Re: [tor-dev] Revisiting prop224 client authorization

On 17 Oct (13:35:24), George Kadianakis wrote: > George Kadianakis writes: > > > [ text/plain ] > > Hello, > > > > we've reached the point in prop224 development where we need to pin down > > the precise cell formats, so that we can start implementing them. HS > > client

Re: [tor-dev] Revisiting prop224 client authorization

George Kadianakis writes: > [ text/plain ] > Hello, > > we've reached the point in prop224 development where we need to pin down > the precise cell formats, so that we can start implementing them. HS > client authorization has been one of those areas that are not yet >

Re: [tor-dev] strange ARM results

Hi Rob. I suppose it's possible arm is having a refresh issue but can't say there's a known bug around that. To double check try running tor-prompt and giving it 'GETINFO circuit-status'... https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/down_the_rabbit_hole.html This is the command arm uses to get the

Re: [tor-dev] [prop269] Further changes to the hybrid handshake proposal (and NTor)

Hi Michael, Michael Rogers wrote: > If we're concerned with the server choosing its public material in such > a way as to bias the entropy extraction, does that mean that in this > case, the attacker is the server, and therefore the server's public > material shouldn't be included in the salt?

Re: [tor-dev] strange ARM results

On Mon, 2016-10-17 at 22:30 +1100, teor wrote: > > On 17 Oct 2016, at 22:04, Rob van der Hoeven > > wrote: > > > > Hi folks, > > > > I'm on a quest to find the average circuit-creation rate of clients. I > > looked in path-spec.txt to find an answer, but it wasn't

Re: [tor-dev] strange ARM results

> On 17 Oct 2016, at 22:04, Rob van der Hoeven wrote: > > Hi folks, > > I'm on a quest to find the average circuit-creation rate of clients. I > looked in path-spec.txt to find an answer, but it wasn't there. So I > thought: lets take some measurements using ARM. This

Re: [tor-dev] Tor Relays on Whonix Gateway

> On 17 Oct 2016, at 19:48, juanjo wrote: > > Interesting... I thought that a Tor client running a relay would actually > help its privacy because you can't tell if its a client connection or relay > connection… It depends what sort of privacy you're after. It provides a

[tor-dev] strange ARM results

Hi folks, I'm on a quest to find the average circuit-creation rate of clients. I looked in path-spec.txt to find an answer, but it wasn't there. So I thought: lets take some measurements using ARM. This got me some strange results. I start ARM, do some browsing, and close my browser. During the

Re: [tor-dev] [prop269] Further changes to the hybrid handshake proposal (and NTor)

On 14/10/16 22:45, isis agora lovecruft wrote: > 1. [NTOR] Inputs to HKDF-extract(SALT, SECRET) which are not secret > (e.g. server identity ID, and public keys A, X, Y) are now removed from > SECRET and instead placed in the SALT. > > Reasoning: *Only* secret data should be placed

Re: [tor-dev] Tor Relays on Whonix Gateway

Interesting... I thought that a Tor client running a relay would actually help its privacy because you can't tell if its a client connection or relay connection... El 17/10/2016 a las 3:04, teor escribió: On 7 Oct 2016, at 08:11, ban...@openmailbox.org wrote: Should Whonix

Re: [tor-dev] Tor Relays on Whonix Gateway

ban...@openmailbox.org transcribed 1.7K bytes: > On 2016-10-17 03:04, teor wrote: > >>On 7 Oct 2016, at 08:11, ban...@openmailbox.org wrote: > >> > >>Should Whonix document/encourage end users to turn clients into relays > >>on their machines? > > > >Probably not: > >* it increases the attack

Re: [tor-dev] [prop269] Further changes to the hybrid handshake proposal (and NTor)

On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 2:45 PM, isis agora lovecruft wrote: > > After discussion with John Schanck and Trevor Perrin over the last month, > we've decided to make some alterations to the specification for hybrid > handshakes in Tor proposal #269. > > It seems that John,