Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay operators please help test #2667 branch

[Roger Dingledine]

On Thu, Feb 04, 2021 at 01:20:58AM +0200, s7r wrote:
> Indeed the defense is triggered more often than I expected. Very nice.

Btw, a better version of the #2667 patch is now included in all of the
current Tor releases: 0.3.5.13, 0.4.3.8, 0.4.4.7, 0.4.5.5-rc.

So if you are still trying out my experiment patch, thank you, but now
please stop doing that and move to one of the actual releases. :)

> This defense is only implemented at the Exit relay, and it blocks all the
> relay:ORPort / DirPort combinations that exit knows about according to its
> version of the consensus?

The design that we decided on was "block relay:ORPort, dirauth:ORPort,
and dirauth:DirPort". That is, it doesn't try to block relay:DirPort
connections.

We chose that balance because if we'd blocked all relay dirports too,
we would have broken relay dirport reachability tests, because the
way those tests work is by building an exit circuit and then "exiting"
back to the relay's dirport to see if it works.

Ultimately I expect we're going to phase out the concept of a dirport
on non-dir-auth relays, since they mostly go unused so it's just yet
another thing to maintain that isn't worth it. But now we can do that
phase-out completely separate from this topic.

> What happens if the abuser has a different valid consensus (newer/older)
> that has some relays which are not known by the Exit?

If there are edge cases where different sides have different knowledge,
then those edge cases will 'get through'. But hopefully they'll be rare,
or even if they're not rare, hopefully they will be low-impact.

> Or if the abuser uses
> for re-entry a relay configured with `PublishServerDescriptor 0`? How does
> it treat bridges?

They are all allowed.

In fact, one of the Tor use cases we're going to break here is people
who torify all their traffic (at the network or host level) and then
run Tor Browser also. The suggested workaround for them is that if they
really need to do this, they should configure their Tor Browser to use
a bridge. There will be a bunch of confused users who don't know they're
doing this, and don't know why it broke, though.

I've been working on
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40271
to do a little bit toward that explanation side.

> And most important, does this means that an Exit will no longer try to
> connect to other middle relay? At this moment can't an exit relay (of course
> with a small probability) be used as a middle or entry? Won't this become a
> mess if we have 80% of relays Exits and thus used more as 1st or 2nd hops,
> or in a perfect future where 100% or relays are all exits?

No, exiting is different from extending. Exit relays can still extend
to other relays -- this is a part of the Tor protocol that lets a relay
make a TLS connection with another relay. The difference is in who the
"ends" of that TLS connection are: in the extend case, the ends are the
two relays. In the 'exit and reenter' case, one end is the client and
the other is the destination relay.

--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay operators please help test #2667 branch

[s7r]

Roger Dingledine wrote:

Hello friendly relay operators,

Another day, another weird thing with the Tor network. This time we
have some jerk bombing the directory authorities with directory fetches,
and doing it via exits:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/network-health/2021-January/000661.html

The network is mostly holding together, but I wouldn't say it is pretty.

One of the long-term fixes will be ticket #2667:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/2667
where exit relays refuse to let users connect back into the Tor network.

David and I made a branch this evening that implements #2667, and it
could use some testing. If you're comfortable building your exit relay
from a git branch, please do, and let us know how it goes. It is the
"ticket2667" branch on either
https://git.torproject.org/user/arma/tor
or
https://gitlab.torproject.org/arma/tor/

And if your relay is currently using 100% cpu and/or way more bandwidth
than usual, you might be especially excited to try out this patch. :)

When the defense triggers, you will see an info-level log line like
"%s tried to connect back to a known relay address. Closing."
(where %s is the destination, so don't get upset at them. :)

You can let us know how it's going either by mail just to me, or by a
reply on the list, whichever you prefer. Once we know that you're running
the branch, we can also probe your relay remotely to verify that it is
correctly refusing those connections.

Thanks!
--Roger



Hello,

Indeed the defense is triggered more often than I expected. Very nice.

I tried to read on that ticket that's a decade old but didn't understand 
what was the final resolution.


This defense is only implemented at the Exit relay, and it blocks all 
the relay:ORPort / DirPort combinations that exit knows about according 
to its version of the consensus?


What happens if the abuser has a different valid consensus (newer/older) 
that has some relays which are not known by the Exit? Or if the abuser 
uses for re-entry a relay configured with `PublishServerDescriptor 0`? 
How does it treat bridges?


And most important, does this means that an Exit will no longer try to 
connect to other middle relay? At this moment can't an exit relay (of 
course with a small probability) be used as a middle or entry? Won't 
this become a mess if we have 80% of relays Exits and thus used more as 
1st or 2nd hops, or in a perfect future where 100% or relays are all exits?




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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay operators please help test #2667 branch

[nusenu]

Roger Dingledine:
> On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 12:34:28AM +0100, nusenu wrote:
>> If dir auths (some or all) are willing to share (privately or publicly) the 
>> distribution of
>> attack load (frequency, bandwidth, ...) by exit source IP in total or 
>> relative values
>> I can correlate this data to strengthen a hypothesis that 
>> malicious/suspicious
>> exits are involved to a greater extend than well-known long term exits.
> 
> I'll send you out-of-band a little snapshot of requests from relay
> IP addresses -- 160k requests over a 24 minute period from yesterday
> early evening.

I've looked at the data and found no clear indicators to support a
hypothesis that malicious/suspicious exit operators are involved to a greater 
extend then others, 
but I'm not sure if 24 minutes is enough to draw any conclusions. 
24 hours would probably more suitable. 

Expected request frequency for exit IPs would also be interesting when looking
and evaluating such data.

> At one point later in the evening I was getting several tens of millions
> of requests per hour. That's when I started to realize that exit relay
> operators were probably seeing this increased load too.

Did any exit operator actually see increased load on their exits?

kind regards,
nusenu

-- 
https://nusenu.github.io
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay operators please help test #2667 branch

[Roger Dingledine]

On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 12:34:28AM +0100, nusenu wrote:
> If dir auths (some or all) are willing to share (privately or publicly) the 
> distribution of
> attack load (frequency, bandwidth, ...) by exit source IP in total or 
> relative values
> I can correlate this data to strengthen a hypothesis that malicious/suspicious
> exits are involved to a greater extend than well-known long term exits.

I'll send you out-of-band a little snapshot of requests from relay
IP addresses -- 160k requests over a 24 minute period from yesterday
early evening.

At one point later in the evening I was getting several tens of millions
of requests per hour. That's when I started to realize that exit relay
operators were probably seeing this increased load too.

> That could mean that they are not (exclusively) attacking via but _from_ 
> servers that also happen to
> run tor exits. 

Well, there are definitely other addresses -- the overload from last
week was non-relay addresses, and that's still going.

It's possible that there are exits that are generating more than their
"fair" share of requests. I didn't see that pattern obviously happening,
and confirming it would be complicated by the fact that some relays
probably have less or more congestion, which would cause the attacks to
be more efficient or less efficient through them.

We had a long debugging session in #tor-dev on irc last night, and there
will be more of those as we proceed. We've found a bunch of short-term
fragile distinguishers, which we could use to block the "bad" traffic
right now, but which wouldn't hold up if the bad traffic adapts a bit.

More broadly, we're trying to walk the fine line between doing our
analysis and patches in public (yay transparency), vs being aware
that whoever is doing this is probably reading these threads too. The
destination we want is that we have defenses that are robust to the
attacker knowing about them, but things will be a bit bumpy as we get
to that destination.

I'm also trying to make sure everybody continues to think about the
privacy side -- the directory authorities or fallbackdirs don't know
what paths clients build, or what destinations they reach with them,
but they can know at what timestamps some IP addresses seemed to be using
Tor. And like most things, that information is better private by default.

> From another angle this is an interesting precedence
> because the tor project uses it's access to protect dir auths
> from exit relays. Why is that interesting? Because no one else
> that gets attacked via exit relays has that "luxury" to "filter"
> it at the "source" (exits).

Actually, the #2667 patch protects all relays from exit relays. That is,
exit relays will decline to exit to known ORPorts or DirPorts of any
relay. There are two benefits here: (a) people can't do circuit-level
amplification attacks (happy to elaborate on these once the defense is
more in place), and (b) people can't create directory requests which
blend with the directory requests that the relay itself does.

These two issues are Tor-specific, and the second one is an especially
good argument I think, because the relay is reserving for itself the
ability to make its dir connections in a way that the destination can
know that the relay is the one making the connection. (Another option
would be to add more authentication to the connection, but most ways of
doing that are heavier-weight, not lighter-weight.)

--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay operators please help test #2667 branch

[nusenu]

Unless you already ruled out that hypothesis by looking at the attack
distribution by source IP:

If dir auths (some or all) are willing to share (privately or publicly) the 
distribution of
attack load (frequency, bandwidth, ...) by exit source IP in total or relative 
values
I can correlate this data to strengthen a hypothesis that malicious/suspicious
exits are involved to a greater extend than well-known long term exits.
That could mean that they are not (exclusively) attacking via but _from_ 
servers that also happen to
run tor exits. 


>From another angle this is an interesting precedence
because the tor project uses it's access to protect dir auths
from exit relays. Why is that interesting? Because no one else
that gets attacked via exit relays has that "luxury" to "filter"
it at the "source" (exits).


-- 
https://nusenu.github.io
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay operators please help test #2667 branch

[Chris Dagdigian]

Have a tor exit running in the US ; fingerprint is 
3DE567C1350C0E858C6147AECB06EA9B3EAF3261 and OR address is 
71.174.105.126:9001


Just built and launched the ticket-2667 branch; came up as:

[notice] Tor 0.4.6.0-alpha-dev running on Linux with Libevent 
2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1t, Zlib 1.2.8, Liblzma N/A, Libzstd N/A and 
Glibc 2.19 as libc.


I'll monitor the log notices but feel free to probe to test. Thanks!





Roger Dingledine 
January 28, 2021 at 1:40 AM
Hello friendly relay operators,

Another day, another weird thing with the Tor network. This time we
have some jerk bombing the directory authorities with directory fetches,
and doing it via exits:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/network-health/2021-January/000661.html

The network is mostly holding together, but I wouldn't say it is pretty.

One of the long-term fixes will be ticket #2667:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/2667
where exit relays refuse to let users connect back into the Tor network.

David and I made a branch this evening that implements #2667, and it
could use some testing. If you're comfortable building your exit relay
from a git branch, please do, and let us know how it goes. It is the
"ticket2667" branch on either
https://git.torproject.org/user/arma/tor
or
https://gitlab.torproject.org/arma/tor/

And if your relay is currently using 100% cpu and/or way more bandwidth
than usual, you might be especially excited to try out this patch. :)

When the defense triggers, you will see an info-level log line like
"%s tried to connect back to a known relay address. Closing."
(where %s is the destination, so don't get upset at them. :)

You can let us know how it's going either by mail just to me, or by a
reply on the list, whichever you prefer. Once we know that you're running
the branch, we can also probe your relay remotely to verify that it is
correctly refusing those connections.

Thanks!
--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay: ERROR -- No Descriptor Available

[William Kane]

I think this is related to available file system descriptors.

Try increasing the number of descriptors, around 8192 should be fine
for most relays.

If running systemd, edit the service (systemctl edit )
and append the following, then restart:

[Service]
LimitNOFILE=8192

You might also need to change limits.conf, depending on your brew of
linux it might be placed in a different directory but generally it
remains in /etc/security.

2020-08-03 22:18 GMT, raspitor :
> After running an exit relay for a few days I see the message: ERROR --
> No Descriptor Available on the torstatus.rueckgr.at site, and the
> traffic of my exit node is almost zero, also seen in nyx. Rebooting the
> system restarts everything normal and it is listed on the ruckgraet
> site, but after a day or so the problem occurs again.
> What might ne the cause of this?
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay throughput

[William Kane]

Tor already has code that avoids having multiple nodes from a single
/16 range or from the same AS (correct me on that one if I'm wrong,
not totally sure about it) in the same circuit, so as long as your
MyFamily setting is set correctly, I see no problem here.

Throughput is important as you will be able to serve more clients at
once, so AES hardware acceleration and a CPU with very good single
thread performance are important.

However, running a high-capacity node under an AS like OVH or Hetzner
has certain anonymity implications, since many Tor nodes already
already being run there, a single wire-tap on their peers / up-streams
is enough to capture the traffic of around 15-25% of all tor nodes
(got the numbers from the top of my head, for exact numbers check out
Tor Metrics @ https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html).

