Am 2012-01-19 15:52, schrieb pro...@tormail.net:
How to correctly answer into an existing tree?
By correctly setting the In-Reply-To and References headers of your
mail. In-Reply-To is to be set to the value of the Message-ID header
(the message ID) of the mail you want to reply to.
On Fri, 20 Jan 2012 17:26:15 +0530
J. Bakshi baksh...@gmail.com wrote:
Dear list,
I have tor-browser-bundle running. how can I use ssh with the tor
running
inside this browser bundle ? I have installed torsocks already. Is
torsocks
is better ? Confused... Please help.
Thanks
well,
On Fri, 20 Jan 2012 11:41:18 -
pro...@tormail.net wrote:
Is Ra's Tor gateway VM
http://ra.fnord.at/2011/05/easy-and-secure-anonymous-internet-usage/
safe to use on trusted host machines?
Many people (ra, JanusVM, me) are interested in deploying something ra
calls 'Tor Workstation',
Of course, TAILS is most secure when run as a LiveCD,
which isn't possible with the Tor gateway+workstation VM setup.
Not with the VM setup but my final goal is to use three cpu's. The goal of
my instructions https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBOX
is to be as portable as
On Fri, 20 Jan 2012 16:47:06 -
pro...@tormail.net wrote:
On Fri, 20 Jan 2012 17:26:15 +0530
J. Bakshi baksh...@gmail.com wrote:
Dear list,
I have tor-browser-bundle running. how can I use ssh with the tor
running
inside this browser bundle ? I have installed torsocks
Hi, it's me again.
I got another idea.
I don't understand what works and what has to be done exactly. I'm not
an developer. I don't understand the technical background as well as
needed to predict my changes to the specs.
It's written in the form of a proposal, but it should not be
It was all very interesting to read. Thank you!
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Another advantage here is that it prevents Tor from seeing who you are
behind the VPN. So if somebody does manage to break Tor and learn the IP
address your traffic is coming from, but your VPN was actually following
through on their promises (they won't watch, they won't remember, and
they
Am 21.01.2012 15:39, schrieb pro...@tormail.net:
2) caching proxy
Just like existing caching proxys. The exit server would safe bandwidth
if
they wouldn't always request all websites fresh but use a local cache.
Also option for both, Tor-user and exit server if they wish to use the
feature.
Nowadays Antivirus software often includes a Webscanner, even free ones...
The webscanner scans the tcp stream on the fly and may stop (or modify?)
it. Perhaps he is sending back - over non anonymous channels - for remote
analysis?
Do you think legit Antivirus software may compromise anonymity?
The problem is not just this site
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO.
Rather it's a problem with the wiki itself, for example also
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO/WebBrowsers
is outdated.
No Tor end user should torify Firefox anymore. Few
I am using a transparent proxy (all connections are forced through Tor).
The Tor Browser isn't just Firefox, it contains many security related
patches, settings and addons. Therefore I can't just go ahead and install
the addons myself into normal Firefox. [1]
There is even a patch to prevent Tor
Ghostery should not be added to TBB, it's not Free Software. No source
code available. TBB would rely on a single company.
If all that would not be the case, and if it's safe to implement, I'd be
happy to see it in TBB.
Same goes for Adblock Plus. If it's safe, it should come preinstalled with
But just curious, which part of Ghostery is closed source, because when I
open up the xpi I don't see any binaries, but haven't looked at everything.
Closed source is the opposite of Open Source, and Open Source is much more
then just giving away the source code. It's about laws and licenses.
So far I haven't found any public info about the possible downsides of
running a hidden service under Windows.
Let's assume a fresh, clean windows installation. Have you found a list
and description of all outgoing network connections, that will be made by
that windows installation? I haven't
Is the time sync spoofing even applicable to hidden services?
How can the MS time server tampering with the exit nodes be applicable to
hidden services?
It has nothing to do directly with Apache or the hidden service.
For correct operation Tor needs the correct time and date. Windows will
Let's assume the time server is not trusted.
How accurate does the clock have to be? Is +/- 30 minutes sufficient for
Tor's correct operation? Do you see any risks if the user manually adjusts
the clock on each restart?
