Re: [tor-relays] bridge offline

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 12/26/2019 07:08 PM, Anonforpeace wrote:
> Hello:
> 
> I had a power outage recently and I've restarted my bridge i.e. restarted the 
> daemon and tor, and when I check the Relay Search 
> section of Tor Metrics, it's taking a long time for my bridge to show
as online again.  Also, not sure if this matters, but I am
> running Linux Mint, and recently upgraded to the latest version, 19.3.
 Any ideas?

Let me know how this goes, as I'm switching from CentOS to Mint soon.




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[tor-relays] toranon (977)?!?

[Kenneth Freeman]

Messing around with my new computer I get this:

[warn]  /run/tor is not owned by this user, but by toranon (977).
Perhaps you are running Tor as the wrong user?

Duckduckgo displays hentai results. Go figure.




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Re: [tor-relays] FW: Lots of spam on new tor exit node.

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/08/2019 06:28 PM, teor wrote:

> Here's our advice for exit relays:
> * don't run them at home, if you're at risk from the police assuming the exit
>   traffic is your traffic

Excellent & standard advice, but I wonder what legally constitutes a
home or one's property. Can you (technically) set up a non-profit in
another room on campus? Say you have a farm with several buildings,
etc.  Curious as whether this has been tested!


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Re: [tor-relays] do not run exits at home

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 07/29/2019 10:54 AM, Happy Boy wrote:
> What I forgot to tell you: CyberTipline / USA investigated the IP and
> the bad data traffic with a report to the FBI, which then informed the
> german BKA. The friendly boys got me then 06:20Uhr gently from the sleep ...

Professionals.


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Re: [tor-relays] do not run exits at home

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 07/29/2019 06:45 AM, niftybunny wrote:
> I was contacted by the FBI, LKA, BKA and many other LEAs in Germany and never 
> had any trouble at all. 

For the non-Teutonic amongst you, Landeskriminalamt (State Criminal
Police) & Bundeskriminalamt, or Federal Criminal Police Office (Germany).

You can definitely run an exit in the U.S.A., albeit not. at. home. You
just need to run it under the aegis of a non-profit and have the
necessary legal and technical boilerplate in place! Complaints and
investigations hit the Teflon Kevlar shield forthwith.

That said, I am currently running an exit in Germany, AnosognosiaRedux,
which has a tad over a 0.4000% exit probability and a bit under 0.2000
consensus weight fraction. Deutschland über alles!

Closer to home, you can make a pitch for Tor as the browser to preclude
ad tracking to www.nextdoor.com. I've already had gotten good feedback,
so proselytize away!


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Re: [tor-relays] Become a Fallback Directory Mirror

[Kenneth Freeman]

B6C4C9A43658F686F8892CA5666717532F72979C



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Re: [tor-relays] Explaining Tor to worried parent

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 11/12/2018 10:14 AM, niftybunny wrote:
> Yeah, one of the complete bullshit things. I get around 200 emails per day 
> like this one:

This is good to know. My ISP just put my service on hold, whereas
IP-Echelon and its ilk can only sound ominous. Cue the theremin!
Zwiebelfreunde is the service I use, so I'm glad to hear it's such
a bulwark.



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Re: [tor-relays] Explaining Tor to worried parent

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 11/12/2018 08:23 AM, niftybunny wrote:

> 1. ISPs want to make money, in fact they have to turn in a profit to survive. 
> Yeah, I know 
>that sounds unbelievable. Tor is legal but someone has to take care of abuse 
>mails. These support 
>people want money for their work. If you get lots of abuse mails and
the support person is working
>for 2 house on them and cost the company 50 euros and you are paying 10
euros for the hosting, they
>will try to get rid of you. Its simple as that. Another issue is that
their is tier 1 support that
>is dumb as hell. Try to talk to KabelDeutschland “Internet Specialists"
(now Vodafone) about DNS
>issues or the OSI model. They have no clue at all und you get suicidal after a 
>few minutes over 
>the incompetence.

Just so. Legally ISP have to respond to DMCA notices, so the less legal
overhead they have to budget for the happier they are. When I first
began running Tor many moons ago I set up an exit node after an exchange
of e-mails with my ISP. Nonetheless they got a DMCA notice (copyright
violation) within two days and automatically cut me off at the knees.
I'm severely deaf and I had to phone the "Help" desk who weren't about
to deviate from their "Three strikes" script" and weren't interested
whatsoever in any input from my end other than following their protocol.




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Re: [tor-relays] Explaining Tor to worried parent

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 11/12/2018 05:53 AM, DrNotThatEvil wrote:

> Secondly she also raised the following question:
> 'if you don't do it somebody else will, so why do you put yourself at risk?

If not us, whom? If not now, when? ~Anabasis

>Thirdly she detected from the conversation that a Exit Relay might not
>be free from legal issues andI can't say that this is not the case, but 
>I do think her view of these issues is utmost grim bringing up my future
>and employment opportunities. How would do you view/explain the severity
>of these legal issues?

