Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+---
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201710R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Thorin):

 FYI: upstream, fixed in FF68+
 - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1541958 - nsIUserInfo
 removed
 - original ticket: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1433350

 One less thing to rebase in ESR68

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+---
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201710R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. Applied to `tor-browser-52.4.0esr-7.5-1` as commit
 e3b99866dbdc29a2949d0a53806b99a94f34cc73.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201710R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 The patch looks good to me as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201710R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-13398-at-startup-browser-gleans-user-FULL-
 NAME-r.patch" added.

 Properly formatted patch, no code changes

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709 => TorBrowserTeam201709R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "13398-pospeselr7.patch" added.

 fixed #if -> #ifndef issue in nsUserInfoMac.mm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pospeselr):

 I'm not sure I'm following.  In each instance XXX is type char^^*^^* or
 wchar^^*^^*.

 Sure if we fail to allocate the 1 (or 2) bytes needed for the empty
 string's null terminator we probably have bigger problems and the error
 handling isn't *technically* needed since we're bound to crash soon
 anyway, but seems sloppy to omit it.

 Fixing the text replacement fail.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R => TorBrowserTeam201709
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 {{{
 return *XXX ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
 }}}
 for "" ? o_0
 `#if TOR_BROWSER_VERSION` -> `#ifndef TOR_BROWSER_VERSION`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709 => TorBrowserTeam201709R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "13398-pospeselr6.patch" added.

 #fdef ESR59 -> #ifndef TOR_BROWSER_VERSION

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R => TorBrowserTeam201709


Comment:

 There is no such define available. I guess you could check for the
 existence of `TOR_BROWSER_VERSION` to make sure the replacement code only
 kicks in in the Tor Browser case. However, I think we could just make sure
 an empty string is returned unconditionally right now and ask Mozilla what
 changes they would like to see to get the patch upstreamed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708 => TorBrowserTeam201709R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Ok, latest patch (13398-pospeselr5.patch) just rips out the offending code
 and returns empty string for all requested properties, assuming ESR59 is
 not defined.  Verified working on linux and windows, building on macOS.
 Version 5 is the same as version 4, except it doesn't 'fix' trailing
 whitespace (new settings config, who dis?).

 I couldn't find any existing firefox version defines, but if any exist I'm
 happy to use them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "13398-pospeselr5.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "13398-pospeselr4.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Is there a firefox #define for the major version already in use to place
 these changes behind?

 Replying to [comment:26 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:25 pospeselr]:
 > > So is the consensus here that we should just #ifdef out the offending
 code and instead return empty-string for the requested data, and undo the
 user-setting change entirely?
 >
 > I think so, yes, given the power of XPCOM-based extensions which are the
 main targets of this patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:25 pospeselr]:
 > So is the consensus here that we should just #ifdef out the offending
 code and instead return empty-string for the requested data, and undo the
 user-setting change entirely?

 I think so, yes, given the power of XPCOM-based extensions which are the
 main targets of this patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pospeselr):

 So is the consensus here that we should just #ifdef out the offending code
 and instead return empty-string for the requested data, and undo the user-
 setting change entirely?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:23 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:22 gk]:
 > > However, after thinking more about this patch I have a bigger concern.
 What is it defending against? I mean, what prevents a rogue extension from
 flipping our pref and just read the values we tried to hide? (I know I
 suggested the pref approach first and should probably have thought more
 about it and not just have recommended the "standard thing" when Firefox
 patches are concerned).
 > >
 > > One could argue that's not possible with the new WebExtensions-based
 add-ons (which is correct) but then I bet those extensions are not allowed
 to extract the info we want to hide in the first place either (but I could
 be wrong about that). So, should we just say this will be fixed when we
 switch to Firefox 59? And, if we really want to defend against that in the
 ESR 52 cycle we would just rip out the offending code (not bothering about
 upstreaming the patch)?
 >
 > So maybe just add #ifdefs for ESR52 to remove the code? I'd still feel
 better if the info was never read (and thus present in memory) in ESR 59
 and later, but in theory the info should not be accessible to
 Webextensions.

 Yes, I think I agree. We could keep the #ifdefs for ESR59 and talk to
 Mozilla folks about it.

