Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Tor "exploits the military" into lending cover to activist groups,
> which they would presumably support.
> This may be too naive a view of the situation.
Exploit is definitely the wrong word here. Different people who
disagree about {policy|topic|whatever} can all see
Apologies for quick post.
If we want to a socially connected link, seems we can use the same
infrastructure for doing keysignings parties but we just use relay public
keys. That seems a nice distributed way of doing this.
On Thu, 24 Sep 2015 at 13:42 Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Can we not use the a
Can we not use the argument "anonymity requires diverse company" on both
sides? For whole rational actors it seems like this should work. Tor
"exploits the military" into lending cover to activist groups, which they
would presumably support.
This may be too naive a view of the situation.
Re: soci
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 06:18:58AM +, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Exit nodes seem a nice place to start concretizing what's meant when we say
> we want relay diversity. Comments immensely appreciated because as-is I
> don't know the answers to these questions.
Hi Virgil,
I've been pondering the
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Hello list,
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> In application this would be a distribution that although unlikely to be
optimal against any specific adversary, it's has robust hardness across a
wide variety of adversaries.
So, the F-35?
Perhaps what needs considered is wether that is even possible; and against
which adversaries is TOR desig
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 11:34:54AM +, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > because "the right distribution" is a function of which adversary you're
> > considering, and once you consider k adversaries at once, no single
> > distribution will be optimal for all of them.)
>
I agree with Roger that ideall
> because "the right distribution" is a function of which adversary you're
> considering, and once you consider k adversaries at once, no single
> distribution will be optimal for all of them.)
Granted. But since we're speaking idealizations, I say take that the
expected-value over the distributi
