** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1366790
Title:
Fix for CVE-2014-1949 (GTK 3.10.x)
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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The bit that got cut off:
dpkg: error processing libgcrypt11 (--configure):
libgcrypt11:amd64 1.5.0-3ubuntu0.3 cannot be configured because
libgcrypt11:i386 is in a different version (1.5.0-3ubuntu0.2)
I suspect if you wait for your mirror of choice to refresh and the run apt-get
update
I believe this is an upstart issue, the tools appear to be selecting
user tasks rather than system tasks. Try adding --system to your various
commands:
sarnold@hunt:~$ initctl --system status ssh
ssh start/running, process 1352
sarnold@hunt:~$ initctl status ssh
initctl: Unknown job: ssh
**
This may be due to a Dbus AppArmor denial; can you also check
/var/log/syslog for Dbus-generated DENIED messages?
Thanks
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Massimiliano, this bug is to track a libav update. If you wish to report
a problem please start a new bug with ubuntu-bug xorg.
Thanks
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Do you get an AppArmor DENIED line for the shm_open() failure? It might
still be worth addressing this:
- needless error logs are annoying and mask tracking down real problems and
they waste flash write cycles
- whatever is used as fallback may or may not be as efficient as shared memory,
which
Ciaby, perhaps try raising your max locked memory resource limit. See
setrlimit(2) and limits.conf(5) manpages for details.
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** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
** Package changed: gnome-screensaver (Ubuntu) = unity (Ubuntu)
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** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1349961
Title:
lock screen don't get focus by closing the lid
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1349961 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1349961
** This bug has been marked a duplicate of bug 1349961
lock screen don't get focus by closing the lid
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The referenced CVEs were in libpng and in gnutls;
http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2014/CVE-2014-0333.html
http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2014/CVE-2014-3466.html
gnutls already had an update: http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-2229-1/ and
the version of libpng we
It might be worth changing your ciphers to something like:
Ciphers
Thank you for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make
Ubuntu better. Reviewing your dmesg attachment to this bug report it
seems that there may be a problem with your hardware. I'd recommend
performing a back up and then investigating the situation. Measures you
might take
Clearing the cache is expensive; if this chain of events will only
affect 'developers', that's not ideal but tolerable. But if it'll affect
average users we should really try to avoid clearing the cache.
I haven't thought this through very far, but I wonder if we can do a
better job solving this
Did you restart your computer or your login session after installing
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-2303-1/ ?
Thanks
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
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I'm surprised an X crash leaves enough of X running for you to interact
with it; that seems highly surprising.
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That's a superb video. Thanks!
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1351616
Title:
Ubuntu 14.04: multi-touch screen can cause desktop to unlock
Status in “unity”
** Changed in: unity (Ubuntu)
Status: New = Confirmed
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Title:
Ubuntu 14.04: multi-touch screen can cause
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1353760
Title:
Fix security issues from OpenSSL 1.0.1i
Status
https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-security-announce/2014-August/002616.html
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-2308-1/
** Changed in: openssl (Ubuntu)
Status: Confirmed = Fix Released
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Have you restarted your session since installing this security update?
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-2303-1/
Thanks
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
** Changed in: unity (Ubuntu)
Status: New = Incomplete
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Note the following line in your dmesg, it might be worth trying:
[ 17.928192] [Firmware Bug]: Duplicate ACPI video bus devices for the
same VGA controller, please try module parameter
video.allow_duplicates=1if the current driver doesn't work.
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Frédéric, note that the 'owner' keyword means that the user running the
program must also own the file; with most files in /usr/ being owned by
root, this addition would only work if you're running Firefox as root.
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** Changed in: unity (Ubuntu)
Status: Invalid = New
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
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Stay away from the patches provided in the linked email; I suspect the
person who put it together does not regularly receive files named foo ;
rm -rf ~ from his friends.
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This is working as expected.
Some people even stick files named e.g. --interactive into their
directories to use this as some kind of defense against accidental
deletion.