 Sorry again, Richard, but we should revise this patch making it more
 straightforward and ignoring upstreaming concerns for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+---
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:22 gk]:
 > However, after thinking more about this patch I have a bigger concern.
 What is it defending against? I mean, what prevents a rogue extension from
 flipping our pref and just read the values we tried to hide? (I know I
 suggested the pref approach first and should probably have thought more
 about it and not just have recommended the "standard thing" when Firefox
 patches are concerned).
 >
 > One could argue that's not possible with the new WebExtensions-based
 add-ons (which is correct) but then I bet those extensions are not allowed
 to extract the info we want to hide in the first place either (but I could
 be wrong about that). So, should we just say this will be fixed when we
 switch to Firefox 59? And, if we really want to defend against that in the
 ESR 52 cycle we would just rip out the offending code (not bothering about
 upstreaming the patch)?

 So maybe just add #ifdefs for ESR52 to remove the code? I'd still feel
 better if the info was never read (and thus present in memory) in ESR 59
 and later, but in theory the info should not be accessible to
 Webextensions.

 > mcs: What about your refactoring concerns?

 That concern is fairly minor; we could just wait and see what Mozilla says
 if or when we try to upstream the patch. And we can change our approach
 later if upstreaming does not happen (and therefore we would need to
 maintain a patch forever).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+---
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708R => TorBrowserTeam201708
 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 The patch looks okay to me, just a small nit: there is trailing whitespace
 on a bunch os
 {{{
 +nsresult
 }}}
 lines that needs to get removed.

 However, after thinking more about this patch I have a bigger concern.
 What is it defending against? I mean, what prevents a rogue extension from
 flipping our pref and just read the values we tried to hide? (I know I
 suggested the pref approach first and should probably have thought more
 about it and not just have recommended the "standard thing" when Firefox
 patches are concerned).

 One could argue that's not possible with the new WebExtensions-based add-
 ons (which is correct) but then I bet those extensions are not allowed to
 extract the info we want to hide in the first place either (but I could be
 wrong about that). So, should we just say this will be fixed when we
 switch to Firefox 59? And, if we really want to defend against that in the
 ESR 52 cycle we would just rip out the offending code (not bothering about
 upstreaming the patch)?

 mcs: What about your refactoring concerns?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201708R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Ok the latest patch is confirmed building on Win32, Linux and OSX using
 RBM.  Also verified the behaviour of the Win32 build.  Win32 Firefox
 totally runs on Linux via wine :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "13398-pospeselr3.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Hmm, if I had to guess it's probably the usage of the NS_METHODIMP macro
 rather than just specifying an nsresult return type.  See if I can repro
 tonight and update the patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708R =>
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:15 pospeselr]:
 > Ok uploaded new patch without white-space issues and with adjusted if
 spacing and mcs's suggested code changes.  Also verified patch behaves as
 expected at runtime.
 >
 > Rest of the night goes to seeing if I can build OSX flavor using rbm.

 I have not tested an OS X build yet but the Windows one (done with
 `mingw-w64`) is failing with:
 {{{
 /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfoWin.cpp:29:45: error:
 ambiguating new declaration of 'nsresult
 nsUserInfo::GetUsernameImpl(char**)'
  nsUserInfo::GetUsernameImpl(char **aUsername)
  ^
 In file included from /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfoWin.cpp:6:0:
 /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfo.h:27:12: note: old
 declaration 'nsresult nsUserInfo::GetUsernameImpl(char**)'
nsresult GetUsernameImpl(char** aUsername);
 ^
 /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfoWin.cpp:45:49: error:
 ambiguating new declaration of 'nsresult
 nsUserInfo::GetFullnameImpl(char16_t**)'
  nsUserInfo::GetFullnameImpl(char16_t **aFullname)
  ^
 In file included from /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfoWin.cpp:6:0:
 /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfo.h:26:12: note: old
 declaration 'nsresult nsUserInfo::GetFullnameImpl(char16_t**)'
nsresult GetFullnameImpl(char16_t** aFullname);
 ^
 /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfoWin.cpp:97:41: error:
 ambiguating new declaration of 'nsresult
 nsUserInfo::GetDomainImpl(char**)'
  nsUserInfo::GetDomainImpl(char **aDomain)
  ^
 In file included from /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfoWin.cpp:6:0:
 /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfo.h:29:12: note: old
 declaration 'nsresult nsUserInfo::GetDomainImpl(char**)'
nsresult GetDomainImpl(char** aDomain);
 ^
 /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfoWin.cpp:116:53: error:
 ambiguating new declaration of 'nsresult
 nsUserInfo::GetEmailAddressImpl(char**)'
  nsUserInfo::GetEmailAddressImpl(char **aEmailAddress)
  ^
 In file included from /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfoWin.cpp:6:0:
 /home/ubuntu/build/tor-
 browser/toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfo.h:28:12: note: old
 declaration 'nsresult nsUserInfo::GetEmailAddressImpl(char**)'
nsresult GetEmailAddressImpl(char** aEmailAddress);
 ^
 make[5]: Leaving directory `/home/ubuntu/build/tor-browser/obj-
 mingw/toolkit/components/startup'
 make[5]: *** [nsUserInfoWin.o] Error 1
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201707R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201707R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Ok uploaded new patch without white-space issues and with adjusted if
 spacing and mcs's suggested code changes.

