I had the same problem, you can connect to your bridge by two means:
1. through orport, the bridge line should be:
:
without obfs4 in the beginning.
2. through obfs4: you need to find out your bridge line, it's under
/var/lib/tor/pt_state/obfs4_bridgeline.txt
the line is like this
obfs4
eel comfortable
> sharing. I am not able to provide legal advice, but if this looks like a
> situation where legal advice will be required, I have some contacts who may
> be able to provide assistance. Thank you for running exit relays. > On Jun 8,
> 2018, at 5:43 AM, Matt Traudt wrote:
ng the recommended
>> reduced exit policy.
>> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy___
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. For purposes of documenting
the approximate ratio of "complaints / traffic processed", these nodes have
handled ~515TB and are using the recommended reduced exit policy.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy_______
tor-rela
). :)
Colin Childs <co...@torproject.org> schrieb am Fr. 18. Mai 2018 um 03:30:
> Hi Privatesociety,
>
> Thank you for setting up these relays and contributing to the Tor network!
> I look forward to working with you in the future.
>
> In the #tor-relays IRC channel, there are a num
Hello tor relay community!
I‘d like to introduce six new relays, which are operated by privatesociety,
a community of people, which fighting for privacy based in europe. The six
relays provide a capacity of around 300 mbit/s (total) and are hosted on
networks, which aren‘t much used - so better
Hi,
how about adding IPv6 to your relays, from a quick look at where they
are hosted all providers support it.
Thank you
On 4/28/2018 8:31 PM, Nathaniel Suchy (Lunorian) wrote:
Hi,
The Tor relay
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/B0BF533DA3BC09DEEB4AF2BEC16FA21063216FE4
of mine
Respectfully, I disagree.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2015-October/007904.html
Thank you for the thought however.
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ortunately, it's time has come.
Thanks.
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onsensus, but I've seen suggestions to lower it to 4).
Am I misunderstanding?
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s pegged
either continuously or intermittently with ingress higher than egress.
Just looked again and see all threads, crypto-worker and main-event
pegging episodically.
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On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 7:06 PM, Toralf Förster <toralf.foers...@gmx.de> wrote:
> On 03/04/2018 07:41 PM, Dhalgren Tor wrote:
>> the main event-worker thread
>> going from a normal load level of about 30%/core to 100%/core and
>> staying there for about 30 seconds;
&g
it for a couple of
weeks.
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) scanned in 3.56 seconds
If you're behind a router doing NAT, you'll need to forward the DirPort and
ORPort ports.
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> Relay search appears to be down right now.
It seems the website (https://www.torproject.org) and package repos (ex:
deb.torproject.org) are currently down as well.
Anyone working on it?
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the package with DoS
mitigations.
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curity reasons. It's also not
recommended to run Tor as root. For best security on FreeBSD, it may be best to
use ports over 1024 for Tor.
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I see this occasionally. It's not specific to 0.3.3.x. I reported it back in
October 2017:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-October/013328.html
Roger replied here:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-October/013334.html
MaxMemInQueues is set to 1.5 GB
ormant, and then keep the
best ones. That's what I would do. :)
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>If you have the CPU, RAM, and disk space, you should leave these settings on.
>
>It will affect some client versions' choice of guards:
>https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24312#comment:4
I have guards that are bottle-necked by CPU, and I'm still exploring vari
e. What's that about? Will disabling the DirCache affect the
Guard flag (today)?
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instead. The second reduces the amount of memory used.
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rote:
>
> January 8, 2018 3:29 PM, "Spiros Andreou" <m...@spiros.io> wrote:
>
> Normalcitizen: E51620B90DCB310138ED89EDEDD0A5C361AAE24E
>
>
> Original Message
>
>
> Subject: [tor-relays] Become a Fallback Directory Mirror
>
>
Attempting to limit a relay to only certain times of day, days of the week,
etc., is very likely to produce a relay that doesn't really get used. I'm not
sure I see the point in running a relay under those types of restrictions.
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For relay operators using iptables connlimit to mitigate DoS attacks (or
increased load from new clients), is it better for the Tor network to use
"DROP" rules, or should we use something like "REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset"?
______
> As a last resort, try setting:
>
> DisableOOSCheck 1
Did you mean "DisableOOSCheck 0"?
"DisableOOSCheck 1" seems to be the default already (for Debian/Ubuntu and as
mentioned here
https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-m
>Other relays seeing this too?
For sure. Here is some recent reading material:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-December/013669.html
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-December/013771.html
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-Decem
I think you just have a typo here:
> ORPort 80.127.177.180:993 NoListen
177 instead of 117 for the third octet.
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at seems entirely normal.