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It's an interesting update and I hope it will widespread along all public
DNS servers.
I am not sure how Tor users could profit from it.
Advantage:
- Exit node can not spy or even worse, spoof and redirect any DNS requests.
Disadvantage:
- Single point of failure, OpenDNS could be forced to
On 02/21/2012 06:48 PM, Andreas Krey wrote:
On Tue, 21 Feb 2012 14:26:06 +, Daniel .koolfy Faucon wrote:
...
Checking the software's signatures should ensure that you are not
bootstrapping from harcoded malicious fake nodes or looking at the
wrong
nodes list, and obfsproxy makes sure
From the FAQ
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#YoushouldusesteganographytohideTortraffic.
First, in the current network topology, the Tor relays list is public and
can be accessed by attackers. An attacker who wants to detect or block
anonymous users could always just notice
Is it still advisable for users of bridges to host hidden services?
Especially for private obfuscated bridges. The bridge users have only a
limited number of non-blocked bridge IP addresses.
And if the bridge is compromised, isn't the the risk for de-anonymizing
the hidden service higher?
proper proper pro...@secure-mail.biz writes:
[...]
You can easily do so by separating traffic at user level (root vs. regular
users). Why do we need a special package for such a simple task?
That's not possible. Everything behind the transparent proxy, root or regular
user, has only
Ok, thanks for your reply!
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snip
But apt uses GPG
(run with (necessarily) root privileges) to verify
the files it downloads.
Sucks to be a Debian user when someone finds
another code-exec bug in GPG's
parsing code.
Indeed. Encrypted updates would be handy. I support
http://brainstorm.ubuntu.com/idea/26541/.
Or
snip
I'm more
worried about the risks to user anonymity. It sucks to be
the user reading
about some sensitive subject when your apt cron job
decides to poke every
package source you install from. “Oh, that guy
who keeps reading about Foozer's
Disease must be in the
Antarctica/McMurdo
--- Ursprüngliche Nachricht ---
Von: grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com
Datum: 02.03.2012 07:45:20
An: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Betreff: Re: [tor-talk] Operating system updates / software installation
behind Tor Transparent Proxy
On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 11:31 PM, Andrew Lewman
The transparently proxied operating system does not know it's real external
IP, only it's Tor exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external
IP.
I see this claim made all the time — is it actually true? Is Tor
designed
to withstand active attacks where Torified applications try
On Sat, 03 Mar 2012 15:00:51 +, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
On Sat, Mar
3, 2012 at 10:33, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
The transparently
proxied operating system does not know it's real external IP, only it's Tor
exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external IP.
I
see this
This is a repost of important question NOT solved within the last two months.
This is my second attempt today to send this message. Is it being deleted
by moderation because
I don't think that is the case. Forget about tormail. I also left them. It's
too often not online and in meanwhile
The users awareness for identity correlation through circuit sharing [0] is
almost zero. There should be more clear warnings about it on torproject.org.
People are frequently told to extensively use Google. They do so and will be
affected. If you google the term [1] you will see that it has
Nice, I like it very much.
It also demonstrates the need for DNSCrypt, then site.com would also
disappear from a few places.
Can you release the source code for the demonstration? That would allow other
to build up on your work. Other things like DNSCrypt, distributed DNS,
alternative web of
I am interested in overtaking the project TorVM. [1] [2] [3] TorVM has been
abandoned by it's original authors, no more development and discussions are
going on for years.
My project, TorBOX [4] offers the already same functionality. And it offers
even more. Almost all key features are ready
I am delighted that you as one of the original TorVM developers, is answering
this thread. If you are still interested in this project, you are invited to
join us.
My project, TorBOX [4] offers the already
same functionality.
not quite; some differences that drove the original
Tor VM
On Tue, Mar 06, 2012 at 08:01:36PM +0100, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote 1.2K
bytes in 19 lines about:
: Please tell me the requirements for overtaking
the project.
Generally, commit code.
That's what we done. Everything is Open Source and documented.
On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 5:37 PM, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
... Nowadays VirtualBox is fully Open Source. It was not in past, but now
it is. There is a closed source extension package for VirtualBox with stuff
like rdp, but that is not required. We use only the Open Source edition which
I am interested in overtaking the project TorVM.
