拾拾拾
It was a great journey and I'd like to thank everyone who participated
in this collective effort or supported it :)
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bo0od:
> There is a full comparison of Tails and Whonix (persistent virtual OS)
> can be found here:
> https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others#Introduction
FTR the Tails part of that page is quite outdated.
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> does not work under AORTA.
If I wanted to find another type of applications that AORTA does not
manage to torify, I would look for programs whose main executable
merely triggers startup of the main program via D-Bus activation (e.g.
those started with gapplication).
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DDRESS', '127.0.0.1'),
int(os.environ.get('TOR_CONTROL_PORT', 9051))
)
self.controller = stem.connection.connect(**connect_args)
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gt; port (hostname).
There's Onion Circuits that we ship in Tails and Debian:
https://git-tails.immerda.ch/onioncircuits/
https://tracker.debian.org/pkg/onioncircuits
> - allows me to kill specific circuits
That's not supported by Onion Circuits.
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you're using the torbrowser-launcher Debian package, then please
report a bug against it. And if you're using the upstream
torbrowser-launcher, then its bug tracker lives there:
https://github.com/micahflee/torbrowser-launcher/
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krishna e bera:
> On 04/07/17 02:13 AM, intrigeri wrote:
>> Answered on tails-...@boum.org.
> That shows as a mailto: link. Perhaps meant to point to […]
Sorry I was too lazy to express what I meant clearly enough. I wasn't
overly enthusiastic at the idea of spending time my
Answered on tails-...@boum.org.
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Hi,
Lara:
> those handicapped enough to be unable to write software
This can be interpreted in a number of ways, including some that
I personally find problematic. But maybe you want to rephrase so
I understand better what you meant?
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Hi,
Patrick Schleizer wrote (09 Feb 2016 23:42:22 GMT) :
> intrigeri:
>> [can you please decide what mailing-list this discussion should happen
>> on, and then we can stop cross-posting over 4 mailing-list?]
This still holds.
>> I'm not sure I understand the problem you
ful
control over it, it's different of course.
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a month due to this, so I'll try to be
pragmatic: I'm adding this as a FIXME on our blueprint, and will come
back to it later.
I'm not sure I understand the problem you mean to raise, though.
Can you please elaborate what problem you see if users do exactly this
("click through whatever hoops requir
Qaz wrote (15 Aug 2015 05:20:45 GMT) :
Are there flash drives that really work well with Tails?
Please send such support requests to the appropriate channels:
https://tails.boum.org/support/
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melting constraints
o Creation of a micro-TNI (Andrea)$ HW of a mobile $ It will have a
subset of the functionality
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Hi,
Petru Daniel Diaconu wrote (25 May 2015 09:56:56 GMT) :
Can you make so that you install cyberghost in tails [...]
Please use the Tails support channels for Tails questions:
https://tails.boum.org/support/
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Hi,
FYI, when we tested Tails 1.3.2, we could successfully use
obfs4 bridges.
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be widespread enough to be very useful for
pluggable transports before a while.
No idea if the protocol has specific issues that will delay its
support in Tor Browser until later than whenever Firefox ESR supports
HTTP/2.
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Kevin wrote (09 Feb 2015 15:59:53 GMT) :
Why is it no longer supported?
Because there are better options for the use cases the Tor Project is
actively supporting, and nobody has volunteered to maintain Vidalia
upstream in the last few years.
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ones should we
prioritize our efforts on?
(An option is of course all, just take whatever the Tor Browser
ships, but it's not obvious that it's the best solution for us, hence
my question.)
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lu...@riseup.net wrote (16 Jan 2015 19:18:06 GMT) :
Riseup Networks has been getting DDoS'd sporadically these couple of days,
this
probably explains the outage of their dir auth.
s/days/weeks/
Actually, that DDoS has started at the beginning of 31C3 :/
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Hi,
Justaguy wrote (15 Dec 2014 13:44:05 GMT) :
What if torbrowser would include adblock, this would reduce the amount of
bandwith
used, and thus increase the overal speeds @ tor
See 5. No filters in
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#philosophy
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pref(app.update.enabled, false);
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Hi,
please don't cross-post. This will be replied on tails-support@.
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Hi,
Sebastian G. bastik.tor wrote (07 Sep 2014 12:29:15 GMT) :
Upsides:
+ will make it easier for Tails to switch to using the Tor
Browser binaries.
