Re: [tor-bugs] #27621 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: port tb-manual to lektor (was: Idea: port tb-manual to lektor)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27621: port tb-manual to lektor
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  project   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * type:  task => project


Comment:

 So it is decided that we want this it seems.

 Here is a draft repository with markdown files based an the current
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser/user-manual.git/ user-manual]:
 https://github.com/traumschule/user-manual-lektor

 You can see an example here:
 https://github.com/traumschule/user-manual-lektor/blob/master/content/en-
 US/first-time.md

 This has been created automatically by a script that can be found in the
 repo as well. It is of course not yet perfect:
 - not all languages are created
 - links point to html pages

 If you agree with this approach i'll continue and create an adapted lektor
 structure based on the support instance.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28091 [Applications/GetTor]: Port GetTor to python3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28091: Port GetTor to python3
-+--
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 See also #28152

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28152 [Applications/GetTor]: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28152: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted
-+-
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by traumschule):

 See also #28091

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[tor-bugs] #28152 [Applications/GetTor]: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28152: Gettor code refactor with Python Twisted
-+-
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Component:  Applications/GetTor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 Code refactor

 Gettor needs some love. It should be more robust to make it: easier to
 maintain (by me or somebody else), to know when it is working or not, and
 to allow more developers to contribute to it.

 For the above, I propose to refactor the current code and turn it into a
 twisted daemon [1, 2]. This would preserve the main logic of the current
 system and add all the benefits of having a daemonized application. This
 service approach considers two main parts:


1. Distribution channels. Whenever gettor receives a request or sends a
 reply it uses a channel (e.g. e-mail). Each channel could be handled by
 one or more services. These services would be constantly fetching and
 updating information in a SQLite database to know how to proceed.

In the case of e-mail, there should be a script that receives messages
 forwarded by the MTA, process them, and add a request with a given status
 to the SQLite database. On the other hand, a service running on background
 will be fetching ready-to-be-sent requests from the database and send
 e-mails with the requested information.

For a twitter bot, a single service that receives DMs, process them and
 send replies would be enough.

2. Tor Browser sync. A service constantly checking new Tor Browser
 releases, downloading the new packages and updating the SQLite database
 with the new links.

 The logging system provided by twistd is easy to use and works very well.
 This will solve one of the problems with the current code and the use of
 logging, also providing useful information for debugging and statistics.
 Log rotation is automatic.

 I have developed a similar service using twistd. Adapting it to gettor
 would be fairly easy and it would take me a few weeks of spare time.

 Twisted is not installed on getulum, so I will collect all the needed
 packages and ask for them to be installed.

 1:
 https://twistedmatrix.com/documents/current/core/howto/application.html.
 2:
 https://twistedmatrix.com/documents/current/core/howto/basics.html#twistd

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27948 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backtrace does not work on NetBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27948: Backtrace does not work on NetBSD
-+-
 Reporter:  wiz  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix regression 035-backport |  Actual Points:
  034-backport netbsd 033-backport 029-backport  |
Parent ID:  #17808   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 In the meantime, I modified the test script to treat NetBSD, OpenBSD, and
 macOS failures as expected, like we did with FreeBSD in #18204.

 See my branch bug27948-029 on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 0.2.9 pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/436

 master pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/437

 We can continue working on the underlying issue in #17808.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27948 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backtrace does not work on NetBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27948: Backtrace does not work on NetBSD
-+-
 Reporter:  wiz  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix regression 035-backport |  Actual Points:
  034-backport netbsd 033-backport 029-backport  |
Parent ID:  #17808   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:8 wiz]:
 > Here's the man page for the backtrace() function on NetBSD.
 >
 > http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?backtrace++NetBSD-current
 >
 > You'll need to link against libexecinfo.

 Tor checks for libexecinfo on every platform, and links it if required
 (see #17151 in 0.2.7.4-rc.)

 Based on what we discovered in #17808, support for execinfo seems to vary
 by compiler and architecture on BSD-derived platforms.

 So either Tor is calling backtrace() in an architecture-specific manner,
 or the compilers are not including debug info in the right format.

 If you can work out how to fix this issue, we'd love some help in #17808.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27948 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backtrace does not work on NetBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27948: Backtrace does not work on NetBSD
-+-
 Reporter:  wiz  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix regression 035-backport |  Actual Points:
  034-backport netbsd 033-backport 029-backport  |
Parent ID:  #17808   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * keywords:  fast-fix regression 034-backport netbsd 033-backport
 029-backport =>
 fast-fix regression 035-backport 034-backport netbsd 033-backport
 029-backport
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.5.2-alpha
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 Update metadata

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28127 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible with version 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28127: Hidden service option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible with
version 3
-+
 Reporter:  pege |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, hs-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Pull request is here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/435

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[tor-bugs] #28151 [Internal Services/Service - sandstorm]: sandstorm: should never happen: anonymous, but no token either.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28151: sandstorm: should never happen: anonymous, but no token either.
---+--
 Reporter:  traumschule|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - sandstorm  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 See this on every pad quite often in the Browser Console:
 > should never happen: anonymous, but no token either.
 {{{
 _isUsingAnonymously
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:191:765358
 isUnread
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:191:773644
 grains/e<
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:159:9759
 grains
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:159:9675
 t/<
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:31311
 f._wrapCatchingExceptions/<
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:17157
 n/https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:31899
 e._withTemplateInstanceFunc
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:37826
 n/<
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:31842
 p.call
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:95:1923
 template.topbar.js/i.sandstormTopbarhttps://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:159:3570
 f.Each/https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:28615
 n/https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:18997
 e._withTemplateInstanceFunc
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:37826
 n/<
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:18940
 f._withCurrentView
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:23077
 n
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:91:18898
 _compute
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:49:2308
 _recompute
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:49:2471
 tracker.js/s._runFlush
 
https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:49:3483
 a
 https://storm.torproject.org/bdce50c3d3c1b20c8e2c5e8bf381d06480bddfdd.js:1:3028
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27813 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.4.8 is leaking memory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27813: Tor 0.3.4.8 is leaking memory
-+-
 Reporter:  anong|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression? memleak oom  |  Actual Points:
  034-backport tor-relay 035-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:27 Christian]:
 > I haven't had a OOM-killing in two days now and I like to imagine that
 switching from `zram` to `zswap` magically helped, maybe.