Ideally go for a hoster in an uncommon, underdeveloped (Tor-wise)
country that only hosts a handful, if any, of Tor Nodes and colocate
if you have the hardware, time and money - this helps spread out Tor
nodes across as many countries as possible, which makes it harder for
adversaries to control all of Tor's traffic at once.

You should also allocate a small IP range for yourself, and ask them
to modify the whois so it shows an e-mail address you control as the
abuse address.

Hope this was helpful.

William

2020-06-20 12:30 GMT, to...@protonmail.com :
> Dear List,
>
> How important is the throughput on an exit relay? I realize that more is
> always better, making it harder to associate exit packets with input ones at
> the other end. My numbers: For the same price I can buy 2 exit relays that
> run about 3500 to 4000 connections or one that runs about 4300 to 4700
> connections. The actual daily throughput varies a good deal, but the cheaper
> ones show about 15-20% less throughput, at around 330 GiB/day when I look at
> vnstat.
>
> Can I assume 2 is almost always better than one? Or is there a threshold
> below which packets are too easily tracked? I have no common sense about
> this.
>
> TIA,
>
> --Torix
>
> Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay throughput

[William Kane]

Also - 4000 connections sounds like your OS limiting the amount of
open file descriptors, when I still used to run exit relays, it was at
least 6500 connections just for all the other Tor relays, which should
now be 7000.

You should at the very least allow 8192 open file descriptors.

If you launch Tor using systemd, use 'systemctl edit '
to create an override such as:

[Service]
LimitNOFILE=8192

You might also want to raise the limits in limits.conf, the location
of this file might be different across different distributions, but
generally (at least on Debian and Arch Linux) you can find it at
/etc/security/limits.conf.

Don't forget to reboot.

2020-06-20 13:10 GMT, William Kane :
> Tor already has code that avoids having multiple nodes from a single
> /16 range or from the same AS (correct me on that one if I'm wrong,
> not totally sure about it) in the same circuit, so as long as your
> MyFamily setting is set correctly, I see no problem here.
>
> Throughput is important as you will be able to serve more clients at
> once, so AES hardware acceleration and a CPU with very good single
> thread performance are important.
>
> However, running a high-capacity node under an AS like OVH or Hetzner
> has certain anonymity implications, since many Tor nodes already
> already being run there, a single wire-tap on their peers / up-streams
> is enough to capture the traffic of around 15-25% of all tor nodes
> (got the numbers from the top of my head, for exact numbers check out
> Tor Metrics @ https://metrics.torproject.org/networksize.html).
>
> Ideally go for a hoster in an uncommon, underdeveloped (Tor-wise)
> country that only hosts a handful, if any, of Tor Nodes and colocate
> if you have the hardware, time and money - this helps spread out Tor
> nodes across as many countries as possible, which makes it harder for
> adversaries to control all of Tor's traffic at once.
>
> You should also allocate a small IP range for yourself, and ask them
> to modify the whois so it shows an e-mail address you control as the
> abuse address.
>
> Hope this was helpful.
>
> William
>
> 2020-06-20 12:30 GMT, to...@protonmail.com :
>> Dear List,
>>
>> How important is the throughput on an exit relay? I realize that more is
>> always better, making it harder to associate exit packets with input ones
>> at
>> the other end. My numbers: For the same price I can buy 2 exit relays
>> that
>> run about 3500 to 4000 connections or one that runs about 4300 to 4700
>> connections. The actual daily throughput varies a good deal, but the
>> cheaper
>> ones show about 15-20% less throughput, at around 330 GiB/day when I look
>> at
>> vnstat.
>>
>> Can I assume 2 is almost always better than one? Or is there a threshold
>> below which packets are too easily tracked? I have no common sense about
>> this.
>>
>> TIA,
>>
>> --Torix
>>
>> Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.
>
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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay "internal error"

[dns1983]

Today I solved the problem deleting the folder /var/lib/for and creating a new 
relay.

I tried to restore at least the old keys but the problem persisted. So I 
definitely think that the problem were the keys.

When I created that backup I verified the integrity with the -W tar option, and 
then I created a sha256 hash. So, my backup wasn't corrupted.

Cheers 
Gigi

Il 18 giugno 2019 20:51:51 CEST, dns1...@riseup.net ha scritto:
>Thank you very much for your support.
>
>I think i'll wait a few days to find a solution, otherwise I'll ask for
>a reset of my VM.
>
>Cheers
>Gigi
>
>
>
>Il 18 giugno 2019 17:26:11 CEST, David Goulet 
>ha scritto:
>>On 18 Jun (12:51:45), dns1...@riseup.net wrote:
>>> Hello,
>>
>>Hi!
>>
>>> 
>>> I have an exit relay on a debian remote vm. Yesterday, after I
>>installed the
>>> last linux security update, I rebooted It, and than I had a problem
>>with
>>> additional IPs, that were no more being assigned. In order to
>>understand if
>>> it were a problem caused by the last upgrade I restored a previous
>>backup,
>>> that I made on May with tar.
>>> 
>>> I didn't solved the problem restoring the backup, so I opened a
>>ticket with
>>> my provider. Now they have fixed this issue, but my tor instance is
>>going in
>>> loop. The log says:
>>
>>Thanks for the report!
>>
>>First time we see this! We've opened
>>https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30916 about this.
>>
>>We hope to get this fixed soon.
>>
>>Huge thanks for taking the time to report this! :)
>>
>>Cheers!
>>David
>>
>>> 
>>> ...
>>> 
>>> Jun 18 13:33:31.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
>>> Jun 18 13:33:32.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
>>> 
>>>  T=
>>1560854012
>>> INTERNAL ERROR: Raw assertion failed at
>>../src/lib/ctime/di_ops.c:179: !
>>>
>>old_val/usr/bin/tor(dump_stack_symbols_to_error_fds+0x33)[0x55a17b410943]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(tor_raw_assertion_failed_msg_+0x86)[0x55a17b410fd6]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(dimap_add_entry+0xa0)[0x55a17b411ba0]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(construct_ntor_key_map+0x69)[0x55a17b357969]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(server_onion_keys_new+0x4d)[0x55a17b39f4dd]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(+0x66e27)[0x55a17b287e27]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(threadpool_new+0x18b)[0x55a17b3b3f0b]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(cpu_init+0x9d)[0x55a17b28828d]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(run_tor_main_loop+0x136)[0x55a17b27a496]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1215)[0x55a17b27b935]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a)[0x55a17b278a8a]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19)[0x55a17b278609]
>>>
>>/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1)[0x7ffb901ba2e1]
>>> /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a)[0x55a17b27865a]
>>> Jun 18 13:33:33.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.5.8 opening log file.
>>> 
>>> ...
>>> 
>>> What could be the problem?
>>> 
>>> thanks
>>> 
>>> Gigi
>>> 
>>> 
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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay "internal error"

[dns1983]

Thank you very much for your support.

I think i'll wait a few days to find a solution, otherwise I'll ask for a reset 
of my VM.

Cheers
Gigi



Il 18 giugno 2019 17:26:11 CEST, David Goulet  ha 
scritto:
>On 18 Jun (12:51:45), dns1...@riseup.net wrote:
>> Hello,
>
>Hi!
>
>> 
>> I have an exit relay on a debian remote vm. Yesterday, after I
>installed the
>> last linux security update, I rebooted It, and than I had a problem
>with
>> additional IPs, that were no more being assigned. In order to
>understand if
>> it were a problem caused by the last upgrade I restored a previous
>backup,
>> that I made on May with tar.
>> 
>> I didn't solved the problem restoring the backup, so I opened a
>ticket with
>> my provider. Now they have fixed this issue, but my tor instance is
>going in
>> loop. The log says:
>
>Thanks for the report!
>
>First time we see this! We've opened
>https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30916 about this.
>
>We hope to get this fixed soon.
>
>Huge thanks for taking the time to report this! :)
>
>Cheers!
>David
>
>> 
>> ...
>> 
>> Jun 18 13:33:31.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
>> Jun 18 13:33:32.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
>> 
>>  T=
>1560854012
>> INTERNAL ERROR: Raw assertion failed at
>../src/lib/ctime/di_ops.c:179: !
>>
>old_val/usr/bin/tor(dump_stack_symbols_to_error_fds+0x33)[0x55a17b410943]
>> /usr/bin/tor(tor_raw_assertion_failed_msg_+0x86)[0x55a17b410fd6]
>> /usr/bin/tor(dimap_add_entry+0xa0)[0x55a17b411ba0]
>> /usr/bin/tor(construct_ntor_key_map+0x69)[0x55a17b357969]
>> /usr/bin/tor(server_onion_keys_new+0x4d)[0x55a17b39f4dd]
>> /usr/bin/tor(+0x66e27)[0x55a17b287e27]
>> /usr/bin/tor(threadpool_new+0x18b)[0x55a17b3b3f0b]
>> /usr/bin/tor(cpu_init+0x9d)[0x55a17b28828d]
>> /usr/bin/tor(run_tor_main_loop+0x136)[0x55a17b27a496]
>> /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1215)[0x55a17b27b935]
>> /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a)[0x55a17b278a8a]
>> /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19)[0x55a17b278609]
>>
>/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1)[0x7ffb901ba2e1]
>> /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a)[0x55a17b27865a]
>> Jun 18 13:33:33.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.5.8 opening log file.
>> 
>> ...
>> 
>> What could be the problem?
>> 
>> thanks
>> 
>> Gigi
>> 
>> 
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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay "internal error"

[David Goulet]

On 18 Jun (12:51:45), dns1...@riseup.net wrote:
> Hello,

Hi!

> 
> I have an exit relay on a debian remote vm. Yesterday, after I installed the
> last linux security update, I rebooted It, and than I had a problem with
> additional IPs, that were no more being assigned. In order to understand if
> it were a problem caused by the last upgrade I restored a previous backup,
> that I made on May with tar.
> 
> I didn't solved the problem restoring the backup, so I opened a ticket with
> my provider. Now they have fixed this issue, but my tor instance is going in
> loop. The log says:

Thanks for the report!

First time we see this! We've opened
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30916 about this.

We hope to get this fixed soon.

Huge thanks for taking the time to report this! :)

Cheers!
David

> 
> ...
> 
> Jun 18 13:33:31.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
> Jun 18 13:33:32.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
> 
>  T= 1560854012
> INTERNAL ERROR: Raw assertion failed at ../src/lib/ctime/di_ops.c:179: !
> old_val/usr/bin/tor(dump_stack_symbols_to_error_fds+0x33)[0x55a17b410943]
> /usr/bin/tor(tor_raw_assertion_failed_msg_+0x86)[0x55a17b410fd6]
> /usr/bin/tor(dimap_add_entry+0xa0)[0x55a17b411ba0]
> /usr/bin/tor(construct_ntor_key_map+0x69)[0x55a17b357969]
> /usr/bin/tor(server_onion_keys_new+0x4d)[0x55a17b39f4dd]
> /usr/bin/tor(+0x66e27)[0x55a17b287e27]
> /usr/bin/tor(threadpool_new+0x18b)[0x55a17b3b3f0b]
> /usr/bin/tor(cpu_init+0x9d)[0x55a17b28828d]
> /usr/bin/tor(run_tor_main_loop+0x136)[0x55a17b27a496]
> /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1215)[0x55a17b27b935]
> /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a)[0x55a17b278a8a]
> /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19)[0x55a17b278609]
> /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1)[0x7ffb901ba2e1]
> /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a)[0x55a17b27865a]
> Jun 18 13:33:33.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.5.8 opening log file.
> 
> ...
> 
> What could be the problem?
> 
> thanks
> 
> Gigi
> 
> 
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[Damian Johnson]

> Sorry, I meant to write "connection getinfo".
>
> And I'm not sure that the original reasoning applies: if Stem is getting the
> information from other sources anyway, why don't we just provide it
> through Tor?

Ah! Gotcha. No argument from me.

> Its worth noting that I have seen circuits on arm / nyx as part of reach
> ability tests like this (ref:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12956):
>
> 76.99.61.63-->  188.138.17.248 (fr)   3.1m (CIRCUIT)
>  │  83.168.200.204 (se)  ParadiseTorRelay1   1 / Guard
>  │  18.181.5.37 (us) VERITAS 2 / Middle
>  └─ 188.138.17.248 (fr)  EuropeCoastDE   3 / Exit
>
> However this is the first time arm has shown me "exit" connections like list
> on first email.