I run into this all the time whilst proselytizing for Tor, as for
example at a local non-profit makerspace recently. "Kiddie porn! FBI
raids!" was the hue and cry, whereupon people's brains shut down. But
this is very much a public relations issue, not a legal issue, assuming
that you have the prerequisite legal boilerplate in place. You do have
to be loaded for bear to run an exit and mind your p's and q's; I myself
am currently running an exit under the aegis of Zwiebelfreunde (Friends
of the Onion) in Germany, as they take care of the technical and legal
overhead & catch whatever flak comes its way.






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Re: [tor-relays] A general question for relay operators

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 06/28/2018 01:19 AM, arisbe wrote:
> Hello George and all,
> 
> When I was learning to implement Tor I had difficulty wading through the
> web pages for information.  Some pages were obsolete, some poorly
> maintained (think Tor flow or good/bad hosting companies).  The Tor
> manual is just a huge list of Tor terminology with no aids to help find
> things.  The Tor project site has no site map.  I still occasionally
> have the same problems when I try to find something.  I found this very
> discouraging as I tried to grow my first Tor node without a live person
> to help me.  I can imagine how daunting this would be to someone also
> trying to learn linux.
> 
> Hey, thanks so much for asking.  I appreciate your interest.

While the official Tor site arguably needs a thorough resign, designing
a manifold manual for diverse interests and levels of ability AND threat
models is no easy task. It's the classic security/ease of use conundrum!



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Re: [tor-relays] Running relays in universities? Exit nodes, perhaps? Please share your experience!

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 04/18/2018 11:34 AM, Gunnar Wolf wrote:

>> https://libraryfreedomproject.org/
> 
> But I didn't know this one. Thanks!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_Freedom_Project

(Full disclosure: I wrote the article.)




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Re: [tor-relays] less than 3 bw auths available: self-measurement (with 10k cap in effect)

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 03/02/2018 01:17 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:

> Turns out the issue was that the default bwauth backend (the server that
> serves the bandwidth files) went offline during our efforts to shuffle
> things around so www.torproject.org could survive this week's 15-20gbps
> ddos attack on our website.
> 
> Faravahar and moria1 were still using the default bwauth backend, but
> we've moved to a different one and things are looking fine again.
> 
> Never a dull moment,
> --Roger

Thanks for all of your hard work; Tor has good back office. I've been
off-line for a while myself because I've been trying to upgrade
equipment (& Tor itself -Error 2...?!?), and I'd rather not run relays
unless I'm running them according to Hoyle, i.e. up-to-date and secure.



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Re: [tor-relays] The Onion Box v4.1

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 01/14/2018 04:03 PM, Ralph Wetzel wrote:

> Give it a try! I'm looking forward receiving your feedback and answering your 
> questions.

I receive "[[Ernno 111]] Connection Refused"; running "$ sudo -u
debian-tor lib/theonionbox" yields "sudo: lib/the onionbox: command not
found" This on my 32-bit machine, Sunflower-II, running Ubuntu 12:04 LTS
and Tor 0.3.0.8 -deprecated, I know, I'll have to upgrade, I tug my
forelock. That said it runs just fine on Gaze, my 64-bit machine, which
is running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS & Tor 0.3.0.1 currently.

Good job on Onionbox! I've long regarded Arm-cum-Nyx as clunky; your UI
is gorgeous!




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Re: [tor-relays] collecting info on Wikipedia blocking non-exits

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 01/02/2018 02:13 PM, Alison Macrina wrote:

> If you run a non-exit relay, would you be so kind as to go to
> wikipedia.org from that IP, click "edit" on any page, and report to me
> off-list if your relay is blocked or not? In your message, please give
> me your relay address and let me know if it's ever functioned as an exit
> before.
> 
> Thank you!

Back in the day, as in the first days of my running Tor, I briefly ran
an exit node and promptly got a DMCA take-down notice from my ISP and an
education. I *might* be able to dig up its fingerprint...



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Re: [tor-relays] Become a Fallback Directory Mirror

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 12/20/2017 04:50 PM, teor wrote:
> Dear Relay Operators,
> 
> Do you want your relay to be a Tor fallback directory mirror?
> Will it have the same address and port for the next 2 years?
> Just reply to this email with your relay's fingerprint.

CE24412AD69444954B4015E293AE53DDDAFEA3D6




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Re: [tor-relays] Tor Advocacy, Political & Artistic

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 12/18/2017 12:15 PM, Vasilis wrote:
> Hello Kenneth,

> Thank you for running an exit relay.
> Anonymity is useful for all creatures. :)

Just a relay, but anonymity is needful.

>> I have been told that Tor is conceptually difficult to wrap your head
>> around, but these are useful mission fields.
> 
> Any specifics on what is the conceptually difficulty to Tor?

The need to be anonymous, how to configure your threat model, and how
the anonymity is provided by Tor. An LGBT kid has different gestalt than
a cop or a whistle blower. Joe Six-Pack might just want to avoid ad
tracking; a human rights activist might want to avoid being killed.
Etc.



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[tor-relays] Tor Advocacy, Political & Artistic

[Kenneth Freeman]

I've recently touted establishing a Tor exit node at the inaugural Boise
organizing committee of the Democratic Socialists of America.