 As dgoulet mentioned above, we believe we have found and fixed the bug:
 #28089.

 That fix is in 0.3.5.3-alpha, and it will be in 0.3.4.9 when it comes out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28133 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crashes/restarts when using Reader View shortcut (ctrl+alt+r)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28133: Tor Browser crashes/restarts when using Reader View shortcut 
(ctrl+alt+r)
--+---
 Reporter:  ev9F8itL  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-crash   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by ev9F8itL):

 Forgot to mention that the last three lines of the output I posted are
 what's relevant; they occur after pressing ctrl+alt+r and before Tor
 Browser restarts. I omitted what comes afterwards because it's just Tor
 Browser starting up again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27380 [Core Tor/Tor]: require torrc to be UTF-8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27380: require torrc to be UTF-8
-+
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust-wants, prop285  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24033   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 This branch already made the requested revision on September 4th.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27647 [Core Tor/Tor]: When randomly choosing IPv4 or IPv6, set IPv6 probability based on IPv6 weight

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27647: When randomly choosing IPv4 or IPv6, set IPv6 probability based on IPv6
weight
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17835   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by neel):

 Where should I look for this patch?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27367 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should reject non-UTF-8 in relay descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27367: Authorities should reject non-UTF-8 in relay descriptors
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust-wants, prop285, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #24033   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 Why is this still needs_revision?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28133 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crashes/restarts when using Reader View shortcut (ctrl+alt+r)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28133: Tor Browser crashes/restarts when using Reader View shortcut 
(ctrl+alt+r)
--+---
 Reporter:  ev9F8itL  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-crash   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by ev9F8itL):

 I installed Tor Browser by downloading and extracting the .tar.xz file. I
 run start-tor-browser from the folder.

 I tried downloading a fresh package from the website and still have the
 issue. Here's the output of ./start-tor-browser --debug

 {{{
 Launching './Browser/start-tor-browser --detach --debug'...
 Oct 22 23:15:54.012 [notice] Tor 0.3.4.8 (git-da95b91355248ad8) running on
 Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2p, Zlib 1.2.8, Liblzma N/A,
 and Libzstd N/A.
 Oct 22 23:15:54.012 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Oct 22 23:15:54.012 [notice] Read configuration file
 "/home/user0/Applications/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/Downloads/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc-defaults".
 Oct 22 23:15:54.012 [notice] Read configuration file
 "/home/user0/Applications/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/Downloads/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc".
 Oct 22 23:15:54.018 [notice] Scheduler type KIST has been enabled.
 Oct 22 23:15:54.018 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 Oct 22 23:15:54.018 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9151
 Oct 22 23:15:54.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file
 /home/user0/Applications/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/Downloads/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip.
 Oct 22 23:15:54.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file
 /home/user0/Applications/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/Downloads/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip6.
 Oct 22 23:15:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 Oct 22 23:15:55.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
 Oct 22 23:15:55.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor
 network
 Oct 22 23:15:55.000 [notice] New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
 Oct 22 23:15:55.000 [notice] New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
 Oct 22 23:15:55.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with
 first hop
 1540250155151   addons.webextension.https-everywhere-...@eff.org
 WARNPlease specify whether you want browser_style or not in your
 browser_action options.
 1540250155151   addons.webextension.{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}
 WARNPlease specify whether you want browser_style or not in your
 browser_action options.
 Oct 22 23:15:55.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
 Oct 22 23:15:55.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks
 like client functionality is working.
 Oct 22 23:15:55.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done
 Oct 22 23:15:57.000 [notice] New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
 Oct 22 23:15:57.000 [notice] New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
 Oct 22 23:16:03.000 [notice] Owning controller connection has closed --
 exiting now.
 Oct 22 23:16:03.000 [notice] Catching signal TERM, exiting cleanly.
 JavaScript error: chrome://torbutton/content/tor-circuit-display.js, line
 436: TypeError: myController is null
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26368: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, 035-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  proposed, tbb-needs|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26368: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, 035-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  proposed, tbb-needs|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I have pushed the new branch. Same PR.

 I don't believe I can write a unit test because of
 `circuit_mark_for_close()`. This function is mocked in other unit tests,
 but the mocked function is a dummy function that basically eliminates the
 functionality which needed by `rend_client_close_other_intros()` (which is
 closing circuits without isolation flags).

 A mocked function for `circuit_mark_for_close()` looks something like this
 (code snippet from `src/test`):
 {{{
 /* Mock function because we are not trying to test the close circuit that
 does
  * an awful lot of checks on the circuit object. */
 static void
 mock_circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line,
 const char *file)
 {
   (void) circ;
   (void) reason;
   (void) line;
   (void) file;
   return;
 }
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28150 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update legind's PGP key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28150: Update legind's PGP key
-+-
 Reporter:  jsha |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by arma:

Old description:

> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> Username: legind
> Old OpenPGP Fingerprint: 977A04EC512A9D0DB4A56E0ECDCAE8ED6842C592
> New OpenPGP Fingerprint: 1073E74EB38BD6D19476CBF8EA9DBF9FB761A677
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
>
> iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEfD6+xfAwwR8vpU1fpzOtltUrJSEFAlvOQrMACgkQpzOtltUr
> JSGPCxAAg53Z5rCB/VRTbnKPCeDPMUSaQwaP6cL3kJbU6IDIkBQBIQQ00+z+i5LK
> uiT9F31QudH4rmsOwHl7enBSXMSVOM2Gk9au2zPmr9b0h1N2l286SFKB49eeFwm3
> L8ZB+JB3soAjcF3RX+wP1nP/DnM4GlNzQbjcw4gC3Dgk5UXQt16ABNi+JZQokt3n
> +g2ifhoZjGWMQKmRWLq3w7X/4Pz9skikONh1ZmBrLQk378ENwt5h1FdC2V2UvbIE
> AFMNmM1qieMTDOPvz8BzovqhAvrvxDrBgkV6/cQdeS9E8f6uv9FCG+v+yfGDHuMh
> /pg5EwWPtKSKr32Udrqg6H1CPaHw6kpKiDSWfg7dzYH8U8hADA+dj9Hea9BsKEWL
> qCHQZv9gDu7XdcDLJI6+eq4skqotU3fT1edQK3vGBvaht+Gzm0IixrBs0GtbWQH9
> c+oNW4O9OvWWmSddL5ndx5ujnsLIvWjvxd1uhFgTOw/lSYXCmlljpJGiLJNkE+jG
> yHuaubRusXE1fz8d1h281JJcFcUk1PS+Xga9kv/vWvdqbawUitNmgy88p6UL7CL/
> BZTwxltRwqmWig5R+wuoRYFR3lfT2aofju0TGuWQZTGxPWct1rT4ZR4umne7dmK1
> XemhSfYpXYhc5TqMbiuXWZ1M+ySYZIdSInCQK9LccwBrl+TFQKs=
> =bl7r
> -END PGP SIGNATURE-

New description:

 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Username: legind
 Old OpenPGP Fingerprint: 977A04EC512A9D0DB4A56E0ECDCAE8ED6842C592
 New OpenPGP Fingerprint: 1073E74EB38BD6D19476CBF8EA9DBF9FB761A677
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEfD6+xfAwwR8vpU1fpzOtltUrJSEFAlvOQrMACgkQpzOtltUr
 JSGPCxAAg53Z5rCB/VRTbnKPCeDPMUSaQwaP6cL3kJbU6IDIkBQBIQQ00+z+i5LK
 uiT9F31QudH4rmsOwHl7enBSXMSVOM2Gk9au2zPmr9b0h1N2l286SFKB49eeFwm3
 L8ZB+JB3soAjcF3RX+wP1nP/DnM4GlNzQbjcw4gC3Dgk5UXQt16ABNi+JZQokt3n
 +g2ifhoZjGWMQKmRWLq3w7X/4Pz9skikONh1ZmBrLQk378ENwt5h1FdC2V2UvbIE
 AFMNmM1qieMTDOPvz8BzovqhAvrvxDrBgkV6/cQdeS9E8f6uv9FCG+v+yfGDHuMh
 /pg5EwWPtKSKr32Udrqg6H1CPaHw6kpKiDSWfg7dzYH8U8hADA+dj9Hea9BsKEWL
 qCHQZv9gDu7XdcDLJI6+eq4skqotU3fT1edQK3vGBvaht+Gzm0IixrBs0GtbWQH9
 c+oNW4O9OvWWmSddL5ndx5ujnsLIvWjvxd1uhFgTOw/lSYXCmlljpJGiLJNkE+jG
 yHuaubRusXE1fz8d1h281JJcFcUk1PS+Xga9kv/vWvdqbawUitNmgy88p6UL7CL/
 BZTwxltRwqmWig5R+wuoRYFR3lfT2aofju0TGuWQZTGxPWct1rT4ZR4umne7dmK1
 XemhSfYpXYhc5TqMbiuXWZ1M+ySYZIdSInCQK9LccwBrl+TFQKs=
 =bl7r
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27813 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.4.8 is leaking memory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27813: Tor 0.3.4.8 is leaking memory
-+-
 Reporter:  anong|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression? memleak oom  |  Actual Points:
  034-backport tor-relay 035-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Christian):

 Replying to [comment:20 arma]:
 > What's in your torrc? Can you simplify it to the point that it's super
 simple, yet you still experience this problem?

 I didn't touch torrc in a long time, except now for adding and tweaking
 `MaxMemInQueues`:


 {{{
 $ grep ^[A-Z] /etc/tor/torrc
 SOCKSPort 0
 Log   notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
 RunAsDaemon   0 # SystemD needs this to be 0
 DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
 ControlPort   9051
 HashedControlPassword 
 ORPort9001
 Nickname  foobar
 RelayBandwidthRate1024 KBytes
 RelayBandwidthBurst   1536 KBytes
 AccountingStart   week 1 00:00
 ContactInfo   XXX
 DirPort   9030
 MyFamily  $, $
 ExitPolicyreject *:*
 ExitRelay 0
 DisableDebuggerAttachment 0
 MaxMemInQueues256 MB
 }}}

 I haven't had a OOM-killing in two days now and I like to imagine that
 switching from `zram` to `zswap` magically helped, maybe. I tried running
 `tor` under `Valgrind` but don't don't know if I did it right and it
 didn't report any leaks:

 {{{
 ==1697== Command: /usr/bin/tor -f /etc/tor/torrc --pidfile
 /var/run/tor/tor.pid --log notice\ file\ /var/log/tor/tor.log
 --runasdaemon 1 --datadirectory /var/lib/tor --user tor
 [...]
 ==1699== LEAK SUMMARY:
 ==1699==definitely lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
 ==1699==indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
 ==1699==  possibly lost: 864 bytes in 3 blocks
 ==1699==still reachable: 34,118 bytes in 206 blocks
 ==1699== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #28150 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update legind's PGP key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28150: Update legind's PGP key
+-
 Reporter:  jsha|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Username: legind
 Old OpenPGP Fingerprint: 977A04EC512A9D0DB4A56E0ECDCAE8ED6842C592
 New OpenPGP Fingerprint: 1073E74EB38BD6D19476CBF8EA9DBF9FB761A677
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEfD6+xfAwwR8vpU1fpzOtltUrJSEFAlvOQrMACgkQpzOtltUr
 JSGPCxAAg53Z5rCB/VRTbnKPCeDPMUSaQwaP6cL3kJbU6IDIkBQBIQQ00+z+i5LK
 uiT9F31QudH4rmsOwHl7enBSXMSVOM2Gk9au2zPmr9b0h1N2l286SFKB49eeFwm3
 L8ZB+JB3soAjcF3RX+wP1nP/DnM4GlNzQbjcw4gC3Dgk5UXQt16ABNi+JZQokt3n
 +g2ifhoZjGWMQKmRWLq3w7X/4Pz9skikONh1ZmBrLQk378ENwt5h1FdC2V2UvbIE
 AFMNmM1qieMTDOPvz8BzovqhAvrvxDrBgkV6/cQdeS9E8f6uv9FCG+v+yfGDHuMh
 /pg5EwWPtKSKr32Udrqg6H1CPaHw6kpKiDSWfg7dzYH8U8hADA+dj9Hea9BsKEWL
 qCHQZv9gDu7XdcDLJI6+eq4skqotU3fT1edQK3vGBvaht+Gzm0IixrBs0GtbWQH9
 c+oNW4O9OvWWmSddL5ndx5ujnsLIvWjvxd1uhFgTOw/lSYXCmlljpJGiLJNkE+jG
 yHuaubRusXE1fz8d1h281JJcFcUk1PS+Xga9kv/vWvdqbawUitNmgy88p6UL7CL/
 BZTwxltRwqmWig5R+wuoRYFR3lfT2aofju0TGuWQZTGxPWct1rT4ZR4umne7dmK1
 XemhSfYpXYhc5TqMbiuXWZ1M+ySYZIdSInCQK9LccwBrl+TFQKs=
 =bl7r
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27838 [Core Tor/Tor]: v3 onion service wrongly considers Invalid signature for service descriptor signing key: expired

