.
- Bump the version of the utls fork.
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too. As of 0.0.10 it no longer does.
Odd. None of that code, both in obfs4proxy and goptlib, has changed for
years. I'll look at it when I have a moment.
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
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/obfs4proxy/obfs4proxy-0.0.10.tar.xz
https://people.torproject.org/~yawning/releases/obfs4proxy/obfs4proxy-0.0.10.tar.xz.asc
Changes in version 0.0.10 - 2019-04-12:
- Disable behavior distinctive to crypto/tls when using utls.
- Bump the version of the utls fork.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
(meek_lite).
- More fixes to HTTP Basic auth.
- (meek_lite) Pin the certificate chain public keys for the default
Tor Browser Azure bridge (meek_lite).
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
[0]: obfs4proxy WILL NOT build with the upstream version of the library,
and the Firefox fingerprint will not function
see much
reason to over engineer it.
Regards,
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arantee that the connection used to
create the inner `http.RoundTripper` instance will be passed to the
correct thread.
Regards,
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ader (depending on how you want to treat TLS).
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ompatibility a good amount.
That said HelloChrome_Auto and HelloIOS_Auto both work fine against the
Azure bridge, so it might not be worth the effort.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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tag.
Questions, comments, feedback appreciated,
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to gitlab.
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AGPL3
network interaction requirement, though there is an exception for
bridges distributed via BridgeDB and those shipped with Tor Browser.
Regards,
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t
on such things, rather than being forced to
re-implement large parts of Tor Browser.
Regards,
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[0]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tbb-dev/2018-January/000743.html
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a to allow LEA/governments to exploit Tor
> Browser users easily? Because I don't think maintaining the sandboxed
> version is that much work and it is a great protection for many users.
LOL.
> So please, make Sandboxed Tor Browser an official thing.
Fuck you, pay me.
Regards,
--
ify files elsewhere on the system.
>
> Example:
>
> TOR_PT_STATE_LOCATION=/var/lib/tor/pt_state/
Regards,
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: Pitfalls of
Covert Channel Censorship Circumvention".
https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/ccs13-cya.pdf
Regards,
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I
still recommend a bit of a wait for tor to open the AF_UNIX socket.
While it usually is nearly instantaneous on modern systems, I had
intermittent problems with "the socket isn't there" related to trying
too fast.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpQp7PSFkF
eal with
this is via using `ControlPortWriteToFile` since the file gets
created after the control port listener is created. You could also use
something like inotify on Linux, but that's non-portable.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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On Mon, 1 Jan 2018 08:45:57 +
nullius <null...@nym.zone> wrote:
> On 2017-12-31 at 10:48:52 +, Yawning Angel
> <yawn...@schwanenlied.me> wrote:
> >This is pointless because internationalized domain names are
> >standardized around Punycode encoding (Unicode&l
at kind of allows development.
Regards,
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uld need
to tear down/respawn PTs, or someone needs to design an out of band IPC
mechanism between tor and PTs that can signal hibernation status.
The current approach to this problem involves toggling `DisableNetwork`.
See: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13213
Regard
ld be something like:
>
> $ tail -c+33 hs_ed25519_secret_key | base64 -w 0
>
> Considering the current situation with the encoded file on disk of
> the key, I think this is kind of the simplest approach?
Yeah. Just the Base64ed private key (excluding that header
; is
> because only clients and exits do the SHA1 step.)
I wonder how many of the relays have support for hardware assisted
SHA. (nb: I don't have access to ARMv8, Ryzen or a sufficiently new
Intel system, so I don't know how good the implementations are)
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
[0]: And
On Tue, 22 Aug 2017 20:47:06 +0200
Peter Schwabe <pe...@cryptojedi.org> wrote:
> Yawning Angel <yawn...@schwanenlied.me> wrote:
>
> Hi Yawning, hi all,
>
> > Ultimately none of this matters because Prop. 261 is dead in the
> > water. Assuming people want th
261 is dead in the
water. Assuming people want the new cell crypto to be both fragile and
to resist tagging attacks, Farfalle may be a better choice, assuming
there's a Keccak-p parameterization such that it gives adequate
performance.