The idea was considered esoteric, but such anonymity craft is useful for
activists of all stripes.

Too, performing artists (neo-burlesque, LGBTQ comics, etc.), punks and
anarchists have also expressed interest in Tor.

I have been told that Tor is conceptually difficult to wrap your head
around, but these are useful mission fields.



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Re: [tor-relays] companies and organizations running relays

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 12/06/2017 07:01 AM, Chuck McAndrew wrote:
> Hi Alison,
> The Lebanon Public Libraries in Lebanon NH are still running our exit.
> Regards
> Chuck

Speaking from local knowledge, one would have thought that libraries
setting up Tor browsers for their patrons would be a no-brainer, but
it's slow going.

That said, plans are afoot for a local non-profit maker space to have a
legally distinct non-profit hacker space established at its venue to run
an exit.

Privacy advocacy takes some savvy...





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Re: [tor-relays] Feedback wanted: letter to my university's library

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 10/03/2017 11:31 PM, Scott Bennett wrote:

>  They have refused to let me speak with those making the decisions about
> what is provided on their public computers, much less to make an organized
> presentation to them.  I was told that the decisions about software on the
> computers are made by the library board, not even by the IT staff.  What is
> a good approach to get better results?  I am at a loss as to how to get the
> library to emerge from the stone age into the age of the Cheka, much less
> that of the NSA, FSB, search engine profilers, botnets, packet sniffers,
> spyware, etc.

One might think that providing the Tor browser would be a no-brainer,
but that's not the case in the Boise Public Library system. The
bureaucratic inertia is a very real thing, so good luck getting them to
install relays and exits too! First things first.



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Re: [tor-relays] A Naïve Question About ARM

[Kenneth Freeman]

I'm running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS (Precise Pangolin) on my 32-bit machine,
but this is useful information for my Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (Xenial Xerus)
64-bit machine, which is a test bed slated to be a Tor exit at a local
hackerspace.

That said, having bought a new keyboard I've rebooted and ARM brought
Tor 0.3.0.5-rc right up. It says the relaying is disabled, which it
isn't, and that no GeoIP database is not found, although the connections
are viewable, so go figure.

On 05/13/2017 12:51 PM, Monkey Pet wrote:
> If you are using a debian derivative distro, follow:
> 
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en
> (select tor from source, select either stable or experimental)
> Build it, then install it..
> 
> 
> If not debian, use the other guides there in the expert section..
> 
> Also remember, Raspbian isn't Debian:
> *Raspbian is not Debian.* These packages will be confusingly broken for
> Raspbian users, since Raspbian called their architecture armhf but Debian
> already has an armhf. See this post
> 
> for
> details.
> 
> However for Raspbian, if you get the source packages for debian, you should
> be able to compile and install it correctly. I have done it.


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[tor-relays] A Naïve Question About ARM

[Kenneth Freeman]

This is possibly a naïve question, but I like to compile and run the
alpha/unstable version of Tor, but for the life of me I can't figure out
how to get ARM to run the latest version. I'm currently running
Anosognosia (Fingerprint: 9536B457F01F40696B131A72BC102343759F46AA),
but it's stuck in the unrecommended Tor 0.2.7.5 and I'd like it to run
0.3.0.5-rc. Please explain it to me like I'm eight. Thanks!

P.S.
I understand that ARM is crufty is shall be updated, and furthermore, I
miss Vidalia.


























































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Re: [tor-relays] Proselytizing Tor at the General Strike

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 02/15/2017 06:00 PM, Kenneth Freeman wrote:
> On February 17, the day before Presidents Day, a general strike shall be
> held against any and all things Trump. If Boise is having an activists
> workshop, then there are plenty of tranches of fertile ground nationwide
> to plant Tor browsers, relays, and exit nodes.

(I meant the day before Presidents Day weekend, of course.)

Nearly 200 people turned out for An Evening of Resistance Building,
several of whom I introduced to Tor. I was even asked about the t-shirt.
Speaking as a privacy advocate, it was an evening well spent.



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[tor-relays] Proselytizing Tor at the General Strike

[Kenneth Freeman]

On February 17, the day before Presidents Day, a general strike shall be
held against any and all things Trump. If Boise is having an activists
workshop, then there are plenty of tranches of fertile ground nationwide
to plant Tor browsers, relays, and exit nodes.

http://sfist.com/2017/02/02/nationwide_general_strike_gains_tra.php

http://strike4democracy.com/

https://www.facebook.com/events/1756631744665376/

There's activism, and then there's activism. I would steer clear of
actual OpSec unless you're in the right milieu.

I have been told in introducing Tor that it can be difficult to
conceptualize. I always tell people that your privacy is more
configurable than you may realize, and that privacy horizons differ.

Get down. Get encrypted.






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Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: If you are on 0.2.9.x, make sure you are running 0.2.9.9

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 02/09/2017 07:25 PM, teor wrote:

>> I haven't been able to upgrade from Tor 0.2.7.5, which ARM tells me in
>> red type is "unrecommended," which seems alarming. I'm running
>> 3.2.0-121-generic-pae GNU/Linux on Ubuntu 12.04 (precise).
> 
> If you're on Ubuntu (or Debian) you can get the latest packages using
> these instructions:
> 
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en

Many thanks. I'd no clue that this was a Debian release issue -I've been
compiling Tor upgrades and running ARM willy-nilly without result!