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27838: v3 onion service wrongly considers Invalid signature for service 
descriptor
signing key: expired
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => asn


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket27838_035_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/434

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[tor-bugs] #28149 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Limit or Restrict GetAndroidSystemInfo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28149: Limit or Restrict GetAndroidSystemInfo
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28147
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 On Android, the PContent IPC method GetAndroidSystemInfo will return
 detailed information about the user's hardware. We should probably limit
 or restrict this.

 As far as I can tell, none of the information is uniquely identifying
 (like a serial number) - but it does contained detailed phone hardware
 information like Model, Manufacturer, Build Version, SDK versions, etc.

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[tor-bugs] #28148 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Limit or Restrict PTCPSocket and PUDPSocket IPC mechanisms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28148: Limit or Restrict PTCPSocket and PUDPSocket IPC mechanisms
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28147
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 These actors live on PNecko.ipdl and appear to allow a content process to
 open a direct TCP or UDP connection to a server; bypassing the proxy.

 We should validate if that is the case, and determine a way to stop that.

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[tor-bugs] #28147 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [meta] Improve Tor Browser Content Process Sandbox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28147: [meta] Improve Tor Browser Content Process Sandbox
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28146
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This ticket is specifically for tightening the content process sandbox.

 An attacker who achieves code execution inside the content process sandbox
 should not be able to achieve the most valuable goals (proxy
 bypass/persistent user identifier) inside the content process and should
 instead need a sandbox escape.

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[tor-bugs] #28146 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [meta] Improve Tor Browser Sandbox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28146: [meta] Improve Tor Browser Sandbox
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Parent bug for capturing improvements to the Tor Browser Sandbox

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to plugabble transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28140: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to 
plugabble
transports
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: teor (added)


Comment:

 Okay, I am not sure where the "Circuit died due to an invalid selected
 path is coming from" (mightbe an additional bug) but the repeated "Failed
 to find node for hop #1 of our path. Discarding this circuit." and Tor
 essentially not working anymore afterwards is coming from git-
 690f646bf8a5de9b which made it into 0.3.2.7-rc.

 The case to repro is:

 1) Open a big news page in Tor Browser
 2) Select obfs4 as PT to use a built-in bridge
 3) Reload if necessary
 4) Switch to obfs3
 5) Reload if necessary

 Let me know if you need more info.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27197 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust protover accepts excess commas in version strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27197: rust protover accepts excess commas in version strings
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, security-low, 033-backport,|  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:  #27194   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 Replying to [comment:10 teor]:
 > The 0.3.3 pull request for this branch is:
 > https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/428

 Was github having an issue with CI? CI ran on
 [https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/431 PR 431] but not on PRs 427 to
 430.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27201 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust/protover doesn't forbid version zero

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27201: rust/protover doesn't forbid version zero
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
  rust,033-backport,034-backport,035-backport|
Parent ID:  #27198   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 Branch is rebased. Other changes were mostly actually already merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27741 [Core Tor/Tor]: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27741: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-must, protover, memory-safety,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #27739   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > We only applied rustfmt in 0.3.5,

 That's true. Though we might as well try to follow the rustfmt rules for
 the commits merged to maint-0.3.3 too, right? Just so that we don't need
 separate style fixups, or merge conflicts, after it's merged to 0.3.5 and
 forward.

 Also, this ticket is missing the `rust` tag.

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[tor-bugs] #28145 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Add link to frontdesk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28145: TBA: Add link to frontdesk
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a2
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8  |
--+
 Once TBA is stable enough (mid november release?) we should look at
 linking it to frontdesk.

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[tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201810
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26693
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We ship Torbutton and NoScript in Tor Browser for Android albeit at a
 different location. We need to update `projects/tor-browser` for that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28127 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible with version 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28127: Hidden service option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible with
version 3
-+
 Reporter:  pege |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, hs-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * cc: neel (added)
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27662 [Core Tor/Tor]: refactor networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27662: refactor networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, refactor, long-  |  Actual Points:
  functions, cthulhucode |
Parent ID:  #22408   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 teor]:
 > This branch conflicts with some changes in master.

 No it doesn't, it merges cleanly when I just tried it. Did you try to
 merge it? It was already rebased a while ago.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28127 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible with version 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28127: Hidden service option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible with
version 3
-+
 Reporter:  pege |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, hs-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 We've identified a couple issue:

 1) If `HiddenServiceVersion` is explicitly set, it should be respected for
 the entire configuration process that is not even call the "learn version
 from the keys" mechanism.

 2) If (1) is not set, then we should learn the version _early_ and *then*
 look for invalid options. Right now, the issue above is because tor stops
 as it found an invalid option while thinking it was a v3 but in reality
 was v2 because no v3 keys exist on disk.

