s, then it is true
that such a burst may occur during a speedtest measurement and inaccurately
indicate low capacity, but given that such bursts are infrequent, this problem
should occur infrequently among all Tor relays.
Best,
Aaron
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uot; in my torrc.
-- Aaron
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een aware, exits have had zero probability of being chosen in any
position other than the exit position.
Aaron
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/24, and the
results of the netflow-based attack detector, which processes the flows as
it gets them.
-- Aaron
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of mysterious
circumstances that should not have happened for which there is no
explanation.
Aaron, if there is anything I can do to help you please let me know.
If anything that I said above sparks a thought, please let me know :)
So in conclusion, I'm not done, I'm just not happy
hope that if you do decide to suspend your relays you will
bring them back in the future. You can also find me on IRC as aagbsn.
--Aaron
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measurements instead, however old those are?
-- Aaron
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. Is the ExitPolicy for
IPv6 completely separate (only using accept6/reject6 lines) or does it also
make use of lines like ExitPolicy accept *:80 which mention a port but not
an IPv4 IP?
-- Aaron
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or
domain name, or refuse the request.
-- Aaron
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On 2015-03-09 18:40, Markus Hitter wrote:
Am 09.03.2015 um 16:08 schrieb Steve Snyder:
Being able to separate webmail from the parent web presence (e.g.
gmail from google.com, Yahoo Mail from yahoo.com, etc.) would be a
big step forward in curbing spam. This would allow the exit
operation to
all ports open intentionally but weren't
really passing traffic.
-- Aaron
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protocol level.
-- Aaron
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available. I'd recommend making this more clear.
I may run this from a machine on the same network as my Tor node, but
definitely not on the Tor node itself.
-- Aaron
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,
mouseHouse, tornonym, or 75.137.122.118, I'd appreciate if you could pass
this along.
Thanks!
-- Aaron
---
I noticed your Tor node _ with an IP of _ is one of 19 nodes that accepts
connections publicly on TCP port 8118, which is the default port for
Privoxy. I
tried to optimize this at all.
-- Aaron
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.
-- Aaron
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. Look for Major features.
-- Aaron
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are not published by the directory authorities, but exits are. If a
censor is blocking the lists of (public) exits by IP, the obfsbridge won't
be much help.
--Aaron
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the target site will get relayed back to
the original client, so the traffic ratio should be 1:1 (unless, as
Andrea alluded to, the amount of bytes transported is significantly
less due to compression).
--Aaron
-
blog: baldric.net
gpg
the box.
What about directory mirrors?
--Aaron
I always argue that this is a good indicator for Tor traffic, and that
it is bad to mix Tor traffic with other traffic for that exact reason.
--
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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.
But in the light of an IP address is not identity -- is it
reasonable to block every user of an IP because one person (or bot) is
up to no good? Why do people insist on stopping problem behavior at
the network layer?
--Aaron
https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py
https
On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 1:16 AM, Aaron aag...@extc.org wrote:
On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 5:46 AM, tor-admin tor-ad...@torland.me wrote:
Hi,
I am operating two 1 GBit/s servers which host 7 exit nodes. One server is
located in GB with
torland1
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details
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