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Re: [tor-relays] Proposing an Exit Node

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 01/17/2017 12:00 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 16, 2017 at 11:49:46PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
>> Or you need adequate anonymity, and be willing to lose sunk cost.
> 
> I think trying to run exit relays with anonymity, and with plans to
> discard them as needed, is a poor plan long-term. In the struggle for
> what the Internet can become, we need to be public and clear about who
> we are and why privacy is important for everybody.

I concur. Curiously, there has to be a public face and public venues for
anonymity as a service.

> (Yes, that looks like a contradiction, but I claim it isn't: privacy
> is about giving people choices, and to win this conflict we need some
> people who will make the choice to step up and be public and build
> relationships.)

A local makerspace was already planning on setting up a separate
hackerspace as is own legal entity for purposes of compartmentalization
when I introduced them to Tor.

> This "slash and burn agriculture" approach to running Tor relays, where
> you set up an exit relay, and if anybody gets angry you move on to
> another ISP, is really appealing since it's simple, but it assumes the
> Internet is infinite. If in fact we're destroying land without regard
> to sustainability, and we run out of land...

The trick, as I understand it, is to preclude the ISP from any legal
exposure or overhead whatsoever.

> The Internet is smaller and more centralized than we think, and we need
> the people who run it to see us as a worthwhile positive and contributing
> community.

I couldn't agree more.



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Re: [tor-relays] FW: What's a "useful" mailing list contributor? (was Re: What's a "useful" relay?)

[Kenneth Freeman]

Tor could use an Eternal September.

On 01/16/2017 10:11 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> I would support Rana's volunteer proposal as described,
> and growing integration, as being a beneficial contribution.
> Let us not forget, all begin as noobs to a norm, and full
> normalization may be chilling to diversity.




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[tor-relays] Proposing an Exit Node

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 01/16/2017 11:49 AM, Olaf Grimm wrote:
> An exit node at home is funny. Last year I've got visitors from law
> enforcement early in the morning. Now I have some new "friends" from the
> police department.
> 
> Be warned! They take a look on bad movies and assume you are the one...
> 
> Now I have my servers outside and at home a middle node only.

This is best practice. And even under a proposed corporate aegis (LLC,
nonprofit hackerspace, etc.) CP always comes up and the pearl clutching
commences. FBI raids, PR, yadda-yadda-yadda... You have no ethical or
criminal liability for criminal usage of the network, but that said you
really need to be loaded for bear to run an exit node.






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Re: [tor-relays] Uptime missing from Arm

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 01/16/2017 11:07 AM, Petrusko wrote:

> To resume,
> So it's working by cloning the git repository as you wrote.
> chown -R debian-tor:debian-tor *
> inside folders /stem and /nyx
> 
> Then (relay with default control socket)
> cd nyx
> sudo -u debian-tor ./run_nyx

This (or just "nyx") yields:
Unable to connect to tor. Are you sure it's running?

> OR (relay with control port, here example 9053)
> sudo -u debian-tor ./run_nyx -i 9053

This yields:
Unable to connect to 127.0.1:9053: [Errno 111] Connection refused.

Errno being a Muppet previously unknown to me.






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Re: [tor-relays] LLC vis-à-vis Nonprofit

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 10/27/2016 05:17 PM, Kenneth Freeman wrote:
> 
> 
> On 10/26/2016 06:58 PM, Nicholas Merrill wrote:
> 
>> Hi Kenneth
>>
>> I am with a New York state non-profit organization that runs a number of
>> exits.  I am not a lawyer, but I have surely spent years discussing
>> these and other related issues with many lawyers.
> 
> Good to know. Keeps me and my cohorts from reinventing the wheel.
> 
>> I could be wrong, but I think LLC was only mentioned as an example of a
>> type of legal entity in that article.  It's not that you couldn't use a
>> classic "C corporation" just the same.   The central point was to have a
>> separate legal entity - a corporation ( even an incorporated association
>> or club might work.)  A non-profit is generally formed as a corporation
>> anyway.
> 
> I figured as much, on both counts, but I wanted to nail it down. That a
> Tor exit node is best run under the aegis of some sort of corporate
> set-up is a given; *which* set-up doesn't particularly matter. Is this a
> fair assessment?
> 
>> So probably that Idaho nonprofit would be fine.  I'd be happy to talk to
>> them if it's helpful, and/or provide referrals to others.
> 
> Much appreciated! Come to think of it, there's another nonprofit venue
> with which I am involved which may be suitable for Tor. Stay tuned.

I have set up a Tor bridge relay at a local artists collective as a
CryptoParty installation. There had been considerable discussion about
liability and FBI raids (child pornography makes for pearl clutching),
and as to whether Tor fits into their artistic mission, but this maker
space now has a didactic test bed.

Once the camel has its nose under the tent flap, the rest of the camel
shall follow, wifi permitting. And given the onslaught of Trump, the
fears of Tor "being deemed political" are moot.