 3) In the code, the code below is wrong. `config_learn_service_version()`
 returns -1 if not keys were found to detect the version instead of the
 already configured version which is what is documented. Trivial fix but
 should be fixed!

 {{{
   service->config.version = config_learn_service_version(service);
   switch (service->config.version) {
 ...
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser forgets DuckDuckGo's search when going back on navigation history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28143: Tor Browser forgets DuckDuckGo's search when going back on navigation
history
--+--
 Reporter:  wencha|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wencha):

 Tor Browser 8.0.2 x64 on Windows 10 x64

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser forgets DuckDuckGo's search when going back on navigation history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28143: Tor Browser forgets DuckDuckGo's search when going back on navigation
history
--+--
 Reporter:  wencha|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by wencha):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #28143 [- Select a component]: Tor Browser forgets DuckDuckGo's search when going back on navigation history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28143: Tor Browser forgets DuckDuckGo's search when going back on navigation
history
+--
 Reporter:  wencha  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 When i search something using the default DuckDuckGo search engine i get
 the expected results. If i click on any link, navigating to it, and then i
 go back to the previous page (which should be the DuckDuckGo search
 results) it takes me to DuckDuckGo's homepage and i have to type in again
 the search terms!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22343 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22343: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |
  regression, tbb-7.0-frequent,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201810   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's my patch from comment:42 rebased on top of tor-
 browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/22343+10
 (4833bfbd82ac4fb6b8836b326a84a11af8971044)

 I manually tested all "save as" functionalities and confirmed they were
 isolated to first party.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28142 [Core Tor/Tor]: Merge original WTF-PAD branch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28142: Merge original WTF-PAD branch
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor2
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 Currently in needs_revision as Mike fixes the branch after the Mexico
 review.

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[tor-bugs] #28142 [Core Tor/Tor]: Merge original WTF-PAD branch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28142: Merge original WTF-PAD branch
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  wtf-pad
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor2  |
--+
 This is a roadmap item for merging Mike's original WTF-PAD branch
 upstream. It's the first step to completing the WTF-PAD project.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28112 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: New LDAP account for Alexis Hancock

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28112: New LDAP account for Alexis Hancock
-+-
 Reporter:  legind   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by legind):

 Thanks, I no longer have access to this key.  I'll try to find a sponsor
 to change the fingerprint I have on file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25013: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201810  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10760| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk, sysrqb, mcs,  |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by igt0):

 I would expect the browser/ directory be more about Desktop stuff. I can
 be totally wrong about it.



 Replying to [comment:39 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:38 igt0]:
 > > These two patches are the first steps to move tor button to firefox,
 it adds a new file called jar.mn that generates the chrome.manifest and
 update the code removing an unecessary import.
 > >
 > > ** bug 25013: Add Gecko build system infrastructure into tor button**
 > >
 
https://github.com/igortoliveira/torbutton/commit/a86d5bbea745ff41e072a049994161eeca642e01
 > >
 > > **bug 25013: Remove non needed import, it is already available in the
 window object**
 > >
 
https://github.com/igortoliveira/torbutton/commit/ceba9655fff4e454bb0c4003d4d3e849abb5033c
 > >
 > > The next step is adding torbutton as submodule in the toolkit
 directory and update its moz.build file.
 >
 > I guess you have that outlined in your proposal but why toolkit and not
 the browser directory where all the other extensions are? Let's clear
 review for now as other, crucial pieces are missing. The review of the
 parts above might depend on them being available.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25158 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Don't assume everyone uses your symlink structure.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25158: Don't assume everyone uses your symlink structure.
--+
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 No info, landed the change already, going to resolve this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28115 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.5.3 FTBFS on mips and s390

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28115: 0.3.5.3 FTBFS on mips and s390
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.3-alpha
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by weasel):

 https://buildd.debian.org/status/package.php?p=tor=experimental --
 everything built it seems

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28115 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.5.3 FTBFS on mips and s390

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28115: 0.3.5.3 FTBFS on mips and s390
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.3-alpha
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28096, #28123

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #28096, #28123 by dgoulet:
reviewer to asn

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27625 [Core Tor/Tor]: add unit tests for tokenize_string() and get_next_token()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27625: add unit tests for tokenize_string() and get_next_token()
---+---
 Reporter:  cyberpunks |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-tests-unit  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #27740, #27751

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #27740, #27751 by dgoulet:
reviewer to nickm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28077 [Core Tor/Tor]: remove unsafe block from cstr! macro

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28077: remove unsafe block from cstr! macro
--+
 Reporter:  cyberpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => ahf
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #27225, #27968

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #27225, #27968 by dgoulet:
reviewer to mikeperry

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24393, #28007

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #24393, #28007 by dgoulet:
reviewer to catalyst

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26812 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Adding client authorization through control port on an existing service fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26812: hs: Adding client authorization through control port on an existing 
service
fails
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28141 [Core Tor/sbws]: Catch DNS-related unhandled exception

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28141: Catch DNS-related unhandled exception
---+-
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/278

 Make sure CI passes before merging.

 Looks like GitHub is still having a ton of ongoing issues after their
 outage yesterday.

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[tor-bugs] #28141 [Core Tor/sbws]: Catch DNS-related unhandled exception

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28141: Catch DNS-related unhandled exception
---+-
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 I've been running sbws for about 5 days without checking on it.