Hi Gary, *this* is the thing Roger was talking about. With Nyx this
should be labeled as 'End' rather than 'Exit' to cut down on the
understandable concern the later term causes. :)
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[Gary]

Hello,

On 6 March 2018 at 00:06, Damian Johnson  wrote:
>
> > I switched to nyx and it is fine allthough on deeper inspection the IP
> to  is actually my IP so clearly this is a bug.
>
> Hi Gary. Sorry, not sure I follow. Are you saying Nyx (not arm) is
> labeling these as 'Outbound' but still scrubbing the address?


When I switched to nyx the problem was gone - nyx did not list any *exit*
connections.

Before I copied & pasted arm's output (see first email) I changed the IP
address in the first column to the words "IP". It turns out that IP was
mine so there was no point in removing it for security as its already on
Atlas.

On 5 March 2018 at 23:15, Roger Dingledine  wrote:

> I am guessing those are self-reachability tests and self-speed tests
> that your relay does by making circuits back to itself.


Its worth noting that I have seen circuits on arm / nyx as part of reach
ability tests like this (ref:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12956):

76.99.61.63-->  188.138.17.248 (fr)   3.1m
(CIRCUIT)
 │  83.168.200.204 (se)  ParadiseTorRelay1   1 / Guard

 │  18.181.5.37 (us) VERITAS 2 / Middle

 └─ 188.138.17.248 (fr)  EuropeCoastDE   3 / Exit


However this is the first time arm has shown me "exit" connections like
list on first email.

Hope that helps you.

Gary.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[teor]

On 6 Mar 2018, at 12:27, Damian Johnson  wrote:

>> A circuit getinfo sounds like a great feature. I'd be happy to review
>> a proposal, but I'm not sure I'd have time to implement it.
> 
> No worries! As mentioned, we already have a proposal. Eight years ago
> Nick encouraged me to write proposals for things I'd find helpful, but
> of course a proposal doesn't magically turn into engineering
> resources. We all have things on our plate, and there's no point in
> spending time writing proposals unless it's gonna turn into something.
> :)

Sorry, I meant to write "connection getinfo".

And I'm not sure that the original reasoning applies: if Stem is getting the
information from other sources anyway, why don't we just provide it
through Tor?

T
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[Damian Johnson]

> A circuit getinfo sounds like a great feature. I'd be happy to review
> a proposal, but I'm not sure I'd have time to implement it.

No worries! As mentioned, we already have a proposal. Eight years ago
Nick encouraged me to write proposals for things I'd find helpful, but
of course a proposal doesn't magically turn into engineering
resources. We all have things on our plate, and there's no point in
spending time writing proposals unless it's gonna turn into something.
:)

Cheers! -Damian
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[teor]

On 6 Mar 2018, at 11:29, Damian Johnson  wrote:

>> Does Tor export a list of connections over the control port?
> 
> Hi teor. Nope, tor doesn't. That's something I wanted many years ago
> and I made a proposal, but Jake talked me into limiting it to circuits
> instead...
> 
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/172-circ-getinfo-option.txt
> 
> Having tor provide this would be very helpful. Stem vends nine
> different connection resolvers because it doesn't. ;P
> 
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/util/connection.py

And a bunch of researchers I'm working with wrote their own 
connection event, too.

A circuit getinfo sounds like a great feature. I'd be happy to review
a proposal, but I'm not sure I'd have time to implement it.

T


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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[Damian Johnson]

> Does Tor export a list of connections over the control port?

Hi teor. Nope, tor doesn't. That's something I wanted many years ago
and I made a proposal, but Jake talked me into limiting it to circuits
instead...

https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/172-circ-getinfo-option.txt

Having tor provide this would be very helpful. Stem vends nine
different connection resolvers because it doesn't. ;P

https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/util/connection.py

Cheers! -Damian
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[teor]

> On 6 Mar 2018, at 11:06, Damian Johnson  wrote:
> 
> For what it's worth here's where Nyx decides to label a connection as
> being an exit. The conditional is "if I can't resolve this to a relay
> and our exit policy allows exiting to it then label as an exit"...
> 
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/tree/nyx/panel/connection.py#n225

Is there something we can do in Tor to make it easier for Stem and other
controllers to distinguish Exit connections from OR connections?

Does Tor export a list of connections over the control port?

(Tor has all the information, but it might not be available over the control
port. Or it might be available, but somewhere you don't expect.)

T
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[Damian Johnson]

Hi Roger, I don't think thats' the issue here. The lines they cited
were exit connections, not the 'Exit' circuit lines (the later look
different and don't include scrubbing).

For what it's worth here's where Nyx decides to label a connection as
being an exit. The conditional is "if I can't resolve this to a relay
and our exit policy allows exiting to it then label as an exit"...

https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/tree/nyx/panel/connection.py#n225

> I switched to nyx and it is fine allthough on deeper inspection the IP to 
>  is actually my IP so clearly this is a bug.

Hi Gary. Sorry, not sure I follow. Are you saying Nyx (not arm) is
labeling these as 'Outbound' but still scrubbing the address?

Cheers! -Damian
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[Roger Dingledine]

On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 10:02:10AM +, Gary wrote:
> What is going on here? I am confused as to why there is exit connections
> but I am not / dont want an exit relay.

I am guessing those are self-reachability tests and self-speed tests
that your relay does by making circuits back to itself.

And I'm guessing that having arm or nyx label them as "exit" circuits
is a confusing bug in arm/nyx.

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6430
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12956

Based on that last ticket, it looks like the confusing word should have
been fixed in recent nyx. If it's still there, or there are similarly
confusing words, please open a ticket.

--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[Gary]

Hello,

On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 2:49 AM, teor  wrote:
  > I think this is a bug in arm.
  > Try nyx.

I switched to nyx and it is fine allthough on deeper inspection the IP to
 is actually my IP so clearly this is a bug.

On 5 March 2018 at 18:18, Damian Johnson  wrote:
   > Oops! Actually, this would happen with Nyx too. This is a Stem
bug...

On reading the bug report, I have always used 'ExitPolicy reject *:*' and
it wasn't until I installed tor on a new machine and on reading/editing the
new default torrc I was surprised to learn that relays are now exit by
default, so use both just to be sure. I am glad I took the time to read the
235 line torrc and the service-defaults in /usr/share/tor!!

Thanks.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[Damian Johnson]

Oops! Actually, this would happen with Nyx too. This is a Stem bug...

https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25423

Thanks for the catch!


On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 2:49 AM, teor  wrote:
>
>
>> On 5 Mar 2018, at 21:02, Gary  wrote:
>>
>> Hello.
>>
>> I have configured my relay (jaffacakemonster2) to be non exit, however arm 
>> shows me the following (I edited out IPs' & some lines after copy/paste from 
>> connection screen for others security / brevity)
>>
>> Connections (1878 inbound, 2113 outbound, 19 exit, 1 control)
>>  IP-->  :443 (HTTPS)  UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :443 (HTTPS)  UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :443 (HTTPS)  UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :443 (HTTPS)  UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.4m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :4000 UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.4m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   1.0m (EXIT)
>>  IP-->  :26155UNKNOWN  
>>  UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>>
>> Atlas reports the flags Fast, Running & Valid.
>>
>> Lines as copied & pasted from torrc:
>>
>> ## Uncomment this if you do *not* want your relay to allow any exit traffic.
>> ## (Relays allow exit traffic by default.)
>> ExitRelay 0
>>
>> What is going on here? I am confused as to why there is exit connections but 
>> I am not / dont want an exit relay.
>
> I think this is a bug in arm.
> Try nyx.
>
> T
>
> --
> teor
>
> teor2345 at gmail dot com
> PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B
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>
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay

[teor]

> On 5 Mar 2018, at 21:02, Gary  wrote:
> 
> Hello.
> 
> I have configured my relay (jaffacakemonster2) to be non exit, however arm 
> shows me the following (I edited out IPs' & some lines after copy/paste from 
> connection screen for others security / brevity)
> 
> Connections (1878 inbound, 2113 outbound, 19 exit, 1 control)
>  IP-->  :443 (HTTPS)  UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :443 (HTTPS)  UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :443 (HTTPS)  UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :443 (HTTPS)  UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.4m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :4000 UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.4m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :9001 UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   1.0m (EXIT)
>  IP-->  :26155UNKNOWN   
> UNKNOWN   3.5m (EXIT)
> 
> Atlas reports the flags Fast, Running & Valid. 
> 
> Lines as copied & pasted from torrc:
> 
> ## Uncomment this if you do *not* want your relay to allow any exit traffic.
> ## (Relays allow exit traffic by default.)
> ExitRelay 0
> 
> What is going on here? I am confused as to why there is exit connections but 
> I am not / dont want an exit relay.

I think this is a bug in arm.
Try nyx.

T

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit Relay Up

[nusenu]

Conrad Rockenhaus:
> Hello All,
> 
> I just brought up my third relay, ConradsOVHRelay03, as an exit. I
> appreciate the feedback that everyone provided me with before and I
> hope that this relay is configured perfectly. I’m glad to add more
> bandwidth to the cause.

thanks for adding more exit bw, please do not forget to 
configure MyFamily.

you can easily see if it is configured properly if the counter
next to the nicknames on atlas shows the amount of relays you run.
If you run 3 relays and the counter says something less than 3 than
MyFamily is not properly configured.

https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/conradsOVHR



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twitter: @nusenu_



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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay

[Gary Smith]

Hello.
If it is not set in your torrc, try looking in the torrc-default file

/usr/share/tor/tor-service-defaults-torrc

If you forget where this file is, look in the log where for two lines near
the top for "loading torrc" or something
If nothing is there, write EXITRELAY 0 yourself, right at the bottom of
your /etc/tor/torrc file.


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 10:04 PM, Evangelos Meintasis <
vagelism22...@protonmail.com> wrote:

> Hello to all,
> I got this warning :
> [warn] Tor is running as an exit relay. If you did not want this behavior,
> please set the ExitRelay option to 0.
>
> But in /etc/tor/torrc file, I can not locate an y EXITRELAY option.
> Should I just type it without comments there with the 0 flag?
> Thank you!
>
> Vagelis.
>
>
> Sent from ProtonMail , encrypted email based in
> Switzerland.
>
>
>
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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay

[teor]

On 15 Dec 2017, at 09:14, Toralf Förster  wrote:

>> On 12/14/2017 11:08 PM, Sebastian Hahn wrote:
>> If you don't want to run an Exit relay, set ExitRelay 0.
> Not needed IMO - I'm under the impression that nowadays with recent Tor 
> versions a user must opt-in to configure Tor to be an exit.

No, we have not changed this default.
And if we do change it, we will remove the warning seen by the operator.

The latest manual page says:

ExitRelay 0|1|auto
Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a non-bridge 
server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to exit according to 
the ExitPolicy option (or the default ExitPolicy if none is specified).
…
If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor behaves as if it were set to 1, but 
warns the user if this would cause traffic to exit. … (Default: auto)

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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay

[Toralf Förster]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

On 12/14/2017 11:08 PM, Sebastian Hahn wrote:
> If you don't want to run an Exit relay, set ExitRelay 0.
Not needed IMO - I'm under the impression that nowadays with recent Tor 
versions a user must opt-in to configure Tor to be an exit.

- -- 
Toralf
PGP C4EACDDE 0076E94E
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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay

[Sebastian Hahn]

> On 14. Dec 2017, at 23:04, Evangelos Meintasis  
> wrote:
> 
> Hello to all, 
> I got this warning :
> [warn] Tor is running as an exit relay. If you did not want this behavior, 
> please set the ExitRelay option to 0.
> 
> But in /etc/tor/torrc file, I can not locate an y EXITRELAY option.
> Should I just type it without comments there with the 0 flag?
> Thank you!

Do you *WANT* to run a nexit relay? Then everything is fine and
you can ignore the warning, or set ExitRelay 1, or set an ExitPolicy.
If you don't want to run an Exit relay, set ExitRelay 0.
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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay consensus weight

[Roger Dingledine]

On Thu, May 25, 2017 at 08:20:16PM -0700, Arisbe wrote:
> I just made an interesting observation that I thought I would share.
> Yesterday I started a VPS exit relay at a well known hosting company
> in Moldova [0]. Within 24 hours I saw the consensus weight exceed
> 1.  The relay is bandwidth limited to 10 MiB/s.  Not that I'm
> complaining!