I'm not sure what
you mean by 'taking over' the project. Besides
having a copy of the source
archived in svn we aren't associated with
it.
What I mean by taking over is, when you go on torproject.org, you see Our
Projects... Additionally
On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 6:27 PM, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
... What I mean by taking over is, when you go on torproject.org, you see
Our Projects...
note that Tor VM is not on that page. (taking
over Tor VM would not
grant you a spot ;)
There are only spots for projects which are
On 22 March 2012 12:15, Robert Ransom rransom.8...@gmail.com wrote:
On 2012-03-22, Michael Holzman mike1...@mail.ru wrote:
Greetings,
I'm a newbie trying to setup a working Azureus
(aka Vuze)-Tor pair.
Unfortunately,I cannot achieve that. Reading
the documentation and searching
I'm curious about what resources
proved to be limiting during your
experiments, and what too demanding
means in your usecases.
Knowing these figures would make this report useful,
to a degree, to
draw conclusions for other usecases.
Quoted from http://dee.su/liberte
Moreover, some concepts
What is the status of TorRouter? Any progress on the project? I've been
monitoring the active trac tickets and wiki sites. There are no changes since a
long time. Is the progress behind closed doors?
What is up with that project? Became it to big, unmaintainable, time-consuming?
Or what are
Thanks Andrew for the detailed answer!
We're pondering kickstarter as well as a for-profit
I didn't know that page. Looks very well..
http://www.kickstarter.com
That sounds like very reasonable plan.
FreedomBox had a lot success using kickstarter. In a very short time they got
loads of
Hi,
is there any deb package or Ubuntu PPA repository for obfsproxy?
If
not - are there any plans for that?
Regards,
Matej
Although compiling obfsproxy is as easy as it could be, I asked that questions
myself.
Hello Proper
On Fri, March 30, Jef Heri jefheri1 at yahoo.com
wrote:
Hello list,
I am interested in setting
up a small Tor centric
message board.
On Sat, 3/31/12, pro...@secure-mail.biz
pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
Nice.
You may be interested
to report your plans
Can TorBOX be of any help for your plans?
Because,
while people can run Tails in a VM by themselves already,
doing this certainly
does not give them the same benefits as an
integrated, pre-configured Live
amnesic host OS + Tor routing VM +
desktop VM Tails would:
Alternative you could
Wow, TorBOX? Does that exist yet?
Yes.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBOX
What is the fastest
VM?
VMware is fastest.
From my experience... ( means faster than)
VMware (fastest) VirtualBox Qemu Bochs (slowest)
Untested: KVM, Xen
We choose VirtualBox, for reasons
Hi
the IP anonymity test at http://ip-check.info/ suggests that
browser.cache.memory.enable
should be set to 'false'. in TBB from
about:config I set it to false but
on every restart it is set again to
'true' (however this is not the case
for browser.cache.disk.enable
which is also
It is really weird, that Vidalia closes by default, when you close Firefox.
There is no option to change that. It does not make sense, if people are
expected, to enable contributing to the Tor network using Vidalia. No one can
be expected to leave Firefox running 24/7. Do we have a ticket about
The only safe way to start TBB is to run 'start-tor-browser'. Any
other
method will cause TBB to be in some odd state.
Can you expand this please? Odd state in sense of no functionality or negative
implications on anonymity?
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I'm sorry because I haven't read the entire conversation up until now, but
if people are using Ubuntu, what is stopping them from doing
sudo apt-get
install tor;
Will conflict with Tor Browser Bundle. (SocksPort on same port.)
configuring relaying in torrc
Vidalia was made for less
I don't think that's a clean and easy solution. Your tool laying around on some
third party server and barely anyone being aware and using it.
Possible solutions:
- As a intermediate fix: Simply change the Windows behavior, not to close
Vidalia/Tor when Firefox is terminated. (Like already on
We make an assumption that if you are running some sort of
unix, you
can handle your package management system, or compile from source,
and
edit the torrc file.
No good assumption. Using unix doesn't make you a geek. Ubuntu is one of the
most widespread AND newbie friendly distribution.