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Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Spam mailout

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 11/21/2016 08:33 AM, Alison wrote:

> Hi Petrusko,
> 
> I got the same to this riseup account, which is not connected to a
> relay. So it may be targeting riseup users.

This riseup account is connected to my relays, and I haven't received
this "Spam mailout" message.





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Re: [tor-relays] LLC vis-à-vis Nonprofit

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 10/26/2016 06:58 PM, Nicholas Merrill wrote:

> Hi Kenneth
> 
> I am with a New York state non-profit organization that runs a number of
> exits.  I am not a lawyer, but I have surely spent years discussing
> these and other related issues with many lawyers.

Good to know. Keeps me and my cohorts from reinventing the wheel.

> I could be wrong, but I think LLC was only mentioned as an example of a
> type of legal entity in that article.  It's not that you couldn't use a
> classic "C corporation" just the same.   The central point was to have a
> separate legal entity - a corporation ( even an incorporated association
> or club might work.)  A non-profit is generally formed as a corporation
> anyway.

I figured as much, on both counts, but I wanted to nail it down. That a
Tor exit node is best run under the aegis of some sort of corporate
set-up is a given; *which* set-up doesn't particularly matter. Is this a
fair assessment?

> So probably that Idaho nonprofit would be fine.  I'd be happy to talk to
> them if it's helpful, and/or provide referrals to others.

Much appreciated! Come to think of it, there's another nonprofit venue
with which I am involved which may be suitable for Tor. Stay tuned.




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[tor-relays] LLC vis-à-vis Nonprofit

[Kenneth Freeman]

An Idaho nonprofit has expressed guarded interest in Tor. Ideally I'd
like them to run an exit node without fuss or bother, but the Tor
Project's Tips on Running an Exit Node only covers limited liability
corporations (LLCs) regarding the legal/corporate set-up. Is there
anything to add, or is that sufficient? Thanks in advance.



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Re: [tor-relays] ISP, Abuses , Intrusion Prevention etc.

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 10/10/2016 11:43 AM, Green Dream wrote:
>>> I set up my own ISP (AS28715) so I could run Tor exits etc without any
>>> trouble.
>>
>> Could you share a bit more about what is involved in doing that?
> 
> 
> I'd also be very interested in learning more about setting up an ISP
> for Tor. Is it a non-profit? How many man hours did it take (roughly)
> to get the structure in place? How much money (roughly) did it take?
> How much legal consultation did it require to setup?

I'm intrigued by this myself. Although Brass Horn Communications is a
British entity, and the best practice is for exit nodes to be run under
the aegis of *some* sort of corporate set-up (non-profit, shell company,
libraries, university IT departments, and what-have-you), I hadn't known
that a /pro forma/ ISP was even a thing, if indeed that's what we're
talking about here.



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Re: [tor-relays] Which OS gives usually the best performance for a relay?

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/07/2016 10:34 AM, George wrote:
> On 09/07/16 11:54, Farid Joubbi wrote:
>> I had not thought of the diversity that way.
> 
> There's a host of diversity issues with Tor to cover, but I tend to
> think OS diversity is one of the more critical.

With apologies to Akira Kurosawa, I think of this as the Seven Samurai
Problem. Diverse samurai are a given; their optimum deployment is not.

> The ultimate difficulty in doing a test comparison is creating identical
> scenarios.  Tor is a  more or less random anonymity routing network,
> which breaks any notion of repeatability.

The Tor network is uniquely protean.

>> I realize that I might not get any good answers since my question is
>> kind of broad and unspecific.
> 
> Clearly you are asking the right questions, which is what's critical IMHO.
> 
> Not directing to the OP, but I also strongly think one should stick with
> the OS they are most comfortable in administering, regardless of
> diversity questions.  If someone's never used a Unix-like system before,
> and can't manage to edit a file with vi(1), start elsewhere :)

I couldn't agree more. I don't get under the hood much; I rely on Ubuntu
Linux and Tor's default configuration. Other relays are much more finely
tuned, I'm sure, on machinery replete with all the bells and whistles.
In this regard the old engineering dictum that "The best is the enemy of
the good enough" (which itself dates to Voltaire) is pertinent. We have
a diverse ecosystem of volunteers, which perforce deploys a host of
heterogeneous attack surfaces. I'm not going to tweak what I don't
understand. I'm not a Kyūzō; I'm a Heihachi.




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Re: [tor-relays] Tor and Diplomatic Immunity

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/04/2016 07:31 PM, Mirimir wrote:
> On 09/04/2016 09:11 AM, Kenneth Freeman wrote:
>> Do embassies and consulates run Tor nodes? AFAIK no studies have been
>> done on this, but diplomatic immunity and Tor would seem to be a match
>> made in Heaven.
> 
> Well, they need uplinks, right? I doubt that diplomatic immunity forces
> ISPs to serve them. Private routing is possible, of course, but is
> probably too expensive for most.

Whatever their budgetary considerations, embassies and consulates afford
diplomatic safe spaces for Tor nodes.