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
pgp8RMxKugm9s.pgp
Description:
wasn't
thought to be quantum resistant in anyway shape or form, and providing
quantum resistance wasn't part of the design goals of the primitive, or
really why it was being considered at one point for use in Tor.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpKHB9bVRRUJ.pgp
Description: OpenPGP di
/cB8ymDZreINJhk7BI
> Qk6UM3PcutB7neTH3FR7DkVtSi23AOfOmlf0kNTSRZuMMB4gZO3KfZXGRWq1+FJ3
> [snip]
Why are you sending PGP encrypted e-mail to a public mailing list.
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ity.
I still don't understand what was so hard about implementing the old
API, on anything but iOS.
The "2.0" spec still doesn't have any provisions for using AF_LOCAL
instead of the loopback interface, go figure. It's not as if I bring
it up every time this topic comes up or anything
maybe the other people who
drafted the original document don't care as much as I do. I find
the attribution in the acknowledgments section entirely inadequate. I
explicitly credited all previous authors when I last rewrote the
specification for a reason.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpgdLflv6ASe.
+ e10s builds, *unless* bubblewrap is version 0.1.8 or newer.
Exiting firefox normally works as intended.
Regards,
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nctionality to a minimum, and something
that's part of the bundle it downloads/auto updates doesn't feel great
to me.
> Maybe this would be a good target for "experiment with Rust" if
> anyone's excited about writing control-port code in Rust...?
I disagree with this, but since it'll neve
t that to me is orthogonal to "there should be a flexible way to
offload name resolution" (a matter of implementation).
In practical terms the tor code would need modifications to allow
anything super exotic anyway, and I doubt anything will actually get
shipped with Tor Browser[0] ti
dresses already are a usability disaster. It
should be easy for researchers to experiment with designs to solve the
problem *now* before prop224 addresses make a bad situation worse.
There's also a world of difference between implementing/shipping the
capability to override the name resolution via plu
ed
up with.
Though I have the benefit of being able to force all application network
traffic through code I control, which makes life easier.
Regards,
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/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-September/009432.html
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21261
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11211
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
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I spoke with some people and got filled in. I'm not going to look at
the claim, because that's something for a legal department somewhere to
sort out, and not my problem.
Since the Simple variant is easier for others to implement, and
sidesteps the random asshats issue,
a
NewHope algorithm (and the NewHope-Simple paper does not mention this
at all either).
That said, implementing NewHope-Simple is trivial given NewHope (an
afternoon if that), so it's not something that worries me much.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpfwXt5HySuw.pgp
De
> functionality in a project I'm working on anyways.
This sort of tooling should (IMO) ideally be written in C, like
`tor-gencert`. Don't let my opinion here stop you or anything, and
it's just my opinion and does not reflect that of anyone else.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpyUrdmhe0TU.pgp
De
-browser/sandboxed-tor-browser.git/
Regards,
--
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[0]: If people are encountering this, particularly with the Debian
package, either upgrade `sandboxed-tor-browser` to the new release, or
update bubblewrap to 0.1.7 or later.
pgpvVzcP1lEqo.pgp
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
no longer have time to work on.
> What is the reason why archive.org is not used? I hear they are almost
> done setting up an onion service for the Internet Archive.
Because, out of all the similar services that are available, I like
archive.is the most.
Regards,
--
Yawning Ange
al). This also
will not work if there is a SOCKS port configured. Basically,
unless you are launching your own copy of the tor daemon, just for
non-anonymous HSes, it's a terrible idea to use these options in
general.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpA9Ze34XqQF.pgp
Description: OpenPGP di
h? I don't see the point since client access requires a priori
knowledge of the server's public key. I probably won't merge changes,
but as long as you comply with the license I don't care.