Most programs provide a -- command line option that says further
arguments should be interpreted as files. But this kind of
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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cross
Bib, I'm not saying that this bug is incorrect.
I'm saying that these patches are insecure and should not be used:
http://michael.orlitzky.com/code/releases/tar-1.27.1-gpcc.patch
http://michael.orlitzky.com/code/releases/coreutils-8.22-gpcc.patch
Do not use those patches. They are unsafe.
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1384419
Title:
com.canonical.UnityGreeter.HideGreeter
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1382559 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1382559
Thanks Michael and Christian; the intention is that connecting via adb
will require the screen to be unlocked.
Thanks
** This bug has been marked a duplicate of bug 1382559
adbd does not check the
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu Trusty)
Status: Fix Released = Confirmed
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1294797
Title:
aa-genprof traceback with
Thank you for using Ubuntu and taking the time to report a bug. Your
report should contain, at a minimum, the following information so we can
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Submitting the bug about the proper source package is essential. For
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** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1369400
Title:
Fails to find the installed drivers
** Also affects: apparmor
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1169881
Title:
Please add gnome-gmail to
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
** CVE added: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2014-6271
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Thank you for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make
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You appear to be running a release of Ubuntu that is no longer supported.
Please see https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Releases for information on our
currently supported releases; consider using one of the LTS releases,
Thomas, I'm not sure about your test -- there is a /bin/echo in the
filesystem (from the coreutils package) so checking for a file named
'echo' in that directory is not indicative of any attack. I suspect you
also have a /root/echo file, perhaps left over from earlier testing. If
you do, please
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Looks vaguely like you've got both i386 and amd64 versions of libnss3
installed and only tried to upgrade the amd64 version for a security
update...
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Looks like we may need to adjust apparmor policy lines too. I wonder
what motivated the path change.
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
** Also affects: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
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Browsers are special. We certainly don't have the resources to fix only
security issues found in the browsers as we do with most other packages.
We package what upstream produces and this is far from the first thing
they've moved: the name of the sandbox executable has changed three or
four times
Are you confident your ufw firewall rules aren't blocking your attempts
to use dhcp?
Thanks
** Information type changed from Public Security to Public
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Public bug reported:
ubuntu@server-a41d04fd-0554-47fb-be87-04c9e54db176:~$ dpkg -l file | cat
Desired=Unknown/Install/Remove/Purge/Hold
| Status=Not/Inst/Conf-files/Unpacked/halF-conf/Half-inst/trig-aWait/Trig-pend
|/ Err?=(none)/Reinst-required (Status,Err: uppercase=bad)
||/ Name
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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There are any number of ways to get a privileged shell from a system
when physically present at booting. The important part is that your data
is still encrypted without the keys.
Thanks
** Changed in: initramfs-tools (Ubuntu)
Status: New = Invalid
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Since you put this into complain mode, there may be more entries needed
that might have been logged with ALLOWED -- can you grep for those, too,
please?
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Thank you for using Ubuntu and taking the time to report a bug. Your
report should contain, at a minimum, the following information so we can
better find the source of the bug and work to resolve it.
Submitting the bug about the proper source package is essential. For
help see
With the prefix+suffix patches, this can no longer be exploited across
privilege boundaries; we'll likely include these fixes at some point in
the future but don't consider them a pressing issue any longer. For more
details please see our CVE tracker: http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-
Also, please, no one ever run any command along the line of curl foo |
bash -- a malicious web server could easily give some friendly-looking
content to a web browser but malware payload to curl.
Download the script, read the script, validate published signatures, and
only then execute the script
Public bug reported:
I left my laptop open and running tonight when away. When I returned 1.5
hours later, my screen was still on, all black except for a white mouse
pointer.
I locked the screen with the windows+L combo and walked away when the
lock screen displayed properly.
The Brightness
Unmarking as a duplicate, see https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source
/gnome-desktop3/+bug/1377847/comments/7 for details.