 Rest of the night goes to seeing if I can build OSX flavor using rbm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201707R =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201707R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:12 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:11 pospeselr]:
 > > I can go through another round, fix these issues, and upload a new
 patch if you like (while disabling sublime's 'trim trailing white-space'
 option).
 >
 > If you can quickly produce a new patch, please proceed. But maybe it
 makes sense to wait for feedback from another member of our team. gk,
 please let pospeselr know if you want a revised patch right away.

 I think proposing a new patch addressing your review comments is a good
 idea.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201707R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:11 pospeselr]:
 > I can go through another round, fix these issues, and upload a new patch
 if you like (while disabling sublime's 'trim trailing white-space'
 option).

 If you can quickly produce a new patch, please proceed. But maybe it makes
 sense to wait for feedback from another member of our team. gk, please let
 pospeselr know if you want a revised patch right away.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201707R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Thanks for the feedback!

 In regards to the ToNewUnicode() call, it looks like you are completely
 correct!  Not only is it less C++ code but the generated machine code is
 shorter too: https://godbolt.org/g/hyurar

 Generated code for when that link eventually dies (gcc version 7.1 with
 -03):
 {{{
 ; int func_local(void** aPtr)
 ; {
 ; if(!aPtr)
 ; {
 ; return FAILURE;
 ; }
 ; auto ptr = get_ptr();
 ; if(ptr)
 ; {
 ; *aPtr = ptr;
 ; return SUCCESS;
 ; }
 ; *aPtr = nullptr;
 ; return FAILURE;
 ; }
 func_local(void**):
 testrdi, rdi
 je  .L7
 pushrbx
 mov rbx, rdi
 callget_ptr()
 testrax, rax
 je  .L6
 mov QWORD PTR [rbx], rax
 xor eax, eax
 pop rbx
 ret
 .L7:
 mov eax, -1
 ret
 .L6:
 mov QWORD PTR [rbx], 0
 mov eax, -1
 pop rbx
 ret

 ; int func_ptr(void** aPtr)
 ; {
 ; if(!aPtr)
 ; {
 ; return FAILURE;
 ; }
 ; *aPtr = get_ptr();
 ; if(*aPtr)
 ; {
 ; return SUCCESS;
 ; }
 ; return FAILURE;
 ; }
 func_ptr(void**):
 testrdi, rdi
 je  .L14
 pushrbx
 mov rbx, rdi
 callget_ptr()
 testrax, rax
 mov QWORD PTR [rbx], rax
 seteal
 movzx   eax, al
 neg eax
 pop rbx
 ret
 .L14:
 mov eax, -1
 ret
 }}}

 I can go through another round, fix these issues, and upload a new patch
 if you like (while disabling sublime's 'trim trailing white-space'
 option).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201707R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I was unable to apply the 13398-pospeselr.patch; it looks like trailing
 whitespace has been removed from the patch. In any case, we typically
 avoid touching lines that we are not otherwise changing because larger
 patches are more work to maintain (but hopefully we can convince Mozilla
 to accept this patch upstream).

 After I manually applied the patch, I then encountered a linker error
 while building on OSX (I attempted a non-gitian build). To fix the
 problem, I had to add an empty destructor to
 `toolkit/components/startup/nsUserInfoMac.mm`:
 {{{
 nsUserInfo::~nsUserInfo() {}
 }}}
 Using userinfotest.xpi I verified that the fix is effective. Good work!

 I have mixed feelings about refactoring the OSX nsUserInfo implementation.
 This seems like a good clean up, but this also may make patch maintenance
 more difficult.

 Please match the style of most other Mozilla code for the `if` statements
 (include a space after `if`).