 The first time the following exception appeared in my logs, I went from
 seeing a variety of thread names in the logs to only seeing a couple. This
 indicates to me this is (a/the) exception that has been causing sbws to
 fallback to just one measurement thread. (Later instances of this
 exception don't change anything)

 {{{
 2018-10-21 11:09:45,926 ERROR Thread-6 scanner.py:259 -
 dispatch_worker_thread - Unhandled exception in worker thread
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/home/mtraudt/.pyenv/versions/3.5.6/envs/sbws-
 venv-3.5.6/lib/python3.5/site-packages/sbws/core/scanner.py", line 257, in
 dispatch_worker_thread
 return measure_relay(*a, **kw)
   File "/home/mtraudt/.pyenv/versions/3.5.6/envs/sbws-
 venv-3.5.6/lib/python3.5/site-packages/sbws/core/scanner.py", line 171, in
 measure_relay
 dest = destinations.next()
   File "/home/mtraudt/.pyenv/versions/3.5.6/envs/sbws-
 venv-3.5.6/lib/python3.5/site-packages/sbws/lib/destination.py", line 251,
 in next
 self._perform_usability_test()
   File "/home/mtraudt/.pyenv/versions/3.5.6/envs/sbws-
 venv-3.5.6/lib/python3.5/site-packages/sbws/lib/destination.py", line 182,
 in _perform_usability_test
 possible_exits = [e for e in self._rl.exits
   File "/home/mtraudt/.pyenv/versions/3.5.6/envs/sbws-
 venv-3.5.6/lib/python3.5/site-packages/sbws/lib/destination.py", line 183,
 in 
 if e.can_exit_to(dest.hostname, dest.port)]
   File "/home/mtraudt/.pyenv/versions/3.5.6/envs/sbws-
 venv-3.5.6/lib/python3.5/site-packages/sbws/lib/relaylist.py", line 123,
 in can_exit_to
 host = resolve(host)[0]
   File "/home/mtraudt/.pyenv/versions/3.5.6/envs/sbws-
 venv-3.5.6/lib/python3.5/site-packages/sbws/globals.py", line 71, in
 resolve
 for result in socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, 0):
   File "/home/mtraudt/.pyenv/versions/3.5.6/lib/python3.5/socket.py", line
 733, in getaddrinfo
 for res in _socket.getaddrinfo(host, port, family, type, proto,
 flags):
 socket.gaierror: [Errno -2] Name or service not known
 2018-10-21 11:09:45,926 ERROR Thread-10 scanner.py:314 - closure -
 Unhandled exception caught while measuring ViDiSrv:  [Errno -2] Name or service not known
 }}}

 Branch incoming.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28137 [Metrics/Statistics]: Modify "Total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities" graph to only include relays that end up in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28137: Modify "Total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities" graph to 
only
include relays that end up in the consensus
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [ticket:28137 karsten]:
 [...[
 ]
 > So, it does seem plausible that the totals by authority would be more
 useful if the underlying set of relays is the same.

 yes, i didn't realize about this before, i think makes more sense to
 compare the same set

 [...]
 > Are there alternatives, like only including relays from votes that have
 the Running flag?

 hmm, i'm not sure how this could help to make the graph more useful

 > Maybe we should run this analysis once and separate from metrics-web and
 then decide.

 if this is not more extra work, yeah :)

 [...]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28103 [Core Tor/sbws]: Stop removing results that are not away from some other X secs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28103: Stop removing results that are not away from some other X secs
---+-
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP nice)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged, thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28105 [Core Tor/sbws]: Use secs-away when provided instead of data_period

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28105: Use secs-away when provided instead of data_period
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged, thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by udo):

 {{{
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c:1022: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal
 assertion !(connection_is_reading(conn)) failed. (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion
 !(connection_is_reading(conn)) failed in conn_close_if_marked at
 src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c:1022. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x46)
 [0x564696486636] (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xc0)
 [0x564696481d30] (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x68d25)
 [0x5646962ffd25] (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: /lib64/libevent-2.1.so.6(+0x24031)
 [0x7ff7cc050031] (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug:
 /lib64/libevent-2.1.so.6(event_base_loop+0x537) [0x7ff7cc0507c7] (on Tor
 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xb0)
 [0x564696301780] (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x147f)
 [0x5646962ef56f] (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a)
 [0x5646962ec7da] (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19)
 [0x5646962ec399] (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug:
 /lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf3) [0x7ff7cb93e413] (on Tor
 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 Oct 22 13:44:12.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a)
 [0x5646962ec3ea] (on Tor 0.3.5.3-alpha )
 }}}
 So it happened again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28094 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix docs in workqueue.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28094: fix docs in workqueue.c
--+
 Reporter:  cyberpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-docs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing description of ED25519-V3 private key format in rend-spec-v3.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28123: Missing description of ED25519-V3 private key format in rend-spec-v3.txt
--+
 Reporter:  riastradh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28127 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible with version 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28127: Hidden service option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible with
version 3
-+
 Reporter:  pege |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, hs-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27841: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs dos|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28097 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get the actual Windows version from Kernel32.dll

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28097: Get the actual Windows version from Kernel32.dll
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final


Comment:

 I think this is something we'll actually want: reporting the OS version is
 pretty important for successful debugging.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to plugabble transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28140: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to 
plugabble
transports
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25013: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201810  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10760| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk, sysrqb, mcs,  |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:38 igt0]:
 > These two patches are the first steps to move tor button to firefox, it
 adds a new file called jar.mn that generates the chrome.manifest and
 update the code removing an unecessary import.
 >
 > ** bug 25013: Add Gecko build system infrastructure into tor button**
 >
 
https://github.com/igortoliveira/torbutton/commit/a86d5bbea745ff41e072a049994161eeca642e01
 >
 > **bug 25013: Remove non needed import, it is already available in the
 window object**
 >
 
https://github.com/igortoliveira/torbutton/commit/ceba9655fff4e454bb0c4003d4d3e849abb5033c
 >
 > The next step is adding torbutton as submodule in the toolkit directory
 and update its moz.build file.

 I guess you have that outlined in your proposal but why toolkit and not
 the browser directory where all the other extensions are? Let's clear
 review for now as other, crucial pieces are missing. The review of the
 parts above might depend on them being available.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #26690, #27111

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #26690, #27111 by gk:


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15948 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Can we do away with public SVN?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15948: Can we do away with public SVN?
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * owner:  tor-gitadm => irl
 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 I believe we are closer to turning off public SVN, but need to have some
 redirects in place for articles, presentations and design paper.

 svn.tpo will be served from the static mirrors but we'll have RewriteRules
 in place to send requests off to the new homes for these files. Some may
 go to media.torproject.org.