Thanks for running an exit relay!

(Using data files from
https://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-descriptors/consensuses/)

$ grep -A4 "^r TorExitMoldova" 2017-05*|grep "w "
2017-05-24-20-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=0 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-24-21-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-24-22-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-24-23-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-00-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-01-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-02-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-03-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-04-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-05-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-06-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-07-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-08-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-09-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1
2017-05-25-10-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=8460
2017-05-25-11-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=8460
2017-05-25-12-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=8180
2017-05-25-13-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=8180
2017-05-25-14-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=8180
2017-05-25-15-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=8180
2017-05-25-16-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=8180
2017-05-25-17-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=8180
2017-05-25-18-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=8180
2017-05-25-19-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=9670
2017-05-25-20-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=9670
2017-05-25-21-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=9670
2017-05-25-22-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=9670
2017-05-25-23-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=9670
2017-05-26-00-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=9670
2017-05-26-01-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=9670
2017-05-26-02-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=9670
2017-05-26-03-00-00-consensus-w Bandwidth=9670

Here's what I think happened:

A) You started up your exit relay the evening of May 24 UTC, and it
published a descriptor with a tiny amount of bandwidth in it (from
self-testing).

B) Somehow, it attracted a traffic flow that was very high volume.
Its consensus weight was tiny, but there are millions of Tor clients,
so maybe one of them chose it anyway. Or maybe the bandwidth authorities
themselves added this load. I'm not sure how step 'B' happened, but
however it did, your relay handled a lot of traffic, so it learned that
it *could* handle a lot of traffic, so it published new relay descriptors
saying that it's quite fast.

It has published three descriptors so far. The third number on the
bandwidth line is its self-reported capacity:

published 2017-05-24 19:50:38
bandwidth 10485760 12582912 145408

published 2017-05-24 23:34:24
bandwidth 10485760 12582912 6487186

published 2017-05-25 15:39:43
bandwidth 10485760 12582912 11526593

C) By the time the bandwidth authorities got around to measuring it,
it was already proudly self-reporting a big capacity. The way the
bandwidth authorities work is that they decide a modification to the
self-reported number, depending on how you perform compared to your peers
who self-report a similar number. You perform about average compared
to your peers, so they gave you a consensus weight that is around the
number you were self-reporting.

> So it begs the question:  Is there not enough exit relays on the Tor
> network?

Well, exit relays attract traffic in a very different pattern than
guard relays. The blog post that we always point people to:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
has to do with how a fast non-exit relay will grow over time.

So it is much more normal for your consensus weight to grow quickly for
an exit relay. (Well, expected. It's hard to say what is normal with
the weird broken design that is the bandwidth authority subsystem these
days. :)

As for whether there are not enough exit relays... always! :) We actually
have about a third of the capacity of the network in Exits right now,
so from a load balancing perspective, it's not a disaster, since clients
avoid using the exit relays for any other positions in their circuits,
and it works out ok. But from the perspective of resistance against
correlation attacks, which is largely a function of diversity of entry
points and exit points, then having only 1/3 of the network as a possible
exit point means things aren't as good as they could be.

Hope that helps,
--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Kurt Besig]

On 8/3/2016 10:13 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 03:29:01PM +0200, t...@as250.net wrote:
>> Absolutely. Most of the infrastructure we provide on that basis and it
>> is ok! The reason for running that exit node was that we believed it
>> would contribute towards a positive impact in many peoples lives.
> 
> Thanks for contributing while you did!
> 
> I'm remembering way back when I would mail all the people running relays
> to see if they needed anything. Then there was the phase where we got
> some funding for Moritz to do relay operator advocacy and coordination:
> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/turning-funding-more-exit-relays
> and that push also led to some cool sites like
> https://compass.torproject.org/
> 
> Among all the things that we need to do next, I think getting a relay
> advocate / coordinator in place would sure be useful. I think there are
> so many things that we need, though, that it's going to be a while yet
> before we get such a person in place.
> 
> In the mean time, hang tight everybody, and let's continue to have a
> community who helps each other, and thanks all for your contributions.
> 
> --Roger
> 
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> 
Well stated and thank-you, Roger.
I agree 100% with the need for a more 'visible' advocacy in this age of
headline reading and jumping to false conclusions for no factual reason.



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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Petrusko]

Haha yes! T-shirts are a good way to start conversations with people who
don't really know what is this "onion" !?
And be proud to wear it ! :p

Registration is open ?!! ;p


Le 04/08/2016 à 17:26, I a écrit :
> Hear Hear, Roger and Petrusko,
>
> Nonetheless, I would like the promised t-shirts before next year.
>
> Robert

-- 
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C0BF 2184 4A77 4A18 90E9 F72C B3CA E665 EBE2 3AE5




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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[I]

Hear Hear, Roger and Petrusko,

Nonetheless, I would like the promised t-shirts before next year.

Robert


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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Petrusko]

And I think a lot of users doesn't know what is there "behind". As
always in computer's world...

Now I'm able to explain quickly (what I've understood) this network to
some friends/family, who were using Tor a long time ago before I've
started to have fun with contributing a little to the network.

How many people around us know how 'it's working", how many are thinking
about that, are interested to know ?
They are connecting the smartphone to Mc Do's wifi, and are happy to
read Facebook... receive emails... etc. But how it's possible to make it
work ? They don't care about that, /"it's working and it's cool !"/
They don't know what is a NAS at their work, what is an IP, what is
domain with AD, why those IT guys are sooo boring with those passwords
(they don't love our pet's name as password... rah!!).
Now my friends/family have quickly understood how "normal people" can
contribute to Tor, but I'm sure some months after /"it's working and
it's cool !"/. Nothing more.
And I think a lot of "little" operators like me are doing this by loving
computer's world (linux, network, dev,...), having fun to investigate
why it's not working nice, or try to make it better, and of course
understand the need to have an "underground" network for all the reasons
we know.
It's cool to contribute, and if it can help censored people, and if it's
better for privacy to the others, it's beautiful !

The day I'll not be able to have some time/money to make nodes working,
I'll sadly "poweroff" them, and thank all people (devs, operators,
mailing lists...) for their work, to have this package working easily
with this support !
apt-get install tor - nano torrc (bridge/relay/exit to contribute)-
service tor restart - it's working. Nice? If it's not working, the
community is here. Nice!
Thanks.

-- 
Petrusko
PubKey EBE23AE5
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Roger Dingledine]

On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 03:29:01PM +0200, t...@as250.net wrote:
> Absolutely. Most of the infrastructure we provide on that basis and it
> is ok! The reason for running that exit node was that we believed it
> would contribute towards a positive impact in many peoples lives.

Thanks for contributing while you did!

I'm remembering way back when I would mail all the people running relays
to see if they needed anything. Then there was the phase where we got
some funding for Moritz to do relay operator advocacy and coordination:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/turning-funding-more-exit-relays
and that push also led to some cool sites like
https://compass.torproject.org/

Among all the things that we need to do next, I think getting a relay
advocate / coordinator in place would sure be useful. I think there are
so many things that we need, though, that it's going to be a while yet
before we get such a person in place.

In the mean time, hang tight everybody, and let's continue to have a
community who helps each other, and thanks all for your contributions.

--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[I]

...t-shirts.[ sotto voce ]



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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[tor]

On Wed, 3 Aug 2016 14:31:34 +0200
Andreas Krey  wrote:

> On Wed, 03 Aug 2016 13:40:03 +, t...@as250.net wrote:
> ...
> > our support. Just to make it clear: "appreciate" in this context
> > doesn't mean funding. All those years we didn't get as much as a
> > "thank you!" from anyone.
> 
> Operating tor nodes is - like operating any
> invisible infrastructure - inherently thankless.

Absolutely. Most of the infrastructure we provide on that basis and it
is ok! The reason for running that exit node was that we believed it
would contribute towards a positive impact in many peoples lives.

The "appreciation" part was rather directed to those individuals who
know me/us personally and only to them. You know who you are.
No bad feelings though! :-)

> ...
> > How's that for a "change in strategy"?
> 
> Well, sad. So long, and thanks for the exit bandwith past.

It surely was a fun time. Including the abuse-report handling.

In the end however, it is no longer appropriate for us to
contribute to the Tor Project so we decided that we have no 
reasonable choice left, but to discontinue the service.

Cheers.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[NotRandom Someone]

I think that the purpose was not being famous or recognized but just having
more kindness.
The fact is that a lot of Tor users don't even know which relay they are
using and how to get the informations of the exit relay they're using,
meaning that they will  actually never thank anyone of running exit or
middle relay...

Hoping something is not good for the mind, if you don't, and receive some
"thank you" it will be a great gift.

I'm running a middle relay, and I know that noone will thank me, and I
don't care because thank to us, people will use our relay to have
internet-informations without censorship or relaying censitive informations
from countries where dictature is in place for exemple...

On 3 Aug 2016 14:39, "Tristan"  wrote:

> If you were running relays just to get recognized, you were probably doing
> it did the wrong reason.
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Tristan]

If you were running relays just to get recognized, you were probably doing
it did the wrong reason.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Andreas Krey]

On Wed, 03 Aug 2016 13:40:03 +, t...@as250.net wrote:
...
> our support. Just to make it clear: "appreciate" in this context
> doesn't mean funding. All those yearswe didn't get as much as a "thank
> you!" from anyone.

Operating tor nodes is - like operating any
invisible infrastructure - inherently thankless.

...
> How's that for a "change in strategy"?

Well, sad. So long, and thanks
for the exit bandwith past.

Andreas

-- 
"Totally trivial. Famous last words."
From: Linus Torvalds 
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 07:29:21 -0800
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[tor]

On Wed, 09 Mar 2016 14:51:12 +0100
Elrippo  wrote:

> Why are you then complaining if you do not accept money for running
> your relays?!

Where do you see any complaining? I guess you misunderstood my mail.

If other people are getting support in keeping their relays up and
running, that's fine and I am quite happy for them. I have re-read my
mail multiple times and can't fathom how one could interpret that mail
as "complaining". It merely states that - although we don't need any
funding for operational expenses - donations for upgrades are more than
welcome.

> I personally do not have any problems with contributing, you earn my
> full respect, but I do have problems with relay operators who are
> complaining about others getting funded.

Where did I do that? Why would I possibly complain about anyone funding
other relays? This makes no sense. It's good for the network if that
happens and allows diversity.

> Maybe a change in your strategy would make the life of your precious
> and fast relays a bit easier...

I have shut down our "precious and fast relays" recently as we
decided unanimously that the tor-community does not need or appreciate
our support. Just to make it clear: "appreciate" in this context
doesn't mean funding. All those yearswe didn't get as much as a "thank
you!" from anyone.
The >500mbit/s of bandwidth from our diversely peered network which we
continuously shoveled into the tor network for the past years can now be
used for more worthwhile projects.

How's that for a "change in strategy"?

Cheers.

p.s. sorry for the delayed reply. I just peek into the folder with this
list every now and then, due to the high volume and bad SNR.
As I don't have any further interest in the tor project I'll be also
unsubscribing shortly. So long and thanks for all the fish!
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Kenneth Freeman]

On 03/09/2016 07:09 AM, Cristian Consonni wrote:

> We have a saying in Italian that says "Chiedere è lecito, rispondere è
> cortesia".
> Roughly translated "Asking is allowed, answering is courtesy", that is
> you can ask for whatever you want, maybe somebody will respond, or
> don't, whatever.
> 
> I am happy to see that there is a community where people can ask for
> and receive help in many forms.
> 
> Of course, in general, if somebody wants to chip in funding remember
> that you can:
> * donate to Tor project
> * get together to run machines
> * donate to groups that run many machines (see torservers.net)
> 
> We could start talking about which is the most efficient way to spend
> money, but should we?

Serendipitously I was telling my tax lady about the Tor Project and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation today. Being support troop on that level
is good. Being able to run a stable array of Tor exit nodes because
you've been able to acquire the necessary institutional knowledge due to
having reliable money stream is also good.

Presumably the fiscal and corporate diversity of the Tor network makes
for hybrid vigor. There's an old engineering maxim (which I believe
dates back to Voltaire) that "The best is the enemy of the good enough."
Accordingly you may plant yourself on Tor's fitness landscape wherever
you want. The environment is quite varied.


