Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

2017-09-06 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

2017-09-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Yes, this is also a fix on v2. The same issue happens on v2 which means
 that this patch will help in performance that is avoiding to re-dance when
 we quickly expire a cannibalized circuit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

2017-09-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 lgtm too, but I'll wait to see if you want change anything because of
 asn's question.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

2017-09-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Patch LGTM.


 BTW, is this also a v2 bug? The patch seems to imply so. Or v2 is not
 affected?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

2017-08-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit => tor-hs, tor-circuit, prop224


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

2017-08-31 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Proposed fix: `bug23123_032_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

2017-08-21 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: mikeperry, arma (added)


Comment:

 CCing couple of people that could help review the proposed fix.

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[tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

2017-08-06 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
--+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Today, I encountered this behavior on a prop224 client when connecting to
 a service:

 {{{
 Aug 06 15:21:06.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit():
 pending-join circ 3551616045 already here, with intro ack. Stalling.
 (stream 2 sec old)
 Aug 06 15:21:07.000 [info] circuit_expire_building(): Marking circ
 3551616045 (state 4:open, purpose 11) as timed-out HS circ;
 }}}

 So my client was able to establish a rendezvous point but then just before
 being attached to a stream and ready to be used, it expires...

 That specific circuit has been cannibalized and in
 `circuit_launch_by_extend_info()`, a RP circuit calls
 `circuit_extend_to_new_exit()` to extend to it which does not update the
 `timestamp_dirty` and has this comment:

 {{{
   // XXX: Should cannibalized circuits be dirty or not? Not easy to say..
 }}}

 Sooo ultimately, down the rabbit hole, the `circuit_expire_building()`
 function checks the `timestamp_dirty` and has that comment:

 {{{
   /* rend and intro circs become dirty each time they
* make an introduction attempt. so timestamp_dirty
* will reflect the time since the last attempt.
 }}}

 ... but that is true only if `timestamp_dirty == 0` which is not true if
 the circuit was cannibalized.

 In `rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened()`, we have this:

 {{{
   if (!circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty)
 circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
 }}}

 Ok, seems the solution is just to set the `timestamp_dirty` every time
 when the RP/IP opens *or* we flag the circuit that it has been
 cannibalized and we can update the timestamp accordingly?

 Btw, this affects legacy system as well.

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