ban...@openmailbox.org transcribed 1.7K bytes:
> On 2016-10-17 03:04, teor wrote:
> >>On 7 Oct 2016, at 08:11, ban...@openmailbox.org wrote:
> >>
> >>Should Whonix document/encourage end users to turn clients into relays
> >>on their machines?
> >
> >Probably not:
> >* it increases the attack surfa
Interesting... I thought that a Tor client running a relay would
actually help its privacy because you can't tell if its a client
connection or relay connection...
El 17/10/2016 a las 3:04, teor escribió:
On 7 Oct 2016, at 08:11, ban...@openmailbox.org wrote:
Should Whonix document/encourage
On 14/10/16 22:45, isis agora lovecruft wrote:
> 1. [NTOR] Inputs to HKDF-extract(SALT, SECRET) which are not secret
> (e.g. server identity ID, and public keys A, X, Y) are now removed from
> SECRET and instead placed in the SALT.
>
> Reasoning: *Only* secret data should be placed in
Hi folks,
I'm on a quest to find the average circuit-creation rate of clients. I
looked in path-spec.txt to find an answer, but it wasn't there. So I
thought: lets take some measurements using ARM. This got me some strange
results. I start ARM, do some browsing, and close my browser. During the
br
> On 17 Oct 2016, at 19:48, juanjo wrote:
>
> Interesting... I thought that a Tor client running a relay would actually
> help its privacy because you can't tell if its a client connection or relay
> connection…
It depends what sort of privacy you're after.
It provides a certain level of traf
> On 17 Oct 2016, at 22:04, Rob van der Hoeven wrote:
>
> Hi folks,
>
> I'm on a quest to find the average circuit-creation rate of clients. I
> looked in path-spec.txt to find an answer, but it wasn't there. So I
> thought: lets take some measurements using ARM. This got me some strange
> resu
On Mon, 2016-10-17 at 22:30 +1100, teor wrote:
> > On 17 Oct 2016, at 22:04, Rob van der Hoeven
> > wrote:
> >
> > Hi folks,
> >
> > I'm on a quest to find the average circuit-creation rate of clients. I
> > looked in path-spec.txt to find an answer, but it wasn't there. So I
> > thought: lets
Hi Michael,
Michael Rogers wrote:
> If we're concerned with the server choosing its public material in such
> a way as to bias the entropy extraction, does that mean that in this
> case, the attacker is the server, and therefore the server's public
> material shouldn't be included in the salt?
In
Hi Rob. I suppose it's possible arm is having a refresh issue but
can't say there's a known bug around that. To double check try running
tor-prompt and giving it 'GETINFO circuit-status'...
https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/down_the_rabbit_hole.html
This is the command arm uses to get the cir
George Kadianakis writes:
> [ text/plain ]
> Hello,
>
> we've reached the point in prop224 development where we need to pin down
> the precise cell formats, so that we can start implementing them. HS
> client authorization has been one of those areas that are not yet
> finalized and are still inf
On 17 Oct (13:35:24), George Kadianakis wrote:
> George Kadianakis writes:
>
> > [ text/plain ]
> > Hello,
> >
> > we've reached the point in prop224 development where we need to pin down
> > the precise cell formats, so that we can start implementing them. HS
> > client authorization has been on
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