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Re: [tor-relays] Tor and Diplomatic Immunity

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/04/2016 07:31 PM, Mirimir wrote:
> On 09/04/2016 09:11 AM, Kenneth Freeman wrote:
>> Do embassies and consulates run Tor nodes? AFAIK no studies have been
>> done on this, but diplomatic immunity and Tor would seem to be a match
>> made in Heaven.
> 
> Well, they need uplinks, right? I doubt that diplomatic immunity forces
> ISPs to serve them. Private routing is possible, of course, but is
> probably too expensive for most.

Whatever their budgetary constraints, the diplomatic immunity avoids a
safe space for Tor nodes for embassies and consulates. I don't know of
any who run any, though.


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[tor-relays] Tor and Diplomatic Immunity

[Kenneth Freeman]

Do embassies and consulates run Tor nodes? AFAIK no studies have been
done on this, but diplomatic immunity and Tor would seem to be a match
made in Heaven.


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Re: [tor-relays] tor-relays Digest, 3 questions on torcc file

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/03/2016 05:35 PM, jensm1 wrote:
> I agree to everything Matt said.
> 
> A good rule of thumb for tor configuration is "leave everything at
> default, unless you've got a reason to change it".

I concur. Generally speaking you really don't have to get under the hood
much. Tor's ready to roll right out of the chute!



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Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/01/2016 01:47 AM, grarpamp wrote:
> On 8/31/16, Kenneth Freeman <kencf0...@riseup.net> wrote:

>> To me it seems to be a bit late in the day for a Cambrian
>> Explosion -let a thousand anonymity networks bloom and see where it gets
>> you.
> 
> I wouldn't say that. So long as any particular network is
> incapable or insufficient at resisting certain adversaries...
> or any of its models on the people or other sides of things
> are non ideal, or it just doesn't do what its users need it to
> do, there's in fact every expectation that other networks
> should and will bloom up. 1000? No of course not. Yet a
> handful of similar nets based on some feature chart... sure.

I was riffing a bit on Mao's infamous Hundred Flowers Campaign. "The
policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of
thought contend is designed to promote the flourishing of the arts and
the progress of science." Depends on your threat model, I suppose.



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Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 08/31/2016 04:39 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> On 8/31/16, Green Dream  wrote:
>> Well said grarpamp.
>>
>>> there are plenty of other already existing, interesting, and
>>> upcoming anonymous overlay networks for transporting IP, messaging,
>>> storage and so on.
>>
>> Mind sharing some names here so I can research further?
> 
> Well, regarding recent threads...
> 
> There's the IndependentOnion / RotorBrowser / Rotor project.
> See the links and audio below for more info on how the latter is
> beginning to take shape and unfurl its own sails.

Flash proxy may be of some utility here, although to the best of my
knowledge it is not in wide use.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_proxy

As for the burgeoning of anonymity networks other than Tor, it'll be
interesting to see what level of interest law enforcement organs take in
them, if any. To me it seems to be a bit late in the day for a Cambrian
Explosion -let a thousand anonymity networks bloom and see where it gets
you.





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Re: [tor-relays] Two bridge relay questions

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 08/04/2016 05:04 PM, isis agora lovecruft wrote:

> Thanks for running an obfs4 bridge!

Which reminds me... I run an obfs6 bridge, the current status of which
is "Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 2 days 0:00 hours, with 0 circuits open.
I've sent 1.19 MB and received 23.27 MB," so presumably it's doing some
non-flashy good. I'd like to be able to see more of what it's doing, if
not to direct its activity, but that said plain vanilla bridges are good
too!



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Re: [tor-relays] BoingBoing Says Running Exits Is No Trouble re: LEA

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 07/06/2016 01:01 PM, grarpamp wrote:
> https://boingboing.net/2016/07/01/researchers-find-over-100-spyi.html
> "Many people fear that running an exit node will put them in police
> crosshairs if it gets used in the commission of a crime. For the
> record, Boing Boing runs a very high-capacity exit node, and though
> we've received multiple contacts from US law enforcement, we've just
> explained that this is a Tor node that runs with logging switched off,
> and thus we have no information that'll be relevant to any
> investigations, and the officers involved have thanked us and gone
> away without further trouble." -- BoingBoing

Along those lines, it is possible to incorporate yourself. The default
is "Don't talk to cops," but if any individuals have incorporated
themselves to provide that helpful corporate legal layer I am unaware of
it. In any case, have your legalese in place. Law enforcement agencies
would rather not waste resources.





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Re: [tor-relays] BoingBoing Says Running Exits Is No Trouble re: LEA

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 07/06/2016 01:09 PM, Green Dream wrote:
> Except the operators at BoingBoing have the privilege of corporate
> liability (instead of personal liability), and very likely corporate
> counsel (i.e., a nice legal team) as well.
> 
> It seems easier to say "don't worry about it, it's not really a problem"
> from that perspective.
> 
> For the average Tor volunteer operator, all that comfort, protection and
> privilege is gone. _My_ ass is on the line. Or at least it feels that way.
> 
> I guess I'm saying, I wouldn't get too comfortable. Definitely not to the
> point of breaking rule #1 of running an exit -- don't do it from home.

Exits are best run from some corporate set-up for this very reason. They
have the legal infrastructure baked in, so to speak.