Regards,
--
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only place (by design) that the
sandbox code checks for the `bwrap` binary is `/usr/bin/bwrap` because
people should be getting their bubblewrap from a trusted source, and I
am envisioning a bright future when it's available as a package for all
distributions.
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
pgpoaSz3
oxed-tor-browser.git/
Regards,
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So the answer is, don't use the Linux sandboxing stuff until this sort
of thing is supported, if you have a really exotic config that you want
to have work[0].
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
[0]: The version number is going to be "0.0.1", and as of now I'm far
more concerned with getting th
On Thu, 24 Nov 2016 11:13:06 +1100
teor <teor2...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On 24 Nov. 2016, at 11:04, Yawning Angel <yawn...@schwanenlied.me>
> > wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 24 Nov 2016 01:43:15 +0200
> > s7r <s...@sky-ip.org> wrote:
> >
don't think it's productive to ask users to already support a new
> feature upon our first release providing the said feature.
If they aren't using existing interfaces correctly, when correct
behavior has been part of the interface since support for it was
added, quite frankly it's t
, remove the RSA1024/SHA1 code and we're all set.
What. Why. Anyone right now, that explicitly wants a v2 service
going forward, should use `ADD_ONION` correctly. It takes the type of
key for a reason.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgp2wVUuKfIgH.pgp
Descript
y, when
their tor is updated.
(People who expect `NEW:BEST` ADD_ONION-ed services to always give
RSA1024 based HSes, should fix their code since the spec makes no
guarantee that `BEST` will be RSA1024.)
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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the server obfs4
ntor handshake response to be more tollerant of clock skew.
- Reuse the read buffer when consuming obfs4 frames over the network to
reduce memory consumption. Patch by oxtoacart.
Thanks to the Lantern people for the memory consumption fix.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
On Sun, 30 Oct 2016 15:19:59 -0500
Tom Ritter <t...@ritter.vg> wrote:
> On Oct 29, 2016 12:52 PM, "Yawning Angel" <yawn...@schwanenlied.me>
> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, 29 Oct 2016 11:51:03 -0200
> > Daniel Simon <ddanielsim...@gmail.com> wrot
eds to be updated seems
terrible as well.
> > What is Tor developers' opinion about this? I personally don't see
> > any drawbacks and would be interested in discussing this further.
There, opinions.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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there, since it's the way of the future.
Regards,
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handshake performance relevant
because it is slow and superseded by ntor.
`src/test/bench` will give concrete numbers (~140 usec on a modern
Intel processor).
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
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nline:
> <https://github.com/NullHypothesis/exit-pinning>
Seems reasonable, but
How is this better than "Tor Browser will honor and aggressively
utilize onion addresses in Alt-Svc headers[0]".
Eg: Alt-Svc: onion="onionsarelongandsilly.onion:443"; ma=86400
Regards,
--
correctly.
* Doing things this way gave me more control over the sandbox
environment.
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fairly well.
The README.md file has more detailed documentation on how it works, the
sandbox environment, and the various caveats.
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;GETINFO
> onions/permanent" would be safest...?
Adding a third option would probably be the best, followed by extending
the response syntax. As I said, the `GETINFO` stuff was added
explicitly along and for the `ADD_ONION` command, with semantics to
match.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpi
lazy to make it cover the other stuff.
> Anyone who wants to open a ticket here, or has a counter argument? :)
Beyond the usual concerns of "the control port allows access to too
much, and has no concept of isolation or ACLs, and this would be a step
towards the worse", not really.
Re
ection process is closed
after the ClientHello is sent.
> * statefully track which tickets servers have issued, and block
>connections that use an unknown ticket.
This is probably feasible, particularly by the sort of people that have
been looking at ClientHello already anyway.
Regards,
--
Ya
gt;
> I'll consider it, but I want the onion service to be relatively
> permanent. It would best if the hostname didn't change every time tor
> restarted.