Hi! I've got tor exit relay running on a dedicated host! About to upgrade
it in a week too! High five to everyone making this project a reality.
Thanks for hosting an exit relay.
I'm
wanting all my apps on my desktop to use tor, what is the recommended
method?
polipo or privoxy + tor? Do
If you want to to do thoroughly like Robert Ransom, it all comes back to this
ticket.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5553
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Recently, I'd come across some chatter that suggested that connecting to
a VPN via TOR was not a good idea and, rather, the better idea was to connect
to a VPN that then used Tor. I've not found any articles on the net that
really discuss this issue. My concern stems from more of a curiosity
I am making Debian machine and want to allow only networking over Tor (secure
box with no leaks).
How can I do this?
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TransparentProxy
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBOX
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TBBJavaScriptEnabled
The FAQ entry is very questionable.
Disabling JavaScript by default, then allowing a few websites to run scripts,
is especially bad for your anonymity: the set of websites which you allow to
run scripts is very likely to uniquely
Tell me if I am wrong, but I think it's not worth to bother with mixmaster,
mixmion, remailing, etc. anymore. It's practically dead.
Some remailing systems have been written by high profile people, some of them
are now working on Tor.
Due to high latency, remailers are theoretically more
I know Tor Button fetches https://check.torproject.org/RecommendedTBBVersions
but I couldn't find check.torproject.org within the Tor Button source code.
How Tor Button comes to its decision to display
https://check.torproject.org/?lang=en-USsmall=1uptodate=0 ?
The script start-only-torbrowser
If I understand correctly, a bridge will be used as the first of three hops.
While users in non-censored areas can will use a certain amount of entry
guards, users in censored areas get only three bridges per mail.
The entry guard users are more unlikely to suffer from unstable (goes offline)
My very first considerations...
What are the dangers of using apt-get over Tor?
Is privoxy + Tor the safest way to go?
I don't think so.
What attacks are possible?
1. Some are documented in the Torify HOWTO. [1]
2. Stale mirror attack. [2]
3. What kind of software you have installed. [2]
Is it safe to use the Tor 0.2.3 Alpha in redistributed projects for regular
use? (Such as Tails or TorBOX.) Or should the alpha branch only be touched by
testers and developers?
Tor Stable is already labeled as experimental software and do not rely on it
for strong anonymity. How much worse
How can I start the tor browser after closing it ?
villdila is still there but no option to start browser.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO#UPDATEforTBBTorBrowserBundleusers
I'd consider it as important to have all torbirdy stable
users
in one anonymity set as soon as there is a feature complete
stable version. I consider the current version as experimental.
Hrmm. Actually, if we can avoid revealing this anonymity set
explicitly to mailing lists and
My test, based on windows, so for VoIP clients I use Phonerlite, it use
UDP. because of TOR is TCP based, I will use openvpn to transferring udp
packet through TOR network.
You should look around, if you can find a voice client supporting TCP.
Tunneling Voip-UDP with OpenVPN over Tor-TCP
Tomorrow (June 6) IPv6 is officially out there.
And will still take years until most ISPs in most countries offer it.
What are the pros and cons of IPv6 regarding our privacy?
Hosting bridges and relays will be easier, because less people are behind NAT.
I hope for some more servers, there
Would it stress the network too much, if everyone had a HiddenServicePort
enabled? (For example, TBB or Tails were in the position to enable it for loads
of users by default.)
Would it improve the anonymity of people who really have hidden servers, if
everyone had a hidden service running?
Many applications, such as wget, apt-get, gpg, etc. do not speak socks, are
unlikely to speak socks anytime soon, but support http.
Privoxy or polipo are of no help. They provides only one http port, with the
one big drawback: all http connections will be presses through the same
SocksPort
freebsd-lis...@fabiankeil.de wrote:
That's incorrect. Privoxy can change the forwarding settings based on tags:
http://www.privoxy.org/user-manual/actions-file.html#CLIENT-HEADER-TAGGER
Excuse me, if I misunderstood. It doesn't look like anyone done that ever
before (and documented that
peter+...@metaverse.org wrote:
To quote the hidden service FAQ
https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service, If your
computer
isn't online all the time, your hidden service won't be either. This
leaks information to an observant adversary., so yes.