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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[elrippo]

That's a reason for me to contribute in funding people/organisations who are 
willing to spend a lot of time and money!

> I agree with that. Not everyone has a job that earns them a load of
> money and they still want to operate a relay.
> I personally spent almost the same money for servers as I can afford to
> buy food - Life can be hard ;)
> 
> Am 2016-03-09 um 14:51 schrieb Elrippo:
> > Why are you then complaining if you do not accept money for running your
> > relays?!
> > 
> > I personally do not have any problems with contributing, you earn my
> > full respect, but I do have problems with relay operators who are
> > complaining about others getting funded.
> > 
> > Maybe a change in your strategy would make the life of your precious and
> > fast relays a bit easier...
> > 
> > 
> > Am 09. März 2016 12:24:33 MEZ, schrieb t...@as250.net:
> > 
> > On Wed, 09 Mar 2016 05:20:44 +0100
> > elrippo  wrote:
> > 
> > if you ask for funding you will get funding, so what's the problem.
> > Leave your BTC address with monthly costs here and we will see how
> > much funding you get Just try it out!
> > 
> > 
> > Well, let's try that!
> > 
> > 
> > https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/B486925DC901969CCE2B371E93740CF98C30539D
> > 
> > The contribution BTC addr. is 15y79y3vc1RjidRTUc8vPb7fejrvi1FAdg
> > 
> > Monthly cost for us is 0.-£$€ as we do not accept/spend money for
> > recurring fees (for similar reasons to those Roger outlined earlier).
> > 
> > We've been running strong with >200mbit/s over two years now and we'll
> > do what we do even
> > without your funding however BTC donations are much
> > appreciated and will be used for hardware upgrades.
> > 
> > Cheers.
> > 
> > 
> > tor-relays mailing list
> > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> > 
> > 
> 
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[elrippo]

Dear Roman,
please let us not be picky, i did not address you or anybody else but 
t...@as250.net in the specific mail.
I am writing to a list so i believe everybody knows who is addressed on that 
list for various reasons. In case you are not satisfied with my awnser i 
apologize for "spamming" someone personally involved in this list, thus this 
person was not even addressed in the mail in question.

Kind regards,
elrippo

> On Wed, 09 Mar 2016 14:51:12 +0100
> Elrippo  wrote:
> 
> > Why are you then complaining if you do not accept money for running your 
> > relays?!
> 
> I believe you have some apologizing to do -- and not to me;
> 
> check the "From:" headers of stuff you have been replying to more carefully.
> 
> 


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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Roman Mamedov]

On Wed, 09 Mar 2016 14:51:12 +0100
Elrippo  wrote:

> Why are you then complaining if you do not accept money for running your 
> relays?!

I believe you have some apologizing to do -- and not to me;

check the "From:" headers of stuff you have been replying to more carefully.

-- 
With respect,
Roman


pgpprE_3X7xxw.pgp
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Cristian Consonni]

2016-03-08 23:15 GMT+01:00 Roman Mamedov :
> Sorry but reading these kinds of things is kind of demoralizing. --
>
> I'm not going to do a "me too" post, but some of us pay for relays with their
> own funds for years, which easily do 30-40 MB/sec combined, receiving zero
> donations -- then some guy with a 3 MB/sec relay comes around and people jump
> at the chance to send him hundreds of Euros just because.
>
> Oh I know mine are not Exit relays, so those are not special enough, nothing
> to see here, move along.

We have a saying in Italian that says "Chiedere è lecito, rispondere è
cortesia".
Roughly translated "Asking is allowed, answering is courtesy", that is
you can ask for whatever you want, maybe somebody will respond, or
don't, whatever.

I am happy to see that there is a community where people can ask for
and receive help in many forms.

Of course, in general, if somebody wants to chip in funding remember
that you can:
* donate to Tor project
* get together to run machines
* donate to groups that run many machines (see torservers.net)

We could start talking about which is the most efficient way to spend
money, but should we?

C
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Sebastian Pfeifer]

I agree with that. Not everyone has a job that earns them a load of
money and they still want to operate a relay.
I personally spent almost the same money for servers as I can afford to
buy food - Life can be hard ;)

Am 2016-03-09 um 14:51 schrieb Elrippo:
> Why are you then complaining if you do not accept money for running your
> relays?!
> 
> I personally do not have any problems with contributing, you earn my
> full respect, but I do have problems with relay operators who are
> complaining about others getting funded.
> 
> Maybe a change in your strategy would make the life of your precious and
> fast relays a bit easier...
> 
> 
> Am 09. März 2016 12:24:33 MEZ, schrieb t...@as250.net:
> 
> On Wed, 09 Mar 2016 05:20:44 +0100
> elrippo  wrote:
> 
> if you ask for funding you will get funding, so what's the problem.
> Leave your BTC address with monthly costs here and we will see how
> much funding you get Just try it out!
> 
> 
> Well, let's try that!
> 
> 
> https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/B486925DC901969CCE2B371E93740CF98C30539D
> 
> The contribution BTC addr. is 15y79y3vc1RjidRTUc8vPb7fejrvi1FAdg
> 
> Monthly cost for us is 0.-£$€ as we do not accept/spend money for
> recurring fees (for similar reasons to those Roger outlined earlier).
> 
> We've been running strong with >200mbit/s over two years now and we'll
> do what we do even
> without your funding however BTC donations are much
> appreciated and will be used for hardware upgrades.
> 
> Cheers.
> 
> 
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> 
> 
> -- 
> Want to trade Bitcoin for physical GOLD ->
> https://www.vaultoro.com/?a=100345
> 
> We don't bubble you, we don't spoof you ;)
> Keep your data encrypted!
> Log you soon,
> your Admin
> elri...@elrippoisland.net
> 
> Encrypted messages are welcome.
> 0x84DF1F7E6AE03644
> 
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Elrippo]

Why are you then complaining if you do not accept money for running your 
relays?!

I personally do not have any problems with contributing, you earn my full 
respect, but I do have problems with relay operators who are complaining about 
others getting funded.

Maybe a change in your strategy would make the life of your precious and fast 
relays a bit easier...


Am 09. März 2016 12:24:33 MEZ, schrieb t...@as250.net:
>On Wed, 09 Mar 2016 05:20:44 +0100
>elrippo  wrote:
>
>> if you ask for funding you will get funding, so what's the problem.
>> Leave your BTC address with monthly costs here and we will see how
>> much funding you get Just try it out!
>
>Well, let's try that!
>
>https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/B486925DC901969CCE2B371E93740CF98C30539D
>
>The contribution BTC addr. is 15y79y3vc1RjidRTUc8vPb7fejrvi1FAdg
>
>Monthly cost for us is 0.-£$€ as we do not accept/spend money for
>recurring fees (for similar reasons to those Roger outlined earlier).
>
>We've been running strong with >200mbit/s over two years now and we'll
>do what we do even without your funding however BTC donations are much
>appreciated and will be used for hardware upgrades.
>
>Cheers.
>___
>tor-relays mailing list
>tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
>https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

-- 
Want to trade Bitcoin for physical GOLD -> https://www.vaultoro.com/?a=100345

We don't bubble you, we don't spoof you ;)
Keep your data encrypted!
Log you soon,
your Admin
elri...@elrippoisland.net

Encrypted messages are welcome.
0x84DF1F7E6AE03644

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[tor]

On Wed, 9 Mar 2016 12:38:03 +0100
"Volker Mink"  wrote:

> It losing much performance over time. Whats the reason for this?

The curve matches pretty much our hardware/network upgrade cycle.
As more services/hosts are provisioned the performance decreases,
then an upgrade happens. (as september last year)

Other factors probably also play a role. If anyone can contribute their
opinion based on their experience and the publicly available data,
feel free!

Cheers.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Volker Mink]

It losing much performance over time. Whats the reason for this?

-Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
Von: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] Im Auftrag von 
t...@as250.net
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 9. März 2016 12:25
An: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Betreff: Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

On Wed, 09 Mar 2016 05:20:44 +0100
elrippo  wrote:

> if you ask for funding you will get funding, so what's the problem.
> Leave your BTC address with monthly costs here and we will see how 
> much funding you get Just try it out!

Well, let's try that!

https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/B486925DC901969CCE2B371E93740CF98C30539D

The contribution BTC addr. is 15y79y3vc1RjidRTUc8vPb7fejrvi1FAdg

Monthly cost for us is 0.-£$€ as we do not accept/spend money for recurring 
fees (for similar reasons to those Roger outlined earlier).

We've been running strong with >200mbit/s over two years now and we'll do what 
we do even without your funding however BTC donations are much appreciated and 
will be used for hardware upgrades.

Cheers.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[tor]

On Wed, 09 Mar 2016 05:20:44 +0100
elrippo  wrote:

> if you ask for funding you will get funding, so what's the problem.
> Leave your BTC address with monthly costs here and we will see how
> much funding you get Just try it out!

Well, let's try that!

https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/B486925DC901969CCE2B371E93740CF98C30539D

The contribution BTC addr. is 15y79y3vc1RjidRTUc8vPb7fejrvi1FAdg

Monthly cost for us is 0.-£$€ as we do not accept/spend money for
recurring fees (for similar reasons to those Roger outlined earlier).

We've been running strong with >200mbit/s over two years now and we'll
do what we do even without your funding however BTC donations are much
appreciated and will be used for hardware upgrades.

Cheers.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Gareth Llewellyn]

FWIW I started my own ISP just so I didn't have to worry about getting
shutdown due to abuse complaints etc.

Paying all the fees (RIPE.net, co-location, servers and bandwidth) is
_incredibly_ expensive but we run 4x Exit nodes without interference, 12
relays and plenty of "private" bridges.

https://globe.torproject.org/#/search/query=BrassHorn
https://BrassHornCommunications.uk
https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/data/uk.brasshorncomms.html

Since we're on the topic of funding / crowdfunding we were considering
launching a crowdfunding round to acquire the capital to build a direct
broadband-to-tor product;
https://twitter.com/BrassHornComms/status/702843519724077057 (and offset
our current running costs). Is this something that people would be
interested in (as a product and as a crowdfunding exercise)?
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[elrippo]

You are welcome :D
There you go -> 
https://btc.blockr.io/tx/info/6e0a510aafe64e021ce910c01ea8be87578e8cf01ad279cd7adb8c10c3be

Kind regards,
elrippo

> elrippo wrote:
> > I will also chip in with some funding.
> > 
> > DO you accept Bitcoin or Monero, i do not like to you use PayPal for
> > funding an TOR relay ;D
> > 
> > If so, please post the addresses, so we can fund a fast running relay.
> 
> Definitely: 1KjWtgsrSRJ6mBMjAuKhqSGvEPVJ8rRoqV
> 
> > Also tell again, how much it costs you per month.
> 
> $35/month.
> 
> Thanks so much! I'm impressed by and grateful for everyone's generosity.
> 
> Michael
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[elrippo]

I do not think so,
if you ask for funding you will get funding, so what's the problem.
Leave your BTC address with monthly costs here and we will see how much funding 
you get 
Just try it out!

Kind regards,
elrippo

> On Tue, 08 Mar 2016 20:17:44 +0100
> elrippo  wrote:
> 
> > I will also chip in with some funding.
> > DO you accept Bitcoin or Monero, i do not like to you use PayPal for 
> > funding an TOR relay ;D
> > If so, please post the addresses, so we can fund a fast running relay.
> > Also tell again, how much it costs you per month.
> > 
> > If you guys agree, the funding can be done monthwise by individuals or via 
> > crowdfunding, i am fine with both.
> 
> Sorry but reading these kinds of things is kind of demoralizing. --
> 
> I'm not going to do a "me too" post, but some of us pay for relays with their
> own funds for years, which easily do 30-40 MB/sec combined, receiving zero
> donations -- then some guy with a 3 MB/sec relay comes around and people jump
> at the chance to send him hundreds of Euros just because.
> 
> Oh I know mine are not Exit relays, so those are not special enough, nothing
> to see here, move along.
> 
> 


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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Greg Moss]

I'll kick in a few month also...
On Mar 8, 2016 5:26 PM, "Michael McConville"  wrote:

> elrippo wrote:
> > I will also chip in with some funding.
> >
> > DO you accept Bitcoin or Monero, i do not like to you use PayPal for
> > funding an TOR relay ;D
> >
> > If so, please post the addresses, so we can fund a fast running relay.
>
> Definitely: 1KjWtgsrSRJ6mBMjAuKhqSGvEPVJ8rRoqV
>
> > Also tell again, how much it costs you per month.
>
> $35/month.
>
> Thanks so much! I'm impressed by and grateful for everyone's generosity.
>
> Michael
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Michael McConville]

elrippo wrote:
> I will also chip in with some funding.
> 
> DO you accept Bitcoin or Monero, i do not like to you use PayPal for
> funding an TOR relay ;D
> 
> If so, please post the addresses, so we can fund a fast running relay.