You realize that ADD_ONION supports using an existing private key right?
Like this: ADD_ONION RSA1024:[Blob Redacted] Port=80,192.16
l (See #16017), beyond "no one has cared enough to write
what should be a simple branch".
Regards,
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wser works as advertised, the only reason it needs
control port access for this sort of use case is the circuit display
(as of torbutton commit 36d849291ec0b20a582cd846fcd2540c9bbe,
sending NEWNYM should be unnecessary if domain isolation is
applied to everything).
Regards,
--
Yaw
carry over the blurb
covering this (though 6.0a5 did):
> We plan to post instructions for removing the code signing parts on
> our website soon. This should make it easier to compare the bundles
> we build with the actual bundles we ship.
The instructions don't exist yet, see #18925.
On Fri, 20 May 2016 12:03:59 -0400
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On 20 May 2016, at 11:59, Yawning Angel <yawn...@schwanenlied.me>
> > wrote:
> >
> > What's strange about it. The client does the path selection. To
> > build
ly don't want to be writing out the
microdescriptor list to non-volatile storage either, because
flash is garbage.
* Carry on keeping the working set in RAM under the assumption that
manufacturers will ship more RAM in their routers as time goes on.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpZj0M
On Thu, 12 May 2016 11:58:56 +0200
Jeff Burdges <burd...@gnunet.org> wrote:
> On Thu, 2016-05-12 at 05:29 +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> > and move the handshake
> > identifier into the encrypted envelope) so that only the recipient
> > can see which algorithm we're using
this is in the
works, and is approaching alpha state, though DID I MENTION NOT TO USE
IT YET?
Questions/Comments/Feedback welcome as always.
Regards,
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ment, gettor in general isn't unblockable because
there is no privacy/security for the request/response messages.
Regards,
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On Sun, 08 May 2016 02:00:51 +0200
Jeff Burdges <burd...@gnunet.org> wrote:
> On Sat, 2016-05-07 at 22:01 +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> > how an adversary will be limited to just this information, and not
> > things that enable a strong attack on it's own like packet
So. the evil observer on Alice's side gets:
* The total number of samples (N).
Bob (or Eve) gets:
* The seed, which may correspond to something that required N samples.
I don't think there's much pattern information available to the
attacker on Alice's side, but I may be missing
ed reasons, with something time
based being tossed around, but requiring a global clock isn't that
great, and leaks clock skew information (Though I would use something
like H(tweak | unixTime / 3600), which is rather coarse...), and as a
peace of mind thing, I do prefer randomizing `a` on a per-conn
public keys in the key
derivation) might lead to subtle vulnerabilities.
Regards,
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mentations well before
SIDH is a realistic option.
Regards,
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l relays be dir caches, we already
are increasing memory pressure on "things that are comically undersized
that shouldn't ever be HSDirs or DirCaches in the first place")
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_
On Sat, 2 Apr 2016 18:14:26 -0400
Ian Goldberg <i...@cs.uwaterloo.ca> wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 02, 2016 at 07:19:30PM +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> > It's not a request header set by the browser. archive.is is acting
> > like a HTTP proxy and explicitly setting X-F-F.
>
On Sun, 03 Apr 2016 16:37:45 +0200
Jeff Burdges <burd...@gnunet.org> wrote:
> On Sun, 2016-04-03 at 06:52 +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> > Your definition of "reasonably fast" doesn't match mine. The
> > number for SIDH (key exchange, when the thread was going off on
ymity system where the Exit possesses linkable client identifiers
between circuits/sessions is also a poor anonymity system.
*plonk*
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nt
to respond to e-mail, so asking them to optionally not set X-F-F, seems
like it'll go absolutely nowhere.
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
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ht
et
Signs, stay for the user scripts).
* I will eventually get annoyed enough at being linked to mobile
wikipedia that I will rewrite URLs to strip out the ".m.".