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l probably fix it. You'll need to trigger Tor to re-upload
its descriptor too. A restart of the Tor service will do it (although there may
be a better way). I've noticed similar issues before with Atlas holding on to
old nodes until that's done.
Cheers.
_________
ay that's still up?
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https://www.twitch.tv/sp00k13z
https://twitter.com/notdan/status/941116413070270465
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+1, thanks for working on IPv6!
Just curious and didn't see an answer on the roadmap -- do bandwidth authority
measurements ever happen over IPv6?
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>I am getting this too, I saw this the logs a few months ago and didn't think
>anything of it.
I wouldn't worry about it. Faravahar has a long history of misbehavior:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2015-November/008097.html
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
, it's going to be mainly complaints about attempts.
I feel like a short notification should be all you need and you're
done with responses to stuff like that, such as:
Hi ,
That is the Tor exit router we host. https://www.torproject.org .
Unfortunately, bad actors sometimes misuse Tor for things
continually vary -
it never hits multiple destinations on 1 port, and it does not hit
multiple ports on 1 host. I presume it is an attack that is intended
to degrade this relay's service quality, or otherwise more broadly,
degrade Tor.
I'm going to reject a few more trojan listen ports, it might
course of action for this sort of thing
would be within Tor itself. I don't know that it was a single client
connection into Tor that was causing all this trouble, but maybe it
was. One would think that one client should not be allowed to do
something so severe with the TCP that it can single
-of-service and
could be the problem. either upgrade to 0.3.2.4+ or edit resolve.conf
per
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/DnsResolver#TuningeventdnscomponentofTorDaemon
also check out https://arthuredelstein.net/exits/
2) if you continue to experience excessive outbound scan
I went and added a reject for exit to port and HUPed the process.
Maybe this is the fix! :)
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munged>: SYN_SENT
Port is supposedly opened up for listen by a virus.
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://www.globalcyberalliance.org/community-partners.html#partner-industries
This leaves many unanswered questions. What criteria is used to define
"malicious" traffic? Who gets to add domains to the blacklist? Etc.
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Using the Tor Browser must have been a joke, because your traffic will route
through the exit nodes, and those exit IPs will presumably be on the same
blacklists.
I'd recommend you don't run a relay at home. Switch it to a bridge. Bridge IP
addresses are (usually) not published and thus
A 200px purple banner with a Schneier quote at the top of every page?
Seriously? What a hideous waste of space. Can anyone explain how this UI
element is helpful to users? It's awful.___
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https
after waiting 5 minutes. It may be the same underlying issue that you just
fixed, but thought I'd mention it. (I'd test it again, but that particular
config option requires a hard restart of the Tor service, so I'm going to leave
it alone for now
and the list is still populated.
It's not really critical but it does seem to have changed with recent commits.
This is on FreeBSD.
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tip about the different sqlite3 versions, although my
system seems to actually still use Python 2.7.14 by default._______
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> Is it shown in the ps output as '/usr/local/bin/tor'? If so then I'll
> adjust Stem to look for that too.
Yep. 'ps ax' output looks like:
PID TT STATTIME COMMAND
83797 - R 1152:14.26 /usr/local/bin/tor -f /usr/local/etc/tor/torrc
--PidFile /var/run/tor/tor.pid --RunAsDa
Hi Damian,
I can confirm the connections now display correctly. Thanks!
> Is 'tor' listed when you run "ps -ao ucomm="?
It is *not* listed. In case it helps, Tor 0.3.1.8 was installed via
ports/security/tor (https://www.freshports.org/security/tor), and I haven't
done anyth
; Unfortunately I'm not sure of a good self-discovery mechanism. Would
> alternative messaging help?
It didn't take me long to figure out, but additional messaging might be
helpful. Right now nyx just displays "Unable to connect to tor. Are you sure
it's running?" Perhaps you could
> These nodes are popping up everywhere - is this some sort of malware being
> deployed on systems around the globe?
Interesting. It does look like malware to me.
- all running Tor 0.3.1.7 on Linux
- diverse AS / IP allocation, mostly looks like ISP end-subscriber
- same exit policy (
I see "Onionoo seems to serve outdated data :( Last update was: Tue Oct 24
2017" at the top of Atlas, and querying the Onionoo API directly results in the
same outdated data.
Anyone working on fixing it?_______
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The relay is running Tor version 0.3.1.7 on Linux. There's 2 GB of available
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In a relay's logs:
Oct 20 10:31:47 X Tor[]: We're low on memory. Killing circuits with
over-long queues. (This behavior is controlled by MaxMemInQueues.)
Oct 20 10:32:11 X Tor[]: Removed 1565259696 bytes by killing 1
circuits; 40008 circuits remain alive. Also killed 0 non
.2.9 will help you, anyway.
