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Shouldn't some exit relays (funded or not) be deployed to use an
exit IP that is different from it's advertised exit IP in order to
prevent a simplistic form of blocking based on scraping the
descriptor set? I think this can happen if the
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Hi,
I found out about it via Moritz's twitter feed [1] and I think it is
great. Am quite curious about it. Does anyone have some insights on
why Akamai decided to start 10 fast exit relays? (CC'ing the relays
contact address here)
Some compass
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In the spectrum of critical, I wouldn't put this one towards the
top. There's no code execution or privacy or anonymity issues. So
yes, upgrading is definitely a fine idea, but it's not a cancel
your dinner plans to do it sort of situation.
I
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Hi Torproject,
would you mind publishing a few Tor Weather statistics?
(I assume publishing this information is safe)
How many relays have at least one Tor Weather subscription?
How many subscriptions did tick the checkbox for:
'Email me when the
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It is quite sad that one has to find out about 'critical' security
updates [0] via an unrelated thread on tor-talk [1] or the blog [2]
instead of getting an announcement on tor-announce [3] - where relay
operators are probably expecting such
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It is quite sad that one has to find out about 'critical' security
updates [0] via an unrelated thread on tor-talk [1] or the blog
[2] instead of getting an announcement on tor-announce [3] - where
relay operators are probably expecting such