* Test this on Fennec.
* Maybe throw this up on addons.mozilla.org.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpKqMog0USwp.pg
I've provided the tricky bits of crypto in a few places to make it
possible to implement in other languages...
Regards,
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ht
[I hate replying to myself.]
On Wed, 23 Mar 2016 09:15:36 +
Yawning Angel <yawn...@schwanenlied.me> wrote:
> My "proof of concept" tech demo is what I consider good enough for
> use by brave people that aren't me, so I have put up an XPI package
> at: https://peopl
t *should* work on everything that isn't Orfox that's relatively
modern, YMMV.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
[0]: A very cynical/adversarial take on things. Opinions are my own,
etc, and I don't care if you're offended.
pgpS7slMkLTl3.pgp
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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with
RSA.
Note: The Ring-LWE variant of this hybrid construct would fulfill the
"both sides contribute material" clause (yay).
Regards,
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tor
for ECC have been EOLed and
no longer receive security fixes, so if your system is using
OpenSSL 0.9.8 (or 1.0.0 for that matter though it has ECC), you are
strongly encouraged to upgrade to something that is being maintained.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgpznz8AGq
datory and
> > preferred in the current stable series.
>
> Is ECDH currently mandatory or did you mean ECDHE?
Yes.
It uses ECDH with Ephemeral keys. Really, unless you vendor's OpenSSL
library is doing something Really Silly, or is ancient, this will Do
The Right Thing (TM).
--
Yaw
delaying the
release) motivated by "meek's behavior is unlike most other
transports" but I expect such things to be straight forward to those
that actually hack on the code.
Thanks to the person on Github for filing a pull request which saved me
time debugging.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
? Since you're using cgo you will run into Really Interesting
behavior wrt OS threads as you try to increase concurrency.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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connections
> per circuit. Maybe that's worth doing - but I'm not sure about the
> plan there, if we do decide to go that route.
Ah that's what that was. If you don't use it then, you won't have lots
of misery fighting with cgo's quirks.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
consider to backport it to 0.2.7 as well so
> other platforms can make use of it before we see tor 0.2.8 (without
> having to ask every package maintainer to maybe ship packages with
> the patch applied)?
The only thing that gets backports to stable releases are security and
compatibility fixes
link padding as a traffic analysis defense.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1512.00524
This is follow up research from M. Juarez's GSOC project which
prototyped the framework used when writing the paper and evaluating the
various algorithms.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
pgp5P4NZJRXsk.pgp
Description: Ope
building
against master or the pre-releases are currently on their own. Thanks
for the patch though.
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
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rt e2e correlation and AS diversity is sub optimal, but the current
plan is to add link layer padding as a defense (Though it comes at a
~60% cost).
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
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ass feature
would be a terrible idea for anyone that isn't a researcher because
people will likely get the path selection horrifically wrong.
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
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eading it to be unable
to alter or clean up said rules on HUP/exit.
Others are free to disagree, patches will be evaluated if someone
writes them.
Regards,
--
Yawning Angel
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ase see
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/708.pdf
> for arguments of those security levels.
Ah gotcha, I haven't seen that paper and I was going off the initial
estimates, thanks for the clarification.
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
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umbers (I did).
I know the algorithm is faster when vectorized but that does little
good for what I suspect are a substantial fraction of the relays.
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Yawning Angel
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my efforts
elsewhere.)
Regards,
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Yawning Angel
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istic threat to be concerned about.
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Yawning Angel
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ection 2.3).
* We have the opportunity (and code in master) to start using the FIPS
202 primitives. Since we need to modify the ntor code to anyway, we
should use SHA-3 and SHAKE256 instead of HMAC-SHA256 and HKDF-SHA256
respectively.
* Is it worth migrating our ECC to X448?
I'll be
same number of Keccak calls for either primitive during the
absorb phase, so there is no performance difference.
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Yawning Angel
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