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an email we could send them,
think how we would receive and store the data, and retrieve useful
info from it: I certainly wouldn't mind :)
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Hi,
mick wrote (29 Jul 2014 14:54:10 GMT) :
I have just checked on my tails mirror and I get the slightly
depressing results below:
[...]
which I make 0.68%
Our download page has been pointing to our own website for downloading
the detached signature file for a few months, which explains the
Michael Carbone wrote (15 Jul 2014 19:11:15 GMT) :
https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/code/parcimonie/
Currently down = better install from Debian (if using this
distribution, or a derivative) or get the source from
https://packages.debian.org/source/sid/parcimonie
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Red Sonja wrote (16 Jul 2014 11:58:41 GMT) :
Do you have anything less demanding?
*I* haven't. See the shell version, linked by Michael earlier on this
thread. I haven't looked at it in details, no idea if it satisfies the
same design goals etc.
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Description: PGP signature
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Hi,
Nathan Freitas wrote (02 May 2014 19:44:35 GMT) :
We are also experimenting with a switch to Polipo
(https://github.com/jech/polipo.git) from Privoxy.
Jacob was strongly advocating that we do the exact opposite change in
Tails, so I'm curious why.
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Hi,
AK wrote (01 Apr 2014 01:53:06 GMT) :
Let me just clarify some points.
Is the goal to be more secure than a standard Linux distro such as Ubuntu
or Debian? Yes.
OK. What I'd be delighted to read now is what more secure means.
I'll wait for your next write-up :)
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Hi,
AK wrote (30 Mar 2014 20:14:06 GMT) :
More details are here: https://piratelinux.org/?p=567.
Interesting, thanks!
Where can I read about the threat model this system is meant to address?
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grarpamp wrote (28 Mar 2014 21:02:35 GMT) :
[...] what happens with entire vm IP transproxy (perhaps like
Tails)?
Tails only uses a transproxy for the automapped .onion addresses:
https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/Tor_enforcement/
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make sure they're installed in
a supported, compatible with the persistence feature, way :)
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Chuck wrote (10 Nov 2013 19:18:31 GMT) :
I recommend sending this email to the tor-talk mailing list, you will
get a lot more useful answers than here.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/
Sorry to redirect you once again, but tails-support is probably more
appropriate given the
://bugs.debian.org/725445) a few weeks ago,
and FTR there were only a few ones. The admins made it clear they will
incrementally re-add addresses on abuse.
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the transition and possible breakage.
At least for parcimonie (which I'm upstream for), I'm pretty sure
we'll manage to talk to each other and provide a good transition
path :)
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supported, but I'm told it
works fine.
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grarpamp wrote (04 Oct 2013 08:25:51 GMT) :
Lots of identical banners... Tails/Whonix are you shipping some defaults?
Tails doesn't ship any web server by default.
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Lunar wrote (06 Sep 2013 13:16:24 GMT) :
See tc-play for an alternative implementation, though:
https://github.com/bwalex/tc-play
FWIW cryptsetup 1.6 supports the TrueCrypt on-disk format, too.
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/tails/roadmap
[3] https://tails.boum.org/contribute/
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curious to see someone check what
is our actual workable margin. (Annoyingly, we depend to some degree
on whether Intel go on using the VT-x feature, or lack thereof, to
segment their stuff.)
Did I mention we need help? :)
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might be the closest thing to what you
describe, but I would not recommend anyone doing the same at home.
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conclusions about
the Debian project's position? Thanks in advance :)
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the real blockers are,
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Hi,
adrelanos wrote (29 Jul 2013 10:51:10 GMT) :
intrigeri:
which easily explains why nobody
ever asked the Iceweasel maintainers to apply them.
I understand, that the Iceweasel maintainers are not interested to add them.
It's not about being *interested* (which is purely about feelings
, 2012.
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information, I suggest you read the 3.4 Notification of security
issues and new Tails release section of our design document, that
points to the actual code: https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/
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Hi,
Jacob Appelbaum wrote (17 Apr 2013 08:58:32 GMT) :
What version of htpdate are you shipping currently?
This is documented there:
https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/Time_syncing/#index2h2
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ChromeOS is using, so I don't know.)
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Hi,
Jacob Appelbaum wrote (19 Jul 2012 23:48:48 GMT) :
intrigeri:
So, Jake tells me that ChromeOS will use tlsdate by default, and that
this should solve the fingerprinting issue. Therefore, I assume this
implicitly answer the (half-rhetorical, I admit) question I asked in
March, and I
file is a real signature file but the
iso file consists of html saying that there is no iso file.