Definitely: 1KjWtgsrSRJ6mBMjAuKhqSGvEPVJ8rRoqV

> Also tell again, how much it costs you per month.

$35/month.

Thanks so much! I'm impressed by and grateful for everyone's generosity.

Michael
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Michael McConville]

I wrote:
> > Sorry but reading these kinds of things is kind of demoralizing.
> 
> +1
> Perhaps crowdfunding a pool from which subsidies could be distributed
> would be fairer.

https://oniontip.com/

It isn't sufficient. I've got $6-10 from it in more than a year, and
almost all of that was because I was an "early adopter". Maybe it could
be better designed, but I'm not confident that that model will ever be
particularly useful.

Part of the reason is that the donations are portioned solely on
bandwidth share, along with guard and exit status. That discourages
carefully maintained relays on carefully selected hosts. In the worst
case (although I don't find it too likely, simply because there will
never be enough money), it could lead to a "get a free-ish VPS if you
run Tor on it!" situation.

I don't feel too obligated to defend my request, though. It's reasonable
for people donating large amounts of time and resources to occasionally
ask for support.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[I]

> Sorry but reading these kinds of things is kind of demoralizing. --
> 

+1
Perhaps crowdfunding a pool from which subsidies could be distributed would be 
fairer.

Robert


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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[renke brausse]

Hi Roman,

> Sorry but reading these kinds of things is kind of demoralizing. --

I kind of understand your sentiment but

> Oh I know mine are not Exit relays, so those are not special enough, nothing
> to see here, move along.

this is (at least for me) not true - Michael's mail was the first I
remember with a plea for support and currently it's easier for me to
donate money* instead of running my own relay.

Unfair? Maybe. But not the fault of the thread starter and I'm sorry if
it felt as if I do not appreciate other relay operators.

Renke

*) on top of my more silent donations to other organisations around data
privacy



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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Michael McConville]

Roman Mamedov wrote:
> Sorry but reading these kinds of things is kind of demoralizing. --
> 
> I'm not going to do a "me too" post, but some of us pay for relays
> with their own funds for years, which easily do 30-40 MB/sec combined,
> receiving zero donations -- then some guy with a 3 MB/sec relay comes
> around and people jump at the chance to send him hundreds of Euros
> just because.

I'm a senior in college and I've been running relays on my own dime
since I was a senior in high school. This exit relay had to come down
unless someone chipped in, so I thought I'd ask. Also, it's a 6-8 MB/s
relay, unless you're only counting one direction of traffic.

> Oh I know mine are not Exit relays, so those are not special enough,
> nothing to see here, move along.

For what it's worth, exit relays generally cost more and are somewhat
more work because you have to:

 o find a company willing to host it, which rules out most hands-off
   budget providers

 o pay for a dedicated server (exits should usually be on dedicated
   servers, IMO, because their security is more critical)

 o deal with abuse complaints

 o make sure the packet filter policies and DNS are configured and
   working properly

I think it makes sense for the community to fund certain experienced
members' relays. Some of us are good operators but aren't at a stage in
life where we can consistently spend hundreds of dollars a year on
hosting. I'd be interested to hear ideas for funding infrastructure
beyond oniontip.com.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Roman Mamedov]

On Tue, 08 Mar 2016 20:17:44 +0100
elrippo  wrote:

> I will also chip in with some funding.
> DO you accept Bitcoin or Monero, i do not like to you use PayPal for funding 
> an TOR relay ;D
> If so, please post the addresses, so we can fund a fast running relay.
> Also tell again, how much it costs you per month.
> 
> If you guys agree, the funding can be done monthwise by individuals or via 
> crowdfunding, i am fine with both.

Sorry but reading these kinds of things is kind of demoralizing. --

I'm not going to do a "me too" post, but some of us pay for relays with their
own funds for years, which easily do 30-40 MB/sec combined, receiving zero
donations -- then some guy with a 3 MB/sec relay comes around and people jump
at the chance to send him hundreds of Euros just because.

Oh I know mine are not Exit relays, so those are not special enough, nothing
to see here, move along.

-- 
With respect,
Roman


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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[elrippo]

I will also chip in with some funding.
DO you accept Bitcoin or Monero, i do not like to you use PayPal for funding an 
TOR relay ;D
If so, please post the addresses, so we can fund a fast running relay.
Also tell again, how much it costs you per month.

If you guys agree, the funding can be done monthwise by individuals or via 
crowdfunding, i am fine with both.

Kind regards,
elrippo.

On Dienstag, 8. März 2016, 10:59:51 Andy Isaacson wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 08, 2016 at 10:13:30AM -0800, Michael McConville wrote:
> > re...@mobtm.com wrote:
> > > > Sadly, I have to shut it down at least temporarily if no one can help me
> > > > pay for it. Is anyone interested? You can search the mailing lists to
> > > > see that I've been contributing for a few years, and I can give more
> > > > verification if you'd like.
> > > 
> > > if you're willing to give me a paypal address (or banking account
> > > infos if you're within the European SEPA zone) I will chip in three
> > > months.
> > 
> > Awesome, thanks!  :-)  My Paypal address is mmcconvi...@mykolab.com.
> > 
> > > Thanks for running a fast relay!
> > 
> > My pleasure - thanks for making it possible.
> 
> Michael,
> 
> If you have a web page tracking your needs and with a donate button
> (ideally a Paypal reocurring donation button), I'd be happy to tweet a
> link from @noisetor - I suspect you'll pick up the necessary support in
> no time flat!
> 
> -andy
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*Want to trade Bitcoin for physical GOLD* -> https://www.vaultoro.com/?a=100345

We don't bubble you, we don't spoof you ;)
Keep your data encrypted!
Log you soon,
your Admin
elri...@elrippoisland.net

Encrypted messages are welcome.
0x84DF1F7E6AE03644

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Andy Isaacson]

On Tue, Mar 08, 2016 at 10:13:30AM -0800, Michael McConville wrote:
> re...@mobtm.com wrote:
> > > Sadly, I have to shut it down at least temporarily if no one can help me
> > > pay for it. Is anyone interested? You can search the mailing lists to
> > > see that I've been contributing for a few years, and I can give more
> > > verification if you'd like.
> > 
> > if you're willing to give me a paypal address (or banking account
> > infos if you're within the European SEPA zone) I will chip in three
> > months.
> 
> Awesome, thanks!  :-)  My Paypal address is mmcconvi...@mykolab.com.
> 
> > Thanks for running a fast relay!
> 
> My pleasure - thanks for making it possible.

Michael,

If you have a web page tracking your needs and with a donate button
(ideally a Paypal reocurring donation button), I'd be happy to tweet a
link from @noisetor - I suspect you'll pick up the necessary support in
no time flat!

-andy
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Michael McConville]

re...@mobtm.com wrote:
> > Sadly, I have to shut it down at least temporarily if no one can help me
> > pay for it. Is anyone interested? You can search the mailing lists to
> > see that I've been contributing for a few years, and I can give more
> > verification if you'd like.
> 
> if you're willing to give me a paypal address (or banking account
> infos if you're within the European SEPA zone) I will chip in three
> months.

Awesome, thanks!  :-)  My Paypal address is mmcconvi...@mykolab.com.

> Thanks for running a fast relay!

My pleasure - thanks for making it possible.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Roger Dingledine]

On Mon, Mar 07, 2016 at 02:34:02PM +0100, re...@mobtm.com wrote:
> Hi Michael,
> 
> > Sadly, I have to shut it down at least temporarily if no one can help me
> > pay for it. Is anyone interested? You can search the mailing lists to
> > see that I've been contributing for a few years, and I can give more
> > verification if you'd like.
> 
> if you're willing to give me a paypal address (or banking account infos if 
> you're within the European SEPA zone) I will chip in three months.
> 
> Thanks for running a fast relay!

Thanks Renke for helping to sustain the relay community!

And thanks Michael for finding and keeping a good US-based exit relay
location.

It's also clear that more mechanisms for sustainability would be helpful
for situations like this.

The Tor Project itself alas doesn't want to get into the business of
operating relays (or paying for them, which is like operating them
if you're into legal metaphors). That's because we are already in an
interesting legal position ("you designed the car that the user drove
away in"), so the EFFs and ACLUs of the world have recommended we not
complicate it with other interesting legal positions.

That said, there are a bunch of umbrella organizations created for the
purpose of operating Tor relays, especially exit relays:
https://www.torservers.net/partners.html
I wonder if there's a good way to get relays in Michael's situation to
"join" one of these umbrellas, for better continuity.

--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[renke]

Hi Michael,

> Sadly, I have to shut it down at least temporarily if no one can help me
> pay for it. Is anyone interested? You can search the mailing lists to
> see that I've been contributing for a few years, and I can give more
> verification if you'd like.

if you're willing to give me a paypal address (or banking account infos if 
you're within the European SEPA zone) I will chip in three months.

Thanks for running a fast relay!

Renke
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Virgil Griffith]

For what it's worth, the primary goal of the Toroken Incentive was to
make it possible for relay operators such as Michael to continue
operating.  If adding a cryptocurrency incentive is now on the table,
I am down for resuming work on it.

-V

On Mon, Mar 7, 2016 at 10:37 AM, Volker Mink  wrote:
> Thats bad to lose such a fast exit.
>
> Ever considered crowdsourcing to get the needed money?
>
> Best,
> Volker
>
>
>
>> Am 07.03.2016 um 03:01 schrieb Michael McConville :
>>
>> Hi, everyone.
>>
>> I'm an experienced Tor relay operator and a mostly dormant community
>> member. My main relay these days is on a dedicated server running
>> OpenBSD and moving 3-4 MB/s. It costs me $35/month.
>>
>> https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/CDAB3AE06A8C9C6BF817B3B0F1877A4B91465699
>>
>> Sadly, I have to shut it down at least temporarily if no one can help me
>> pay for it. Is anyone interested? You can search the mailing lists to
>> see that I've been contributing for a few years, and I can give more
>> verification if you'd like.
>>
>> Thanks for your time,
>> Michael McConville
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[grarpamp]

On 3/6/16, Volker Mink  wrote:
> Thats bad to lose such a fast exit.

And the diversity of an OpenBSD one at that.

Somebody could just turn off one of their Linux relays
and send this guy the monthly fee instead.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Volker Mink]

Thats bad to lose such a fast exit. 

Ever considered crowdsourcing to get the needed money?

Best,
Volker



> Am 07.03.2016 um 03:01 schrieb Michael McConville :
> 
> Hi, everyone.
> 
> I'm an experienced Tor relay operator and a mostly dormant community
> member. My main relay these days is on a dedicated server running
> OpenBSD and moving 3-4 MB/s. It costs me $35/month.
> 
> https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/CDAB3AE06A8C9C6BF817B3B0F1877A4B91465699
> 
> Sadly, I have to shut it down at least temporarily if no one can help me
> pay for it. Is anyone interested? You can search the mailing lists to
> see that I've been contributing for a few years, and I can give more
> verification if you'd like.
> 
> Thanks for your time,
> Michael McConville
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay funding

[Michael McConville]

Michael McConville wrote:
> My main relay these days is on a dedicated server running OpenBSD and
> moving 3-4 MB/s.

To clarify: 3-4 MB/s each way, 6-8 MB/s total.
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 10 Nov 2015, at 14:03, Sean Greenslade  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 12:40:19AM +, Tim Sammut wrote:
>> I meant is it possible for a relay operator to detect if a snapshot of a
>> running VM or VPS has been taken? Asked slightly differently, if I have
>> a relay running as a VPS or VM, can I somehow detect if my provider took
>> a snapshot of the relay without informing me?
> 
> Probably not. With most VM solutions, storage is pretty well abstracted
> from the virtual guests. I know that with Xen and OpenVZ, the typical
> way storage is provided (loopbacks) gives no way for the guest to see
> what the hypervisor is doing to the data. Furthermore, if the data is on
> a SAN, there's even more ways that the data can be snooped at without
> informing the guest of such activities.

