried for 120 seconds to get a connection
 to [scrubbed]:80. Giving up.
 Aug 10 11:35:05.000 [notice] Received reload signal (hup). Reloading
 config and resetting internal state.
 Aug 10 11:35:05.000 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-
 service-defaults-torrc".
 Aug 10 11:35:05.000 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
 Aug 10 11:35:05.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.3.9 (git-ca1a436fa8e53a32) opening
 log file.
 Aug 10 11:35:05.000 [warn] connection_ap_attach_pending(): Bug:
 0x55fdfbbe4ed0 is no longer in circuit_wait. Its current state is waiting
 for rendezvous desc. Why is it on pending_entry_connections? (on Tor
 0.3.3.9 )
 Aug 10 11:35:05.000 [warn] connection_ap_attach_pending(): Bug:
 0x55fdfb703df0 is no longer in circuit_wait. Its current state is waiting
 for rendezvous desc. Why is it on pending_entry_connections? (on Tor
 0.3.3.9 )
 Aug 10 11:37:06.000 [notice] Tried for 120 seconds to get a connection to
 [scrubbed]:80. Giving up.}}}

 We need more details to be logged in order to track this problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use NSS for RSA

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26818: Use NSS for RSA
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-subticket, 035-triaged-  |  Actual Points:
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26631   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I just rebased this branch onto the latest nss_ds_squashed_merged, to make
 it more testable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26474 [Webpages/Website]: old experimental version 0.3.3.x https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26474: old experimental version 0.3.3.x
https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en
---+-
 Reporter:  autodidactTor  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  expert guide dead end  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  hiro   |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => hiro


Comment:

 I issued a new PR: https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/5 to explain
 apt-transport-tor:

 {{{
 # apt update
 Hit:1 tor://ftp.de.debian.org/debian buster InRelease
 Hit:2 tor://security.debian.org/debian-security buster/updates InRelease
 Hit:3 tor://sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/torproject.org buster InRelease
 Hit:4 tor://debug.mirrors.debian.org/debian-debug testing-debug InRelease
 Hit:5 tor://sdscoq7snqtznauu.onion/torproject.org tor-nightly-master-
 stretch InRelease
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20874 [Core Tor/Tor]: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20874: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, torrc, saveconf, |  Actual Points:
  configuration, annoyance, 035-triaged- |
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I'd like a test to make sure that the line gets added at the appropriate
 time.

 Also somebody should test manually to make sure that the "reject" really
 happens -- that is, if you list a bunch of 'accept' reachable addresses,
 then other addresses should not be accepted.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20874 [Core Tor/Tor]: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20874: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, torrc, saveconf, |  Actual Points:
  configuration, annoyance, 035-triaged- |
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 There are no tests right now, but I can write them if you want it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20874 [Core Tor/Tor]: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20874: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, torrc, saveconf, |  Actual Points:
  configuration, annoyance, 035-triaged- |
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Before I merge -- do we have any tests for this code?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26829 [Core Tor/Tor]: torspec: bandwidth file generators should write the file atomically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26829: torspec: bandwidth file generators should write the file atomically
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, doc, tor-dirauth,  |  Actual Points:
  metrics, tor-bwauth, torspec   |
Parent ID:  #26851   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 The list of committers is: `aagbsn mikeperry teor tom` .  Could one of you
 merge this, please?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal errors'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27034: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal
errors'
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27102 [Core Tor/Tor]: decouple bootstrap progress numbers from BOOTSTRAP_STATUS enum values

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27102: decouple bootstrap progress numbers from BOOTSTRAP_STATUS enum values
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  usability, ux, ux-team, bootstrap,   |  Actual Points:
  035-roadmap-subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  s8-bootstrap   |
Parent ID:  #22266   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I favor renumbering over decoupling, but I don't feel too strongly about
 it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26827 [Core Tor/Tor]: torspec: DirAuths should only read the V3BandwidthsFile once per vote

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26827: torspec: DirAuths should only read the V3BandwidthsFile once per vote
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  doc, fast-fix, tor-dirauth,  |  Actual Points:
  metrics, tor-bwauth, torspec   |
Parent ID:  #26797   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26829 [Core Tor/Tor]: torspec: bandwidth file generators should write the file atomically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26829: torspec: bandwidth file generators should write the file atomically
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, doc, tor-dirauth,  |  Actual Points:
  metrics, tor-bwauth, torspec   |
Parent ID:  #26851   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Who can merge this?  I don't think I have (or should have!) commit
 permissions on torflow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prune INSTALL file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26588: Prune INSTALL file
--+-
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.05
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 ok, merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26882 [Core Tor/Tor]: IP address is not scrubbed in info logs, channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell() AND manpage for SafeLogging overgeneralizes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26882: IP address is not scrubbed in info logs, 
channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell()
AND manpage for SafeLogging overgeneralizes
--+
 Reporter:  dmr   |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-log, tor-client, tor-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 lgtm too; merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27092 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Torbirdy Disabled Still Needs Tor to Fetch Emails in Thunderbird 60+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27092: Torbirdy Disabled Still Needs Tor to Fetch Emails in Thunderbird 60+
---+--
 Reporter:  Luigi-B|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Torbirdy, Thunderbird  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by Luigi-B):

 I was using Tor browser, but even after shutting it down and
 'deactivating' the Torbirdy extension in Thunderbird and attempting to
 fetch emails it failed. I kept the Torbirdy extension disabled...then as a
 test restarted Tor, and it fetched emails successfully. I understood that
 disabling an extension in Thunderbird was enough to turn off this feature.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20260 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add mitigating action to window size warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20260: Add mitigating action to window size warning
--+--
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-torbutton  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sajolida):

 In the case of Tails, the fact that people might not be used to the way
 their pointing device and the window manager behaves, leads to many people
 maximizing their Tor Browser by mistake.

 See https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/15766.

 Providing an "Undo" or other mitigation mechanisms in the warning would be
 particularly relevant for Tails.

 What about having two buttons:

 [Undo] [Ignore]

 Instead of only [Ok]?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20260 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add mitigating action to window size warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20260: Add mitigating action to window size warning
--+--
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-torbutton  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sajolida):

 * cc: sajolida (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16982 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resizing Tor Browser only issues warning if maximized fully

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16982: Resizing Tor Browser only issues warning if maximized fully
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sajolida):

 * cc: sajolida (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16364 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16364: Add an option to resize the browser window to the "safe default"
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-   |  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sajolida):

 * cc: sajolida (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16982 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resizing Tor Browser only issues warning if maximized fully

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16982: Resizing Tor Browser only issues warning if maximized fully
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sajolida):

 This relates to #16364.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20260 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add mitigating action to window size warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20260: Add mitigating action to window size warning
--+--
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-torbutton  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sajolida):

 Having this would also solve #16364.

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