 In the code that calls `ToNewUnicode()` it would be slightly more compact
 to directly assign to the output parameter, e.g.,
 {{{
 NS_IMETHODIMP
 nsUserInfo::GetFullname(char16_t** aFullname)
 {
   NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aFullname);

   if (sHideUserInfo) {
 *aFullname = ToNewUnicode(NS_LITERAL_STRING(""));
 if (aFullname) {
   return NS_OK;
 }

 return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
   }

   return this->GetFullnameImpl(aFullname);
 }
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201707R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+---
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201707R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201707R


Comment:

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+---
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by pospeselr):

 I've attached a patch addressing this issue as well as the modified
 'hello-world' add-on I used to manually verify the change (on Linux).
 Here's a description of the patch:

 Change Summary:

 - added new 'privacy.hide_user_info' setting which defaults to 'false' in
 firefox, but is set to 'true' in tor-browser via the 000-tor-browser.js
 script
 - added static bool sHideUserInfo bool to the nsUserInfo class
  - bool is inited and registered with the mozilla::Preferences system in
 static method nsUserInfo::InitializeStatics which is called from the
 nsAppStartup::Init method on firefox boot
 - refactored the various nsUserInfo objects such that the old platform
 specific Get$PROPERTY methods are now named Get$PROPERTYImpl
  - Single implementation of nsIUserInfo interface methods added to new
 nsUserInfo.cpp file
  - Each Get$PROPERTY method checks against newly added sHideUserInfo
 static bool before either returning an empty string, or calling the
 Get$PROPERTYImpl method
  - Now calling the new Get$PROPERTYImp methods where appropriate (in the
 UNIX implementation of GetEmailAddress for instance)
 - refactor to OSX nsUserInfo implementation
  - changed GetPrimaryEmailAddress to be static function in
 nsUserInfoMac.mm, rather than a 'secret' class method (since it is not
 dependent on any object specific data or private/protected methods)
  - removed the OSX specific nsUserInfoMac.h header which included the
 'secret' GetPrimaryEmailAddress method

 Caveats:

 - haven't verified this change works (or even builds) on Windows or OSX
  - seems like something is borked with my Linux install regarding
 virtualization, so I'm going to wipe and re-install fresh
  - will resend an updated patch if I get to that this weekend and find any
 build or runtime errors on these platforms
 - an automated test also needs to be added verifying this parameter works
 as intended, if I have time this weekend will try to get that going too

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+---
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * severity:   => Normal


Old description:

> (Reporting against Tor Browser 3.6.6, but this is a longstanding issue
> which affects all versions of the browser.)
>
> At each startup, code within nsUserInfoWin.cpp
> (see also: nsUserInfoUnix.cpp, nsUserInfoOS2.cpp, nsUserInfoMac.mm)
> scrapes user's FULL NAME (real name, given name) from the operating
> system
> and retains this in memory, stored to a constant, throughout the browser
> session.
>
> Additionally, the browser scrapes user's windows login username (and
> windows domain) along with his/her email address (if present, filled in
> within user's windows user account details). These personal details are
> similarly stored by the browser throughout the life of each browsing
> session.
>
> This privacy-infringing behavior is unconditional ~~ no user_pref is
> available to prevent it.
>
> In researching "How dare they?!?" I gathered that this behavior exists
> because Firefox shares a codebase with Thunderbird, and back in the day
> someone thought it would be "kewl" for a Thunderbird user to find that
> the system magically knows his/her details when setting up a new TB
> account...
>
> If challenged to prove/demonstrate where these details are ever "leaked"
> by the browser, I cannot. However, these personal details are accessible
> to any extension (or out-of-band Mozilla update) and therefore are
> subject to exfiltration.

New description:

 (Reporting against Tor Browser 3.6.6, but this is a longstanding issue
 which affects all versions of the browser.)

 At each startup, code within nsUserInfoWin.cpp
 (see also: nsUserInfoUnix.cpp, nsUserInfoOS2.cpp, nsUserInfoMac.mm)
 scrapes user's FULL NAME (real name, given name) from the operating system
 and retains this in memory, stored to a constant, throughout the browser
 session.

 Additionally, the browser scrapes user's windows login username (and
 windows domain) along with his/her email address (if present, filled in
 within user's windows user account details). These personal details are
 similarly stored by the browser throughout the life of each browsing
 session.

 This privacy-infringing behavior is unconditional — no user_pref is
 available to prevent it.

 In researching "How dare they?!?" I gathered that this behavior exists
 because Firefox shares a codebase with Thunderbird, and back in the day
 someone thought it would be "kewl" for a Thunderbird user to find that the
 system magically knows his/her details when setting up a new TB account...

 If challenged to prove/demonstrate where these details are ever "leaked"
 by the browser, I cannot. However, these personal details are accessible
 to any extension (or out-of-band Mozilla update) and therefore are subject
 to exfiltration.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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