You could use an encrypted disk partition for key storage, but that only 
protects the keys "at rest", and not in memory.

There is also ongoing development work on offline ed25519 master identity keys.
The master key need never be stored on the server itself.
Instead, it is used to certify a number of medium-term signing keys, and those 
keys are then sent to the server.
An operator can limit the scope of compromise to the number of signing keys on 
the server.

An operator can transmit the next signing key just before the previous one 
expires, limiting the scope of compromise to a single signing key.

There is also work on key revocation, where a key can be cancelled in the event 
of compromise.

See https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13642 
 for more details.

Tim

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Sean Greenslade]

On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 12:40:19AM +, Tim Sammut wrote:
> I meant is it possible for a relay operator to detect if a snapshot of a
> running VM or VPS has been taken? Asked slightly differently, if I have
> a relay running as a VPS or VM, can I somehow detect if my provider took
> a snapshot of the relay without informing me?

Probably not. With most VM solutions, storage is pretty well abstracted
from the virtual guests. I know that with Xen and OpenVZ, the typical
way storage is provided (loopbacks) gives no way for the guest to see
what the hypervisor is doing to the data. Furthermore, if the data is on
a SAN, there's even more ways that the data can be snooped at without
informing the guest of such activities.

> Following from that, are uninterrupted snapshots of running VMs possible
> in all hypervisors or should we be using the provider's hypervisor
> technology choice to inform how we decide which providers to use?

Storage tech is mostly independent of virtualization tech. I don't think
it really matters what hypervisor is used. Ultimately, the hypervisor
must be trusted regardless of what storage is in use, so I don't think
it really matters, either. If you're really worried about security, run
your Tor node on hardware you control.

--Sean
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 10 Nov 2015, at 11:40, Tim Sammut  wrote:
> 
> Hi Tim, sorry.
> 
> On 11/10/2015 12:33 AM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>>> On 11/06/2015 08:41 PM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>> The directory authorities are generally more concerned when
>> they *don't* stop it afterwards, and instead keep running it,
>> perhaps with extra logging, packet dumps, and decryption via
>> seized private keys.
 
 Is there a reliable way for an operator to detect this?
>> 
>> If the directory authorities have removed the relay from the
>> consensus, only they will see its fingerprint in their logs.
>> 
>> If they haven't, and it's running on the public network, the
>> fingerprint will be visible in Globe as a running relay.
> 
> I meant is it possible for a relay operator to detect if a snapshot of a
> running VM or VPS has been taken? Asked slightly differently, if I have
> a relay running as a VPS or VM, can I somehow detect if my provider took
> a snapshot of the relay without informing me?

As far as I know, there are ways to detect some kinds of access, but I'm pretty 
sure there are exceptions.

Pedantically, I'm not even sure it's possible:
* to detect all memory snapshots on some physical hardware configurations.
* to detect whether you're running on a VM/VPS or dedicated machine (but most 
hypervisors will tell you).

However, it's worth noting that the Tor network security model relies on 
semi-trusted directory authorities and untrusted relays.
Occasional compromises can be tolerated while maintaining overall network 
security (of course, some specific users of those relays may have some specific 
activity disclosed, particularly if information from multiple sources is 
combined).

> Following from that, are uninterrupted snapshots of running VMs possible
> in all hypervisors or should we be using the provider's hypervisor
> technology choice to inform how we decide which providers to use?

I don't know enough to answer this.

Tim

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Tim Sammut]

Hi Tim, sorry.

On 11/10/2015 12:33 AM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>> On 11/06/2015 08:41 PM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> The directory authorities are generally more concerned when
> they *don't* stop it afterwards, and instead keep running it,
> perhaps with extra logging, packet dumps, and decryption via
> seized private keys.
>>> 
>>> Is there a reliable way for an operator to detect this?
>
> If the directory authorities have removed the relay from the
> consensus, only they will see its fingerprint in their logs.
> 
> If they haven't, and it's running on the public network, the
> fingerprint will be visible in Globe as a running relay.

I meant is it possible for a relay operator to detect if a snapshot of a
running VM or VPS has been taken? Asked slightly differently, if I have
a relay running as a VPS or VM, can I somehow detect if my provider took
a snapshot of the relay without informing me?

Following from that, are uninterrupted snapshots of running VMs possible
in all hypervisors or should we be using the provider's hypervisor
technology choice to inform how we decide which providers to use?

thanks and hope you are well
tim
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 10 Nov 2015, at 11:28, Tim Sammut  wrote:
> 
> Hi Tim, everyone.
> 
> On 11/06/2015 08:41 PM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
>> The directory authorities are generally more concerned when they
>> *don't* stop it afterwards, and instead keep running it, perhaps with
>> extra logging, packet dumps, and decryption via seized private keys.
> 
> Is there a reliable way for an operator to detect this?

If the directory authorities have removed the relay from the consensus, only 
they will see its fingerprint in their logs.

If they haven't, and it's running on the public network, the fingerprint will 
be visible in Globe as a running relay.
https://globe.torproject.org/

Tim

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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Tim Sammut]

Hi Tim, everyone.

On 11/06/2015 08:41 PM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> The directory authorities are generally more concerned when they
> *don't* stop it afterwards, and instead keep running it, perhaps with
> extra logging, packet dumps, and decryption via seized private keys.

Is there a reliable way for an operator to detect this?

hope you are well
t
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Moritz Bartl]

On 11/06/2015 05:31 PM, Kevin Beranek wrote:
> Is there a better list than this one for doing so?  I can't find a list
> that seems more appropriate
> on https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo.  Or do I have
> to email the DirAuths directly?  If so, where do I find the addresses to
> use?

The "official way" is to email bad-rel...@lists.torproject.org :
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/how-report-bad-relays

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[I]

It would seem to make a difference if you are in one country and the company is in another and the legal action is in another.Robert



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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 7 Nov 2015, at 08:36, Kevin Beranek  wrote:
> 
> Russian, I assume because the relay was in Russia.

Russia has over 200 mutual legal assistance treaties.
Source: http://www.mlat.is/p/query-interface.html (requires JavaScript)

Sometimes it's impossible to tell where the investigation was initiated, even 
if the police force executing the seizure is local.
(And even if it was foreign law enforcement, I'd be surprised if they told you 
anything.)

T

> 
> On Fri, Nov 6, 2015 at 12:49 PM, I  > wrote:
> Which police?
> 
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Kevin Beranek]

Russian, I assume because the relay was in Russia.

On Fri, Nov 6, 2015 at 12:49 PM, I  wrote:

> Which police?
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Nima Fatemi]

Kevin Beranek:
> Is there a better list than this one for doing so?  I can't find a list
> that seems more appropriate on
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo.  Or do I have to
> email the DirAuths directly?  If so, where do I find the addresses to use?

That would be bad-rel...@lists.torproject.org; I've forwarded your
original email to the list. Please don't hesitate to email updates,
questions or concerns.

Thanks,
-- Nima




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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[I]

Which police?



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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Kevin Beranek]

Thanks everyone.  I sent an email to all of the DirAuth operators.

On Fri, Nov 6, 2015 at 12:41 PM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor  wrote:

>
> On 7 Nov 2015, at 07:20, Josef Stautner  wrote:
>
> Well, of course they take a dump of the RAM and stop it afterwards :-)
>
>
> The directory authorities are generally more concerned when they *don't*
> stop it afterwards, and instead keep running it, perhaps with extra
> logging, packet dumps, and decryption via seized private keys.
>
> T
>
>
> Am 06.11.2015 um 21:18 schrieb Josef Stautner:
>
> They stop it, make a dump of the RAM and save the hard drive.
>
> Am 06.11.2015 um 20:58 schrieb I:
>
> How can they seize a virtual server?
> Which country are the police from?
>
> Robert
>
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>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 7 Nov 2015, at 07:20, Josef Stautner  wrote:
> 
> Well, of course they take a dump of the RAM and stop it afterwards :-)

The directory authorities are generally more concerned when they *don't* stop 
it afterwards, and instead keep running it, perhaps with extra logging, packet 
dumps, and decryption via seized private keys.

T

> 
> Am 06.11.2015 um 21:18 schrieb Josef Stautner:
>> They stop it, make a dump of the RAM and save the hard drive.
>> 
>> Am 06.11.2015 um 20:58 schrieb I:
>>> How can they seize a virtual server?
>>> Which country are the police from?
>>> 
>>> Robert
>>> 
>>> ___
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>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
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>> 
> 
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Josef Stautner]

Well, of course they take a dump of the RAM and stop it afterwards :-)

Am 06.11.2015 um 21:18 schrieb Josef Stautner:
> They stop it, make a dump of the RAM and save the hard drive.
>
> Am 06.11.2015 um 20:58 schrieb I:
>> How can they seize a virtual server?
>> Which country are the police from?
>>
>> Robert
>>
>>
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>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Josef Stautner]

They stop it, make a dump of the RAM and save the hard drive.

Am 06.11.2015 um 20:58 schrieb I:
> How can they seize a virtual server?
> Which country are the police from?
>
> Robert
>
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[I]

How can they seize a virtual server?Which country are the police from?Robert



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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[DerTor Steher]

and here's the URL I spoke of:
https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/flag:Authority
Sorry, I forgot to paste it in the email.

2015-11-06 18:16 GMT+01:00 DerTor Steher :

> Hey Kevin,
>
> under the following URL you can find all authorities with their email
> adresses stated in the "contact" section.
> Please make sure you inform every single one of them in case you have lost
> any access to your VPS so you can't shutdown/delete your relay.
>
> 2015-11-06 17:31 GMT+01:00 Kevin Beranek :
>
>> Is there a better list than this one for doing so?  I can't find a list
>> that seems more appropriate on
>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo.  Or do I have to
>> email the DirAuths directly?  If so, where do I find the addresses to use?
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 6, 2015 at 8:20 AM, justaguy  wrote:
>>
>>> Because you lost control of your exit relay, you should ask DirAuths to
>>> reject/refuse/ban your exit.
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/06/2015 05:05 PM, Kevin Beranek wrote:
>>>
>>> Is there a procedure I should follow if a relay has been seized by the
>>> police?  Do DirAuths typically do something in cases where a relay is
>>> seized?  I just got a message from NQHost stating that "We have received
>>> several police inquires and court order to seize your VPS. ".  This affects
>>> relay A1E0245862C707F977DF0EC79257C49CD5DA99FE.
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Kevin
>>>
>>>
>>> ___
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>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>
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>>
>>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[DerTor Steher]

Hey Kevin,

under the following URL you can find all authorities with their email
adresses stated in the "contact" section.
Please make sure you inform every single one of them in case you have lost
any access to your VPS so you can't shutdown/delete your relay.

2015-11-06 17:31 GMT+01:00 Kevin Beranek :

> Is there a better list than this one for doing so?  I can't find a list
> that seems more appropriate on
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo.  Or do I have to
> email the DirAuths directly?  If so, where do I find the addresses to use?
>
> On Fri, Nov 6, 2015 at 8:20 AM, justaguy  wrote:
>
>> Because you lost control of your exit relay, you should ask DirAuths to
>> reject/refuse/ban your exit.
>>
>>
>> On 11/06/2015 05:05 PM, Kevin Beranek wrote:
>>
>> Is there a procedure I should follow if a relay has been seized by the
>> police?  Do DirAuths typically do something in cases where a relay is
>> seized?  I just got a message from NQHost stating that "We have received
>> several police inquires and court order to seize your VPS. ".  This affects
>> relay A1E0245862C707F977DF0EC79257C49CD5DA99FE.
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Kevin
>>
>>
>> ___
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>>
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>>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[Kevin Beranek]

Is there a better list than this one for doing so?  I can't find a list
that seems more appropriate on
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo.  Or do I have to
email the DirAuths directly?  If so, where do I find the addresses to use?

On Fri, Nov 6, 2015 at 8:20 AM, justaguy  wrote:

> Because you lost control of your exit relay, you should ask DirAuths to
> reject/refuse/ban your exit.
>
>
> On 11/06/2015 05:05 PM, Kevin Beranek wrote:
>
> Is there a procedure I should follow if a relay has been seized by the
> police?  Do DirAuths typically do something in cases where a relay is
> seized?  I just got a message from NQHost stating that "We have received
> several police inquires and court order to seize your VPS. ".  This affects
> relay A1E0245862C707F977DF0EC79257C49CD5DA99FE.
>
>
> Thanks,
> Kevin
>
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay seized by police

[justaguy]

Because you lost control of your exit relay, you should ask DirAuths to
reject/refuse/ban your exit.