In the other bug I had mentioned that 'xset 500 ' worked fine
to turn off my screen as I want.
Thanks
** This bug is no longer a duplicate of bug 1377847
It'd be nice to track down which library call wants this so we can
better figure an abstraction to add this to.. (it might just belong in
abstractions/base if it is common enough.)
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Can you please add an attachment:
grep DEN /var/log/syslog
This should capture AppArmor denied messages, it's my hunch there are
some missing rules.
Thanks
** Tags added: apparmor
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http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-2393-1
** Changed in: wget (Ubuntu)
Status: Confirmed = Fix Released
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1386711
Title:
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1388336
Title:
Browser is disabled easily
Status in “xorg”
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1388962
Title:
Black screen
Status in “xorg” package in Ubuntu:
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu Trusty)
Status: Fix Released = Confirmed
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1319829
Title:
aa-genprof will crash when
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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Note from your bootlog that you have some apparmor policy errors:
https://launchpadlibrarian.net/189391868/BootLog.txt
Your /etc/apparmor.d/tunables/home file should be owned by root with
group root and permissions 0644.
You may need to customize the contents some, here's mine:
#
Thank you for using Ubuntu and taking the time to report a bug. Your
report should contain, at a minimum, the following information so we can
better find the source of the bug and work to resolve it.
Submitting the bug about the proper source package is essential. For
help see
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1393612
Title:
Protect against BadUSB device
Status
Sadly, the solution is not easy nor obvious. Ubuntu is used in a wide
variety of different ways and many of them do not lend themselves well
to just popping up a dialog box.
Furthermore, the problem is not at all restricted to just devices that
can be reprogrammed to act like keyboards.
A fairly
Public bug reported:
The comment at the top of tunables/global says:
# All the tunables definitions that should be available to every profile
# should be included here
But not all defined variables are included:
$ grep include global
# should be included here
#include tunables/home
#include
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
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If you're going to bodge this with a wrapper script, a better choice
would address the constant network monitoring performed in whoopsie by
using the assume-online command line option.
I don't know the whoopsie codebase but based on a quick reading it looks
like the only real downside to this
This looks roughly like you've got both amd64 and i386 versions of this
library installed; they should be updated in lockstep should you wish to
keep them both.
Thanks
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
** Changed in: jasper (Ubuntu)
Status: New =
It would be helpful to have the error messages.
Thanks
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
** Changed in: shadow (Ubuntu)
Status: New = Incomplete
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** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
** Package changed: apport (Ubuntu) = eclipse (Ubuntu)
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1402972
** Changed in: unity
Status: Incomplete = New
** Changed in: unity (Ubuntu)
Status: Incomplete = New
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Andrea, the URGENT flag still doesn't work in Ubuntu 14.04 LTS Unity. I
haven't upgraded to 14.10 yet
** Tags removed: quantal
** Tags added: trusty
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^G is the ascii BEL character; most terminals will pass that along to
X11 as an URGENT flag.
$ ascii bel
ASCII 0/7 is decimal 007, hex 07, octal 007, bits 0111: called ^G, BEL
Official name: Bell
C escape: '\a'
Other names: Alert
From urxvt(1):
urgentOnBell: boolean
Thank you for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make
Ubuntu better. Please execute the following command, as it will
automatically gather debugging information, in a terminal:
apport-collect 1357720
This will help us to find and resolve the problem. Bear in mind that you
may need
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1358421 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1358421
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a
Derek, what is 14.04.4? 12.04.4 or 14.04.1? Thanks
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/505278
Title:
ssh-add -D deleting all identities does not work. Also,
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1347100 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1347100
** This bug has been marked a duplicate of bug 1347100
package python3-apparmor 2.8.95~2430-0ubuntu5 failed to install/upgrade:
trying to overwrite '/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/apparmor/__init__.py',
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a regular (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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This error message looks worth investigating further:
[ 34.728378] init: Failed to spawn hybrid-gfx main process: unable to
execute: No such file or directory
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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