I'm not sure either. :) I'm getting some mixed messages. 0.2.9.11 has the bug
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20059 from my top post, which
was fixed in 0.2.9.12. That package would at least remove the bug from the
equation. You had also mentioned the 0.3.x s
yond looking in the Tor logs
and syslog would be appreciated.
> There's 0.2.9 nightly, but I don't know if we have an 0.2.9-release build.
Yeah, unfortunately I could not find a 0.2.9.12 dpkg. I did find a deb, but it
wouldn't install due to mismatched dependencies. I was able to get 0.2.9.12
> There's a bug in 0.3.0 and later that causes clients to fetch
> microdescriptors from fallbacks. So fallbacks (and authorities)
> will have extra load until that's fixed.
>
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23862
Makes sense. The relay can't keep up with the e
from kernel
upgrades, there's no recent changes. Maybe it's just busier than usual now.
I'll keep digging. Thanks for the feedback!___________
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Hi,
I'm troubleshooting a Linux relay where the Tor service is having problems.
External monitoring alerts indicate both the ORPort and DirPort are unreachable
(TCP connection timeout). I can ssh in and the Tor service is still running.
The node seems to have increased memory usage
Hello AMuse,
we faced the same about 1-2 month ago. Actuall people use fail2ban which
creates abuse mails to you provider.
Thats not new. But recently the abuse mails have risen to numbers which
lead us to believe there are acutally more people abusing ssh via tor
than people really using
Hi AJ,
First, thank you for supporting Tor!
Second, you're smart to contact the library, as IT would immediately shut
down the idea as they don't want to receive more abuse emails than they
already do (I know we did when I worked in academia). An additional
resource you may wish to research
FWIW I run a 100TB (150mbps) exit and am convinced that this size
provides better quality exit connectivity than the highest ranked
monster bandwidth relays. The biggest relays attract the greatest
blacklist treatment due to the volume of abuse emanating from them.
As a user of Tor I frequently
Hi there,
If your exit node has been online for more than two months with little hassle
from the ISP, be sure to update the wiki at
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GoodBadISPs with your exit
node's ISP information. And thank you for your contribution to the Tor network
> Doesn't a lot of it depend on context anyway?
Yes.
> How can we quantify something like this?
We can't. We don't have all the data. We have to assume the worst and plan
accordingly._______
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> I get about sixty (60) abuse notifications a day and on average eight (8)
> subpoenas a month.
How do you handle the subpoenas?_______
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http://lmgtfy.com/?q=CVE-2017-0380
> Original Message
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] More recent rpm somewhere?
> Local Time: September 17, 2017 12:53 PM
> UTC Time: September 17, 2017 12:53 PM
> From: bnag...@gmail.com
> To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
>
&
Hi
I'm running an obfs4 bridge and upgraded to latest version.
Use Debian Jessie (8.9).
One thing that puzzles me is the log
/var/log/tor/log
I used to always see some useful info there, like number of connecting clients
during the last 6 hours etc.
I have an entry:
[notice] Clean shutdown
be
> great to filter out the noise better than we currently do.
>
> Did anyone set up an infrastructure like that before? How would you do it?
>
> Also, if you just want to help with our abuse management, let me know!
> We can always use one or
Yes, I'd find that very useful.___
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> So let me get this straight – Because you don’t agree with the way I’m
> marketing my network I must be malicious and this must be a “social
> engineering” attack? Seriously guys, put away the tin foil hats. I truly
> DON’T want to know what people on tor are browsing.
>
&
ry
traffic go over the ORPort too? Is it safe to disable the DirPort on fallback
relays?_______
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You'll lose your uptime, but... don't be ridiculous. It's better to keep Tor
up-to-date. That uptime undoubtedly means you're running an outdated kernel
too, which is not ideal. I think it would be wise to take the hit and update
both.___
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@Toralf
> Tor serves the "DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice_DE.html" at that
> port
> and I'd like to avoid a slow responsive Tor due to a DDoS at that port.
Tor also provides the directory service on the same port (unless you have it
disabled). How do you know limit
in their homes to utilize the wastefully
underutilized bandwidth they're paying for.
Make your day great,
Isaac, t...@sechsnulldrei.org
-Original Message-
From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of
Nagaev Boris
Sent: Thursday, August 10, 2017 10:45 AM
To: tor
http://154.35.175.225/ is the directory authority "Faravahar". This error
happens from time to time with this authority. There's nothing for you (the
relay operator) to do about it._______
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> I'd recommend posting your finding to the sks-devel mailing list ... I'll
> post it in the morning if you like.