I can reproduce none of these problems, sorry.
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for me to do this work :)
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of another existing
report, but I doubt everyone would do that.
[1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/report
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://git.immerda.ch/?p=amnesia.git;a=blob;f=wiki/src/doc/first_steps/manual_usb_installation/mac.mdwn;hb=165da525a2b0e3b84afba1cd4da532ba8e85da73
[3] https://tails.boum.org/todo/UEFI/
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Hi,
Jacob Appelbaum wrote (12 Feb 2013 19:25:59 GMT) :
intrigeri:
A Git tag integrates perfectly with packaging workflow... iff it's the
canonical form of distribution of the complete upstream release.
[...]
I'll discuss it with nickm and see what he thinks. A tar.gz isn't too
much
to get the released code?
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Hi,
Jacob Appelbaum wrote (12 Feb 2013 16:40:01 GMT) :
Would you like a tar.gz and a tar.gz.asc?
A Git tag integrates perfectly with packaging workflow... iff it's the
canonical form of distribution of the complete upstream release.
If a tarball with slightly different content (e.g. that
Hi,
charlie.mail wrote (01 Dec 2012 06:07:49 GMT) :
I have seen tails sync the clock with UTC just after a network
connection and start browser. How does it do so. It is the ntpupdate ?
Please direct questions about Tails to the Tails
communication channels.
Anyhow:
hi,
charlie.m...@riseup.net wrote (29 Nov 2012 13:39:31 GMT) :
If I then apply my firewall ping failed and no access to internet.
I think this is off-topic, and I suggest you find a better suited
place for basic iptables/netfilter support.
iptables -N lan
As far as I can see, this chain is
, and perhaps put a 1.2.1 bugfix
release out, that would include some long-standing proposed fixes, and
prove the world that upstream is alive and kicking again.
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and...@torproject.is wrote (20 Oct 2012 16:01:01 GMT) :
The last to publish a descriptor wins. I do this now for some of my own
hidden services. The relevant keys are copied to multiple machines. If
one goes offline, the others become used.
This is more like failover than load balancing, but
Hi,
adrelanos wrote (16 Oct 2012 18:28:19 GMT) :
Abel Luck:
I need to do more research into what it would take to protect the
localtime. For example, what are the consequences (technically and
UX-wise) of changing the local timezone to, presumably, UTC?
UTC is fine. Afaik Tails, Liberte
to Privoxy, we might as well
want to simply drop Polipo. I've updated our ticket on this topic
accordingly:
https://tails.boum.org/todo/replace_polipo_with_privoxy__63__/
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Well, I think Jacob did (in 2011).
and now I am considering your improvements for aos. Nice!
I'm glad this may be useful for aos :)
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Hi,
Nick Mathewson wrote (29 Aug 2012 13:22:36 GMT) :
I'd need an actual list of applications to think about
IsolateDestAddr. Which ones did you have in mind?
Thank you for having a look.
The main network applications shipped in Tails, that would get
IsolateDestAddr according to our plan,
Tails
users, and I guess these options were not added in order not to be
used, but still.)
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guidelines, that
will lead you report your problem in a way that enables us to help:
https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/bug_reporting/
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there:
https://tails.boum.org/contribute/how/input/
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Hi,
adrelanos wrote (23 Jul 2012 01:36:26 GMT) :
Because Tails doesn't use stream isolation and uses tails_htp over
Tor, the exit node can see Hello, this is a Tails user!. (Who else
uses tails_htp over Tor.) The problem persists until the exit node
is changed.
To be on the safe side, I'll
, I think.
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Hi,
Roger Dingledine wrote (21 Jul 2012 15:54:22 GMT) :
the Tails people set up a forum, and I hear they hate it so much
that at this point they wish they had nothing rather than the one
they have.
Well, not exactly, else we would just shut it down immediately :)
But yeah, our current forum
Hi,
|| ΣΖΟ || wrote (21 Jul 2012 18:28:14 GMT) :
PiTails?
On the Tails side, we have decided to wait a bit for the dust to
settle, and for our upstreams (Linux, Debian, Debian Live) to support
embedded and ARM platforms better, before we even try supporting this
kind of hardware.
Our efforts
more what kind of fingerprinting
resistance a system like Tails can reasonably pretend to at this scale.
