[tor-talk] Tor Weekly News — August, 28th 2013

2013-08-28 Thread dope457
Tor Weekly NewsAugust 28th, 2013 Welcome to the ninth issue of Tor Weekly News, the weekly newsletter that

Re: [tor-talk] Default clients to be non-exit relay LibTech x

2013-08-28 Thread Nathan Suchy
That's a good idea. My ISP CenturyLink blocks incoming traffic I think... On Aug 27, 2013 8:22 PM, Griffin Boyce griffinbo...@gmail.com wrote: On 08/27/2013 07:29 PM, Percy Alpha wrote: There're few problems with ISP when running non-exit relay. Users in moderately censored areas can act as

Re: [tor-talk] Default clients to be non-exit relay LibTech x

2013-08-28 Thread Moritz Bartl
On 28.08.2013 04:30, Percy Alpha wrote: Theoretically, the directory authority could serve up a set of a thousand random nodes, and then the client software could select a random set to use initially. This will make blocking tor nearly impossible and eliminate the need for Bridge node since

Re: [tor-talk] Inquiry about Vidalia/Tor bundle

2013-08-28 Thread The Doctor
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 08/27/2013 09:20 PM, Griffin Boyce wrote: specific individual is doing whatever. Secret police don't have to prove that a single person wrote something against regime -- they'll just narrow it down to a handful of possibilities and start

[tor-talk] Tor relay activity from Antarctica

2013-08-28 Thread lee colleton
There is an indication that computers are connecting to the Tor anonymizing proxy network from Antarctica. This information is anonymously self-reported by the connecting client computers and it's entirely possible that the locations are inaccurate. However, there is also a possibility that

Re: [tor-talk] Tor relay activity from Antarctica

2013-08-28 Thread Tom Ritter
On 28 August 2013 12:29, lee colleton l...@colleton.net wrote: There is an indication that computers are connecting to the Tor anonymizing proxy network from Antarctica. This information is anonymously self-reported by the connecting client computers and it's entirely possible that the

Re: [tor-talk] Risks of using custom .onion addresses

2013-08-28 Thread George Kadianakis
bm-2d8jtri23dyth7whmaldhsvhdfwp91z...@bitmessage.ch writes: Hi, I'm wondering how safe is it to use custom hidden service names (.onion). I'm not asking this for public hidden services but for private ones (only for myself or for friends). Using an easy to remember address just for using

Re: [tor-talk] Tor relay activity from Antarctica

2013-08-28 Thread The Doctor
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 08/28/2013 12:29 PM, lee colleton wrote: that the locations are inaccurate. However, there is also a possibility that malicious software has been installed on computers in one of your research stations which is using the Tor network for

[tor-talk] Tor and Financial Transparency

2013-08-28 Thread BM-2D9WhbG2VeKsLCsGBTPLGwDLQyPizSqS85
I noticed that the Tor Project's 2012 Financial Report from https://www.torproject.org/about/findoc/2012-TorProject-FinancialStatements.pdf notes that what appears to be Tor's largest single source of funding is a $876K U.S. Department of Defense grant obtained via the Stanford Research Institute

Re: [tor-talk] Tor and Financial Transparency

2013-08-28 Thread Andrew Lewman
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 10:18:31 -0700 bm-2d9whbg2vekslcsgbtplgwdlqypizsq...@bitmessage.ch wrote: Despite this transparency on Tor's own website, Tor's Sponsors page at https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en currently lists its largest donor as an anonymous NGO. Isn't SRI an

Re: [tor-talk] Tor and Financial Transparency

2013-08-28 Thread BM-2D9WhbG2VeKsLCsGBTPLGwDLQyPizSqS85
Thanks; please see https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9614. Can anyone working for the Tor Project comment on its U.S. Department of Defense funded activities beyond what appears when searching for N66001-11-C-4022 (the number of the award from the Tor Project's 2012 Financial

[tor-talk] Default clients to be non-exit relay LibTech x

2013-08-28 Thread Percy Alpha
Every client has to download the full list of relays (consensus) periodically. In areas with little connectivity, this already puts a high burden on clients. Griffin pointed out Tor could download only a portion of relays. It is very hard for Tor clients to determine which relays to use.

Re: [tor-talk] Default clients to be non-exit relay LibTech x

2013-08-28 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 12:41:58PM -0700, Percy Alpha wrote: Every client has to download the full list of relays (consensus) periodically. In areas with little connectivity, this already puts a high burden on clients. Griffin pointed out Tor could download only a portion of relays. Done