 For everything that is not in the set of commonly linked resources, there
 is the full archive dump now uploaded to archive.org:
 https://archive.org/details/tor_public_svn

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28039 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser log is not shown anymore in terminal since Tor Browser 8.5a2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28039: Tor Browser log is not shown anymore in terminal since Tor Browser 8.5a2
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201810,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201810R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201810, TorBrowserTeam201810 =>
 tbb-regression, GeorgKoppen201810, TorBrowserTeam201810R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay, this took me longer than planned. :/ `bug_28039_v3` in the
 `torbutton`
 
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug_28039_v3=75e31589b9647b5c67374b28f0cb15929e32d52a)
 and `bug_28039_v2` in the `tor-launcher`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 
launcher.git/commit/?h=bug_28039_v2=8a7059a334ba582f5440440b3792cbd7e9b0d4df)
 repo have proposed fixes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28046 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Delete unused authdirbadexit.git repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28046: Delete unused authdirbadexit.git repo
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15949 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Can we migrate internal SVN to a document store, wiki, or set of git repositories?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15949: Can we migrate internal SVN to a document store, wiki, or set of git
repositories?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by irl):

 If it is currently used, the people that are using it should be the owners
 of this ticket. I don't think the git team can really make any progress
 with this ticket as it is.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28139 [Internal Services/Service - git]: please add linus to @torproject-admin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28139: please add linus to @torproject-admin
-+
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to plugabble transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28140: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to 
plugabble
transports
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by gk):

 I attached an info level log. This happened while I was on a big news site
 and first switching to the built-in obfs4 bridges (which worked) and then
 to obfs3 (which resulted in the the bug).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to plugabble transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28140: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to 
plugabble
transports
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * Attachment "28410_obfs4_obfs3.log.gz" added.


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[tor-bugs] #28140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to plugabble transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28140: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to 
plugabble
transports
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 On the blog we got a report about a Tor notice:
 {{{
 Tor NOTICE: Our circuit 0 (id: 570) died due to an invalid selected path,
 purpose General-purpose client. This may be a torrc configuration issue,
 or a bug.
 }}}
 (see: https://blog.torproject.org/comment/278164#comment-278164)

 It turns out I can reproduce this quite often (but not always) if I switch
 to pluggable transports (e.g. the built-in obfs4 bridges) in Tor Browser
 while a page is still loading. Then I get log output like
 {{{
 Oct 22 09:41:00.000 [warn] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 Oct 22 09:41:00.000 [notice] Our circuit 0 (id: 40) died due to an invalid
 selected path, purpose General-purpose client. This may be a torrc
 configuration issue, or a bug.
 Oct 22 09:41:00.000 [warn] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 Oct 22 09:41:00.000 [warn] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 Oct 22 09:41:00.000 [warn] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 }}}
 (Note, I have no clue why the timestamp is always the same in this snippet
 but it seems this warning is emitted on a second basis and not stopping)

 This makes Tor Browser essentially unusable until one changes settings
 again or restarts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25013 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25013: Move TorButton code to the tor browser repository
--+
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201810  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10760| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk, sysrqb, mcs,  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by igt0):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 These two patches are the first steps to move tor button to firefox, it
 adds a new file called jar.mn that generates the chrome.manifest and
 update the code removing an unecessary import.

 ** bug 25013: Add Gecko build system infrastructure into tor button**
 
https://github.com/igortoliveira/torbutton/commit/a86d5bbea745ff41e072a049994161eeca642e01

 **bug 25013: Remove non needed import, it is already available in the
 window object**
 
https://github.com/igortoliveira/torbutton/commit/ceba9655fff4e454bb0c4003d4d3e849abb5033c

 The next step is adding torbutton as submodule in the toolkit directory
 and update its moz.build file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28132 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add 'linus' to 'adm'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28132: Add 'linus' to 'adm'
-+
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Added linus to gid adm, to cn=LDAP Administrator, to tor-password's
 @admins,
 to torproject-admin@torproject, and filed #28139 for git stuff.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28139 [Internal Services/Service - git]: please add linus to @torproject-admin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28139: please add linus to @torproject-admin
-+
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Description changed by weasel:

Old description:

> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>

> please add linus to @torproject-admin (cf. #28132).
>
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
>
> iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEs4PXhajJL968BgN2hgLIIDhyMx8FAlvNnNEACgkQhgLIIDhy
> Mx8C5wf9GvgOjjFjF3iCjHo7JE66jytUDOs4C+kac4Fhu2v88+v/0LxUwgW0NO4w
> DW2FwC+lrjlcsMEj/ELG0VVCNlb4W5j8gUTdgVYaUHivnYmNnbQ+BiNRla9199x2
> 2snptlpQ0ekQBOCt2whmYzAMKq/A9ImkBlBEApjOtwq4MnMck8VMe3Dk582XTpHl
> rNGi3zEz3lVgmdHo474RUWrIxlBNXR9gqgEWMS6Fg4RQDU0tfyhMeqwyHsVQsoAP
> 7JjlXcR8i/8z4Ou/ROSHsUy900Lsp10rEiEgMJaIOi3KSeeNRGBrUU9/LpvOWNk5
> FdaFYVPCFsOR+NhnPVpA4b7MW1+amg==
> =k+jW
> -END PGP SIGNATURE-

New description:

 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256


 please add linus to @torproject-admin (cf. #28132).

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEs4PXhajJL968BgN2hgLIIDhyMx8FAlvNnNEACgkQhgLIIDhy
 Mx8C5wf9GvgOjjFjF3iCjHo7JE66jytUDOs4C+kac4Fhu2v88+v/0LxUwgW0NO4w
 DW2FwC+lrjlcsMEj/ELG0VVCNlb4W5j8gUTdgVYaUHivnYmNnbQ+BiNRla9199x2
 2snptlpQ0ekQBOCt2whmYzAMKq/A9ImkBlBEApjOtwq4MnMck8VMe3Dk582XTpHl
 rNGi3zEz3lVgmdHo474RUWrIxlBNXR9gqgEWMS6Fg4RQDU0tfyhMeqwyHsVQsoAP
 7JjlXcR8i/8z4Ou/ROSHsUy900Lsp10rEiEgMJaIOi3KSeeNRGBrUU9/LpvOWNk5
 FdaFYVPCFsOR+NhnPVpA4b7MW1+amg==
 =k+jW
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #28139 [Internal Services/Service - git]: please add linus to @torproject-admin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28139: please add linus to @torproject-admin
-+
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256


 please add linus to @torproject-admin (cf. #28132).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25578 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Package and distribute Tor Browser using Flatpak

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25578: Package and distribute Tor Browser using Flatpak
--+--
 Reporter:  mjog  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 This really sucks to do because of the sub-optimal way that the various
 Tor components are integrated into Tor Browser.  The flatpak model does
 not mesh well with Tor Browser currently shipping a user profile directory
 that is expected to be volatile.