(I'm re-adding the Cc to tails-dev, that was lost at some point.
Please don't drop it again.)
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| GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
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Hi,
intrigeri wrote (25 Mar 2012 23:02:55 GMT) :
Jacob Appelbaum wrote (20 Feb 2012 20:30:08 GMT) :
For a while I've been interested in secure network time that would
be useful for Tor users. Tor users generally need accuracy to the
hour in the local system clock.
Thank you for tackling
Ethan Lee Vita wrote (12 Jul 2012 20:23:38 GMT) :
I agree, but what about the email client for Tails?
Will Thunderbird/TorBirdy be available in Tails in the future?
Or a way to torify that client?
Please see https://tails.boum.org/todo/Return_of_Icedove__63__/
In case you want to follow-up on
hi,
AK wrote (31 May 2012 15:36:27 GMT) :
Was it your answer to my question about upgrading Tails?
[...]
If someone is using Tails booted from Pirate Linux, they can
download the ISO from the Tails website, and use the USB installer
there, it should work as long as they have enough RAM to
Hi,
Andrew K wrote (31 May 2012 19:07:54 GMT) :
- Convenient access from the boot menu to the Tails Amnesic Incognito
Live System (This method of using Tails is not officially supported
by the Tails developers, and some features such as the USB installer
may not work).
It always feels good
Hi,
AK wrote (31 May 2012 14:00:17 GMT) :
From what I tested, no security feature is broken.
Great.
It's meant to easily allow people to try Tails, an if they like it
and they want the official version, they can go to the Tails website
and download the latest ISO.
Was it your answer to my
miniBill wrote (15 May 2012 19:25:46 GMT) :
4) this requires every user to have an always on machine
Julien Voisin is going to work on Tails server during GSoC this year;
the task page was not updated -yet- with all the deeper thought that
was put in the project since then, but you'll get the
linkage to
particular physical locations or hardware. In this case, finding out
the computer's MAC / IP addresses is not the least of their problems.
I hope this clarifies things a bit.
Cheers,
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intrigeri
| GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
| OTR fingerprint
.
Maxim Kammerer wrote (26 Mar 2012 16:12:41 GMT) :
On Mon, Mar 26, 2012 at 00:52, intrigeri intrig...@boum.org wrote:
I'm curious about what resources proved to be limiting during your
experiments, and what too demanding means in your usecases.
Well, Intel VT / AMD-V virtualization extensions
pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote (29 Mar 2012 21:34:28 GMT) :
I haven't seen any ticket for creating a .deb package.
Perhaps obfsproxy should also be added to the
torproject.org repository?
obfsproxy is in Debian experimental:
http://packages.qa.debian.org/o/obfsproxy.html
Cheers,
--
intrigeri
another tool, tlsdate[1], that
I regularly use for setting my own clock.
What network fingerprint does tlsdate currently display if I run it in
the clear, without forwarding its traffic through Tor?
Cheers,
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intrigeri
| GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
Hi,
Maxim Kammerer wrote (22 Mar 2012 14:07:25 GMT) :
I implemented that approach once for the purpose of running unsafe
browser (https://github.com/mkdesu/liberte/commit/0f0646e),
executing an already-running image inside a nested QEMU. It's a nice
exercise, but too demanding on resources,
(this time a video) and answer
the dialog of NoScript.
I think this may be what this ticket is about:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5266
Regards,
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intrigeri
| GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
| OTR fingerprint @ https
Robert Ransom wrote (20 Feb 2012 08:23:05 GMT) :
torsocks 1.2-3 just hit wheezy/testing, and it works on irssi (at
least as shipped in wheezy).
torsocks 1.2-3~bpo60+1 is now available in squeeze-backports.
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developers to audit Transmission, or
possibly a client written in a safer language - better avoid
duplicating the effort.
Cheers,
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intrigeri
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what top you see right now.
See similar ideas on our wishlist / todo list:
https://tails.boum.org/todo/Two-layered_virtualized_system/
https://tails.boum.org/todo/autorun_in_Windows/
Cheers,
--
intrigeri
| GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
| OTR
information is useful to make this attack
more efficient (or working).
Regards,
--
intrigeri
| GnuPG key @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/intrigeri.asc
| OTR fingerprint @ https://gaffer.ptitcanardnoir.org/intrigeri/otr.asc
| Who wants a world in which the guarantee that we shall
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