On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 05:21:26PM +0100, Philipp Winter wrote:
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 08:30:12AM -0500, Ian Goldberg wrote:
On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 01:40:43AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
obfs3 is supposed to be fairly difficult to detect because entropy
estimation is seemingly more
On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 01:40:43AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
obfs3 is supposed to be fairly difficult to detect because entropy
estimation is seemingly more difficult than typically assumed,
and thus far from what has been seen in practice this seems to be true.
Wouldn't the way to detect
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 08:30:12AM -0500, Ian Goldberg wrote:
On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 01:40:43AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
obfs3 is supposed to be fairly difficult to detect because entropy
estimation is seemingly more difficult than typically assumed,
and thus far from what has been
On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 01:40:43AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
obfs3 is supposed to be fairly difficult to detect because entropy
estimation is seemingly more difficult than typically assumed,
and thus far from what has been seen in practice this seems to be true.
There's a recent paper which
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 05:30:27PM +0100, Philipp Winter wrote:
On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 01:40:43AM +, Matthew Finkel wrote:
obfs3 is supposed to be fairly difficult to detect because entropy
estimation is seemingly more difficult than typically assumed,
and thus far from what has been
On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 06:12:47PM +, David Stainton wrote:
In that case would it then look like zero in $(organizational unit of
harvard) using tor and
one in $(organizational unit of harvard) using scramble suit?
I like the idea of the tor pluggable transport combiner... wherein we
On Wed, 15 Jan 2014 21:16:20 +, Jim Rucker wrote:
There was a story in the news recently of a Harvard student who used Tor to
send a bomb threat to Harvard in order to cancel classes so he wouldn't
have to take a test. He was apprehended within a day, which puts into
question the anonymity
On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 09:16:20PM -0600, Jim Rucker wrote:
Are there any projects in Tor being worked in to combat data correlation?
For instance, relays the send/recv constant data rates continuously -
capping data rates and padding partial or non-packets with random data to
maintain the
In that case would it then look like zero in $(organizational unit of
harvard) using tor and
one in $(organizational unit of harvard) using scramble suit?
I like the idea of the tor pluggable transport combiner... wherein we
could wrap a pseudo-random appearing obfuscation protocol (such as
I imagine the anonymity set would be much smaller for these combined
transports... fewer people using them.
In my understanding, the anonymity set doesn't apply to use of PTs since this
is only at the entry side. The exit side does not know[1] what PT the
originator is using, so is unable to
On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 7:16 PM, Jim Rucker mrjim...@gmail.com wrote:
[snip]
From my understanding (please correct me if I'm wrong) Tor has a weakness in
that if someone can monitor data going into the relays and going out of the
exit nodes then they can defeat the anonymity of tor by
Ximin Luo wrote:
In my understanding, the anonymity set doesn't apply to use of PTs
since this is only at the entry side. The exit side does not know[1]
what PT the originator is using, so is unable to use that information
to de-anonymise.
[1] at least, in theory should not know, perhaps
Yeah I guess if the PT doesn't draw attention and the bridge IP is not known
then one's Tor traffic may be somewhat obscured.
What about bananaphone? Do you mean the bananaphone PT?
It is trivially detectable... more so than say... a transport like obfs3
who's output looks like pseudo random
There was a story in the news recently of a Harvard student who used Tor to
send a bomb threat to Harvard in order to cancel classes so he wouldn't
have to take a test. He was apprehended within a day, which puts into
question the anonymity of Tor.
From my understanding (please correct me if I'm
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