Re: [tor-relays] DNS Timeouts - I think the threshold for overload needs raising

2022-01-16 Thread AMuse
at 6:14 AM John Csuti via tor-relays < tor-relays@lists.torproject.org> wrote: > Update your version of tor this is an old issue that has been fixed in the > latest version. > > Thanks, > John C. > > > On Jan 16, 2022, at 4:17 AM, AMuse wrote: > > > >  &g

[tor-relays] DNS Timeouts - I think the threshold for overload needs raising

2022-01-16 Thread AMuse
Hi all! I'm operating a TOR Exit on dedicated hardware. The load average is low (0.07) and the network load is fine (120Mb/sec out of a 1Gb/sec link). Connections aren't being dropped, and for all I can see things are fine. However, on the TOR Metrics relay search, my exit consistently shows as

Re: [tor-relays] General overload -> DNS timeouts

2022-01-07 Thread AMuse
Hey all, I wanted to chime in on this thread because I'm suddenly seeing DNS "Overload" errors (and corresponding notices that my system is overloaded on prometheus) lately as well. The hardware and OS and configs for my public exit haven't changed - what has changed is that I upgraded tor

Re: [tor-relays] Collaborative Bad-Abuse-Sender Blocklist

2020-10-12 Thread AMuse
My ISP (Hurricane Electric) forwards me support tickets with abuse emails they receive, and asks that I respond to their ticket with information so they can show that they did their duty as an ISP in informing me. Because I typically get floods of this abuse-SPAM from only a few dedicated

[tor-relays] SSH scanning on TOR Exit - Nerfing Rules

2019-08-30 Thread AMuse
Hi all! I'm curious what y'all think of this situation. I have SSH open as an exit port on a TOR exit that my friends and I are maintaining - and of course it's the #1 offender by far in automated abuse notifications we get from our ISP, from peoples' fail2ban servers sending abuse emails. This

[tor-relays] Blocking outbound 22 or no?

2017-10-05 Thread AMuse
Hi all! I'm getting a number of ISP Abuse complaints around outbound ssh brute-forcing from our exit relay. I'm personally of the opinion that people should run fail2ban (or equiv) and get on with life and I generally ignore the complaints - but wondered, what are other operators doing? Is

Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike

2016-08-21 Thread AMuse
I'm not switching off my relay, primarily because I'm lazy and can't be arsed to figure out what all the politics bullshit is about. Some project member did some shit and other project members are mad at them. Other people may or may not be righteously mad at the first people for reasons I

Re: [tor-relays] Unbelieveable

2015-12-04 Thread AMuse
Looks like you got more than you paid for. On 2015-12-03 18:46, Kurt Besig wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > That I got two responses after posting to tor-relays regarding a > fairly simple, I thought, CntrolPort question on a new VPS relay.. > That's pathetic.

Re: [tor-relays] Unbelieveable

2015-12-04 Thread AMuse
Are you aware that you just wrote "write that sort of retort privately" by not, yourself, writing your retort privately? As to why I published my original reply to the list, it's because I felt that other lurkers who are perhaps newbies to how open source support listservs work might also

Re: [tor-relays] Unbelieveable

2015-12-04 Thread AMuse
peoples' time and expertise for free. On 2015-12-04 10:21, Kurt Besig wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 12/4/2015 9:29 AM, AMuse wrote: > >> Looks like you got more than you paid for. On 2015-12-03 18:46, Kurt Besig >> wrote: That I got

Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather not working?

2015-11-20 Thread AMuse
I also went through the "Ask us for a shirt" instructions and never heard back. :( On 2015-11-20 11:29, Jannis Wiese wrote: > This is what https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/tshirt.html [1]says: > >> The nice people at torservers.net are handling the tshirt requests. > > I got a note

Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather not working?

2015-11-20 Thread AMuse
did you send them something? As they're doing it voluntarily, just give > them some time. :) Also, as the guys at torservers.net <http://torservers.net > [1]> are operating some nice exit nodes, they're most probably reading this. > On 20.11.2015, at 20:39, AMuse <tor-

Re: [tor-relays] HoneyPot?

2015-10-29 Thread AMuse
Given the current state of the internet (ie, massive warrantless spying by LEO's and packet inspection by ISP's) I cannot imagine how any TOR operator would block encrypted services and not be what most reasonable people consider a "Bad exit". On 2015-10-29 14:05, Mike Perry wrote: > Green

Re: [tor-relays] webiron requesting to block several /24 subnet

2015-10-21 Thread AMuse
>Some people out there apparently are of the opinion that it is a >reasonable choice to use the ugly crutch that is "fail2ban" instead of >deprecating password based authentication for ssh. You're technically correct (the best kind) but I wanted to point out that Fail2Ban is a really useful

Re: [tor-relays] webiron requesting to block several /24 subnet

2015-10-20 Thread AMuse
The TOR directory of exit nodes is readily available for ISP's and website operators to apply in their filters. I don't see why them putting the onus on tens of thousands of exit operators to exit-block THEIR addresses is in any way reasonable. On 2015-10-20 12:51, yl wrote: > Hello, > I