In there's one phrase you never want to be on the wrong side of, it's
"The way the law is written..."

In today's Slashdot article on "honions" the Library Freedom Project was
touted, and for very good reason.

https://yro.slashdot.org/story/16/07/08/2034209/researchers-discover-over-100-tor-nodes-designed-to-spy-on-hidden-services#comments

So go to your local library's board meeting and tout Tor exits!



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Re: [tor-relays] Exit node situation in Finland

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 04/01/2016 04:54 PM, Sam Lanning wrote:
> Hi Juha,
> 
> I'd just like to say great work! I'm sure I speak for everyone when I say I
> really appreciate the local advocacy and positive vibes you're spreading!
> Exciting stuff and a good situation to be in!
> 
> I'm sure Alison and Nima in particular will be very excited about the
> library stuff!

I've thought the same. The burgeoning of Tor in various nation-state
library systems is particularly cogent!



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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 03/09/2016 07:09 AM, Cristian Consonni wrote:

> We have a saying in Italian that says "Chiedere è lecito, rispondere è
> cortesia".
> Roughly translated "Asking is allowed, answering is courtesy", that is
> you can ask for whatever you want, maybe somebody will respond, or
> don't, whatever.
> 
> I am happy to see that there is a community where people can ask for
> and receive help in many forms.
> 
> Of course, in general, if somebody wants to chip in funding remember
> that you can:
> * donate to Tor project
> * get together to run machines
> * donate to groups that run many machines (see torservers.net)
> 
> We could start talking about which is the most efficient way to spend
> money, but should we?

Serendipitously I was telling my tax lady about the Tor Project and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation today. Being support troop on that level
is good. Being able to run a stable array of Tor exit nodes because
you've been able to acquire the necessary institutional knowledge due to
having reliable money stream is also good.

Presumably the fiscal and corporate diversity of the Tor network makes
for hybrid vigor. There's an old engineering maxim (which I believe
dates back to Voltaire) that "The best is the enemy of the good enough."
Accordingly you may plant yourself on Tor's fitness landscape wherever
you want. The environment is quite varied.


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Re: [tor-relays] atlas not showing 3 days and 1 week graphs

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 01/10/2016 08:35 PM, krishna e bera wrote:
> Is atlas.torproject.org broken or changed?
> It seems to show only 1 month and longer graphs now.

I've wondered about this myself. I'm currently running two relays,
Anosognosia and AnosognosiaToo, and the latter has never shown up on
Atlas although it's active. I've been running it for less than a month,
though, and it's DirPort and ORPort aren't accessible. I'm probably
missing something fairly basic!



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Re: [tor-relays] Unbelieveable

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 12/03/2015 10:09 PM, Michael McConville wrote:
> Kurt Besig wrote:
>> Well. even a doctor would make a few suggestions based on some sort of
>> experience based reasoning. Perhaps some connection problems
>> associated with running tor-arm on a VPS vs. a home server...things of
>> that nature. Also I was just wondering as I don't see many of the
>> relay operators that used to post to this list around anymore, has
>> something changed to make them move on??
>> Lots of people whining about their consensus weight numbers, but
>> little of substance being posted.
> 
> The people who know what they're doing can quickly, reliably
> set-and-forget relays. That's the ideal scenario - tweaking knobs is
> mostly a liability and performance issues are a development concern.

This is very much the case.


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Re: [tor-relays] TorFlow

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 11/10/2015 04:57 AM, mick wrote:

> Any idea where that concentration of 16 relays South of Ghana in the
> Gulf of Guinea is? The traffic there seems disproportionate to the size
> of the location. 

What jumped out for me were the 109 relays (!) northeast of Wichita,
Kansas. At first I assumed Lawrence, it being a college town and all,
but it's Potwin, estimated population 441.

> Mick
> 
> (Beautiful and really cool visualisation BTW. Many thanks to the
> designer(s) and coder(s)).

Couldn't agree more. Kudos to all involved!




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Re: [tor-relays] TorFlow

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 11/10/2015 04:19 PM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Nov 2015, at 09:44, Kenneth Freeman <kencf0...@riseup.net> wrote:

>> What jumped out for me were the 109 relays (!) northeast of Wichita,
>> Kansas. At first I assumed Lawrence, it being a college town and all,
>> but it's Potwin, estimated population 441.
> 
> Any IP to location mapping is imperfect, which is why location-aware secure 
> protocols are hard.

No kidding! I figured it was an artifact of some sort.

> When I looked up the local servers of some big US companies, they were all 
> listed as being on the US west coast, rather than the Australian east coast. 
> That's a pretty big inaccuracy.

I've often wondered how these faux locations are actually generated,
which is an interesting study in and of itself. The map is not the
territory and all that.



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[tor-relays] TorFlow

[Kenneth Freeman]

A gorgeous visualization of the Tor's data traffic. Feast your eyes!

https://torflow.uncharted.software/



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Re: [tor-relays] (no subject)

[Kenneth Freeman]

It's our version of 4'33".