Please do if you think it would be helpful. Thanks Paul.___
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know why there is a SSL mismatch
in the browser, or why you can no longer access the web UI, but it's not as
broken as it looked.___
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I'm trying to follow the instructions here to install Tor from the official
package repository:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en
On the steps to add the gpg signing key, it doesn't work. It seems something
has changed with the keyserver at keys.gnupg.net:
1) http://keys.gnupg.net
The files in the repo location we have configured have not changed
recently, and I know that Tor's been updated.
The repo we're configured for is based out of:
https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/rpm/el/6/x86_64
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>> On 23 Jun 2017, at 04:57, t...@t-3.net wrote:
>>
>>
>> I've suddenly started seeing a lot of these in our exit's logs:
>>
>> Rejecting INTRODUCE1 on non-OR or non-edge circuit ...….
>
>Did you upgrade the Tor version on your relay recently?
>What a
I've suddenly started seeing a lot of these in our exit's logs:
Rejecting INTRODUCE1 on non-OR or non-edge circuit ...
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> I tried disabling pf and restarting tor. To my surprise, the authorities
> connected to my relay successfully and distributed its information in
> subsequent consensuses!
Haha. This is the least surprising thing I've read all week._______
t
Hello Roger,
I updated the ticket. You will find the output of the valgrind there as
well:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/valgrind.txt
best regards
Dirk
On 23.05.2017 06:00, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Tue, May 23, 2017 at 03:01:10AM +, John Ricke
Dear all,
we are operating two exit nodes with each two tor processes out of
Switzerland.
The nodes worked quite stable until about 2-3 weeks ago.
Since then we experience frequent disruptions (Up to several times a
day). This is caused by a significant rise in memory consumption
by the tor
Here's a recent thread with a good answer:
https://www.mail-archive.com/tor-relays@lists.torproject.org/msg10829.html
The consensus seems to be, since bridges are allocated to users randomly, they
may not see much traffic in some cases.
There's some guidance here:
https://www.torproject.org
d 5TB per month. They might notice.___________
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>>> What can be known is *how* TOR is being used by setting up studies at
>>> exits and seeing what kind of services people are connecting to.
>> Please don't do that, or suggest doing that. Sniffing or inspecting exit
>> traffic may be illegal in some
> What can be known is *how* TOR is being used by setting up studies at exits
> and seeing what kind of services people are connecting to.
Please don't do that, or suggest doing that. Sniffing or inspecting exit
traffic may be illegal in some jurisdictions, and will result in the BadExit
It was two days ago. Today I can not reach it as well.
best regards
Dirk
On 01.05.2017 08:08, scar wrote:
> I was unable to reach the site, is it still in operation?
>
> _______
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for reducing the log footprint of a relay? Are
the OS defaults generally sufficient, or do operators need to take additional
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ontrol._______
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going to help at all. Tor still isn't optimized for it.
If running on Linux or Unix there are a lot of optimizations to be done. For
Linux, I'd start here: https://www.torservers.net/wiki/setup/server and look at
the "High Bandwidth Tweaks" section._____
Nope that need not be it.
I had my bridge relay running for many moths with a few Mbps BW and it steadily
had the guard flag set.
When doing the latest TOR upgrade I upped the BW-limit 100% but since that tor
service restart it has now been running some 40 days without getting the guard
flag
On 16/02/2017 08:55, tor-ad...@torland.is wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> after 5 years of operation I will shutdown TorLand1
> (https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/E1E922A20AF608728824A620BADC6EFC8CB8C2B8)
>
> on February 17 2017.
Thank you for
an organization like torservers, nos onions, etc.
I hope others will step up and run high capacity exits. The Tor network needs
your help. I will continue to run a meek bridge.
Regards,
torland
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It's a bridge.
Original Message
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Normal to lose stable/guard flags on relay reboot?
Local Time: February 9, 2017 11:29 PM
UTC Time: February 9, 2017 11:29 PM
From: teor2...@gmail.com
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> On 10 Feb 2017, at 08
Mine is still missing the guard flag after 17 days since reboot.
Original Message
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Normal to lose stable/guard flags on relay reboot?
Local Time: February 6, 2017 12:04 AM
UTC Time: February 6, 2017 12:04 AM
From: dl1...@gmx.de
To: tor-relays
On 8/02/2017 15:00, Andrew Deason wrote:
> I assume some people will say this isn't even worth the effort; it's not
> like it's hard to just ignore those reports. But it doesn't take much
> effort to just try to talk ot them, and it perhaps helps to give tor a
> reputation of
On 06.02.17 09:25, nusenu wrote:
The first release with the fix for [1] was in 0.3.0.3-alpha [2].
So if you run an IPv6 exit, upgrading to 0.3.0.3-alpha potentially
increases the tor network's IPv6 exit capacity.
teor and nickm plan a backport for tor 0.2.9.x
[1] https://trac.torproject.org
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