On 11/06/2015 05:05 PM, Kevin Beranek wrote:
> Is there a procedure I should follow if a relay has been seized by the
> police?  Do DirAuths typically do something in cases where a relay is
> seized?  I just got a message from NQHost stating that "We have
> received several police inquires and court order to seize your VPS.
> ".  This affects relay A1E0245862C707F977DF0EC79257C49CD5DA99FE.
>
>
> Thanks,
> Kevin
>
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay is apparently being used to attack other servers

[Moritz Bartl]

On 06/14/2015 10:35 PM, trillium wrote:
> Thanks all for the help. I think I may try to move the exit relay 
> over to SolarVPS or another VPS.

I think it's a very good approach to hunt new providers on platforms
like lowendbox.com, ask them whether they are okay with exit relays, and
then try them out. If you run into problmes, avoid the temptation of
concentrating too much capacity on the small number of known friendly
ISPs, but rather hunt down the next "possibly friendly" ISP. Don't
forget to add your experiences including date to the wiki [1].

It is plain stupidity when a provider asks you to remove your IPs from a
simple DNSBL that lists Tor relays. In these cases, maybe you can relay
them to people like us at torservers.net for "expert opinion" on the matter?

In dealing with "hacking attempt" complaints, if your ISP doesn't
understand how little influence you have on these quite usual Internet
activities which are basically just background noise [2], what may help
is if you tell them that you have successfully blocked the attacks (by
blacklisting the respective IPs to your ExitPolicy), and will continue
to do so in a responsive way in the future.

We at Zwiebelfreunde have basically stopped dealing with automated
reports. But, we did so only after a few years of "training our ISPs" by
being very polite and fast in dealing with complaints. And, dedicated
machines make a difference. Maybe pool your money with other Tor relay
fans, similar to what I did? Especially since a fast relay currently
helps the network more than a lot of small ones.

[1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GoodBadISPs
[2]
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/05/whos-scanning-your-network-a-everyone/

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay is apparently being used to attack other servers

[yl]

Am 14.06.2015 um 22:35 schrieb trillium:
> Thanks all for the help. I think I may try to move the exit relay over to 
> SolarVPS or another VPS. It’s just a bummer because the relay was advertising 
> ~6-7MB/s bandwidth and using a fair amount of it before people decided to use 
> it for attacks, so I felt like I was contributing to the community.

Instead you might wanna try to restrict the exit a bit, it is common
practice to disallow connections to some ports. Maybe have a look at the
details of the attack, Linode should give them to you. Based on the
services that are attacked it might be good to block these ports if
reasonable. Also contacting the complaining party might be a good idea
in some cases.

greetings
yl
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay is apparently being used to attack other servers

[trillium]

Thanks all for the help. I think I may try to move the exit relay over to 
SolarVPS or another VPS. It’s just a bummer because the relay was advertising 
~6-7MB/s bandwidth and using a fair amount of it before people decided to use 
it for attacks, so I felt like I was contributing to the community.

-trillium
> On Jun 13, 2015, at 8:36 PM, I  wrote:
> 
> Trillium,
> 
> I hope this advances your knowledge.
> A couple of days ago one of my exits was threatened with suspension for being 
> 'blacklisted'.
> The VPS business gave me this (below) and was happy when I blocked the ports.
> It is more limiting of TOR but the exit survived.
> 
> " Listing on the Sectoor TOR DNSBL indicates that this IP address is a tor 
> node or a subnet (/24) containing a tor node. This listing does not indicate 
> that your IP address has been blacklisted by Sectoor, as this list also 
> contains subnets that contain a tor node. The subnet listing is not designed 
> to block connections, but rather for use as a scoring mechanism. Your IP will 
> only be blacklisted if it is the tor node itself and listed by Sectoor 
> Exitnodes.
> 
> Sectoor TOR DNSBL lists every IP address which is known to run a tor server 
> and allow their clients to connect to one of the following ports:
> 
>Port 25
>Port 194
>Port 465
>Port 587
>Port 994
>Port 6657
>Ports 6660-6670
>Port 6697
>Ports 7000-7005
>Port 7070
>Ports 8000-8004
>Port 9000
>Port 9001
>Port 9998
>Port 
> More information about SECTOOR can be found at their website: 
> http://www.sectoor.de/tor.php
> 
> Robert
> 
> 
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay is apparently being used to attack other servers

[I]

Trillium,

I hope this advances your knowledge.
A couple of days ago one of my exits was threatened with suspension for being 
'blacklisted'.
The VPS business gave me this (below) and was happy when I blocked the ports.
It is more limiting of TOR but the exit survived.

" Listing on the Sectoor TOR DNSBL indicates that this IP address is a tor node 
or a subnet (/24) containing a tor node. This listing does not indicate that 
your IP address has been blacklisted by Sectoor, as this list also contains 
subnets that contain a tor node. The subnet listing is not designed to block 
connections, but rather for use as a scoring mechanism. Your IP will only be 
blacklisted if it is the tor node itself and listed by Sectoor Exitnodes.

Sectoor TOR DNSBL lists every IP address which is known to run a tor server and 
allow their clients to connect to one of the following ports:

Port 25
Port 194
Port 465
Port 587
Port 994
Port 6657
Ports 6660-6670
Port 6697
Ports 7000-7005
Port 7070
Ports 8000-8004
Port 9000
Port 9001
Port 9998
Port 
More information about SECTOOR can be found at their website: 
http://www.sectoor.de/tor.php 

Robert


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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay is apparently being used to attack other servers

[spiros_spiros]

Hi Trillium,

It is always sad when Tor is used to hack/DoS/compromise servers. As operator 
of an Exit Node unfortunately you will see as well as the DMCA notice the 
hacking/abuse/spamming/botnet alerts from some service provider, also you will 
get notification that the node is added to this blacklist and that spammer 
list. 

My advice is to work very closely with your Exit Node datacentre and make them 
know that you respond quickly to abuse emails (even the annoying automatic 
ones) with polite message to tell them you have a Tor Exit and cannot provide 
details of traffic source or realistically block individual user or IP. If the 
datacentre is friendly you will hopefully not be shut down or account closed. 

If you get paranoid about one particular provider, or they harass you with 
email threats/notifications you could use iptables or ipfw to block individual 
host, or close the port to the Exit Node in your torrc. It would be better to 
explain situation if you are in contact with them and go from there. In my 
experience when I email complaining party to explain I run Tor relays I almost 
never get a response but sometimes they just block the Exit Node IP on their 
firewall which is fine. 

If really paranoid, consider moving to provider that does not require scan of 
government ID or passport, pay with BitCoin if possible, don't provide real 
house address and don't log in to server from your home IP. As others have 
written before me, Linode is not great for Tor friendliness. 

S




On 13 Jun 2015, at 19:03, trillium  wrote:

Hello,

I’m running an exit relay (fingerprint: 
5793CB9E1F5BAD3D5DA6C4158E16067D80CD8A2E) on a Linode VPS right now, and so far 
they’ve been really fantastic with dealing with a couple of DMCA notices that 
were sent to them. However, in the last week, I received notice from them that 
my server is attacking multiple sites around the web. Their suggestion was to 
go through my logs and remove the offending user, which is obviously unhelpful 
advice as I don’t keep any logs on my relay’s users.

I’d like to keep running the exit relay, but I’m not really sure how to best go 
about mitigating these sorts of threats and don’t want Linode to shut down the 
entire server.

Any suggestions are very much welcomed.

Thanks,
trillium
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay is apparently being used to attack other servers

[James Moore]

I experienced the same thing with LInode and decided to take down my relay
and move it to SolarVPS. Multiple exchanges with Linode support led me to
believe they didn't understand how tor worked or they were covering their
ass. I had previously let them know I was running an exit and they
responded by thanking me for the head's up.



James


On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 11:03 AM, trillium  wrote:

> Hello,
>
> I’m running an exit relay (fingerprint:
> 5793CB9E1F5BAD3D5DA6C4158E16067D80CD8A2E) on a Linode VPS right now, and so
> far they’ve been really fantastic with dealing with a couple of DMCA
> notices that were sent to them. However, in the last week, I received
> notice from them that my server is attacking multiple sites around the web.
> Their suggestion was to go through my logs and remove the offending user,
> which is obviously unhelpful advice as I don’t keep any logs on my relay’s
> users.
>
> I’d like to keep running the exit relay, but I’m not really sure how to
> best go about mitigating these sorts of threats and don’t want Linode to
> shut down the entire server.
>
> Any suggestions are very much welcomed.
>
> Thanks,
> trillium
>
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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay is apparently being used to attack other servers

[Carlin Bingham]

On Sun, 14 Jun 2015, at 06:03 AM, trillium wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I’m running an exit relay (fingerprint:
> 5793CB9E1F5BAD3D5DA6C4158E16067D80CD8A2E) on a Linode VPS right now, and
> so far they’ve been really fantastic with dealing with a couple of DMCA
> notices that were sent to them. However, in the last week, I received
> notice from them that my server is attacking multiple sites around the
> web. Their suggestion was to go through my logs and remove the offending
> user, which is obviously unhelpful advice as I don’t keep any logs on my
> relay’s users.
> 
> I’d like to keep running the exit relay, but I’m not really sure how to
> best go about mitigating these sorts of threats and don’t want Linode to
> shut down the entire server.
> 
> Any suggestions are very much welcomed.
> 
> Thanks,
> trillium

Linode are not a good host for exits. See
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GoodBadISPs#US1


--
Carlin
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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay not utilising full capacity (even after months)

[Rejo Zenger]

++ 29/10/14 10:15 +0100 - Jeroen Massar:
>There are some weird properties in trying to do full-bandwidth.
>Deterministic it for sure is not.
>
>The IP is not mentioned in atlas:
>https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/94.142.240.243

Nope. That is the IP-address of the switch in front of the node. The 
IP-address of the node is 94.142.245.231. The fingerprint is, as you 
have figured out already, AA0D167E03E298F9A8CD50F448B81FBD7FA80D56.

>Is "Tor 0.2.5.9-rc" not outdated? You might be missing some features there.

Fixed. It's now running 0.2.5.10.

>Are you also sure that coloclue likes you playing exit? (I can only
>assume so ;)

Yes. 

Anyway, I can't explain i) why the node was picking up speed so fast 
during April, both before and after Heartbleed and why it is so slow 
picking up speed in mid-July and 2) why there is a sudden drop in 
traffic since Friday.

As said before, I don't have the time (and lacking expertise to do this 
efficiently) to investigate these issues. If anyone else is interested, 
I am more than happy to help - of course. 

-- 
Rejo Zenger
E r...@zenger.nl | P +31(0)639642738 | W https://rejo.zenger.nl  
T @rejozenger | J r...@zenger.nl
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Re: [tor-relays] exit relay not utilising full capacity (even after months)

[Jeroen Massar]

On 2014-10-29 09:41, Rejo Zenger wrote:
[..]
>  - So, the question is: why is it so much slower maximising the full 
>bandwidth? The configuration from mid-July onwards is identical to 
>the one in April. The only thing that has changed is in mid-August, 
>when I moved to relay into a LXC container. However, that doesn't 
>explain the slow pickup in mid-July to mid-August.

Note that LXC likely does not give you the security properties that you
expect.

issue this in your container to shutdown the host:
echo b > /proc/sysrq-trigger

There is a bug open on this:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/645625

>  - And yes, I am aware of the Roger's blogpost. That does explain why 
>the node may be slow to pick up traffic, but it doesn't explain why 
>it was a lot faster in doing so in April then in mid-July.

There are some weird properties in trying to do full-bandwidth.
Deterministic it for sure is not.

The IP is not mentioned in atlas:
https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/94.142.240.243

Nor in: https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/

Though there is:
https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=aa0d167e03e298f9a8cd50f448b81fbd7fa80d56

https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/AA0D167E03E298F9A8CD50F448B81FBD7FA80D56

Is "Tor 0.2.5.9-rc" not outdated? You might be missing some features there.

I see similar issues with other nodes btw, eg:
https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/BDB26EF60A419089CA3AA0891AF1681455285D48

Though that is not an exit, which gives it a completely different metric.

Are you also sure that coloclue likes you playing exit? (I can only
assume so ;)

Greets,
 Jeroen

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