On 10/07/2015 09:00 AM, Dominik Ungar wrote:
> Was this thread created by accident?
> Am 07.10.2015 13:56 schrieb "Bandie Yip Kojote" :
> 
> I guess you are right.
> 
> On 10/07/2015 01:48 PM, ??? wrote:


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[tor-relays] Library Freedom Project

[Kenneth Freeman]

This institutional support for the Tor Project is extremely important.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_Freedom_Project

The Tor Browser and Intellectual Freedom in the Digital Age
https://journals.ala.org/rusq/article/view/5704/7092



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Re: [tor-relays] Experience hosting exit relay with Costa Rica Servers: crservers.com

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/08/2015 12:14 PM, Patrick O'Doherty wrote:
> I received the following response from them:
> 
>> We do not discriminate on the use of any protocol among our customers.
>> Nevertheless, if we get complains or any type of pressure from public or 
>> private 
>> entities for illegal activity occurring in your server, we will have to 
>> suspend 
>> service.
>> You will be immediately contacted about any issue that arises.

This explanation is marvelously vague.

> so it would appear that they're not too friendly about hosting exit
> relays. I've asked if they can forward all abuse complains to be instead
> of immediately terminating service, but I'm not too hopeful.

My hunch is that they just don't want to deal with the complaints and
legal & administrative overhead -it's more cost-effective just to cut
you off. When I first set up Tor some years ago I briefly ran it as an
exit node, having sent an explanatory e-mail to my ISP, but I very
quickly learned that once they receive a DMCA notice they cut you off at
the knees, whereupon you're dealing with "help" desk morons working from
a very strict script. Best to run an exit node from a corporate set-up
with the legal boilerplate already in place.



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[tor-relays] Does Setting Up a Bridge Relay Disable the Browser?

[Kenneth Freeman]

This may be a naïve question, but I've fired up my 64-bit Debian box now
that the nights are cool, and editing the torrc to establish a bridge
relay borks the browser. I provide anonymity much more than I use it
myself, but is the bridge relay copacetic? Thanks in advance.


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Re: [tor-relays] Does Setting Up a Bridge Relay Disable the Browser?

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/07/2015 12:25 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:

> Well, it depends what you put in the torrc file. I assume you edited
> the torrc file that's inside the tor browser directory tree? Perhaps
> you did something there that it didn't like. Maybe you followed one of
> the instructions that suggested setting your socksport to 0, which would
> disable the client part of your Tor?

That's exactly it.

> The simplest approach in my opinion would be to install the Tor deb
> and configure it to be a bridge:
> https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian
> and in step 2, be sure to uncomment the 'bridgerelay 1' line too.
> 
> Then use your Tor Browser totally separately from this Tor.

I'll give this a shot.

> (It's great that you're using Debian -- not because it's the best OS,
> though some good arguments can be made that it is, but rather because
> the Linux Tor packages are maintained best for Debian.)

I like routine updates, I cannot lie.

Incidentally, Wendy Fox is giving a presentation on social media under
the aegis of the OSHER Lifelong Learning Institute at BSU as I'm typing
this. I've given my spiel about Tor on her show (Tennis Court Disco on
KRBX Radio Boise), and she's said that she'll mention the Tor Project.
After all, your privacy is more configurable than you may realize, and
this holds true for retirees and octogenarians too! Description's on Page 8.

http://extendedstudies.boisestate.edu/osher/files/2015/05/Osher_Fall2015_Catalog.pdf



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Re: [tor-relays] Does Setting Up a Bridge Relay Disable the Browser?

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/07/2015 12:18 AM, Billy Humphreys wrote:
> Well, people suggest that, unless you give <100KB/s, you should run a
> relay, not a bridge, as more relays are used (and we have Tor weather
> and such). You should be using Tor's daemon (apt-get install tor
> tor-arm) for the relay or bridge itself.
> -Poke

I shall try this. If I have the bandwidth I'll run two relays, but for
now I'd like to run a relay and a bridge relay.



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Re: [tor-relays] Does Setting Up a Bridge Relay Disable the Browser?

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 09/07/2015 11:17 AM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> On 09/07/2015 01:07 PM, Kenneth Freeman wrote:
>> On 09/07/2015 12:18 AM, Billy Humphreys wrote:
>>> Well, people suggest that, unless you give <100KB/s, you should
>>> run a relay, not a bridge, as more relays are used (and we have
>>> Tor weather and such). You should be using Tor's daemon (apt-get
>>> install tor tor-arm) for the relay or bridge itself. -Poke
>>
>> I shall try this. If I have the bandwidth I'll run two relays, but
>> for now I'd like to run a relay and a bridge relay.
> 
> The whole point of a bridge is to provide access to Tor for people
> whose networks blacklist all normal relays, and those networks
> normally do that by IP address.  Therefore, bridges need to not be on
> the same IP address as a normal relay.  Even being in the same /24 can
> be problematic, IIUC.

Ah! Makes sense. I've been involved with Tor for at least five years
now, keeping its Wikipedia article up to date and such, but after all
this time I'm still parsing the forest from the trees.


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Re: [tor-relays] Does Setting Up a Bridge Relay Disable the Browser?

[Kenneth Freeman]

(The OSHER presentation is actually tomorrow. Duh!)


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