> On 28 Oct 2015, at 14:31, Virgil Griffith wrote:
>
> Instead of WOT, it seems more desirable, and better fit diversity, to have
> both your best friends and worst enemies on the same circuit. Ergo,
> minimizing chance of collaboration.
Like Tails' friends, foes, and neutral HTP pools…
"any
Instead of WOT, it seems more desirable, and better fit diversity, to have
both your best friends and worst enemies on the same circuit. Ergo,
minimizing chance of collaboration.
-V
On Mon, 26 Oct 2015 at 01:30 grarpamp wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 8:44 AM, tor-dev had:
> > I agree with Roge
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 8:44 AM, tor-dev had:
> I agree with Roger that ideally all relays can be exits (and since
> we're being ideal, we'll assume that 'exit' means to every port). And
> the network location distribution of relays by bandwidth is
> proportional to both the client destination sele
> On 24 Sep 2015, at 23:10, Thomas White wrote:
>
> Signed PGP part
> Could we perhaps expand the contact information field in some way? One
> thing I was pondering a while ago was a social contact, not just an
> email address. I raised a very brief point about this with Virgil in
> Paris last y
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Could we perhaps expand the contact information field in some way? One
thing I was pondering a while ago was a social contact, not just an
email address. I raised a very brief point about this with Virgil in
Paris last year, but I think I made it very
Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Tor "exploits the military" into lending cover to activist groups,
> which they would presumably support.
> This may be too naive a view of the situation.
Exploit is definitely the wrong word here. Different people who
disagree about {policy|topic|whatever} can all see
Apologies for quick post.
If we want to a socially connected link, seems we can use the same
infrastructure for doing keysignings parties but we just use relay public
keys. That seems a nice distributed way of doing this.
On Thu, 24 Sep 2015 at 13:42 Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Can we not use the a
Can we not use the argument "anonymity requires diverse company" on both
sides? For whole rational actors it seems like this should work. Tor
"exploits the military" into lending cover to activist groups, which they
would presumably support.
This may be too naive a view of the situation.
Re: soci
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 06:18:58AM +, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> Exit nodes seem a nice place to start concretizing what's meant when we say
> we want relay diversity. Comments immensely appreciated because as-is I
> don't know the answers to these questions.
Hi Virgil,
I've been pondering the
> In application this would be a distribution that although unlikely to be
optimal against any specific adversary, it's has robust hardness across a
wide variety of adversaries.
So, the F-35?
Perhaps what needs considered is wether that is even possible; and against
which adversaries is TOR desig
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 11:34:54AM +, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > because "the right distribution" is a function of which adversary you're
> > considering, and once you consider k adversaries at once, no single
> > distribution will be optimal for all of them.)
>
I agree with Roger that ideall
> because "the right distribution" is a function of which adversary you're
> considering, and once you consider k adversaries at once, no single
> distribution will be optimal for all of them.)
Granted. But since we're speaking idealizations, I say take that the
expected-value over the distributi
On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 06:26:47AM +, Yawning Angel wrote:
> On Wed, 23 Sep 2015 06:18:58 +
> Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > * Would the number of exit nodes constitute exactly 1/3 of all Tor
> > nodes? Would the total exit node bandwidth constitute 1/3 of all Tor
> > bandwidth?
>
> No. There
On Wed, 23 Sep 2015 06:18:58 +
Virgil Griffith wrote:
> * Would the number of exit nodes constitute exactly 1/3 of all Tor
> nodes? Would the total exit node bandwidth constitute 1/3 of all Tor
> bandwidth?
No. There needs to be more interior bandwidth than externally facing
bandwidth since n
Let's try a simple special case. In an idealized Tor network, what would
the distribution of exit nodes look like?
* Would each exit node have the same bandwidth? Or would there instead be
only one exit node per AS?
* Would the number of exit nodes constitute exactly 1/3 of all Tor nodes?
Would t
15 matches
Mail list logo