 There are various kludges that can be done to work around this, but more
 realistically the better solution is to solve #10760 among other things.

 The protections provided by the sandbox would still be severely lacking
 because you would want to decouple the tor process and the firefox one,
 but at least it may improve the distribution situation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28138 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please refresh my PGP key.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28138: Please refresh my PGP key.
-+
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ldap, pgp|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #28138 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please refresh my PGP key.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28138: Please refresh my PGP key.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  ldap, pgp
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I decided to generate new sub-keys when they expired a few months ago,
 instead of extending the expiration for another year like I always do.  I
 would appreciate it if my PGP key could be refreshed at your convenience.

 My offline master key is unchanged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201810  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201805 => ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201810


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[tor-bugs] #28137 [Metrics/Statistics]: Modify "Total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities" graph to only include relays that end up in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28137: Modify "Total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities" graph to 
only
include relays that end up in the consensus
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 This suggestion is based on a discussion with arma and Sebastian in #tor-
 dev:

 {{{
 07:00:41 <+armadev> would be interesting to compare to: "the sum of
 moria1's
 votes about each relay that ended up in the consensus"
 07:00:51 <+armadev> since that would compare between bwauths better
 07:01:12 <+armadev> right now if moria1 knows about a bunch of relays that
 used
 to be around, but aren't now, and other dir auths
 don't
 know about them, then moria1 votes a much higher total
 }}}

 So, it does seem plausible that the totals by authority would be more
 useful if the underlying set of relays is the same.

 One issue is a technical one: we'd need to retain much more data in the
 database to implement this graph. The background is that we always need to
 match relays in a vote with the corresponding consensus in order to decide
 whether to include a relay in the total sum or not. However, we do not
 require descriptors to appear in a certain order, and we want the end
 result to be the same even if we process a consensus or vote a couple days
 or even weeks later.

 Another, minor issue is that we'd have to reprocess the entire archive.
 This is doable and shouldn't stop us. Just saying that it's going to
 require some effort.

 Are there alternatives, like only including relays from votes that have
 the Running flag?

 Maybe we should run this analysis once and separate from metrics-web and
 then decide.

 teor, juga, pastly, you were all involved in #25459 which led to the
 original graph. What do you think about this possible modification?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28133 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crashes/restarts when using Reader View shortcut (ctrl+alt+r)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28133: Tor Browser crashes/restarts when using Reader View shortcut 
(ctrl+alt+r)
--+---
 Reporter:  ev9F8itL  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-crash   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr => ff60-esr, tbb-crash
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team


Comment:

 Do you get some useful information in your terminal when Tor Browser
 crashes if you start it with `./start-tor-browser.desktop --debug`? (FWIW:
 It's not crashing for me on my 64bit Debian system) How did you install
 Tor Browser? Does this happen with a clean, new one downloaded from our
 website?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28091 [Applications/GetTor]: Port GetTor to python3 (was: Refactor GetTor to python3)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28091: Port GetTor to python3
-+--
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by traumschule:

Old description:

> It's good to be ahead of time refactoring GetTor to python3.
> https://docs.python.org/2/library/2to3.html#to3-reference

New description:

 It's good to be ahead of time refactoring GetTor to python3.
 https://docs.python.org/3/howto/pyporting.html
 https://docs.python.org/2/library/2to3.html#to3-reference

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28125 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't let Android leak DNS queries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28125: Don't let Android leak DNS queries
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-proxy-bypass  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #5709 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Very High => Immediate
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, tbb-proxy-bypass


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA connects to location.services.mozilla.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27431: TBA connects to location.services.mozilla.com
--+--
 Reporter:  towiw3|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #28125 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28136 [Metrics/Website]: OnionPerf graph handles missing data on 2018-10-01 in a weird way

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28136: OnionPerf graph handles missing data on 2018-10-01 in a weird way
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * priority:  Medium => High


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-28136=0408b73e647a0207f6b6db486d46f1c9993323b6
 commit 0408b73 in my task-28136 branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26697 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Android toolchain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26697: Add Android toolchain
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201810R  |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Why do we still have API 23 bits in this patch (like `--api 23` and using
 23.0.3 build tools) if we are targetting API 26?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27309 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deterministic builds / ar warns about u modifier

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27309: Deterministic builds / ar warns about u modifier
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 IIRC to adopt new flags they need to be tested with all compilers in use.

 > <+nickm> I'd mostly think about non-gmake systems. right now we work on
 OSX and most BSDs.  So that would be good to keep.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24993 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24993: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usabilty, tbb-branding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  mozilla firefox branding => tbb-usabilty, tbb-branding
 * cc: Simone (added)


Comment:

 #28131 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28131 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Troubleshooting: refresh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28131: Troubleshooting: refresh
--+---
 Reporter:  Simone|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Yes, this is confusing. We have #24993 for dealing with it better. We
 should probably hide that option until we get it to work as expected. In
 short: you can't use that option right now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16899 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hide or otherwise disable "Restart with Add-ons Disabled..."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16899: Hide or otherwise disable "Restart with Add-ons Disabled..."
--+
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  usability, ux |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 This menu item seems to be gone.

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[tor-bugs] #28136 [Metrics/Website]: OnionPerf graph handles missing data on 2018-10-01 in a weird way

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28136: OnionPerf graph handles missing data on 2018-10-01 in a weird way
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/torperf.html?start=2018-07-24=2018-10-22=all=onion=50kb

 Unclear if it's a visualization or statistics bug. Going for
 Metrics/Website for now.

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