I don't think that applies here.
1.
peter+...@metaverse.org wrote:
On 8/06/12 9:53 AM, Matthew Kaufman wrote:
Great questions. And does hosting a hidden service exposé the machine
to
penetration attacks?
Yes, if those services are vulnerable whether they're running as a Tor
service or not.
The other concern is that hidden
pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
Many applications, such as wget, apt-get, gpg, etc. do not speak socks, are
unlikely to speak socks anytime soon, but support http.
[...]
What other options left, to route, let's say, wget through port 9052, apt-get
through SocksPort 9053, gpg through SocksPort
malcolm.tur...@gmail.com wrote:
How can I force VirtualBox to only use Tor?
Host OS: Windows XP SP3
Guest OS: Windows XP SP3
Short answer:
Not recommend.
Long answer:
You can not simply torify VirtualBox with torsocks or so.
Easiest thing to use two Virtual Machines. One works as a
freebsd-lis...@fabiankeil.de wrote:
pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
freebsd-lis...@fabiankeil.de wrote:
That's incorrect. Privoxy can change the forwarding settings based
on
tags:
http://www.privoxy.org/user-manual/actions-file.html#CLIENT-HEADER-TAGGER
Excuse me, if I
sch...@eff.org wrote:
Similarly, having a GPS receiver in your phone does not mean that
everyone you send an SMS to or everyone you call will learn your
exact physical location. However, it does mean that if there's
spyware on your phone, that spyware is able to use the GPS to learn
your
sch...@eff.org wrote:
One of the defenses people have talked about against hardware
fingerprinting is running inside a virtual machine. Normally,
software inside the virtual machine, even if it's malicious,
doesn't learn much about the physical machine that hosts the VM.
If you always use
Once either method has been configured correctly and tested
it should work reliably until the environment changes.
I am working on an anonymous operating system (TorBOX [1]) and made
a modification to torsocks, called uwt [2].
Using uwt breaks down to sudo ip=127.0.0.1 port=9053 uwt
If you ever wanted to contribute something related to Tor, then TorBirdy is a
good place to start because the project is relatively new. Therefore it's easy
(from user's perspective) to learn everything about it and to stay up to date
as it grows.
Installation and usage is easy.
The issue
A malicious certificate for torproject.org has been given out at least twice by
broken certificate authorities. (Comodo, DigiNotar, who is next...)
To prevent that in future, I'd like to pin the SSL certificate's fingerprint.
How can that be done? Running an own local CA or is there an easier
m...@dee.su wrote:
On Fri, Jul 6, 2012 at 7:24 PM, pro...@secure-mail.biz wrote:
I didn't even archive to get torproject.org's public key. That's what
I used.
openssl s_client -showcerts -connect www.torproject.org:443 /tmp/x.cert
/dev/null
But it doesn't contain the begin public key
Thanks to Maxim Kammerer I have now the torproject.org SSL public key.
Does anyone know how to sign a certificate, without having the private key or
certificate signing request?
One post [1] implicates it's possible, but I haven't found out how. If I get
this working, I'll add step by step
grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
Fetchmail, msmtp, etc can all connect to a host,
take that cert fingerprint, compare it to the one you've
configured, and drop the connection if they differ.
That may work against some adversaries but not against very clever adversaries.
He can let the first
grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
Fetchmail, msmtp, etc can all connect to a host,
take that cert fingerprint, compare it to the one you've
configured, and drop the connection if they differ.
That may work against some adversaries but not against very clever
adversaries.
He can let the first
grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
Fetchmail, msmtp, etc can all connect to a host,
take that cert fingerprint, compare it to the one you've
configured, and drop the connection if they differ.
That may work against some adversaries but not against very
clever adversaries.
He can let the
jue...@yahoo.com wrote:
i'm wonder if it makes any sense to allow users to access a public web server
access normal at same time as hidden service on same machine?
Yes.
- saves exit bandwidth
- will continue to work even if all exits are shut down
- exit policy/ports do not matter
- more
HS + SSL makes sense:
- stronger encryption
Not looking too long for a good source...
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/HiddenServiceNames
If you decide to run a hidden service Tor generates an RSA-1024
keypair. The .onion name is computed as follows: first the SHA1 hash [...]
I think the concept of hidden services has a lot potential. Not only
because they are hidden. Let's face it:
- You get a free domain for live.
- You get transparent, free end to end encryption. No flawed root CA system.
- That's something remarkable, isn't it?
With some modifications/improvements
Rejo Zenger:
Hi,
- You get transparent, free end to end encryption. No flawed root CA system.
Just curious, maybe I am overlooking something: how would this be better than
a self-signed and self-generated certificate (apart from the user not being
nagged with a warning)?
Self-signed:
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif):
Yo,
i really appreciate such discussion about empowering TorHS, a lot of
work still have to be done to make proper leverage of the capabilities
that TorHS provide.
On 7/11/12 5:36 PM, proper wrote:
I think the concept of hidden services has a lot potential
tor-admin:
Am Mittwoch, 11. Juli 2012, 17:43:52 schrieb Fabio Pietrosanti:
Don't exaggerate, it still need a software client to access them, so the
usability is heavily impacted.
This imply that TorHS are not for general uses in the context of mutual
anonymity .
What about a Firefox/Chromium
Anthony Papillion:
I know that Tor does a good job at protecting users from discovery but
what about the server? Is it as hard to find as the clients? I'm
thinking no.
It's a wide question. What are you interested in?
What do you want to know about? Server software, operating system
security,
antispa...@sent.at:
I remember reading about installing more extensions as a bad
thing as it might identify a Tor configuration from another. But
can't this be hidden?
Maybe. Would require development which no one wants to take.
I know extensions can answer javascript
requests. Is it
antispa...@sent.at:
On Fri, Jul 13, 2012, at 15:02, proper wrote:
antispa...@sent.at:
I remember reading about installing more extensions as a bad
thing as it might identify a Tor configuration from another. But
can't this be hidden?
Maybe. Would require development which no one wants
Praedor Atrebates:
Would not cpu/system data get hidden if you ran tor browser inside an
emulator?
Depends on virtualizing platform and settings.
For Virtual Box...
try:
cat /proc/cpuinfo
Power off VM. Restart VM. Then run:
VBoxManage modifyvm VMname --synthcpu on
check again:
cat
antispa...@sent.at:
On Fri, Jul 13, 2012, at 16:38, Praedor Atrebates wrote:
My main interest in emulators and/or VMs is to be able to use tor
browser but also leave some of the add-ons activated (javascript, flash)
and STILL defeat tracking. Tor gives you ip X and the VM provides a
antispa...@sent.at:
On Fri, Jul 13, 2012, at 22:14, proper wrote:
My non-offical project supports [1] that. Java and Flash do not leak IP
or DNS.
Even without leaking IP, they have far too much power for a far too
small benefit. The ability to write or read the disk beyond the powers
Praedor Atrebates:
On 07/13/2012 06:22 PM, antispa...@sent.at wrote:
On Fri, Jul 13, 2012, at 22:14, proper wrote:
My non-offical project supports [1] that. Java and Flash do not leak IP
or DNS.
Even without leaking IP, they have far too much power for a far too
small benefit. The ability
antispa...@sent.at:
On Fri, Jul 13, 2012, at 23:25, proper wrote:
For people who really can't abstain from Flash / Java it's the best
option I know of.
It does sound wonderful. But it sure needs a powerful machine. A CPU
designed for lower power consumption and thus battery maximisation
antispa...@sent.at:
On Fri, Jul 13, 2012, at 23:37, proper wrote:
But what will never change is, the more anonymity/privacy/security you
want, the more technical knowledge you'll need. We'll continue to
provide loads of additional information to make it even more safe.
Could you make
is not recommended -- automatic update
installers are likely to leak information about the software they are trying to
update, whether due to malicious design or due to lack of consideration for
users' location privacy.
proper: This is the reason why we want to make them over Tor. Those information
would stay
proper proper pro...@secure-mail.biz writes:
I
was told, to ask this question here. [3]
Tor's transparent proxy
feature is at the moment a bit complicated to take
advantage off and
therefore unpopular. That might change in the future, because
a) documentation
improves [1]; b
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